ITAT Chennai Judgments — April 2022

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing all three appeals, accepting the Assessee's submission that the delay was attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Supreme Court's suo motu order extending timelines. Regarding the eligibility for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i), the Tribunal held that the Assessee is a co-operative society and not engaged in banking activities as defined by the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. It reasoned that the Assessee is a Primary Agricultural Credit Society, providing financial accommodation to its members for agricultural purposes. The Tribunal further clarified that Section 80P(4) excludes co-operative banks engaged in banking business with the public, which does not apply to the Assessee. The admission of Associate Members was found to be in accordance with the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983. Therefore, the Assessee is entitled to the deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i). The orders of the lower authorities were reversed, and the appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal noted that the first issue concerning personal hearing and reopening of assessment was not pressed by the assessee and was dismissed as not pressed. On the second issue, the Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act in respect of income earned from associate members. The Tribunal relied on a coordinate bench decision in the case of Tamilnadu Co-operative State Agriculture and Rural Development Bank Limited, which considered the Supreme Court decision in The Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. and the Madras High Court decision in S-1308 Ammapet Primary Agricultural Co-operative Bank Ltd. The Tribunal found that the assessee is a cooperative society, not engaged in banking activities, and its primary object is to provide financial accommodation to its members, including associate members, for agricultural purposes. The Tribunal clarified that Section 80P(4) excludes cooperative banks engaged in banking business, which the assessee is not. The Tribunal also referred to the definition of 'member' under the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act, 1983, and found that associate members are validly admitted. Therefore, the orders of the lower authorities were reversed, and the deduction was allowed. The Tribunal also noted that for AY 2017-18, the Revenue had accepted the assessee's position in a scrutiny assessment, and there was no change in facts.

The Tribunal noted that the first issue concerning personal hearing and reopening of assessment was not pressed by the assessee and was dismissed as not pressed. On the second issue, the Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act in respect of income earned from associate members. The Tribunal relied on a coordinate bench decision in the case of Tamilnadu Co-operative State Agriculture and Rural Development Bank Limited, which considered the Supreme Court decision in The Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. and the Madras High Court decision in S-1308 Ammapet Primary Agricultural Co-operative Bank Ltd. The Tribunal found that the assessee is a cooperative society, not engaged in banking activities, and its primary object is to provide financial accommodation to its members, including associate members, for agricultural purposes. The Tribunal clarified that Section 80P(4) excludes cooperative banks engaged in banking business, which the assessee is not. The Tribunal also referred to the definition of 'member' under the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act, 1983, and found that associate members are validly admitted. Therefore, the orders of the lower authorities were reversed, and the deduction was allowed. The Tribunal also noted that for AY 2017-18, the Revenue had accepted the assessee's position in a scrutiny assessment, and there was no change in facts.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing all three appeals, accepting the Assessee's submission that the delay was attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Supreme Court's suo motu order extending timelines. Regarding the eligibility for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i), the Tribunal held that the Assessee is a co-operative society and not engaged in banking activities as defined by the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. It reasoned that the Assessee is a Primary Agricultural Credit Society, providing financial accommodation to its members for agricultural purposes. The Tribunal further clarified that Section 80P(4) excludes co-operative banks engaged in banking business with the public, which does not apply to the Assessee. The admission of Associate Members was found to be in accordance with the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983. Therefore, the Assessee is entitled to the deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i). The orders of the lower authorities were reversed, and the appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing all three appeals, accepting the Assessee's submission that the delay was attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Supreme Court's suo motu order extending timelines. Regarding the eligibility for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i), the Tribunal held that the Assessee is a co-operative society and not engaged in banking activities as defined by the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. It reasoned that the Assessee is a Primary Agricultural Credit Society, providing financial accommodation to its members for agricultural purposes. The Tribunal further clarified that Section 80P(4) excludes co-operative banks engaged in banking business with the public, which does not apply to the Assessee. The admission of Associate Members was found to be in accordance with the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983. Therefore, the Assessee is entitled to the deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i). The orders of the lower authorities were reversed, and the appeals were allowed.

The Tribunal held that an ex-parte order without adjudication is not maintainable. The CIT(A) is obligated to decide the appeal on merits even in the absence of the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to the deduction under Section 54F. Despite the property having commercial approval and being partially let out, it was predominantly used for residential purposes, and Section 54F is a beneficial provision.

The PCIT found the assessment order to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue, specifically regarding the undervaluation of property and deficit stamp duty. Consequently, the PCIT set aside the original assessment order and directed a fresh assessment.

The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to provide sufficient evidence to justify the higher cost of acquisition for the first 9 flats. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the issue to the AO for fresh consideration, allowing the AO to refer the matter for valuation.

The Tribunal held that Section 54F is a beneficial provision and liberal interpretation is required. The completion of construction is not the sole criterion if the entire sale consideration is invested in acquiring the new property, and there are genuine reasons for delay.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer erred in adding gross profit on the difference in turnover as there was an overlapping of turnover reported in Service Tax and VAT returns due to the composite nature of AMC contracts. The CIT(A) rightly deleted the additions.

The Tribunal held that the PCIT's order under Section 263 was passed without observing the principles of natural justice, as the assessee was not given a reasonable opportunity of hearing. Therefore, the order of the PCIT was set aside.

The Tribunal held that the Rs. 5 lakh payment was not substantiated and confirmed the disallowance. However, it found that the Rs. 38 lakh payment was part of sale proceeds of a trustee's land and not from the trust's funds, thus deleting the disallowance for this amount. The Tribunal also ruled that exemption denial should be restricted to the violative part of income, not the entire income.

The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeals under a wrong impression. Since the assessee had not opted for the Vivad Se Viswas Scheme and the Revenue could not prove otherwise, the orders of the CIT(A) were set aside.

The tribunal held that the PCIT's revision order was passed without affording the assessee a proper opportunity to be heard, as the show-cause notice was not demonstrably served on the assessee. Therefore, the order was set aside.

The Tribunal held that if an assessee maintains books of account as per Section 44AA, they can declare profits lower than the presumptive rate under Section 44AD(1), provided they comply with the conditions in Section 44AD(5). Since the assessee claimed to have maintained books, the lower authorities' orders were set aside.

The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeals under a wrong impression. Since the assessee had not opted for the Vivad Se Viswas Scheme and the Revenue could not prove otherwise, the orders of the CIT(A) were set aside.

The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer is legally bound to give appeal effect to the CIT(A)'s order. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.

The Tribunal held that a quasi-judicial authority cannot dismiss an appeal for default unless expressly authorized. The CIT(A)'s ex-parte and non-speaking order was deemed not maintainable.

The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) for interest income earned from deposits made with co-operative banks, following a coordinate bench decision. The disallowance made by the Assessing Officer was directed to be deleted.

The Tribunal noted that the issue of whether the land was agricultural was fundamental and should not have been dismissed. Following a similar order for an adjacent property, the Tribunal restored the issue to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration.

The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 36(1)(va) by the Finance Act, 2021, is prospective and applicable from AY 2021-22 onwards. Therefore, employee contributions paid before the due date of filing the return under Section 139(1) are allowable deductions.

The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 36(1)(va) of the Act is prospective, applicable from AY 2021-22 onwards. Therefore, payments made by the due date of filing the return of income are deductible.

The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) for interest income earned from deposits made with co-operative banks, following a coordinate bench decision. The disallowance made by the Assessing Officer was directed to be deleted.

The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) for interest income earned from deposits made with co-operative banks, following a coordinate bench decision. The disallowance made by the Assessing Officer was directed to be deleted.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer could not levy late fees under Section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision in Section 200A at that time. The Tribunal also directed the CIT(A) to consider the condonation of delay petition.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer could not levy late fees under Section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision in Section 200A at that time. The Tribunal also directed the CIT(A) to consider the condonation of delay petition.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer could not levy late fees under Section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision in Section 200A at that time. The Tribunal also directed the CIT(A) to consider the condonation of delay petition.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer could not levy late fees under Section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision in Section 200A at that time. The Tribunal also directed the CIT(A) to consider the condonation of delay petition.

The tribunal upheld the disallowance of consultancy payments to non-residents as the assessee failed to provide evidence that TDS was not required. However, it directed the AO to restrict the disallowance of foreign travel expenses to 50% of the actual expenses incurred.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer could not levy late fees under Section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision in Section 200A at that time. The Tribunal also directed the CIT(A) to consider the condonation of delay petition.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer could not levy late fees under Section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision in Section 200A at that time. The Tribunal also directed the CIT(A) to consider the condonation of delay petition.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer could not levy late fees under Section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision in Section 200A at that time. The Tribunal also directed the CIT(A) to consider the condonation of delay petition.

The Tribunal held that bank interest and profit on sale of fixed assets are not part of turnover. Therefore, the AO erred in applying the 30% tax rate based on the total credits to the Profit & Loss account.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer could not levy late fees under Section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision in Section 200A at that time. The Tribunal also directed the CIT(A) to consider the condonation of delay petition.

The ITAT upheld the addition for unexplained investment in shares as the assessee failed to provide sufficient evidence. However, for cash deposits, the ITAT directed the AO to accept the explanation to the extent of declared agricultural income, confirming the balance amount.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer could not levy late fees under Section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision in Section 200A at that time. The Tribunal also directed the CIT(A) to consider the condonation of delay petition.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer could not levy late fees under Section 234E for periods prior to June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision in Section 200A at that time. The Tribunal also directed the CIT(A) to consider the condonation of delay petition.

The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 36(1)(va) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, inserting Explanation 2, is prospective and not retrospective. Therefore, the disallowance of delayed PF remittance was deleted. The Tribunal also directed the AO to re-examine the TDS credit claim.

The Tribunal held that while the estimation of income at 5% was reasonable, it should be assessed as 'Business Income' and not as unaccounted money under Section 69A, as the Assessing Officer had accepted the assessee's business.

The Tribunal held that advances received from customers for services to be rendered in the succeeding assessment year should not be treated as income in the current year, following its own previous decisions and Supreme Court rulings. The addition made by the AO was directed to be deleted.

The Tribunal held that advances received from customers for services to be rendered in the succeeding assessment year should not be treated as income in the current year, following its own previous decisions and Supreme Court rulings. The addition made by the AO was directed to be deleted.

The Tribunal held that advances received from customers for services to be rendered in the succeeding assessment year should not be treated as income in the current year, following its own previous decisions and Supreme Court rulings. The addition made by the AO was directed to be deleted.

The Tribunal noted that a separate assessment for the HUF had accepted similar additions under Section 2(22)(e) where the HUF was found to hold shares in the company. Therefore, the Tribunal accepted the assessee's contention that the shares were held by the HUF.

The Tribunal held that advances received from customers for services to be rendered in the succeeding assessment year should not be treated as income in the current year, following its own previous decisions and Supreme Court rulings. The addition made by the AO was directed to be deleted.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed to have furnished all copies of Form 15H. Therefore, the matter was remitted back to the Assessing Officer to consider the Form 15H and allow the assessee to resubmit them.

The Tribunal found contradictions in the lower authorities' findings regarding agricultural income and the nature of the land. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.