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186 orders · Page 2 of 4
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A)'s order was cryptic and violated Section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the CIT(A) for a fresh, speaking, and reasoned order.
The Tribunal held that the AO is bound to dispose of the assessee's objections to the reopening of assessment by passing a speaking order. Since this procedure was not followed, the matter was remitted back to the AO.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back for fresh consideration. The CIT(A) was directed to examine the facts in light of specific High Court and Supreme Court judgments, particularly regarding the source of funds for the deposits.
The Tribunal held that the assessee should be given the benefit of deduction under Section 54 for the sum invested in the construction of a new residential house within the time allowed under Section 139(4). The issue was remitted to the Assessing Officer for quantifying the exemption.
The Tribunal condoned the delay and set aside the CIT(Appeals) orders, restoring the appeals to the CIT(Appeals) for adjudication on merits. The Tribunal emphasized substantial justice and the principle of natural justice.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, accepting the explanation of the counsel's lapse as a reasonable cause. However, regarding the disallowed expenses, the Tribunal granted the assessee one more opportunity to present necessary evidence and remitted the issue back to the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal held that Section 44AD exempts assessees from maintaining books of account, and therefore, Section 68, which applies to credits in the assessee's books, cannot be invoked. Bank statements are not considered the assessee's books.
The Tribunal held that Section 54F does not expressly require the new residential property to be purchased in the assessee's name. The crucial factor is the investment of sale consideration in acquiring a new residential house.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to the assessee's illiteracy and lack of timely legal assistance. It found that the lower authorities failed to examine the evidence presented, including affidavits from the sons, and remanded the issue for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that Section 44AD exempts assessees from maintaining books of account, and therefore, Section 68, which applies to credits in the assessee's books, cannot be invoked. Bank statements are not considered the assessee's books.
The Tribunal restored the issues of asset acquisition and loan repayment using borrowed funds to the AO for fresh examination, allowing the assessee to provide details. The revenue's grounds regarding computation of income and carry forward of deficit were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that deduction under Section 36(1)(viia) cannot be allowed unless the provision is created by debiting the provision for bad and doubtful debts account in the profit and loss account. However, it upheld the deletion of disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) for interest paid to persons who furnished Form 15G/H.
The Tribunal held that deduction under Section 36(1)(viia) cannot be allowed unless the provision is created by debiting the provision for bad and doubtful debts account in the profit and loss account. However, it upheld the deletion of disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) for interest paid to persons who furnished Form 15G/H.
The Tribunal held that royalty payments to the government were either made via demand drafts or directly to the treasury, falling under Rule 6DD exceptions, and thus allowed deletion of the disallowance. For quarry expenses, while Section 40A(3) was initially attracted, the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's claim of remote location and lack of banking facilities, allowing a partial disallowance to account for voucher deficiencies.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals before the CIT(A), noting that there was no legal remedy prior to June 1, 2015, against an intimation under Section 200A. The matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals before the CIT(A), noting that there was no legal remedy prior to June 1, 2015, against an intimation under Section 200A. The matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals before the CIT(A), noting that there was no legal remedy prior to June 1, 2015, against an intimation under Section 200A. The matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals before the CIT(A), noting that there was no legal remedy prior to June 1, 2015, against an intimation under Section 200A. The matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals before the CIT(A), noting that there was no legal remedy prior to June 1, 2015, against an intimation under Section 200A. The matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals before the CIT(A), noting that there was no legal remedy prior to June 1, 2015, against an intimation under Section 200A. The matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the principle of 'audi alteram partem' (hear the other side) was violated, as the assessee was not given a proper hearing. Therefore, the appeals were allowed for statistical purposes, restoring the matters to the AO for de novo consideration.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Appeals) had no power to declare the TDS return as non est in law, as there is no such provision in the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(A) had already deleted the levy of fee under Section 234E.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Appeals) had no power to declare the TDS return as non est in law, as there is no such provision in the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(A) had already deleted the levy of fee under Section 234E.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Appeals) had no power to declare the TDS return as non est in law, as there is no such provision in the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(A) had already deleted the levy of fee under Section 234E.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Appeals) had no power to declare the TDS return as non est in law, as there is no such provision in the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(A) had already deleted the levy of fee under Section 234E.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Appeals) had no power to declare the TDS return as non est in law, as there is no such provision in the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(A) had already deleted the levy of fee under Section 234E.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Appeals) had no power to declare the TDS return as non est in law, as there is no such provision in the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(A) had already deleted the levy of fee under Section 234E.
The Tribunal found that the TPO had incorrectly compared entity-level costs with segmental margins and that the DRP had failed to adjudicate certain objections properly. The Tribunal directed the TPO to re-evaluate the transfer pricing issues, including working capital and risk adjustments, and to consider the assessee's submissions in detail.
The Tribunal admitted the additional ground of appeal concerning the limitation of the penalty order. Since this issue was not adjudicated by the CIT(Appeals), the matter was restored to the CIT(Appeals) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the Departmental Representative could not provide findings from the CIT(Appeals) regarding the limitation issue. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(Appeals)'s order and restored the issue to the CIT(Appeals) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal directed the exclusion of three comparable companies and restored one for fresh consideration. It also restored two other companies for fresh adjudication by the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO).
The Tribunal held that the property was indeed an HUF property and the capital gains arising from its sale should be taxed in the hands of the HUF, not the individual assessee. The Tribunal also directed the Assessing Officer to re-examine the computation of capital gains.
The Tribunal noted that the transfer pricing adjustment and ALP determination issues had been settled under the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) as per the DTAA between India and Netherlands. The assessee requested the appeal be treated as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Appeals) had no power to declare the TDS return as non est in law, as there is no such provision in the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal also noted that the CIT(A) had already deleted the levy of fee under Section 234E.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals before the CIT(A), noting that there was no legal remedy prior to June 1, 2015, against an intimation under Section 200A. The matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) did not provide a proper and reasonable opportunity for the assessee to be heard. The assessee's subsequent submissions were not considered due to the timing of the CIT(E)'s order.
The Tribunal held that the principle of 'audi alteram partem' (hear the other side) was violated, as the assessee was not given a proper hearing. Therefore, the appeals were allowed for statistical purposes, restoring the matters to the AO for de novo consideration.
The Tribunal directed the exclusion of two companies (ICRA Techno Analytics Ltd. and KALS Information Systems Ltd.) from the comparables list, following earlier coordinate bench decisions. The issue of working capital adjustment was restored to the AO/TPO for fresh examination.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to establish that the land was purchased by the HUF as a settlement for work contract dues. The explanation provided was not supported by any documentary evidence.
The Tribunal, following a precedent where a similar issue was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh decision with specific directions, decided to remit the issue back to the Assessing Officer. The AO is to decide the issue afresh after providing the assessee with necessary documents and an opportunity for cross-examination.
The Tribunal held that transactions between close relatives, even if considered loans, constitute a reasonable cause for accepting/repaying in cash. Therefore, the penalty under Section 271E was not sustainable.
The Tribunal, following a previous judgment, set aside the orders of the lower authorities and restored the matter to the Assessing Officer for a fresh decision. This was done to provide the assessee with a fair opportunity to be heard and to furnish relevant details.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had a reasonable and sufficient cause for the delay, as they were exploring an alternate remedy by filing a Section 154 petition within the statutory time limit. The Tribunal condoned the delay.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(Appeals) order and restored the issues for fresh adjudication, directing the CIT(Appeals) to provide an adequate opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal found the assessee's submissions to be realistic and noted that the CIT(Appeals) had not given a proper finding on the legal issue raised. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(Appeals)'s order and restored the issue for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the date of transfer of the original asset (land) was the date of the Joint Development Agreement (JDA), when the new flats did not exist. Therefore, the proviso to Section 54F(1) regarding owning more than one residential house was not applicable. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee was claiming deduction for one residential house and owned only one other self-occupied house, making the proviso inapplicable.
The Tribunal held that disallowances under Section 40(a)(i) that enhance profits eligible for deduction under Chapter VI-A (like Section 10AA) should result in the deduction being allowed on the increased profit. Therefore, the issue of the disallowance itself became academic.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had raised a specific ground before the CIT(A) and that the CIT(A) should have examined the cash book extracts. The matter was set aside for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(Appeals), emphasizing that substantial justice should prevail over technical considerations. The matter was remanded to the CIT(Appeals) to decide the appeals on merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(Appeals), emphasizing that substantial justice should prevail over technical considerations. The matter was remanded to the CIT(Appeals) to decide the appeals on merits.