Madhya Pradesh High Court Judgments — 2024

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the order of the ITAT for consideration. The Court found no merit in the appeals filed by the Revenue. The reasoning was based on the assessees' contention that they had fulfilled all the conditions stipulated under Section 10(38) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for claiming exemption on long-term capital gains. The shares were listed, purchased through legitimate channels, and STT was paid. The Court acknowledged that the issuing company had complied with all statutory formalities under the Companies Act, and therefore, the shares could not be termed as bogus. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Revenue had failed to provide the investigation report to the assessees, violating principles of natural justice. The Court also referred to various High Court and ITAT decisions that had ruled in favor of assessees on similar facts concerning M/s Sunrise Asian Ltd. shares. The Court concluded that the appeals did not meet the criteria for admission under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as they did not involve any substantial question of law.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the order of the ITAT, making the appeal inadmissible under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court found no merit in the revenue's appeals. The reasoning was based on the assessees' submissions that they had complied with all conditions for exemption under Section 10(38), including listing, purchase through exchange and banking channels, and STT payment. The Court implicitly accepted the assessees' argument that listed shares issued under the Companies Act cannot be termed bogus without cogent evidence, and that the revenue failed to provide such evidence or demonstrate a violation of natural justice by relying on an undisclosed report. The Court also noted the favorable decisions from other High Courts and ITAT benches on similar issues. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the order of the ITAT, making the appeal inadmissible under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court found no merit in the revenue's appeals. The reasoning was based on the assessees' submissions that they had complied with all conditions for exemption under Section 10(38), including listing, purchase through exchange and banking channels, and STT payment. The Court implicitly accepted the assessees' argument that listed shares issued under the Companies Act cannot be termed bogus without cogent evidence, and that the revenue failed to provide such evidence or demonstrate a violation of natural justice by relying on an undisclosed report. The Court also noted the favorable decisions from other High Courts and ITAT benches on similar issues. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose from the order of the ITAT, making the appeal inadmissible under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court found no merit in the appeals. The reasoning was based on the assessees' contention that they had fulfilled all the conditions stipulated under Section 10(38) of the Act for claiming exemption on long-term capital gains. These conditions included the shares being listed on a stock exchange, purchased through the stock exchange via banking channels, and Security Transaction Tax (STT) having been paid. The Court noted that the assessees argued that the Income Tax Act does not mandate the Assessing Officer to investigate the genuineness of listed shares, especially when the issuing company has complied with all statutory formalities under the Companies Act. Furthermore, the Court acknowledged the assessees' submission that the Revenue failed to provide the investigation report, thereby violating principles of natural justice, and that various High Courts and the ITAT had decided similar issues in favour of assessees. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the order of the ITAT, thus not meeting the criteria for admission of an appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court found no merit in the appeals. The reasoning was based on the assessees' submission that they had complied with all conditions stipulated under Section 10(38) for claiming exemption on LTCG. These conditions included the shares being listed on a stock exchange, purchased through the stock exchange via banking channels, and STT paid. The Court noted that the assessees had relied on various High Court and ITAT judgments that had dealt with similar issues concerning M/s Sunrise Asian Limited shares and decided in favour of the assessees. The Court also acknowledged the dismissal of SLPs by the Apex Court against such favourable High Court orders. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the order of the ITAT for consideration. The Court found no merit in the appeals filed by the Revenue. The reasoning was based on the assessees' contention that they had complied with all conditions stipulated under Section 10(38) for claiming exemption on long-term capital gains. The shares were listed, purchased through the stock exchange via banking channels, and STT was paid. The Court noted that the revenue failed to appreciate that shares issued by a company incorporated under the Companies Act, following prescribed procedures, cannot be termed as bogus. Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that several High Courts and the ITAT itself had dealt with similar issues concerning M/s Sunrise Asian Ltd. shares and decided in favour of the assessees. The dismissal of SLP by the Apex Court against a Gujarat High Court order in a similar matter was also considered significant. The Court concluded that the appeals did not meet the provisions of Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for admission.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the order of the ITAT for consideration. The Court found no merit in the appeals filed by the Revenue. The reasoning was based on the assessees' contention that they had complied with all conditions stipulated under Section 10(38) for claiming exemption on long-term capital gains. The shares were listed, purchased through the stock exchange via banking channels, and STT was paid. The Court noted that the revenue failed to appreciate that shares issued by a company incorporated under the Companies Act, following prescribed procedures, cannot be termed as bogus. Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that several High Courts and the ITAT itself had dealt with similar issues concerning M/s Sunrise Asian Ltd. shares and decided in favour of the assessees. The dismissal of SLP by the Apex Court against a Gujarat High Court order in a similar matter was also considered significant. The Court concluded that the appeals did not meet the provisions of Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for admission.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the order of the ITAT for consideration. The Court found no merit in the appeals filed by the Revenue. The reasoning was based on the assessees' contention that they had complied with all conditions stipulated under Section 10(38) for claiming exemption on long-term capital gains. The shares were listed, purchased through the stock exchange via banking channels, and STT was paid. The Court noted that the revenue failed to appreciate that shares issued by a company incorporated under the Companies Act, following prescribed procedures, cannot be termed as bogus. Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that several High Courts and the ITAT itself had dealt with similar issues concerning M/s Sunrise Asian Ltd. shares and decided in favour of the assessees. The dismissal of SLP by the Apex Court against a Gujarat High Court order in a similar matter was also considered significant. The Court concluded that the appeals did not meet the provisions of Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for admission.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the order of the ITAT for consideration. The Court found no merit in the appeals filed by the Revenue. The reasoning was based on the assessees' contention that they had fulfilled all the conditions stipulated under Section 10(38) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for claiming exemption on long-term capital gains. The shares were listed, purchased through legitimate channels, and STT was paid. The Court acknowledged that the issuing company had complied with all statutory formalities under the Companies Act, and therefore, the shares could not be termed as bogus. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Revenue had failed to provide the investigation report to the assessees, violating principles of natural justice. The Court also referred to various High Court and ITAT decisions that had ruled in favor of assessees on similar facts concerning M/s Sunrise Asian Ltd. shares. The Court concluded that the appeals did not meet the criteria for admission under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as they did not involve any substantial question of law.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the order of the ITAT for consideration. The Court found no merit in the appeals filed by the Revenue. The reasoning was based on the assessees' contention that they had fulfilled all the conditions stipulated under Section 10(38) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for claiming exemption on long-term capital gains. The shares were listed, purchased through legitimate channels, and STT was paid. The Court acknowledged that the issuing company had complied with all statutory formalities under the Companies Act, and therefore, the shares could not be termed as bogus. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Revenue had failed to provide the investigation report to the assessees, violating principles of natural justice. The Court also referred to various High Court and ITAT decisions that had ruled in favor of assessees on similar facts concerning M/s Sunrise Asian Ltd. shares. The Court concluded that the appeals did not meet the criteria for admission under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as they did not involve any substantial question of law.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the order of the ITAT for consideration. The Court found no merit in the appeals filed by the Revenue. The reasoning was based on the assessees' contention that they had fulfilled all the conditions stipulated under Section 10(38) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for claiming exemption on long-term capital gains. The shares were listed, purchased through legitimate channels, and STT was paid. The Court acknowledged that the issuing company had complied with all statutory formalities under the Companies Act, and therefore, the shares could not be termed as bogus. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Revenue had failed to provide the investigation report to the assessees, violating principles of natural justice. The Court also referred to various High Court and ITAT decisions that had ruled in favor of assessees on similar facts concerning M/s Sunrise Asian Ltd. shares. The Court concluded that the appeals did not meet the criteria for admission under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as they did not involve any substantial question of law.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the order of the ITAT for consideration. The Court found no merit in the appeals. The reasoning was that the assessees had fulfilled the conditions for exemption under Section 10(38) by ensuring shares were listed, purchased through the stock exchange and banking channels, and STT was paid. The Court noted that the revenue failed to appreciate that shares issued by a company incorporated under the Companies Act, following prescribed procedures, cannot be termed bogus. The mere increase in share prices does not automatically render shares bogus, especially when they are listed and traded. The Court also acknowledged the assessees' contention regarding the non-provision of the Investigation Wing's report, which violated natural justice principles. Furthermore, the Court referred to various ITAT and High Court decisions, including the dismissal of SLPs by the Apex Court, which supported the assessees' position. The Court concluded that the appeals did not meet the criteria for admission under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the order of the ITAT for consideration. The Court found no merit in the appeals. The reasoning was that the assessees had fulfilled the conditions for exemption under Section 10(38) by ensuring shares were listed, purchased through the stock exchange and banking channels, and STT was paid. The Court noted that the revenue failed to appreciate that shares issued by a company incorporated under the Companies Act, following prescribed procedures, cannot be termed bogus. The mere increase in share prices does not automatically render shares bogus, especially when they are listed and traded. The Court also acknowledged the assessees' contention regarding the non-provision of the Investigation Wing's report, which violated natural justice principles. Furthermore, the Court referred to various ITAT and High Court decisions, including the dismissal of SLPs by the Apex Court, which supported the assessees' position. The Court concluded that the appeals did not meet the criteria for admission under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the order of the ITAT for consideration. The Court found no merit in the appeals. The reasoning was that the assessees had fulfilled the conditions for exemption under Section 10(38) by ensuring shares were listed, purchased through the stock exchange and banking channels, and STT was paid. The Court noted that the revenue failed to appreciate that shares issued by a company incorporated under the Companies Act, following prescribed procedures, cannot be termed bogus. The mere increase in share prices does not automatically render shares bogus, especially when they are listed and traded. The Court also acknowledged the assessees' contention regarding the non-provision of the Investigation Wing's report, which violated natural justice principles. Furthermore, the Court referred to various ITAT and High Court decisions, including the dismissal of SLPs by the Apex Court, which supported the assessees' position. The Court concluded that the appeals did not meet the criteria for admission under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the order of the ITAT for consideration. The Court found no merit in the appeals. The reasoning was that the assessees had fulfilled the conditions for exemption under Section 10(38) by ensuring shares were listed, purchased through the stock exchange and banking channels, and STT was paid. The Court noted that the revenue failed to appreciate that shares issued by a company incorporated under the Companies Act, following prescribed procedures, cannot be termed bogus. The mere increase in share prices does not automatically render shares bogus, especially when they are listed and traded. The Court also acknowledged the assessees' contention regarding the non-provision of the Investigation Wing's report, which violated natural justice principles. Furthermore, the Court referred to various ITAT and High Court decisions, including the dismissal of SLPs by the Apex Court, which supported the assessees' position. The Court concluded that the appeals did not meet the criteria for admission under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the order of the ITAT for consideration. The Court found no merit in the appeals. The reasoning was that the assessees had fulfilled the conditions for exemption under Section 10(38) by ensuring shares were listed, purchased through the stock exchange and banking channels, and STT was paid. The Court noted that the revenue failed to appreciate that shares issued by a company incorporated under the Companies Act, following prescribed procedures, cannot be termed bogus. The mere increase in share prices does not automatically render shares bogus, especially when they are listed and traded. The Court also acknowledged the assessees' contention regarding the non-provision of the Investigation Wing's report, which violated natural justice principles. Furthermore, the Court referred to various ITAT and High Court decisions, including the dismissal of SLPs by the Apex Court, which supported the assessees' position. The Court concluded that the appeals did not meet the criteria for admission under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the order of the ITAT for consideration. The Court found no merit in the appeals. The reasoning was that the assessees had fulfilled the conditions for exemption under Section 10(38) by ensuring shares were listed, purchased through the stock exchange and banking channels, and STT was paid. The Court noted that the revenue failed to appreciate that shares issued by a company incorporated under the Companies Act, following prescribed procedures, cannot be termed bogus. The mere increase in share prices does not automatically render shares bogus, especially when they are listed and traded. The Court also acknowledged the assessees' contention regarding the non-provision of the Investigation Wing's report, which violated natural justice principles. Furthermore, the Court referred to various ITAT and High Court decisions, including the dismissal of SLPs by the Apex Court, which supported the assessees' position. The Court concluded that the appeals did not meet the criteria for admission under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the order of the ITAT for consideration. The Court found no merit in the appeals, stating that they do not involve any substantial question of law as required by Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for admission. The Court agreed with the ITAT's finding that the assessees had fulfilled the conditions for exemption under Section 10(38) by demonstrating that the shares were listed, purchased through the stock exchange and banking channels, and Security Transaction Tax (STT) was paid. The Court also noted the assessees' argument that the revenue failed to provide the Investigation Wing report, violating principles of natural justice, and that various High Courts and the ITAT Mumbai Bench had decided similar issues in favour of assessees. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the order of the ITAT for consideration. The Court found no merit in the appeals, stating that they do not involve any substantial question of law as required by Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for admission. The Court agreed with the ITAT's finding that the assessees had fulfilled the conditions for exemption under Section 10(38) by demonstrating that the shares were listed, purchased through the stock exchange and banking channels, and Security Transaction Tax (STT) was paid. The Court also noted the assessees' argument that the revenue failed to provide the Investigation Wing report, violating principles of natural justice, and that various High Courts and the ITAT Mumbai Bench had decided similar issues in favour of assessees. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that the requirement of filing the auditor's report (Form 10BB) along with the return of income is a procedural requirement and directory in nature, not mandatory. Numerous High Court and Tribunal decisions, including CIT vs. Rai Bahadur Bissesswarlal Motilal Malwasie Trust, Calcutta Management Association vs. ITO, CIT v. Gujarat Oil & Allied Industries, and CIT vs. Shahzedanand Charity Trust, were cited to support the view that exemption under Section 11 should not be denied solely due to delay in furnishing the audit report, especially when the delay is for valid reasons and the report is available before the completion of assessment or at the appellate stage. The Court found that the Commissioner's rejection of the delay condonation application, ignoring the technical glitch and the spirit of CBDT Circular No. 19/2020, was not justified. The impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remanded back to the Commissioner for a fresh decision on the condonation application, directing the petitioner to file a fresh application with proper reasons and documents. The Commissioner was directed to pass a reasoned order expeditiously.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the order of the ITAT for consideration. The Court found no merit in the appeals, stating that they do not involve any substantial question of law as required by Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for admission. The Court agreed with the ITAT's finding that the assessees had fulfilled the conditions for exemption under Section 10(38) by demonstrating that the shares were listed, purchased through the stock exchange and banking channels, and Security Transaction Tax (STT) was paid. The Court also noted the assessees' argument that the revenue failed to provide the Investigation Wing report, violating principles of natural justice, and that various High Courts and the ITAT Mumbai Bench had decided similar issues in favour of assessees. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed.

The High Court held that the deletion of additions by the CIT(A), affirmed by the ITAT, was justified. Regarding the addition of Rs. 1,68,64,954/-, the Court found that the CIT(A) had correctly observed that the AO made additions based on guesswork and assumption, and that the assessee had provided supportive documentary evidence for the increase in liabilities. The Court also addressed the disallowance under Section 14A, noting that the amendment relied upon by the revenue was prospective from AY 2022-23 and thus not applicable to AY 2013-14. The Court further referenced the Delhi High Court's decision in Chivenwest Vs. CIT, holding that Section 14A does not apply if no exempt income is received or receivable. The Court found the orders of the CIT(A) and ITAT to be well-reasoned and based on settled norms, upholding the deletion of additions totaling Rs. 3,79,85,854/-, Rs. 1,68,64,954/-, and Rs. 1,29,26,925/-. No substantial question of law arose.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the order of the ITAT. The Court referred to Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which mandates that an appeal to the High Court lies only if a substantial question of law is involved. The Court cited various Supreme Court judgments, including Santosh Hazari and K. Ravindranathan Nair, emphasizing that a substantial question of law must be debatable, not previously settled, and have a material bearing on the decision. The Court found that the appellant (Revenue) raised questions of fact and disputed the fact-findings of the ITAT in the garb of substantial questions of law, which is not permissible. The Court noted that the ITAT had dealt with all grounds and passed a well-reasoned order, and in the absence of demonstrated perversity, interference with the concurrent findings of the CIT(A) and ITAT was not warranted. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed in limine.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the order of the ITAT. The Court referred to Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which mandates that an appeal to the High Court lies only if a substantial question of law is involved. The Court cited various Supreme Court judgments, including Santosh Hazari and K. Ravindranathan Nair, emphasizing that a substantial question of law must be debatable, not previously settled, and have a material bearing on the decision. The Court found that the appellant (Revenue) raised questions of fact and disputed the fact-findings of the ITAT in the garb of substantial questions of law, which is not permissible. The Court noted that the ITAT had dealt with all grounds and passed a well-reasoned order, and in the absence of demonstrated perversity, interference with the concurrent findings of the CIT(A) and ITAT was not warranted. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed in limine.

The High Court held that no question of law, much less any substantial question of law, arises from the order of the ITAT. The Court found no merit in the appeals filed by the revenue. The ITAT had interpreted Section 249(4)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits. The ITAT's reliance on the principles laid down in Vijay Prakash D. Mehta and CIT Vs. K Satish Kumar Singh was considered by the High Court as not erroneous or prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. The High Court noted that the ITAT's order was not passed on merits but on an interpretation of Section 249(4)(a) concerning the deposit of admitted tax, which could be prior to or after filing the appeal. The Court concluded that the ITAT's decision to remand the matter for adjudication on merits was justified based on the cited precedents. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed in limine.

The High Court held that no question of law, much less any substantial question of law, arises from the order of the ITAT. The Court found no merit in the appeals filed by the revenue. The ITAT had interpreted Section 249(4)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits. The ITAT's reliance on the principles laid down in Vijay Prakash D. Mehta and CIT Vs. K Satish Kumar Singh was considered by the High Court as not erroneous or prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. The High Court noted that the ITAT's order was not passed on merits but on an interpretation of Section 249(4)(a) concerning the deposit of admitted tax, which could be prior to or after filing the appeal. The Court concluded that the ITAT's decision to remand the matter for adjudication on merits was justified based on the cited precedents. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed in limine.

The High Court held that the parties had arrived at a consensus for the review. The Court allowed the review petition to the extent that the Joint Director of Income Tax (Inv) (respondent no. 2) would be at liberty to refer the case to the concerned Jurisdictional Assessing Officer if he/she found himself/herself not to be the competent authority. The remaining part of the original order dated 08.02.2024 was to be kept intact for further compliance by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer. The time for taking a decision on the application was extended by 30 days from the date of production of the copy of the review order. The Court reiterated that the competent authority shall decide the issue on merits without being influenced by the stand taken by the parties. No issue was expressly left undecided.

The High Court held that the review petition was not maintainable. It noted that the grounds for review under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure include the discovery of new and important matters, mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason. The Court found that the petitioner had not demonstrated any such grounds. Specifically, the Court observed that the issue of jurisdiction, as now raised, was not part of the original grounds in the writ petition, which focused on the DVO's report and the reasoning of the 148A(d) order. The Court reiterated that a review is not a platform to argue a case de novo or to seek a different view. Citing various Supreme Court judgments, the Court concluded that there was no error apparent on the face of the record that warranted interference with the order dismissing the writ petition. The review petition was accordingly dismissed.

The High Court dismissed the review petition. The Court found that none of the grounds available for seeking a review under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure were made out. The Court reiterated that a review application is maintainable on grounds of discovery of new and important matters or evidence, mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason. However, it emphasized that an error must be evident per se and not require detailed examination or debate. The Court noted that the petitioner's original writ petition had raised grounds related to the Finance Act, 2021, the reasoning of the Section 148A(d) order, the reopening based on the DVO's report, and the disclosure of material facts. The Court observed that the issue of jurisdiction, as now argued, was not raised in the original writ petition and was being raised for the first time in the review petition. Citing precedents, the Court held that a review cannot be sought merely because an order is erroneous or a different view could have been taken, and that a party cannot argue de novo in the garb of review. Therefore, there was no error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference with the order dismissing the writ petition.

The High Court dismissed the review petition. It held that for a review petition to be maintainable under Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC, the grounds must be limited to the discovery of new and important matters, a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason. The Court noted that the original writ petition had raised grounds concerning the information under the Finance Act, 2021, the non-reasoned nature of the order, reopening based on the DVO's report, disclosure of material facts under the old law, and estimation in the DVO's report. The Court found that the issue of jurisdiction was not raised in the original writ petition and was being raised for the first time in the review petition. Citing various Supreme Court judgments, including S. Bhagirathi Amaal and State of West Bengal, the Court reiterated that a review is not a platform to argue de novo or to fish out errors. It concluded that there was no error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference with the order dismissing the writ petition. Therefore, the review petition failed.

The High Court dismissed the review petition. It held that the grounds available for review under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, namely the discovery of new and important matters or evidence, or a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason, were not made out. The Court noted that the petitioner's original writ petition had raised grounds related to the information used for reopening, the reasoning in the Section 148A(d) order, the reliance on a valuation report, and disclosure requirements. However, the Court observed that the issue of jurisdiction was not raised in the writ petition and was being introduced for the first time in the review petition. The Court reiterated that a review is not maintainable for merely arguing a case de novo or to correct an order that is merely erroneous in law or on fact. The Court found no error apparent on the face of the record that warranted interference with the previous order dismissing the writ petition. Therefore, the review petition was dismissed.

The High Court dismissed the review petition. It held that the grounds for review under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, namely discovery of new and important matters/evidence, mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason, were not made out. The Court noted that the petitioner had raised grounds related to the Finance Act, 2021, the reasoning of the order under Section 148A(d), the DVO's report, and disclosure of material facts in the original writ petition. However, the issue of jurisdiction, as now argued, was not raised in the writ petition and was being raised for the first time in the review. The Court emphasized that a review is not for re-arguing the case or for correcting an erroneous decision, but only for errors apparent on the face of the record that do not require detailed examination. Citing various Supreme Court judgments, the Court concluded that there was no error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference with the order dismissing the writ petition. The review petition was accordingly dismissed.

The High Court held that the ITAT, being the last forum for factual determination, its findings have attained finality. The court found no material to show perversity in the ITAT's findings. The assessee's Memorandum of Association clearly stated its main object as the business of constructing, owning, developing, managing, running, hiring, letting out, selling, or leasing multiplexes, cinema halls, shopping malls, etc. The assessee consistently offered income from these activities under the head "profit and gain of business or profession." The court relied on the Supreme Court judgments in *Sultan Brothers Private Limited v. CIT*, *Chennai Properties and Investments Limited v. CIT*, and distinguished *Rayala Corporation Private Limited v. ACIT* and *Raj Dadarkar and Associates*. Since the assessee's principal business activity was letting out properties and it consistently offered such income as business income, the CIT(A) and ITAT rightly set aside the AO's order. The court found no substantial question of law involved in the appeals.

The High Court held that the ITAT, being the last forum for factual determination, its findings have attained finality. The court found no material to show perversity in the ITAT's findings. The assessee's Memorandum of Association clearly stated its main object as the business of constructing, owning, developing, managing, running, hiring, letting out, selling, or leasing multiplexes, cinema halls, shopping malls, etc. The assessee consistently offered income from these activities under the head "profit and gain of business or profession." The court relied on the Supreme Court judgments in *Sultan Brothers Private Limited v. CIT*, *Chennai Properties and Investments Limited v. CIT*, and distinguished *Rayala Corporation Private Limited v. ACIT* and *Raj Dadarkar and Associates*. Since the assessee's principal business activity was letting out properties and it consistently offered such income as business income, the CIT(A) and ITAT rightly set aside the AO's order. The court found no substantial question of law involved in the appeals.

The High Court held that the ITAT, being the last forum for factual determination, its findings have attained finality. The court found no material to show perversity in the ITAT's findings. The assessee's Memorandum of Association clearly stated its main object as the business of constructing, owning, developing, managing, running, hiring, letting out, selling, or leasing multiplexes, cinema halls, shopping malls, etc. The assessee consistently offered income from these activities under the head "profit and gain of business or profession." The court relied on the Supreme Court judgments in *Sultan Brothers Private Limited v. CIT*, *Chennai Properties and Investments Limited v. CIT*, and distinguished *Rayala Corporation Private Limited v. ACIT* and *Raj Dadarkar and Associates*. Since the assessee's principal business activity was letting out properties and it consistently offered such income as business income, the CIT(A) and ITAT rightly set aside the AO's order. The court found no substantial question of law involved in the appeals.

The High Court held that the rental income derived by the assessee from leasing out properties in the mall should be computed under the head 'income from business' and not 'income from house property'. The Court reasoned that the assessee's Memorandum of Association clearly stated its main objects included the business of constructing, owning, developing, managing, and letting out shopping malls. The assessee had consistently offered this income under the head 'profit and gains of business or profession'. The Court relied on Supreme Court judgments in Sultan Brothers Private Limited v. CIT, Chennai Properties and Investments Limited (supra), and distinguished Rayala Corporation Private Limited (supra) and Raj Dadarkar and Associates (supra). The ITAT, being the last forum for factual determination, had made findings that were not perverse. Therefore, no substantial question of law was involved.

The High Court dismissed the review petition. It held that none of the grounds available for seeking a review under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure were made out. The Court referred to Apex Court judgments in S. Bhagirathi Amaal and State of West Bengal, emphasizing that a review requires an error apparent on the face of the record, not an error to be 'fished out' or searched for. The Court found no such error in the impugned order. It reiterated that a decision cannot be reviewed merely because it is erroneous or because a different view could have been taken. The Court also noted that the issue of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in the review petition, which was not a valid ground for review. Therefore, the review petition was dismissed as failing to demonstrate any error apparent on the face of the record.

The High Court held that the appeal filed by the Revenue is not maintainable. The Court's reasoning was based on CBDT Circular No. 17 of 2019, which stipulates that no appeal shall be filed before the High Court where the tax effect is below Rs. 1 Crore. Since the tax effect in this case was nil, the appeal did not meet the prescribed monetary limit for filing. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed at the admission stage itself. The Court clarified that the department would be free to pursue the issue raised in this case in appropriate proceedings where the tax limit exceeds the minimum prescribed limit. No specific finding was made on the merits of the original dispute before the ITAT.

The High Court upheld the ITAT's decision. It reasoned that the ITAT correctly relied on the judgment of the Pune Bench in Shri Ramamoorthy Vasudevan v/s PCIT and other consistent decisions from various benches of the Tribunal and the Allahabad High Court. These precedents established that once an assessment order under Section 143(3) r/w Section 153A is passed after obtaining prior approval from the ACIT under Section 153D, the revisional jurisdiction under Section 263 cannot be invoked by the same or a higher authority. The Court noted that the Assessing Officer required prior approval from the Joint Commissioner (or equivalent) under Section 153A for passing orders in cases involving search and seizure. Therefore, the authority that granted the approval could not subsequently exercise power under Section 263 to revise the order. The High Court also observed that the total tax effect was below Rs. 1,00,00,000/-, further supporting the decision not to interfere with the ITAT's order. The appeal was dismissed.

The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the PCIT. The Court noted that the tax effect in the appeal was below Rs.1,00,00,000/-. The Court found no ground to interfere with the order passed by the ITAT. The ITAT had relied on a judgment of the Pune Bench in Shri Ramamoorthy Vasudevan v/s PCIT, which held that the order passed by the PCIT under Section 263 was unsustainable due to a lack of jurisdiction. This was because the assessment order under Section 143(3) r/w Section 153A had been passed after obtaining prior approval under Section 153D. The High Court observed that the ITAT had consistently followed this view, citing various judgments from different benches of the Tribunal and one judgment from the Allahabad High Court. The Court further reasoned that for passing an order under Sections 143(3) & 153A, prior approval of the Joint Commissioner or Principal Commissioner/Commissioner is required. Therefore, the same authority that granted the prior approval cannot then exercise power under Section 263 to reverse the Assessing Officer's order. The Court did not expressly leave any issue undecided.

The High Court held that the appeal did not involve any substantial question of law, as required under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court observed that the appellant (Revenue) had raised questions of fact and disputed the fact-findings of the ITAT under the guise of substantial questions of law, which is impermissible. The Court noted that the ITAT had dealt with all grounds raised by the appellant and passed a well-reasoned order, considering all available material. The Tribunal, being the final fact-finding authority, its findings could only be challenged before the High Court if they were perverse, meaning they could not reasonably have been arrived at on the material placed before it. The Court found no perversity in the ITAT's order, nor in the concurrent findings of the CIT(A). Therefore, interference by the High Court was not warranted. The Court concluded that the appeal lacked merit as the addition/deletion could not be said to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue, and thus did not meet the criteria for admitting an appeal under Section 260A.

The Madhya Pradesh High Court at Indore disposed of the appeal filed by the Revenue in light of the Supreme Court's judgment dated 28/02/2024 in Civil Appeal No.7257/2011 (Bharti Cellular Ltd. Now Bharti Airtel Limited vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circuld 57, Kolkata and another). The Supreme Court had held that assessees are not under a legal obligation to deduct tax at source on the income/profit component in payments received by distributors/franchisees from third parties/customers, or while selling/transferring pre-paid coupons or starter-kits to distributors. The Apex Court concluded that Section 194-H of the Act is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. Consequently, appeals filed by the assessee challenging Delhi and Calcutta High Court judgments were allowed, and appeals by the Revenue challenging Rajasthan, Karnataka, and Bombay High Court judgments were dismissed. As the Supreme Court had already decided the issue, nothing survived for adjudication in the present appeal before the High Court.

The High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore, in light of the Supreme Court's judgment dated 28/02/2024 in Civil Appeal No. 7257/2011 (Bharti Cellular Ltd. Now Bharti Airtel Limited vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 57, Kolkata and another), held that the assessees (cellular mobile service providers) would not be under a legal obligation to deduct tax at source on the income/profit component in the payments received by the distributors/franchisees from third parties/customers, or while selling/transferring pre-paid coupons or starter-kits to the distributors. The Supreme Court concluded that Section 194-H of the Act is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of such cases. Consequently, the appeals filed by the assessee challenging the judgments of the Delhi and Calcutta High Courts were allowed and set aside, while appeals by the Revenue challenging the judgments of the Rajasthan, Karnataka, and Bombay High Courts were dismissed. As a result, nothing survived for adjudication in the present appeal filed by the Revenue, and it was disposed of accordingly.

The High Court of Madhya Pradesh, while hearing the appeal filed by the Revenue, noted that the Apex Court had already adjudicated the issue in Civil Appeal No. 7257/2011 (Bharti Cellular Ltd. Now Bharti Airtel Limited vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 57, Kolkata and another) vide its judgment dated 28/02/2024. The Apex Court held that assessees are not under a legal obligation to deduct tax at source on the income/profit component in payments received by distributors/franchisees from third parties/customers, or while selling/transferring pre-paid coupons or starter-kits to distributors. The Apex Court concluded that Section 194-H of the Act is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. Consequently, the appeals filed by the assessee challenging the judgments of the Delhi and Calcutta High Courts were allowed, and those judgments were set aside. The appeals filed by the Revenue challenging the judgments of the Rajasthan, Karnataka, and Bombay High Courts were dismissed. In light of the Apex Court's decision, the High Court found that nothing survived for adjudication in the present appeal filed by the Revenue.

The High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Indore Bench, disposed of the appeal filed by the Revenue in light of the Supreme Court's judgment dated 28/02/2024 in Civil Appeal No.7257/2011 (Bharti Cellular Ltd. Now Bharti Airtel Limited vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 57, Kolkata and another). The Supreme Court held that assessees are not under a legal obligation to deduct tax at source on the income/profit component in payments received by distributors/franchisees from third parties/customers, or while selling/transferring pre-paid coupons or starter-kits to distributors. Consequently, Section 194-H of the Act was held to be not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court allowed appeals filed by assessees challenging Delhi and Calcutta High Court judgments and dismissed appeals by the Revenue challenging Rajasthan, Karnataka, and Bombay High Court judgments. Therefore, nothing survived for adjudication in the present appeal.

The High Court noted that the Supreme Court, in Civil Appeal No. 7257/2011 (Bharti Cellular Ltd. Now Bharti Airtel Limited vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 57, Kolkata and another) vide its judgment dated 28/02/2024, had conclusively decided the issue. The Supreme Court held that assessees would not be under a legal obligation to deduct tax at source on the income/profit component in payments received by distributors/franchisees from third parties/customers, or while selling/transferring pre-paid coupons or starter-kits to distributors. Consequently, Section 194-H of the Act was held to be not applicable to the facts and circumstances of such cases. The Supreme Court allowed appeals filed by assessees challenging Delhi and Calcutta High Court judgments and dismissed appeals filed by the Revenue challenging Rajasthan, Karnataka, and Bombay High Court judgments. In light of this Supreme Court decision, the High Court found that nothing survived for adjudication in the present appeal filed by the Revenue.

The High Court held that the grievance of the petitioner has been answered. The Court noted that the Income Tax Department had already taken action, including conducting an inquiry and a survey under Section 133-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. During the survey, it was found that the assessee (Respondent No. 3) claimed Rs. 28,00,000/- as donations but could not substantiate the source, and appropriate orders were issued. Since these actions were concluded in 2018, the Court found that nothing further survived for consideration. The writ petition was disposed of, with liberty reserved for the assessee or any aggrieved party to take recourse to law as permissible. The Court did not decide on the merits of the alleged illegal claim of exemption but rather on the fact that the department had acted upon the matter.

The High Court held that the stage of the show cause notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, had already passed, and subsequent assessment proceedings had taken place, culminating in a final assessment order. The Court noted that the petitioner had not informed the department about the death of the original assessee along with the death certificate. The Court emphasized that when a statutory forum is created for redressal of grievances, a writ petition cannot normally be entertained, bypassing such a statutory remedy. In this case, the proceedings under Section 148 had attained finality with the assessment order. Therefore, it was inappropriate for the High Court to intervene by bypassing the efficacious statutory alternative remedy available to the petitioner under Section 246 of the Act. The petition was disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to pursue the statutory appeal, and the period spent in prosecuting the writ petition was directed not to be counted for calculating any delay in filing the appeal.

The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the order of the ITAT. The Court observed that the appellant (Revenue) raised questions of fact and disputed the fact-findings of the ITAT under the guise of substantial questions of law, which is not permissible under Section 260A of the Act. The Court found no perversity in the ITAT's order, noting that the Tribunal dealt with all grounds raised by the appellant and passed a well-reasoned order considering all material on record. As the ITAT is the final fact-finding authority, interference with its concurrent findings with the CIT(A) is not warranted in the absence of demonstrated perversity. The Court concluded that the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law as required by Section 260A for admission. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed in limine.

The High Court directed Respondent No. 2, the National Faceless Appeal Centre, to decide the pending appeal of the petitioner forthwith and as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of 4 weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order. The Court emphasized that the decision should be a reasoned and speaking order and communicated to the petitioner promptly. The Court explicitly stated that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. The principle derived is that courts can direct authorities to decide pending matters within a reasonable timeframe, especially when statutory timelines are exceeded and significant delays are observed, without delving into the merits of the underlying appeal. The operative direction is to decide the appeal expeditiously.