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The High Court dismissed the appeal in limine. The Court noted that the appellant (Revenue) had declared that the tax effect was Rs. 6.78 Lakhs, which was less than the permissible limit as per Clause 10(c) of Circular No. 3/2018. The Court also observed that the Revenue had not challenged the AO's orders dated 23.3.2016 and 10.12.2018 before the appellate authority or the Tribunal. The ITAT, by order dated 17.1.2022, had restored the assessment order dated 23.3.2016 on an application filed by the assessee, which the Revenue had not challenged. The Court found that no case was made out on merits, and therefore, the appeal failed and was dismissed.
The High Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable. The Court noted the preliminary objection raised by the respondent that the impugned order, passed by the Commissioner, Central GST and Central Excise, was appealable to the CESTAT under Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944, read with Section 85 of the Finance Act. In view of the availability of this alternative and efficacious statutory remedy, the High Court found it inappropriate to entertain the writ petition. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed. The Court did not delve into the merits of the case or the grounds for quashing the OIO.
The High Court held that the prayers sought by the petitioner could not be considered because the appeal itself did not exist for consideration. The Court noted that the appeal filed by the petitioner before the CESTAT had already been dismissed, and that order had attained finality. Consequently, the question of entertaining the present writ petition, either on facts or law, did not arise. The Court found no good ground to entertain the petition and accordingly dismissed it. The specific issue of liability under the Central Excise Act and the quashment of proceedings were rendered moot by the dismissal of the appeal. The alternative prayer concerning the CESTAT's order was also dismissed as the underlying appeal was no longer pending.
The High Court held that the petitioner's ignorance of the law cannot be considered a valid ground for condoning the delay in filing Form 10-B under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court distinguished the present case from the Gujarat High Court's decision in Shree Maharaja Agrasen Seva Sansthan vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, where the delay was due to technical problems and lack of software support, which the Gujarat High Court found to be a genuine cause falling under "undue hardship." The Madhya Pradesh High Court opined that the expression "undue hardship" in Section 119(2)(b) cannot be stretched to include ignorance of law or a recently established institution's lack of familiarity with statutory requirements. Accepting such an argument would lead to an absurd expansion of the statutory provision not contemplated by the legislature. Therefore, the application for condonation of delay was rejected, and the petition was dismissed.
The High Court, in light of the CBDT circular dated July 19, 2022, which delegates the power of condoning delay beyond 365 days under Section 119(2) of the Income Tax Act to the Principal Chief Commissioner/Chief Commissioner of Income-Tax, extended liberty to the petitioner. The Court directed that the petitioner can approach the said authority invoking Section 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act. If the application is filed within one month from the date of this order, the concerned Authority is directed to decide the application for condonation of delay on its own merits and pass orders on the question of limitation as expeditiously as possible. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions. No specific finding was given on the merits of the original delay, as the matter was remanded for fresh consideration of the condonation application.
The High Court dismissed the second bail application. The Court noted that the applicant's earlier bail application was rejected on merits by the same Court on July 18, 2022. The Court found no material change in circumstances that would entitle the applicant to bail in this repeated application. Regarding the revised guidelines for arrest and bail cited by the applicant, the Court observed that these guidelines do not support the applicant's case. Furthermore, the Court noted that subsequent to the rejection of the earlier application, the respondent had collected additional evidence, including call detail records. Therefore, the Court was not inclined to allow the repeated bail application.
The High Court held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) did not commit any error in setting aside the penalty order passed by the Assessing Officer and CIT under Section 271(1)(c). The Court reasoned that to attract Section 271(1)(c), there must be a satisfaction that the assessee concealed particulars of income or furnished inaccurate particulars. In this case, the respondent disclosed the source of income as a capital receipt, and the receipt of Rs. 5,18,02,396/- from Michelin Company was correctly disclosed. Even if it was shown as a capital receipt based on the opinion of a tax consultant, it was a debatable issue, as evidenced by the reference sent to the High Court. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in CIT v. Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd., which held that a mere claim not sustainable in law does not amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars. Similarly, in Price Waterhouse Coopers Private Limited v. CIT, the Apex Court held that inadvertent and bona fide errors do not attract penalty. The High Court concluded that no case for imposition of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was made out for Assessment Year 1992-93. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court observed that disputed questions of fact pertaining to the issue of condonation of delay were involved. It further noted that the power to condone delay beyond the prescribed period is available with the CBDT under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act. Consequently, the Court advised the petitioner to approach the CBDT. The CBDT was directed to consider the petitioner's prayer for condonation of delay on its own merits, provided the petition is filed within one month from the date of receipt of the Court's order. The High Court did not decide the merits of the condonation application itself but directed the petitioner to the appropriate authority.
The Tribunal, in its findings, noted that the Revenue was aggrieved by the CIT(A)'s decision to treat the additional income of Rs. 2,95,00,000/- admitted by the assessee during a survey under the head 'income from other sources' instead of invoking Section 69B. The CIT(A) had observed that Section 69B applies to investments in bullion, jewellery, or other valuable articles exceeding amounts recorded in books of account, which was not the case here. The CIT(A) also noted that the AO had not commented on whether the additional income was part of regular books of account and that Section 69B is applicable only to income not fully disclosed. The CIT(A) relied on the decision in Mukesh Sangla HUF vs. DCIT, holding that the AO's findings were arbitrary and not based on relevant material. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s detailed findings, especially since the assessee had voluntarily disclosed the investment in construction material and offered it for tax in AY 2016-17. The Tribunal confirmed the CIT(A)'s order, dismissing Ground No. 2 of the Revenue's appeal. The High Court, upon perusal, found the ITAT's findings regarding the disclosure of additional income not to be illegal or perverse and concluded that no substantial question of law arose, thus dismissing the appeal at the admission stage.
The High Court held that the delay of 75 days in filing the review petition was condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Court found that an error apparent on the face of the record had indeed occurred in the order dated 27.11.2019. This error stemmed from the Revenue's mistaken belief that the tax effect was below Rs. 1 Crore, which led to the withdrawal of ITA No.17/2015. Upon reviewing the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) dated 30.01.2013, it was evident that the tax effect exceeded Rs. 1 Crore. Consequently, the provisions of Circular No.17/2019 were inapplicable. The Court allowed the review petition, setting aside the order of withdrawal and restoring ITA No.17/2015 to its original number for listing and admission.
The High Court noted the submission by the learned senior standing counsel for the Revenue that the tax effect in the present case is Rs. 34,76,250/-, which is below the mandatory limit prescribed by the Board's Circular No. 17/2019 dated 08.08.2019. In view of this instruction received, the learned counsel for the appellant (Revenue) sought permission to withdraw the appeal. The Court permitted the withdrawal. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the case. The letter dated 23.08.2022 was directed to be placed on record.
The High Court held that the order passed by the Assessing Officer under Section 148A(d) is a preliminary order and not a final adjudication. It is issued to determine if a notice under Section 148 can be issued. The Court referred to the Supreme Court's judgment in Ashish Agrawal (supra), specifically paragraph 10(iv), which states that all defenses available to the assessees, including those under Section 149 of the IT Act, shall continue to be available. Therefore, the petitioner is free to raise objections regarding limitation in the proceedings initiated under Section 148. The Court found that as of the current stage, the authorities have prima facie found it a fit case for issuing a notice under Section 148, in compliance with the Apex Court's directions. The final proceedings under Section 148 will provide the petitioner with a full opportunity to contest the matter. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as premature. No specific finding was given on the merits of the limitation argument, as it was deferred to the Section 148 proceedings.
The High Court held that to ascertain the true nature of the relationship between the petitioner-college and the Guest Faculty Lecturers, and whether their services fell under Section 194J of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for TDS purposes, disputed questions of fact would need to be examined. It is trite law that writ jurisdiction should not be exercised when disputed questions of fact are involved and the relevant statute provides for an alternative efficacious remedy. The petitioner had not availed the alternative statutory remedy of appeal under Section 246 of the Act before the Commissioner (Appeals). The Court found no apparent jurisdictional error in the Assessing Authority's order, thus none of the exceptions laid down in Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai could be invoked. Consequently, the Court granted the petitioner 45 days to approach the Appellate Authority, with the interim order continuing for that period. If no appeal is filed within 45 days, the Revenue is free to execute the impugned assessment order. The Appellate Authority is free to adjudicate the appeal without being influenced by this order.
The High Court held that to ascertain the true nature of the relationship between the petitioner-college and the Guest Faculty Lecturers, and whether their services fell under Section 194J of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for TDS purposes, disputed questions of fact would need to be examined. It is trite law that writ jurisdiction should not be exercised when disputed questions of fact are involved and the relevant statute provides for an alternative efficacious remedy. The petitioner had not availed the alternative statutory remedy of appeal under Section 246 of the Act before the Commissioner (Appeals). The Court found no apparent jurisdictional error in the Assessing Authority's order, thus none of the exceptions laid down in Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai could be invoked. Consequently, the Court granted the petitioner 45 days to approach the Appellate Authority, with the interim order continuing for that period. If no appeal is filed within 45 days, the Revenue is free to execute the impugned assessment order. The Appellate Authority is free to adjudicate the appeal without being influenced by this order.
The High Court held that to ascertain the true nature of the relationship between the petitioner-college and the Guest Faculty Lecturers, and whether their services fell under Section 194J of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for TDS purposes, disputed questions of fact would need to be examined. It is trite law that writ jurisdiction should not be exercised when disputed questions of fact are involved and the relevant statute provides for an alternative efficacious remedy. The petitioner had not availed the alternative statutory remedy of appeal under Section 246 of the Act before the Commissioner (Appeals). The Court found no apparent jurisdictional error in the Assessing Authority's order, thus none of the exceptions laid down in Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai could be invoked. Consequently, the Court granted the petitioner 45 days to approach the Appellate Authority, with the interim order continuing for that period. If no appeal is filed within 45 days, the Revenue is free to execute the impugned assessment order. The Appellate Authority is free to adjudicate the appeal without being influenced by this order.
The High Court held that to ascertain the true nature of the relationship between the petitioner-college and the Guest Faculty Lecturers, and whether their services fell under Section 194J of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for TDS purposes, disputed questions of fact would need to be examined. It is trite law that writ jurisdiction should not be exercised when disputed questions of fact are involved and the relevant statute provides for an alternative efficacious remedy. The petitioner had not availed the alternative statutory remedy of appeal under Section 246 of the Act before the Commissioner (Appeals). The Court found no apparent jurisdictional error in the Assessing Authority's order, thus none of the exceptions laid down in Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai could be invoked. Consequently, the Court granted the petitioner 45 days to approach the Appellate Authority, with the interim order continuing for that period. If no appeal is filed within 45 days, the Revenue is free to execute the impugned assessment order. The Appellate Authority is free to adjudicate the appeal without being influenced by this order.
The High Court held that to ascertain the true nature of the relationship between the petitioner-college and the Guest Faculty Lecturers, and whether their services fell under Section 194J of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for TDS purposes, disputed questions of fact would need to be examined. It is trite law that writ jurisdiction should not be exercised when disputed questions of fact are involved and the relevant statute provides for an alternative efficacious remedy. The petitioner had not availed the alternative statutory remedy of appeal under Section 246 of the Act before the Commissioner (Appeals). The Court found no apparent jurisdictional error in the Assessing Authority's order, thus none of the exceptions laid down in Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai could be invoked. Consequently, the Court granted the petitioner 45 days to approach the Appellate Authority, with the interim order continuing for that period. If no appeal is filed within 45 days, the Revenue is free to execute the impugned assessment order. The Appellate Authority is free to adjudicate the appeal without being influenced by this order.
The High Court held that to ascertain the true nature of the relationship between the petitioner-college and the Guest Faculty Lecturers, and whether their services fell under Section 194J of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for TDS purposes, disputed questions of fact would need to be examined. It is trite law that writ jurisdiction should not be exercised when disputed questions of fact are involved and the relevant statute provides for an alternative efficacious remedy. The petitioner had not availed the alternative statutory remedy of appeal under Section 246 of the Act before the Commissioner (Appeals). The Court found no apparent jurisdictional error in the Assessing Authority's order, thus none of the exceptions laid down in Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai could be invoked. Consequently, the Court granted the petitioner 45 days to approach the Appellate Authority, with the interim order continuing for that period. If no appeal is filed within 45 days, the Revenue is free to execute the impugned assessment order. The Appellate Authority is free to adjudicate the appeal without being influenced by this order.
The High Court held that to ascertain the true nature of the relationship between the petitioner-college and the Guest Faculty Lecturers, and whether their services fell under Section 194J of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for TDS purposes, disputed questions of fact would need to be examined. It is trite law that writ jurisdiction should not be exercised when disputed questions of fact are involved and the relevant statute provides for an alternative efficacious remedy. The petitioner had not availed the alternative statutory remedy of appeal under Section 246 of the Act before the Commissioner (Appeals). The Court found no apparent jurisdictional error in the Assessing Authority's order, thus none of the exceptions laid down in Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai could be invoked. Consequently, the Court granted the petitioner 45 days to approach the Appellate Authority, with the interim order continuing for that period. If no appeal is filed within 45 days, the Revenue is free to execute the impugned assessment order. The Appellate Authority is free to adjudicate the appeal without being influenced by this order.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition in light of the directions issued by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in SLP (C) No.32709-32710/2018, had directed the Goods and Services Tax Network (GSTN) to open a common portal for filing or revising concerned forms for availing transitional credit through TRAN-1 and TRAN-2 for a period of two months, from September 1, 2022, to October 31, 2022. The Supreme Court's directions also stipulated that any aggrieved registered assessee could file or revise their forms irrespective of whether they had filed a writ petition or if their case was decided by the ITGRC. GSTN was to ensure no technical glitches during this period. Concerned officers were given 90 days thereafter to verify claims and pass orders. The High Court granted liberty to the petitioner to avail the benefit of the Supreme Court's order during the specified period. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the assessment order could not be entertained on the ground of non-affording an opportunity of hearing or violation of principles of natural justice. The court observed that a reply was filed by the petitioner, and the impugned order was passed after consideration of that reply, thus it could not be said that no opportunity of hearing was given. Regarding the contention that the grounds in the reply were not considered, the court held that if an order ignores one or more grounds taken in the reply, it is not a ground for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. Such an order can be assailed through the alternative remedy of appeal. The court noted that the petition was filed within 20 days of the assessment order and directed that if the petitioner files a statutory appeal within a further period of 30 days, it shall be decided on merits, ignoring the delay. The writ petition was disposed of with these observations, declining interference.
The High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, without entering into the merits of the matter, disposed of the writ petition. The Court directed the Appellate Authority, namely the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), National Faceless Appeal Centre, Delhi, to decide the appeal of the petitioner. This decision is to be made expeditiously and in accordance with the law. The appeal pertains to an order passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax dated 07.12.2019. The Court's order focuses solely on ensuring the timely resolution of the pending appeal and does not address the substantive grounds of the appeal itself.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as time-barred and also sans merit. The court found that the assessee's explanation for the delay was vague and made in a casual manner, lacking cogent reasons. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, which held that the law of limitation must be applied with rigor and courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The court found that the assessee did not have a good prima facie case, as the Dy. Commissioner of Income-tax and the ITAT had rightly found the transaction of a gift of Rs. 3 lac each to his daughter and niece from an NRI donor as unexplained. The authorities noted that despite both donor and donee having bank accounts, the money was withdrawn as cash instead of being transferred directly, indicating a lack of genuineness in the gift transaction. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay was rejected, and the appeal was dismissed as barred by time and lacking merit.
The High Court dismissed the appeal as time-barred and sans merit. The Court found that the appellant had not explained the delay with cogent reasons, describing the explanation as vague and casual. The Court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, which held that the law of limitation must be applied with rigor and courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The High Court found the discretion exercised by it in condoning delay to be neither proper nor judicious and thus the order condoning the delay could not be sustained. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay was rejected, and the appeal was dismissed as barred by time. The Court also noted that the appellant did not have a prima facie case, as the authorities had rightly found the transaction of a Rs. 5 lac gift to be an unexplained gift due to the donor and donee having bank accounts but the money being withdrawn in cash instead of being transferred directly.
The High Court held that the impugned order dated March 27, 2022, passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was vitiated due to the procedural impropriety of not considering the petitioner's reply filed on March 15, 2022. The respondents themselves conceded this fact. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order. Liberty was reserved to the department to pass a fresh order in accordance with law after considering the petitioner's reply. The consequential notice dated March 29, 2022, was also set aside with the same liberty. The Court explicitly stated that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. The writ petition was allowed and disposed of.
The High Court held that the validity of an order of a statutory authority must be examined based on the grounds mentioned therein, not on reasons provided in a counter-affidavit. The Court found substance in the petitioner's argument that the impugned order dated 15/09/2020 did not consider the mistake made by the Chartered Accountant as a bonafide mistake, which was a relevant point based on the judgments cited by the petitioner. The Court noted that the application for condonation of delay was maintainable and was not dismissed on the ground of not availing alternative remedies. Therefore, the Court set aside the impugned order and remitted the matter back to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption), Bhopal, to reconsider the application for condonation of delay afresh in accordance with law. The Court explicitly stated it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and directed the authority to decide the application within 45 days.
The High Court held that the issue raised in the writ petition had been put to rest by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 3005/2022 (Union of India Vs Ashish Agarwal). The Apex Court had upheld the validity of the amendment brought to Section 148 of the Income Tax Act. Consequently, the writ petitions were disposed of in terms of the orders and directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned civil appeal and connected appeals. No specific finding on the merits of the petitioner's case was recorded, as the matter was decided based on the Supreme Court's precedent.
The High Court noted that both the petitioner and the respondents jointly submitted that the issue raised in the writ petition had been settled by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 3005/2022 (Union of India Vs Ashish Agarwal). The Apex Court had upheld the validity of the amendment brought into Section 148 of the Income Tax Act. Consequently, the High Court disposed of the writ petitions in terms of the orders and directions issued by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned case and connected appeals. No specific finding on the merits of the petitioner's case was recorded, as the matter was decided based on the Apex Court's ruling and the joint submission of the parties.
The High Court held that the issue raised in the writ petitions had been put to rest by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 3005/2022 (Union of India Vs Ashish Agarwal). The validity of the amendment brought to Section 148 of the Income Tax Act has been upheld by the Apex Court. Consequently, the writ petitions were disposed of in terms of the orders and directions issued by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgment and connected appeals. The ratio decidendi is that amendments to Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, as upheld by the Supreme Court, are binding and resolve disputes concerning their validity. The operative direction was to dispose of the writ petitions in accordance with the Supreme Court's order.
The High Court held that the issue raised in the writ petition had been settled by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 3005/2022 (Union of India Vs Ashish Agarwal). The Apex Court had upheld the validity of the amendment brought into Section 148 of the Income Tax Act. Consequently, the writ petitions were disposed of in terms of the orders and directions issued by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgment and connected appeals. The specific relief granted to the petitioner is not detailed, but the disposal is based on the Apex Court's ruling. No issues were left undecided.
The High Court held that the Income Tax Appeal (ITA No.95/2017) had been disposed of by recording the concession of the counsel for the appellants erroneously. The Court found that even if a concession was recorded, the order could still be recalled due to such a procedural mistake, especially since other appeals were also decided on the same day. The Court found force in the contention raised by the review petitioner (Revenue). Accordingly, the order dated 31.10.2019 was recalled, and ITA No.95/2017 was restored to its original number for further proceedings. The Registry was directed to list the appeal accordingly. No issue was expressly left undecided, as the review petition was allowed, leading to the restoration of the original appeal.
The High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur held that it could not assume jurisdiction over the cause of action raised in the writ petition. This was because the seizure had taken place in Ratlam, but the case was presently pending in Mumbai, following its transfer under Section 127 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The court noted that the petitioner's case was being conducted under the jurisdiction of the DCIT, Central Circle-1(3), Mumbai. Consequently, the bench at Jabalpur was not the appropriate forum to adjudicate the matter. The court did not decide on the merits of the seizure or the petitioner's claim for return of gold and compensation.
The High Court noted that disputed questions of fact pertained to the issue of condonation of delay. It acknowledged that the power to condone delays beyond the prescribed period is vested with the CBDT under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act. Therefore, the Court advised the petitioner to approach the CBDT directly with their prayer for condonation of delay. The Court directed that if the petitioner approaches the CBDT within one month, the Board shall consider the prayer on its own merits, without dismissing it solely on the ground of limitation. The impugned order of the Commissioner was not directly adjudicated upon its merits by the High Court, but the path forward was clarified.
The High Court held that disputed questions of fact pertained to the issue of condonation of delay. It acknowledged that the power to condone delays beyond the prescribed period is vested with the CBDT under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act. Therefore, the Court advised the petitioner to approach the CBDT. The Court directed that if the petitioner approaches the CBDT within one month, the CBDT shall consider the prayer for condonation of delay on its own merits, without dismissing it solely on the ground of limitation. The High Court did not decide on the merits of the condonation request itself but guided the petitioner to the appropriate authority.
The High Court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a breach of any statutory provision requiring the affording of a reasonable opportunity of being heard. A perusal of the assessment order indicated that notices were issued during search and seizure operations, which were responded to by the petitioner. The petitioner's returns and replies were considered before passing the assessment order. Regarding the pending litigation in the Allahabad High Court, the Court noted that it pertained to the validity of the transfer order under Section 127 and that no interim order was granted. Therefore, the pendency of that petition did not assist the petitioners. Concerning the penalty notice, the Court found that it was issued after assessment proceedings revealed tax evasion, making it within the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere, noting that the petitioners had an alternative statutory remedy under the Income Tax Act. The Court granted liberty to the petitioners to avail the alternative remedy before the appropriate Appellate Authority within 60 days, with the appeal to be decided on its merits without being dismissed on limitation alone, provided other statutory requirements were met.
The High Court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a breach of any statutory provision requiring the affording of a reasonable opportunity of being heard. A perusal of the assessment order indicated that notices were issued during search and seizure operations, which were responded to by the petitioner. The petitioner's returns and replies were considered before passing the assessment order. Regarding the pending litigation in the Allahabad High Court, the Court noted that it pertained to the validity of the transfer order under Section 127 and that no interim order was granted. Therefore, the pendency of that petition did not assist the petitioners. Concerning the penalty notice, the Court found that it was issued after assessment proceedings revealed tax evasion, making it within the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere, noting that the petitioners had an alternative statutory remedy under the Income Tax Act. The Court granted liberty to the petitioners to avail the alternative remedy before the appropriate Appellate Authority within 60 days, with the appeal to be decided on its merits without being dismissed on limitation alone, provided other statutory requirements were met.
The High Court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a breach of any statutory provision requiring the affording of a reasonable opportunity of being heard. A perusal of the assessment order indicated that notices were issued during search and seizure operations, which were responded to by the petitioner. The petitioner's returns and replies were considered before passing the assessment order. Regarding the pending litigation in the Allahabad High Court, the Court noted that it pertained to the validity of the transfer order under Section 127 and that no interim order was granted. Therefore, the pendency of that petition did not assist the petitioners. Concerning the penalty notice, the Court found that it was issued after assessment proceedings revealed tax evasion, making it within the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere, noting that the petitioners had an alternative statutory remedy under the Income Tax Act. The Court granted liberty to the petitioners to avail the alternative remedy before the appropriate Appellate Authority within 60 days, with the appeal to be decided on its merits without being dismissed on limitation alone, provided other statutory requirements were met.
The High Court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a breach of any statutory provision requiring the affording of a reasonable opportunity of being heard. A perusal of the assessment order indicated that notices were issued during search and seizure operations, which were responded to by the petitioner. The petitioner's returns and replies were considered before passing the assessment order. Regarding the pending litigation in the Allahabad High Court, the Court noted that it pertained to the validity of the transfer order under Section 127 and that no interim order was granted. Therefore, the pendency of that petition did not assist the petitioners. Concerning the penalty notice, the Court found that it was issued after assessment proceedings revealed tax evasion, making it within the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere, noting that the petitioners had an alternative statutory remedy under the Income Tax Act. The Court granted liberty to the petitioners to avail the alternative remedy before the appropriate Appellate Authority within 60 days, with the appeal to be decided on its merits without being dismissed on limitation alone, provided other statutory requirements were met.
The High Court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a breach of any statutory provision requiring the affording of a reasonable opportunity of being heard. A perusal of the assessment order indicated that notices were issued during search and seizure operations, which were responded to by the petitioner. The petitioner's returns and replies were considered before passing the assessment order. Regarding the pending litigation in the Allahabad High Court, the Court noted that it pertained to the validity of the transfer order under Section 127 and that no interim order was granted. Therefore, the pendency of that petition did not assist the petitioners. Concerning the penalty notice, the Court found that it was issued after assessment proceedings revealed tax evasion, making it within the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere, noting that the petitioners had an alternative statutory remedy under the Income Tax Act. The Court granted liberty to the petitioners to avail the alternative remedy before the appropriate Appellate Authority within 60 days, with the appeal to be decided on its merits without being dismissed on limitation alone, provided other statutory requirements were met.
The High Court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a breach of any statutory provision requiring the affording of a reasonable opportunity of being heard. A perusal of the assessment order indicated that notices were issued during search and seizure operations, which were responded to by the petitioner. The petitioner's returns and replies were considered before passing the assessment order. Regarding the pending litigation in the Allahabad High Court, the Court noted that it pertained to the validity of the transfer order under Section 127 and that no interim order was granted. Therefore, the pendency of that petition did not assist the petitioners. Concerning the penalty notice, the Court found that it was issued after assessment proceedings revealed tax evasion, making it within the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere, noting that the petitioners had an alternative statutory remedy under the Income Tax Act. The Court granted liberty to the petitioners to avail the alternative remedy before the appropriate Appellate Authority within 60 days, with the appeal to be decided on its merits without being dismissed on limitation alone, provided other statutory requirements were met.
The High Court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a breach of any statutory provision requiring the affording of a reasonable opportunity of being heard. A perusal of the assessment order indicated that notices were issued during search and seizure operations, which were responded to by the petitioner. The petitioner's returns and replies were considered before passing the assessment order. Regarding the pending litigation in the Allahabad High Court, the Court noted that it pertained to the validity of the transfer order under Section 127 and that no interim order was granted. Therefore, the pendency of that petition did not assist the petitioners. Concerning the penalty notice, the Court found that it was issued after assessment proceedings revealed tax evasion, making it within the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere, noting that the petitioners had an alternative statutory remedy under the Income Tax Act. The Court granted liberty to the petitioners to avail the alternative remedy before the appropriate Appellate Authority within 60 days, with the appeal to be decided on its merits without being dismissed on limitation alone, provided other statutory requirements were met.
The High Court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a breach of any statutory provision requiring the affording of a reasonable opportunity of being heard. A perusal of the assessment order indicated that notices were issued during search and seizure operations, which were responded to by the petitioner. The petitioner's returns and replies were considered before passing the assessment order. Regarding the pending litigation in the Allahabad High Court, the Court noted that it pertained to the validity of the transfer order under Section 127 and that no interim order was granted. Therefore, the pendency of that petition did not assist the petitioners. Concerning the penalty notice, the Court found that it was issued after assessment proceedings revealed tax evasion, making it within the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere, noting that the petitioners had an alternative statutory remedy under the Income Tax Act. The Court granted liberty to the petitioners to avail the alternative remedy before the appropriate Appellate Authority within 60 days, with the appeal to be decided on its merits without being dismissed on limitation alone, provided other statutory requirements were met.
The High Court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a breach of any statutory provision requiring the affording of a reasonable opportunity of being heard. A perusal of the assessment order indicated that notices were issued during search and seizure operations, which were responded to by the petitioner. The petitioner's returns and replies were considered before passing the assessment order. Regarding the pending litigation in the Allahabad High Court, the Court noted that it pertained to the validity of the transfer order under Section 127 and that no interim order was granted. Therefore, the pendency of that petition did not assist the petitioners. Concerning the penalty notice, the Court found that it was issued after assessment proceedings revealed tax evasion, making it within the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere, noting that the petitioners had an alternative statutory remedy under the Income Tax Act. The Court granted liberty to the petitioners to avail the alternative remedy before the appropriate Appellate Authority within 60 days, with the appeal to be decided on its merits without being dismissed on limitation alone, provided other statutory requirements were met.
The High Court held that the bar excluding the Assessing Authority's jurisdiction to re-open cases relating to assessment years more than four years old is subject to exceptions. These exceptions include the assessee's failure to file a return under Section 139 or failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment. Explanation-1 to the proviso clarifies that if account books or material produced by the assessee were insufficient for the Assessing Officer to discover escaped income despite due diligence, the assessee would not be immune from Section 147. The Court noted that the reasons assigned by the Assessing Officer in the rejection order (Annexure P/7) stated that the material and accounts furnished were insufficient to discover escaped income despite due diligence. The Court found that it could not delve into the sufficiency of these reasons, especially when the case was pending before the Assessing Authority. The Court concluded that the writ jurisdiction under Article 226/227 cannot be invoked to question the sufficiency of reasons for re-opening a case of escaped income, as long as the power exercised and reasons assigned are traceable to a statutory provision. Therefore, the impugned notice was not bereft of jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed, relegating the petitioner to participate in the assessment proceedings or pursue other available remedies.
The High Court held that the writ petition was filed at a premature stage. It noted that a notice under Section 148-A was issued, followed by an order under Section 148-A and subsequently a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for assessment year 2018-19. The court found that the petitioner had been afforded an opportunity to respond to the notice under Section 148. Therefore, the petitioner's objections regarding the change in PAN number could be raised and considered by the authorities during the ongoing proceedings. The court granted liberty to the petitioner to raise all grounds in his reply to the notice, and directed the authority to consider these grounds in a reasoned order after providing a hearing. The court explicitly stated it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter.
The High Court of Madhya Pradesh, acknowledging the petitioner's prayer, allowed the withdrawal of the writ petition. The Court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue the remedy of appeal under Section 246-A of the Income Tax Act. The Court noted that the appeal had been pending for more than one year. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn with the aforementioned liberty granted to the petitioner. No decision was made on the merits of the underlying tax dispute.
The Tribunal held that for issuing a notice under Section 148 after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, sanction from the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner is mandatory under Section 151(1). The assessment year in question was 2015-16, and by the time the notice under Section 148 was issued, more than four years had elapsed. The sanction obtained was from the Joint Commissioner under Section 151(2), which is applicable only to cases other than those falling under Section 151(1). Therefore, the sanction was accorded by an incompetent authority, rendering the notice under Section 148, the assessment order, and the demand notice invalid due to a jurisdictional error. The Tribunal found the reliance on the Rajesh Jhaveri case by the revenue to be inapplicable as the issue of sanction under Section 151 was not debated in that case. The High Court of Mumbai's decision in J.M. Financial and Investment Consultancy Services Private Limited was followed. Consequently, the impugned notice under Section 148, the assessment order, and the demand notice were quashed. The respondents were granted liberty to proceed afresh after obtaining sanction from the competent authority.
The High Court declined to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court reasoned that since the petitioner had already availed the statutory remedy by filing an appeal under Section 246-A of the Income Tax Act against the assessment order, it was not appropriate for the High Court to interfere at this stage. The Court did not comment on the merits of the matter. The writ petition was disposed of with a direction to the appellate authorities (respondents No. 2 & 3) to consider the petitioner's appeal and any application for stay expeditiously. The principle established is that writ jurisdiction is generally not exercised when an effective alternative remedy is available and has been pursued.
The High Court held that while Section 144B(7)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, provides for an opportunity of personal hearing, it does not mandate a "physical" hearing. The Court noted that a notice dated January 20, 2022 (Annexure-P/14) explicitly informed the petitioner that the Faceless Assessment Scheme does not permit physical hearings and advised him to opt for available virtual modes. The petitioner's reply to this notice did not dispute this aspect, indicating acquiescence. Subsequently, another notice dated March 23, 2022 (Annexure-P/18) again apprised the petitioner of the video conferencing option for hearings. Despite this, the petitioner insisted on a physical hearing, which the Court deemed misconceived. The Court found that an opportunity for hearing in accordance with the law was provided through virtual means, which the petitioner failed to utilize. Therefore, the petitioner could not challenge the impugned order and notices, and the petition was dismissed.
The High Court held that while Section 144B(7)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, provides for an opportunity of personal hearing, it does not mandate a "physical" hearing. The Court noted that a notice dated January 20, 2022 (Annexure-P/14) explicitly informed the petitioner that the Faceless Assessment Scheme does not permit physical hearings and advised him to opt for available virtual modes. The petitioner's reply to this notice did not dispute this aspect, indicating acquiescence. Subsequently, another notice dated March 23, 2022 (Annexure-P/18) again apprised the petitioner of the video conferencing option for hearings. Despite this, the petitioner insisted on a physical hearing, which the Court deemed misconceived. The Court found that an opportunity for hearing in accordance with the law was provided through virtual means, which the petitioner failed to utilize. Therefore, the petitioner could not challenge the impugned order and notices, and the petition was dismissed.