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527 orders · Page 10 of 11
The High Court held that the assessment order dated 24.04.2021 was liable to be set aside due to a clear violation of the principles of natural justice. The Court noted that Section 144B(1)(vii) and Section 144B(1)(xxii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, contemplate an application for extension of time and the grant of such extended time. When the petitioner sought a further four days to respond, citing the need to gather materials, the assessing officer was obligated to respond to this request, either by accepting or rejecting it. The lack of a response from the assessing officer led the petitioner to reasonably expect that its request for adjournment had been accepted. Therefore, the assessing officer ought not to have proceeded with the assessment on 24.04.2021. The Court set aside the impugned order. However, to allow the respondents an opportunity to pass fresh orders, the Court directed the respondents to accept objections to the show cause notice if filed by the petitioner within thirty days from the date a link for filing objections is opened. The respondents were directed to consider these objections and pass appropriate orders after granting a hearing, expeditiously, and at any rate, within two months from the date of opening the link.
The High Court followed its common judgment in I.T.A. No. 323/2019 dated 01.11.2021. The Court held that interest income earned from the Treasury by the assessee is not eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) and should be computed and taxed as income from other sources. The questions were answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Specifically, for ITA No. 7/2020, a sum of Rs. 52,01,501/- representing interest income earned from the Treasury was directed to be deleted from the deduction claimed by the assessee and added to the income from other sources. Similarly, for ITA No. 14/2020, a sum of Rs. 28,77,189/- representing interest income earned from the Treasury was directed to be deleted from the deduction claimed by the assessee and added to the income from other sources. The appeals were allowed to this extent.
The High Court set aside the Tribunal's common order. The matters were remitted back to the Tribunal for fresh consideration and disposal on merits.
The High Court followed its previous judgment in a similar case involving the assessee's mother. Both grounds raised by the assessee were rejected, upholding the Revenue's position.
The High Court noted that the business premises of the assessee's partner disclosed documents/accounts that were at variance with the declared returns, with differences under various heads being on the higher side. The Assessing Officer provided an opportunity for the assessee to justify the claims, but the resistance was informal and unconvincing. The Court found that the assessee failed to demonstrate any error in law for examination and that the questions of law framed were unavailable, being simple findings of fact. The Court independently perused the conclusions of the Assessing Officer, CIT(A), and the Tribunal and found no reason to interfere with the orders under appeal. The questions were answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The appeals were dismissed.
The High Court followed its previous judgment in a similar case involving the assessee's mother. Both grounds raised by the assessee were rejected, upholding the Revenue's position.
The tribunal held that the levy of interest under Section 158BFA is automatic for delayed filing of returns. The CBDT's power to waive interest under Section 119(2)(a) is limited to classes of cases, not individual ones. Interest under Section 245D(6A) is an integral part of the settlement and cannot be waived.
The Tribunal found that the Assessing Authority was incorrect in treating 50% of AMC receipts as attributable to spares. For the assessment years 2005-2006, 2007-2008, and 2008-2009, the court fixed 6% of AMC receipts as the value of spares sold.
The High Court held that the assessee's reply regarding the cash receipts was self-serving and not supported by any documentary evidence. The court noted that this gap in evidence could have been rectified before the CIT(A) or the Tribunal, but the assessee merely reiterated the same grounds. The High Court found no merit in the substantial questions of law raised, stating that the assessee failed to justify the details of the cash flow statement. The court concluded that the amounts of Rs. 11,78,300/- and Rs. 5,10,000/- in Assessment Years 2009-10 and 2010-11, claimed as receipts from Ziad through Fathima, were unexplained. Consequently, the question was answered in favor of the Revenue and against the assessee. The appeals were dismissed. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the substantial questions of law raised in these appeals were considered in companion appeals (ITA Nos.68 & 72/2018 and ITA 67/2018) which were disposed of by judgments of even date and 11.03.2022, respectively. The Court relied on the reasons provided in those judgments. Consequently, the substantial questions of law were answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The appeals were dismissed. The Court did not explicitly state its reasoning on each individual question as presented by the assessee, but rather adopted the reasoning from the companion judgments. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeals.
The Tribunal found that the Assessing Authority was incorrect in treating 50% of AMC receipts as attributable to spares. For the assessment years 2005-2006, 2007-2008, and 2008-2009, the court fixed 6% of AMC receipts as the value of spares sold.
The High Court held that the proceedings initiated under Section 153A read with Section 153C were legally sustainable. The court found it difficult to appreciate the assessee's objection to the inquiry, which was initiated by reference to documents recovered during the search, and agreed with the views of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the ITAT, which were based on the seized documents and their connection to the assessee. Regarding the claim of agricultural income, the court noted that the Assessing Officer had called upon the assessee to furnish details and evidence, which were not provided. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the ITAT had both rejected the claim, stating that income cannot be based on mere presumption and that proper procedures for maintaining details of receipts and expenses were not followed. The High Court affirmed these findings, stating that substantial questions of law did not arise and that the findings recorded by all authorities under the Act on this behalf were satisfactory. Therefore, the questions were answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
The Tribunal found that the Assessing Authority was incorrect in treating 50% of AMC receipts as attributable to spares. For the assessment years 2005-2006, 2007-2008, and 2008-2009, the court fixed 6% of AMC receipts as the value of spares sold.
The High Court agreed with the lower authorities that the proceedings under Section 153A read with Section 153C were valid, as they were initiated based on documents recovered in the search that established a connection with the assessee. The claim for agricultural income was also rejected for lack of evidence.
The High Court agreed with the lower authorities that the proceedings under Section 153A read with Section 153C were valid, as they were initiated based on documents recovered in the search that established a connection with the assessee. The claim for agricultural income was also rejected for lack of evidence.
The High Court held that the proceedings initiated under Section 153A read with Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were sustainable. The court found it difficult to appreciate the assessee's objection to the inquiry, which was initiated by reference to documents recovered in the search, and agreed with the views of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the ITAT, which were based on the seized documents and their connection to the assessee. Regarding the agricultural income claim, the court noted that the assessee had not furnished any evidence to establish the veracity of her claim for agricultural income, despite being called upon to do so. The findings of the lower authorities, which rejected the agricultural income claim and treated it as income from other sources due to lack of substantiation, were affirmed. The court found no infirmity in the orders of the CIT(A) and the ITAT. Therefore, the substantial questions of law were answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
The High Court agreed with the Tribunal's decisions. It upheld the additions to the assessee's income from employees' accounts and the loan transaction, finding no substantial question of law to disturb the Tribunal's findings. The court also agreed with the Tribunal's order to remand the valuation issue back to the Assessing Authority.
The High Court agreed with the Tribunal's decisions. It upheld the additions to the assessee's income from employees' accounts and the loan transaction, finding no substantial question of law to disturb the Tribunal's findings. The court also agreed with the Tribunal's order to remand the valuation issue back to the Assessing Authority.
The tribunal held that an employer's circular cannot override the statutory right of an employee to claim reimbursement for actual medical expenses incurred for work-related injuries. It also found the employee's declared monthly income to be higher than what the Commissioner had assessed.
The High Court agreed with the Tribunal's decisions. It upheld the additions to the assessee's income from employees' accounts and the loan transaction, finding no substantial question of law to disturb the Tribunal's findings. The court also agreed with the Tribunal's order to remand the valuation issue back to the Assessing Authority.
The High Court agreed with the Tribunal's decisions. It upheld the additions to the assessee's income from employees' accounts and the loan transaction, finding no substantial question of law to disturb the Tribunal's findings. The court also agreed with the Tribunal's order to remand the valuation issue back to the Assessing Authority.
The High Court found it necessary to reconsider the issue of lease rent classification in light of the lease surrender and the assessee's failure to commence activity. Ancillary issues were also deemed to require revisiting.
The High Court held that the question concerning the addition of amounts from the accounts of the assessee's employees was answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The Court found that the credits in favour of the assessee's employees had been added to the assessee's income, and no substantial objection was raised to treat it as a substantial question for consideration. Regarding the loan to U.K. Mohanraj, the Court found no ground to interfere with the Tribunal's order of remand, agreeing that the reasons given by the CIT(A) for a different view were untenable. The question was answered in favour of the Revenue. Similarly, concerning the valuation of the factory building and plant and machinery, the Court agreed with the Tribunal's view that remand was warranted and found no substantial question of law to disturb the Tribunal's findings. All appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that the question concerning the addition of amounts from the accounts of the assessee's employees was answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The Court found that the credits in favour of the assessee's employees had been added to the assessee's income, and no substantial objection was raised to treat it as a substantial question for consideration. Regarding the loan to U.K. Mohanraj, the Court found no ground to interfere with the Tribunal's order of remand, agreeing that the reasons given by the CIT(A) for a different view were untenable. The question was answered in favour of the Revenue. Similarly, concerning the valuation of the factory building and plant and machinery, the Court agreed with the Tribunal's view that remand was warranted and found no substantial question of law to disturb the Tribunal's findings. All appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that the question concerning the addition of amounts from the accounts of the assessee's employees was answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The Court found that the credits in favour of the assessee's employees had been added to the assessee's income, and no substantial objection was raised to treat it as a substantial question for consideration. Regarding the loan to U.K. Mohanraj, the Court found no ground to interfere with the Tribunal's order of remand, agreeing that the reasons given by the CIT(A) for a different view were untenable. The question was answered in favour of the Revenue. Similarly, concerning the valuation of the factory building and plant and machinery, the Court agreed with the Tribunal's view that remand was warranted and found no substantial question of law to disturb the Tribunal's findings. All appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that the question concerning the addition of amounts from the accounts of the assessee's employees was answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The Court found that the credits in favour of the assessee's employees had been added to the assessee's income, and no substantial objection was raised to treat it as a substantial question for consideration. Regarding the loan to U.K. Mohanraj, the Court found no ground to interfere with the Tribunal's order of remand, agreeing that the reasons given by the CIT(A) for a different view were untenable. The question was answered in favour of the Revenue. Similarly, concerning the valuation of the factory building and plant and machinery, the Court agreed with the Tribunal's view that remand was warranted and found no substantial question of law to disturb the Tribunal's findings. All appeals were dismissed.
The High Court agreed with the Tribunal's decisions. It upheld the additions to the assessee's income from employees' accounts and the loan transaction, finding no substantial question of law to disturb the Tribunal's findings. The court also agreed with the Tribunal's order to remand the valuation issue back to the Assessing Authority.
The High Court of Kerala dismissed the Income Tax Appeal filed by the Revenue as ineffective. The reason for dismissal was the assessee's decision to opt for the 'Vivad Se Vishwas' scheme during the pendency of the appeal. This scheme provides a mechanism for settling tax disputes. The Court granted liberty to the assessee or Revenue to file a petition to recall the order if the assessee's request under the scheme is not taken to its logical conclusion. The specific findings of the ITAT that were under challenge are not discussed as the appeal was disposed of on a procedural ground.
The High Court directed the 3rd respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), NFAC) to consider and pass orders on the stay petition (Ext.P4) within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. Until a decision is taken on the stay petition, all coercive proceedings pursuant to Ext.P2 penalty order under Section 271D of the Income Tax Act, 1961, are to be kept in abeyance. The writ petition is disposed of with these directions. The court did not decide the merits of the appeal or the penalty order itself, focusing solely on the procedural aspect of the stay petition.
The High Court of Kerala did not decide on the merits of the assessment order or the appeal. Instead, the Court acknowledged that the petitioner had already preferred an appeal before the 2nd respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)) and that this appeal was pending consideration. Therefore, the High Court deemed it appropriate to dispose of the writ petition by directing the Appellate Authority to consider the appeal in a time-bound manner. The Court directed the 2nd respondent to consider and pass appropriate orders on Ext.P3 (the appeal) as expeditiously as possible. Furthermore, the Court ordered that no coercive steps shall be initiated against the petitioner pursuant to Ext.P1 (the assessment order) until the disposal of the appeal. The issue of whether the deduction under Section 80P was rightly denied was expressly left undecided by the High Court, as it was a matter for the appellate authority.
The Tribunal disallowed the remuneration to partners, finding no positive proof that they were working partners. However, the High Court allowed the assessee to present additional evidence and decided to remand the matter for reconsideration.
The High Court directed the 3rd respondent (National Faceless Appeal Center) to provide a link to the petitioner within four weeks from the date of receiving a copy of the judgment, enabling him to upload his stay petition. Upon receiving the link, the petitioner must upload the stay petition within two weeks. The 3rd respondent is then mandated to consider the stay petition expeditiously, within four weeks of its uploading. Crucially, all coercive recovery proceedings against the petitioner, pursuant to the assessment order (Ext.P1), are to be kept in abeyance until a decision is passed on the stay petition. The Court noted a pattern of assessees facing difficulties in filing stay petitions under the faceless appeal regime.
The High Court held that the absence of an uploading facility for stay petitions in pending appeals under the Faceless Appeal regime is prejudicial to the principles of the Rule of Law. Consequently, the Court directed the 3rd respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)) to provide a link to the petitioner to upload their stay petition within one month of receiving the judgment. If the petitioner uploads the stay petition within two weeks of receiving the link, the 3rd respondent is to consider it expeditiously, within four weeks of uploading, after hearing the petitioner. Until an order is passed on the stay petition, all coercive proceedings against the petitioner pursuant to the assessment order and related notices are to be kept in abeyance. The Court did not decide on the merits of the stay petition itself.
The High Court of Kerala, while hearing a writ petition, noted that the petitioner had already preferred an appeal (Ext.P2) before the 3rd respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax Appeal) and that this appeal was pending consideration. The Court deemed it appropriate to dispose of the writ petition by directing the Appellate Authority to consider the appeal in a time-bound manner. Accordingly, the 3rd respondent was directed to consider and pass appropriate orders on Ext.P2 expeditiously. Furthermore, the Court ordered that no coercive steps would be initiated against the petitioner pursuant to Ext.P1 penalty order until the disposal of the appeal. The issue of whether the penalty order was validly issued, considering the alleged non-consideration of the Supreme Court judgment, was not decided on merits by the High Court but was to be adjudicated by the appellate authority.
The High Court held that the petitioner should be granted a similar relief as in similar matters where directions were issued to the National Faceless Appeal Centre to provide a link for assessees to upload stay petitions. The Court directed respondents 3 to 5 (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, National E-Assessment Centre) to provide a link to the petitioner to upload an application for stay within four weeks of receiving the judgment. The petitioner was then to upload the stay application within two weeks thereafter. The Competent Appellate Authority was directed to consider and dispose of the stay application expeditiously, within six weeks of its uploading. The appellate authority was also at liberty to consider the appeal itself. Crucially, until the stay application was considered, all coercive proceedings pursuant to the assessment order (Ext.P1) were to be kept in abeyance. The Court did not decide the merits of the assessment order or the appeal itself.
The High Court noted that the counsel for the appellant, Adv. Nisha John, did not press the prayers in the instant Income Tax Appeal. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. No findings were made on the merits of any issue, nor was any ratio decidendi established. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal.
The High Court directed the 2nd respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), National Faceless Appeal Centre) to provide a link to the petitioner to upload their stay petition within three weeks of receiving a copy of the judgment. If the petitioner uploads the stay petition within two weeks thereafter, the 2nd respondent is to consider and pass appropriate orders on it within six weeks. The Appellate Authority was also given liberty to consider prioritizing the disposal of the appeal. Coercive proceedings pursuant to the assessment order (Ext.P1) were to be kept in abeyance until orders were passed on the stay petition. The petitioner was also granted an opportunity of hearing before the disposal of the stay petition. The Court did not decide on the merits of the assessment order or the appeal itself, focusing solely on the procedural aspect of filing the stay petition.
The High Court held that the requirement of a link to move applications in pending appeals is a facet of the right of access to a court of law, which is a fundamental right. The absence of such a link is contrary to the fundamental rights of every individual. The Court emphasized that the Income Tax Department, particularly the Faceless Appeal Centre, must provide an electronic link for appellants to file necessary interim applications, ensuring proper access to justice. The Court directed the 2nd respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)) to make available a link to upload stay petitions within four weeks of receiving the judgment. If the petitioner uploads a stay application after the link is provided, it must be considered and disposed of within two months of uploading. Until the stay application is disposed of, all recovery proceedings pursuant to the impugned order shall be kept in abeyance. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the penalty order was within the jurisdiction of the assessing officer. The Court found that the order under Section 263 (Ext.P2) was an open remand, setting aside the original assessment order in its entirety and vesting the assessing officer with all the powers of an original assessing officer for passing a fresh assessment order. Consequently, the assessing officer, while passing the fresh assessment order (Ext.P3), was empowered to record his satisfaction for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c). This satisfaction was recorded before the conclusion of the assessment proceedings, fulfilling the condition laid down in Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras and Others v. S.V.Angidi Chettiar. The Court distinguished the cited precedents by noting that in those cases, the assessment orders did not record the necessary satisfaction for penalty, unlike in the present case where the post-remand assessment order did. Therefore, the initiation and imposition of penalty were held to be within the assessing officer's authority. The writ petition was dismissed, but the petitioner was granted liberty to pursue statutory remedies against the penalty order.
The High Court did not decide the merits of the assessment order or the appeal. Instead, it noted that the petitioner had already preferred an appeal before the 2nd respondent (appellate authority) and that this appeal was pending. Therefore, the Court deemed it appropriate to dispose of the writ petition by directing the appellate authority to consider the pending appeal in a time-bound manner. The Court directed the 2nd respondent to consider and pass appropriate orders on the appeal expeditiously. Furthermore, the Court ordered that no coercive steps shall be initiated against the petitioner pursuant to the assessment order until the disposal of the appeal. The issue of whether the petitioner satisfied the ingredients of a Primary Agricultural Credit Society and the applicability of the Supreme Court judgment were left to be decided by the appellate authority.
The High Court held that the assessment order (Ext.P3) was passed in violation of Section 144C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the principles of natural justice. The Court noted that the CBDT's circular (Ext.P2), issued under Section 119 of the Act, extended the time for filing objections to the DRP until May 31, 2021. The assessee had filed its objections on May 28, 2021, which was within the extended period and binding on the revenue authorities, as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Thrissur. The Assessing Officer's failure to consider these objections before passing the final assessment order rendered the order invalid. Consequently, the Court set aside Ext.P3. As Ext.P3 was set aside, the DRP's order (Ext.P8), which rejected the objections on the ground that the final assessment order had already been passed, was also set aside. The Court directed the DRP to consider the assessee's objections afresh after providing an opportunity of hearing. The writ petition was allowed.
The High Court of Kerala did not decide the merits of the case. Instead, it noted that the petitioner had already preferred an appeal before the 2nd respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)) and that this appeal was pending consideration. Consequently, the Court deemed it appropriate to dispose of the writ petition by directing the Appellate Authority to consider the appeal in a time-bound manner. The 2nd respondent was directed to consider and pass appropriate orders on the appeal expeditiously. Furthermore, the Court ordered that no coercive steps would be initiated against the petitioner pursuant to the assessment order until the disposal of the appeal. The issue of whether the deduction under Section 80P was rightly denied was expressly left undecided by the High Court.
The High Court held that the appeals were not maintainable. The Court observed that the valuation of the subject appeals was less than the limit stipulated by the CBDT Circular. Citing the Supreme Court's judgment in S.C. Naregal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, which dealt with the effect of CBDT Circulars on appeals below the prescribed monetary limit, the High Court concluded that the present appeals were also covered by this precedent. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed on the grounds of maintainability, without delving into the merits of the case.
The High Court held that the appeals were not maintainable. The Court reasoned that the value in the subject appeals was less than the limit stipulated by the CBDT Circular. Citing the Supreme Court judgment in S.C. Naregal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, which dealt with the effect of CBDT Circulars on appeals, the High Court concluded that the present appeals fell within the purview of the Supreme Court's decision. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed on the grounds of maintainability, without delving into the merits of the ITAT's order. No issues were expressly left undecided.
The High Court directed the 2nd respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), to consider and pass orders on the petitioner's stay petition (Ext.P3) within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the judgment. Until a decision is taken on the stay petition, all coercive proceedings against the petitioner are to be kept in abeyance. The court found that this direction would adequately address the petitioner's apprehension of coercive action pending the adjudication of his appeal and stay application. The core principle applied is ensuring procedural fairness and preventing undue hardship by keeping recovery actions suspended during the pendency of a stay application.
The High Court held that the writ petition could be disposed of with a specific direction. The court noted that the stay application (Ext.P4) was filed before the third respondent but needed to be considered by the second respondent. Consequently, the court directed the third respondent to transmit Ext.P4 to the second respondent within one month of receiving the judgment. The second respondent was then directed to consider and pass orders on the stay petition within two months of receiving it. Crucially, the court ordered that all coercive proceedings against the petitioner be kept in abeyance until a decision is taken on the stay petition. The court did not decide on the merits of the assessment or the appeal.
The High Court held that the penalty orders issued under Section 271(1)(c) and Section 270A of the Income Tax Act are appealable under Section 246A of the Act. Therefore, the Court was of the view that the appropriate remedy for the petitioner was to pursue the statutory remedies available to them. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed. The Court, however, granted liberty to the petitioner to pursue the statutory remedies against the penalty orders (Ext.P1 to Ext.P3). No specific finding was made on the merits of the penalty orders themselves, as the petition was dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy.
The High Court held that the denial of an opportunity to file a stay petition in a pending appeal, due to the absence of a functional link for the assessee to upload such petitions, causes prejudice. The Court reiterated its observation in a previous case (WPC No. 26935/2021) that the right to seek a stay of an impugned order or recovery proceedings pending appeal is a vested right. The Court found that the right to prefer an appeal would not be complete if there is no opportunity to seek a stay. Consequently, the Court directed the 4th respondent to transmit the petitioner's stay petition (Ext.P12) to the 3rd respondent within one month. Upon receipt, the 3rd respondent is to consider the stay application expeditiously, within two months. Pending a decision on the stay petition, all coercive proceedings against the petitioner pursuant to the assessment order are to be kept in abeyance. The remaining questions raised in the writ petition were left open for consideration at an appropriate time.
The High Court of Kerala did not decide the merits of the case. Instead, it directed the second respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), to consider and pass appropriate orders on the petitioner's appeal (Ext.P3) expeditiously. The Court acknowledged that the appeal was pending before the Appellate Authority. As an interim measure, the Court ordered that no coercive steps would be initiated against the petitioner pursuant to the assessment order (Ext.P1) until the disposal of the appeal. The primary focus was on procedural expediency rather than substantive legal determination at this stage.
The High Court of Kerala, while considering the writ petition, directed the second respondent (National Faceless Appeal Centre, Delhi) to consider and pass orders on the petitioner's stay petition (Ext.P3) within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. The court further ordered that all coercive proceedings against the petitioner shall be kept in abeyance until a decision is taken on the stay petition. The reasoning is based on the apprehension of coercive action before the stay petition is adjudicated. The ratio decidendi is that a taxpayer filing a stay petition should be protected from coercive measures until the stay petition is decided, provided it is considered within a reasonable timeframe. No issue was expressly left undecided.