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The High Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the impugned orders of the ITAT. The Court followed the Full Bench judgment in Lakshadweep Development Corporation Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner of Income-tax (TDS). The Full Bench had clarified that Section 273B, with its non-obstante clause, applies to all provisions mentioned therein, including Section 271C in its entirety. Therefore, an assessee can claim the benefit of Section 273B even in cases covered by Section 271C(1)(b) (failure to remit deducted tax), provided they prove a reasonable cause. The Full Bench also held that the Division Bench's view in U.S. Technologies International Pvt. Ltd. that failure to remit tax after deducting it was a more grievous default and outside Section 273B was not acceptable. The High Court found that the non-remittance of tax deducted at source, as in the present case (under Section 194C), is not covered by Section 271C(1)(b) to attract penalty, contrary to the verdict of the departmental authorities and the Tribunal. Consequently, the penalties imposed were not attracted, and the appeals were allowed.
The High Court held that the questions raised in the appeals were no longer res integra and were covered by the Full Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court in Lakshadweep Development Corporation Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner of Income-tax (TDS). The Full Bench had declared that non-remittance of tax deducted at source, as in the instant case (falling under Section 194C of Chapter XVII-B), is not covered by Section 271C(1)(b) to attract penalty. Consequently, the levy of penalty for delayed deposit of TDS was not attracted. The impugned orders of the departmental authorities and the Tribunal, which were contrary to this declaration, were set aside. The appeals were allowed accordingly. The Court noted that the Full Bench judgment clarified that Section 273B, with its non-obstante clause, extends its benefit to cases covered by Section 271C(1)(b), even if it's a more serious default than failure to deduct tax at source. The Court found no reason to send the case back to the Tribunal.
The High Court held that the Revenue's objection regarding the interest income from Treasury and Laxmi Vilas Bank cannot be considered at this juncture. The Revenue had accepted the AO's assessment order granting a deduction of Rs. 69,323/- on this account and did not challenge it before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) or the ITAT. This objection is being raised for the first time before the High Court. Regarding the main issue, the Court held that the assessee, being a Primary Agricultural Credit Society, is entitled to deduction under Section 80P(2)(i)(a). The 5% of interest expenditure disallowed by the AO, once accepted by all authorities, forms part of the interest earned by the Society on amounts lent to its members, thus constituting income from business. Therefore, it is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(i)(a). The Court rejected the Revenue's argument that the Circular relied upon by the Tribunal was inapplicable, noting the use of 'etc.' in the Circular indicated broader coverage. The Court also found that Section 68 of the Act was not applicable to an entry warranted consequent to disallowed expenditure. The questions raised by the Department were found to be without merit and answered in favour of the assessee.
The High Court considered the submissions of both parties. It was deemed appropriate to direct the 3rd respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)) to decide the stay petition (Ext.P5) filed in the pending statutory appeal (Ext.P3) within a period of two weeks from the date of communication of the judgment. As a consequence of the stay petition being pending, the Court directed the respondents to keep the recovery proceedings initiated vide the notice of demand (Ext.P4) in abeyance until the disposal of the stay petition. The Court also noted that the petitioner should cooperate with the 3rd respondent in the disposal of the stay petition. The petition was disposed of with these directions.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition with specific directions. The petitioner was directed to appear before the 3rd respondent, the Appellate Authority, on March 22, 2021, at 11:30 am. The 3rd respondent was directed to consider and hear the applications for condonation of delay (Exts. P5 and P6) and decide them on or before March 26, 2021. The orders on these applications were to be communicated to the petitioner forthwith. The petitioner was also instructed to communicate a copy of the judgment to the 3rd respondent. The parties were to act on the authenticated copy of the judgment. The court did not decide the merits of the delay condonation applications themselves but mandated their timely disposal.
The High Court noted that the value of the subject appeals was less than the ceiling limit stipulated by a CBDT Circular. Citing a Supreme Court judgment on the binding nature of CBDT circulars, the Court applied the dictum to the appeals.
The High Court noted that the value of the subject appeals was less than the ceiling limit stipulated by a CBDT Circular. Citing a Supreme Court judgment on the binding nature of CBDT circulars, the Court applied the dictum to the appeals.
The High Court of Kerala accepted the memo filed by the appellant, Shri. P. Gopalakrishnan alias Dileep, dated February 17, 2021. The memo requested permission to withdraw the appeal because the assessee intended to settle the dispute under the 'Vivad Se Vishwas' scheme. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The reasoning is based solely on the assessee's request and the Court's acceptance of that request, without delving into the merits of the original dispute or the 'Vivad Se Vishwas' scheme itself. No specific ratio decidendi for future cases on the merits of the scheme or appeal withdrawal procedures was established, beyond the procedural acceptance of the withdrawal request.
The High Court of Kerala, comprising Justices S.V. Bhatti and Bechu Kurian Thomas, dismissed the appeals. The decision was based on the joint submission of the counsel for the parties. They stated that the valuation of the subject appeals was below the ceiling limit stipulated by a CBDT circular. Consequently, the court applied the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in S.C. Naregal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, which deals with the effect of binding CBDT circulars. The court found this principle applicable to the appeals on hand, leading to their dismissal. No order as to costs was made. The specific grounds or merits of the appeals before the ITAT were not discussed or decided by the High Court.
The High Court noted that the value of the subject appeals was less than the ceiling limit stipulated by a CBDT Circular. Citing a Supreme Court judgment on the binding nature of CBDT circulars, the Court applied the dictum to the appeals.
The High Court held that the assessee is entitled to the deduction of income earned from surplus funds deposited with the District Co-operative Bank. The Court referred to the Supreme Court's judgment in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, which clarified that Section 80P is a benevolent provision to be read liberally in favour of the assessee. The Court reiterated that Section 80P(4) is a proviso that specifically excludes co-operative banks engaged in banking business with the public and holding an RBI license. Since the assessee is a primary agricultural credit society and not a licensed co-operative bank dealing with the public, it is not excluded by Section 80P(4). The Court found that the grounds raised in the appeals did not merit consideration, as the issue was no longer res integra. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court allowed the appeals and remanded the matters back to the Income Tax Officer. The Court noted that the Supreme Court in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax reversed the Full Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court. The Supreme Court held that Section 80P is a benevolent provision and should be read liberally in favour of the assessee. It clarified that Section 80P(4) excludes co-operative banks engaged in banking business and holding an RBI license, but Primary Agricultural Credit Societies are generally entitled to deduction. However, the Supreme Court also stated that profits attributable to loans given to non-members cannot be deducted. The High Court found that the Assessing Officer's observation about the non-production of books was not expressly considered by the Appellate Authority and the Tribunal. Therefore, the matter required reconsideration by the primary authority to examine the books of accounts and verify the return in light of the Supreme Court's dictum in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. case, making fresh assessment orders. The assessee was granted an opportunity to file a fresh reply.
The High Court noted that the Supreme Court in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. reversed the Full Bench judgment, clarifying that co-operative societies are entitled to deduction under Section 80P, but profits from loans to non-members cannot be deducted. The Court found that the Assessing Officer's observation about unproduced books was not addressed by lower authorities.
The High Court held that the assessee is entitled to the deduction of income earned from surplus funds deposited with the District Co-operative Bank while computing its total income. The Court referred extensively to the Supreme Court's judgment in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax. The Supreme Court had clarified that Section 80P is a benevolent provision to be read liberally in favour of the assessee. It was held that Section 80P(4) is a proviso that specifically excludes co-operative banks engaged in banking business with the public and holding an RBI license. Primary agricultural credit societies, whose primary object is to provide financial accommodation to their members for agricultural purposes, do not fall within the mischief of Section 80P(4), even if they provide loans not strictly related to agriculture. The Court found that the grounds raised in the appeals did not merit consideration as the issue was no longer res integra. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that the authorities below failed to consider the provisions of Section 43B of the Income Tax Act regarding the deduction for gratuity paid before the return filing date. The court also noted that the issue of customer payments was not properly examined.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition with a direction to the 4th respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), National Faceless Appeal Centre) to decide the pending stay petition (Ext.P5) within a period of three months from the date of communication of the judgment. The petitioner was directed to cooperate with the 4th respondent in the disposal of the stay petition. Crucially, the respondents were restrained from effecting recovery pursuant to the notice of demand (Ext.P3) until the disposal of the stay petition. The court did not decide the merits of the assessment or the appeal, focusing solely on the procedural aspect of expediting the stay petition and providing interim relief.
The High Court of Kerala held that since the assessee had availed the 'Vivad Se Vishwas' scheme and received a certificate in Form No. III, the appeals were not pressed. The court accepted this statement and accordingly dismissed the appeals. The reasoning was based on the procedural aspect that if a party opts for a settlement scheme that resolves the dispute, the pending appeals become infructuous. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeals. The court also granted liberty to the assessee to file a petition to recall the order if they were unable to comply with the obligations stipulated in the Form No. III certificate. No issue was left undecided.
The High Court noted that the assessee had availed the 'Vivad Se Vishwas' scheme and received the necessary certificate. Consequently, the appeals were not pressed by the assessee.
The High Court of Kerala did not decide on the merits of the petitioner's claim for deduction under Section 80P. Instead, the Court directed the 3rd respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)) to consider and decide the pending stay petition (Ext.P4) within two months from the date of the judgment. The petitioner was directed to cooperate with the expeditious disposal of the stay petition. Crucially, until the stay petition is disposed of, the respondents were directed to keep coercive action for the recovery of the amount determined under the assessment order (Ext.P2) in abeyance. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions. The issue of the actual entitlement to Section 80P deduction was expressly left undecided by the High Court.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition with directions. It directed the 2nd respondent (National Faceless Appeal Centre) to decide the stay petition filed with the statutory appeal within four months from the date of communication of the judgment. The petitioner was directed to cooperate in the expeditious disposal of the stay petition. Crucially, the Court ordered that all coercive actions for realizing the amount determined by the assessment order at Ext.P1 should be kept in abeyance until the disposal of the stay petition. The petitioner was to furnish a copy of the judgment to the 2nd respondent for necessary action. The issue of the allowability of the Section 80P deduction was not decided on merits.
The High Court, considering the pendency of the statutory appeal and stay petition, disposed of the writ petition with specific directions. The 2nd respondent (National Faceless Appeal Centre) was directed to decide the stay petition filed with the statutory appeal within four months from the date of communication of the judgment. The petitioner was directed to cooperate in the expeditious disposal of the stay petition. Crucially, until the disposal of the stay petition, all coercive actions for realizing the amount determined by the assessment order at Ext.P1 were to be kept in abeyance. The petitioner was also directed to furnish a copy of the judgment to the 2nd respondent for necessary action. The court did not decide the merits of the Section 80P claim.
The High Court of Kerala, considering the submissions and the pendency of the statutory appeal along with the stay petition, disposed of the writ petition with specific directions. The Court directed the second respondent (National Faceless Appeal Centre) to decide the stay petition within four months from the date of communication of the judgment. The petitioner was directed to cooperate in the expeditious disposal of the stay petition. Crucially, the Court ordered that all coercive actions for realizing the amount determined by the assessment order at Ext.P1 should be kept in abeyance until the disposal of the stay petition. The petitioner was also directed to furnish a copy of the judgment to the second respondent for necessary action.
The High Court held that the impugned order at Ext.P4 was merely a show-cause notice. While the petitioner argued that the DVO's report dated May 19, 2020, was not before the AO when the assessment order was passed on May 6, 2020, the Court noted that the PCIT could use such a report for exercising suo motu revisional jurisdiction. The Court found that the matter was at the show-cause notice stage, where the petitioner's objections were invited, and an opportunity of hearing was to be granted. The Court stated that it could not be said that the revisional authority was biased or bent on deciding adversely, as official acts are presumed to be done regularly. Therefore, the issuance of the show-cause notice did not reflect a biased attitude. The Court found no proper reason to interfere with the show-cause notice issued by the revisional authority, which possessed the power to revise the assessment order suo motu. The petition was dismissed.
The High Court held that the appellant (assessee) was not serious in pursuing the remedy, especially after the Court had shown indulgence by condoning the abnormal delay of 2029 days. The appellant's failure to comply with the cost order of ₹10,000/- in each appeal, as directed by the Court on 02.03.2020, was the decisive factor. The Court found this non-compliance indicative of a lack of seriousness. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed. The ratio decidendi is that a litigant must demonstrate seriousness and compliance with court orders, particularly when seeking extraordinary relief like condonation of substantial delays. No costs were ordered. The merits of the ITAT order were not decided.
The High Court found that the appellant was not serious about pursuing the appeals despite the indulgence shown. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court of Kerala decided to close the appeals, taking note of the developments regarding the assessee's availing of the 'Vivad Se Vishwas' Scheme. The Court acknowledged the statement made by the assessee's counsel that applications under the scheme were filed and were being processed. The Court reasoned that keeping the appeals pending would be unnecessary when an alternative mechanism for dispute resolution was being utilized by the assessee. However, to protect the revenue's interests, the Court granted liberty to the appellant (Department) to file a petition to recall the order and revive the appeals. This liberty was specifically granted in two scenarios: (a) if the Department finds that the certificate in Form No.III could not be issued to the assessee, or (b) if the Department issues the certificate and the assessee fails to comply with the conditions imposed therein. The assessee's counsel did not oppose this liberty being granted to the revenue. The appeals were closed with this liberty preserved.
The High Court noted the developments and the statement made by the respondent/assessee regarding their availing of the 'Vivad Se Vishwas' Scheme. The Court acknowledged that the assessee had opted for this scheme to resolve the disputes. Consequently, the Court was of the view that the appeals did not need to remain pending before it. The appeals were closed. However, liberty was granted to the appellant/Department to file a petition to recall the order and revive the appeals if the 'Vivad Se Vishwas' certificate in Form No. III could not be issued to the assessee, or if the assessee failed to comply with the conditions stipulated in the certificate. This liberty was granted to ensure that the Department's interests were not prejudicially affected if the challenge to the ITAT's order needed to be canvassed at a later stage.
The High Court noted the developments and the statement made by the respondent/assessee regarding their availing of the 'Vivad Se Vishwas' Scheme. The Court acknowledged that the assessee had opted for this scheme to resolve the disputes. Consequently, the Court was of the view that the appeals did not need to remain pending before it. The appeals were closed. However, liberty was granted to the appellant/Department to file a petition to recall the order and revive the appeals if the 'Vivad Se Vishwas' certificate in Form No. III could not be issued to the assessee, or if the assessee failed to comply with the conditions stipulated in the certificate. This liberty was granted to ensure that the Department's interests were not prejudicially affected if the challenge to the ITAT's order needed to be canvassed at a later stage.
The High Court held that the Appellate Tribunal erred in allowing the rectification application filed by the Department. The Court reasoned that a subsequent decision taken in another case, or a subsequent change of law or opinion, does not constitute a 'mistake apparent from the record' for the purpose of rectification under Section 254(2) of the Act. The power of rectification is limited to obvious errors visible from the existing record at the time of the original decision and cannot be used to correct errors of judgment or to harmonize contradictory decisions made on different dates. The Court noted that the Tribunal's order of rectification did not demonstrate satisfaction regarding a mistake apparent from the record, but rather relied on a contradiction with a later decision concerning a sister concern. The Court also found that the revenue's argument regarding the explanation to Section 271(1) was not applicable to the facts of the case, as the penalty was levied under Section 271(1)(i)(a), while the explanation pertained to Section 271(1)(i)(b). Consequently, the first question was answered in favour of the assessee, and the remaining questions were rendered infructuous.
The Tribunal held that the entire gross amount of the ceased liability should be treated as income under Section 41(1), disallowing the deduction of tax and interest paid. The High Court, however, held that only the actual amount obtained by the assessee, excluding tax paid and not refunded, should be deemed as profit.
The High Court held that reasons are the heart and soul of an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority. Upon perusal of paragraph 4 of the impugned order, which was the sole paragraph dealing with the request for stay, the Court found that it did not disclose any reasons pertinent to the facts of the case. The rejection of the stay application was considered to be mechanical. Consequently, the Court found the impugned order to be unsustainable as it was devoid of any reasons for rejecting the request for stay. The writ petition was allowed, the impugned order rejecting the stay petition was quashed and set aside, and the matter was remitted to the 2nd respondent for fresh consideration and decision by passing a reasoned order after hearing the parties. Until the disposal of the stay petition, the respondents were directed not to take any coercive steps for recovery of the amount determined in the assessment order under appeal.
The High Court directed the 3rd respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)) to decide the application for condonation of delay (Ext.P13) and, consequently, the stay petition (Ext.P12) within six weeks of the judgment's communication. The petitioner was directed to cooperate in this time-bound disposal. Until these applications were decided, the 1st respondent (Income Tax Officer) was directed to keep recovery proceedings in abeyance. The court reasoned that given the minimal delay of two days, a time-bound disposal of the stay petition by the appellate authority was appropriate, and recovery could be deferred in the interim. The principle is that interim relief can be granted pending disposal of a stay application, especially when the delay is minor, to ensure that the appeal, if admitted, is not rendered infructuous.
The High Court held that the application for condonation of delay filed by the petitioner under Section 119(b) and (c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was still pending before the 2nd respondent. The Court found it necessary in the fitness of things to direct the 2nd respondent to decide the said application after hearing the petitioner. The Court did not decide on the merits of the exemption claim or the validity of the delay itself, but rather on the procedural aspect of the pending condonation application. The operative direction was to the 2nd respondent to consider and pass an order on the application for condonation of delay, ensuring the petitioner's presence and granting an opportunity of hearing, within two months from the date of communication of the order.
The High Court granted the assessee's counsel the liberty to withdraw the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the case. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn, allowing the assessee to pursue the 'Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme'. No issues were expressly left undecided as the appeal was withdrawn.
The High Court granted the liberty as prayed for by the appellant's counsel. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. The Court did not decide on the merits of the original appeal, as the withdrawal was permitted to allow the assessee to pursue an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. No specific issues were decided on their merits.
The High Court of Kerala granted the assessee's counsel the liberty to withdraw the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. The Court's decision was based on the assessee's request to pursue remedies under the 'Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme'. No decision was made on the merits of the original appeal. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn, allowing the assessee to pursue the alternative scheme.
The High Court held that the issues raised in the appeal were no longer res integra and were conclusively decided in favour of the assessee by the Supreme Court's judgment in Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. and others v Commissioner of Income Tax and another. By following this dictum, the High Court set aside the orders under appeal, which included the order of the ITAT, the order of the first appellate authority, and the order of assessment. The appeal was allowed accordingly. The court did not expressly leave any issue undecided. The ratio decidendi is that co-operative societies, including primary credit societies, engaged in banking with their members are entitled to the deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i), and the scope of Section 80P(4) further solidifies this position, as per the Supreme Court's ruling.
The High Court noted that the assessee had applied for the benefit under the 'Vivad Se Vishwas' scheme and that the applications were under process. The Standing Counsel for the Revenue stated that it would take two to three weeks to process the applications and issue the certificate in Form No. III. The Court accepted this statement and directed that the certificate be issued within three weeks from the date of receipt of the judgment. Consequently, the Court held that the appeals need not be kept pending. The Court also granted liberty to the assessee to seek revival of the appeals if the certificate in Form No. III was not issued, or if, despite receiving the certificate, the assessee was unable to comply with its conditions for reasons not discernible at the time. The appeals were closed.
The tribunal accepted the statement that the applications are being processed and will take 2-3 weeks for completion. The appeals were closed with liberty granted to the assessee to seek revival if the certificate is not issued or if they cannot comply with its conditions.
The Court noted that the conditions imposed for condoning the delay were not complied with by the assessee. Consequently, the delay was not condoned, and the appeal was dismissed.
The tribunal accepted the statement that the applications are being processed and will take 2-3 weeks for completion. The appeals were closed with liberty granted to the assessee to seek revival if the certificate is not issued or if they cannot comply with its conditions.
The High Court granted the appellant liberty to withdraw the appeals without prejudice to their rights to avail the benefit under the 'Vivad Se Vishwas' scheme. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court granted the appellant (assessee) permission to withdraw the appeals, as prayed for by their counsel. This permission was granted with the liberty to avail the benefits under the 'Vivad Se Vishwas' scheme. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed. The Court did not decide on the merits of the original dispute that led to the ITAT's order. The ratio decidendi is that an assessee can withdraw an appeal if permitted by the court, especially when seeking to avail a beneficial scheme like 'Vivad Se Vishwas'.
The High Court noted that the assessee had applied for the benefit under the 'Vivad Se Vishwas' scheme, fulfilling the condition of pendency of litigation. The Standing Counsel for the Revenue informed the court that the applications were being processed and a certificate in Form No. III would be issued within two to three weeks. The Court accepted this statement and directed that the certificate be issued within three weeks from the date of receipt of the judgment. Consequently, the Court was of the view that the appeals need not be kept pending. However, acknowledging the assessee's apprehension, the Court granted liberty to the assessee to seek revival of the appeals by filing a petition to recall the order and restore the appeals to the file for hearing on merits, in the event the certificate in Form No. III was not issued, or if issued, the assessee was unable to comply with its stipulated conditions for reasons not discernible at that time. The appeals were closed.
The High Court granted the appellant (assessee) permission to withdraw the appeals, as prayed for by their counsel. This permission was granted with the liberty to avail the benefits under the 'Vivad Se Vishwas' scheme. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed. The Court did not decide on the merits of the original dispute that led to the ITAT's order. The ratio decidendi is that an assessee can withdraw an appeal if permitted by the court, especially when seeking to avail a beneficial scheme like 'Vivad Se Vishwas'.
The High Court noted that the assessee had applied for the benefit under the 'Vivad Se Vishwas' scheme, fulfilling the condition of pendency of litigation. The Standing Counsel for the Revenue informed the court that the applications were being processed and a certificate in Form No. III would be issued within two to three weeks. The Court accepted this statement and directed that the certificate be issued within three weeks from the date of receipt of the judgment. Consequently, the Court was of the view that the appeals need not be kept pending. However, acknowledging the assessee's apprehension, the Court granted liberty to the assessee to seek revival of the appeals by filing a petition to recall the order and restore the appeals to the file for hearing on merits, in the event the certificate in Form No. III was not issued, or if issued, the assessee was unable to comply with its stipulated conditions for reasons not discernible at that time. The appeals were closed.
The High Court allowed the memo to withdraw the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
The High Court of Kerala, vide its order dated February 10, 2021, in I.A No. 1 of 2021 in I.T.A. No. 215 of 2014, dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the case. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal. No issues were expressly left undecided as the appeal was disposed of on a procedural ground.
The High Court of Kerala, upon considering the memo filed by the appellant's counsel, Sri. Christopher Abraham, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Income Tax Department, to withdraw the appeal, ordered the withdrawal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. The Court also noted that refund of proportionate court fee had been granted, taking into consideration the memo filed to withdraw the appeal, as per a previous judgment of the same Court in I.T.A. No.74 of 2016 dated 11.11.2019. The Registry was directed to make the refund of court fee to the extent admissible in law. No other issues were decided on merits.
The High Court considered the memo dated January 14, 2021, filed by the learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Income Tax Department, seeking to withdraw the appeal. The Court ordered that the memo be taken on record and accordingly dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The Court also noted that refund of proportionate court fee had been granted, taking into consideration the memo filed to withdraw the appeal, and directed the Registry to make the refund to the extent admissible in law. No specific findings on the merits of the original appeal were made as it was withdrawn.