ICLEI SOUTH ASIA GROUP GRATUITY TRUST,NEW DELHI vs. CIT(E), NEW DELHI

Similarly, the ld.CIT(E) distinguished the order of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court relied upon by the assessee in the case of Hiralal Bhagwati vs. CIT, reported in 246 ITR 188 (Guj) as factually distinguishable. The ld.CIT(E) observed that in that case, the trust was created to ‘give financial aid to the employees of Gujarat Law Society in cases of death of an employee during his/her service, illness or permanent disability which incapacitates the employee to discharge his/her duties.’ In order to avail the benefits, the staff working in the institution were required to become member on payment of entrance fee and also required to make contribution to the fund, whereas, in the case of the assessee herein, no such requirement of making contribution to the fund by the ITA No.1201/Del/2022; & employees are mandated and it can be seen from the financial statements that the funds have instead been received by the assessee trust from ICRW. Therefore, the ld.CIT(E) held that the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case referred to, supra, would not be applicable in the case of the assessee trust herein as it is only acting as an agent to discharge the statutory liability of ‘ICRW’ of making gratuity payment to its employees.

Further, the ld. CIT(E) observed that despite specific show-cause notice issued by him, the assessee trust had not furnished any documentary evidences indicating the purpose of formation of its trust and, ultimately, concluded that the assessee trust was formed only for the limited purpose of managing the statutory obligations in the form of gratuity payable to the employees of ICRW. Accordingly, he concluded that the said purpose would not fall within the ambit of ‘charitable purpose’ as defined u/s 2(15) of the Act and dismissed the application seeking registration u/s 12AA of the Act. Aggrieved, the assessee is in appeal before us.

At the outset, we find that the observation of the ld.CIT(E) that no documentary evidences were furnished by the assessee trust to prove the purpose of its creation, its financial statements, etc., made by the ld.CIT(E) is factually incorrect and totally contradictory to the observations made in his own order in para 5. In para 5 of the impugned order, we find that the ld.CIT(E) had reproduced the reply given by the assessee in response to show-cause notice issued by him. For the sake of convenience, the reply given by the assessee in that regard before the ld.CIT(E) is reproduced hereunder:-

The trust is formed for the social cause of the employees of International Center For Research on women (ICRW) and the said trust is part of ICRW and is formed for payment of gratuity amount to its employee. There is no further activities carried out by the trust and not involved in any trade or business activities.

A detail of source of fund is enclosed as Annexure-2 5. The amount of Rs 20,16000/- was received from ICRW towards setting up of gratuity fund for the employees of ICRW. Since this amount was received for specific purpose and was to be used for retirement fund of employees of ICRW, it was capital receipt in nature , hence it was capitalised as per normal Indian accounting standards. This was the reason that it was shown in balance sheet instead of instead of income and expenditure account, being corpus fund in nature.

Your honour has presumed that a public charitable trust can not be an employer, This presumption is basically wrong because a public charitable trust to carry out its activity of charity also employs person who are its employees, thus payments towards gratuity of employee is a part of the normal activity of charitable trust. The activities of forming a gratuity trust is only a step , in this direction of payments towards employees of charitable trust.”

The assessee has also placed on record the copy of registered trust deed which is enclosed in pages 1-14 of the paper book. On going through the objects of the said trust and the reply given by the assessee before the ld.CIT(E), we are of the considered opinion that the assessee’s activity falls squarely within the object of ‘advancement of general public utility’ as defined in section 2(15) of the Act. Hence, apparently, the activity carried out by the ITA No.1201/Del/2022; & assessee is a charitable activity as per section 2(15) of the Act. It is not in dispute that the assessee’s case does not fall within the ambit of proviso to section 2(15) of the Act, which provides a restriction, if the charitable purpose is not for advancement of general public utility. Hence, the assessee’s case does not fall within the ambit of proviso to section 2(15) of the Act.

In respect of another observation made by the ld.CIT(E) that any trust that has been created for the purpose of discharging statutory obligations of another parent trust could not be considered as a charitable purpose within the meaning of section 2(15) of the Act, we find that this issue has been addressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ACIT (Exemption) vs. Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority & Ors in Civil Appeal No.21762 of 2017 dated 19.10.2022 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court in respect of appeal in the case of Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) had held as under:-

These provisions of the Act clarify beyond a doubt that the Institute performs statutory functions in the larger public interest of regulating the standards of education, leading up to the profession of Chartered Accountancy and also prescribing standards of professional etiquette, behaviour, and discipline of its members. No other entity or body has the authority in law to perform the functions that the Institute does. Although the Act regulating Chartered Accountancy came into force prior to the Constitution of India, the subject (of regulating professions, etc.) appears to be relatable to the exercise of legislative power under Entry 25 and 26 of the Concurrent List. Furthermore, they also appear to conform to Entry of the Union List (which has been adverted to in Entry 25 of the Concurrent List). As things stand, the Institute is the only body which prescribes the contents of professional education and entirely regulates the profession of Chartered Accountancy. There is no other body authorised to perform any other duties which it performs. It, therefore, clearly falls in the description of a charity advancing general public utility. Having regard to the previous discussion on the nature of charities and what constitutes activities in the ‘nature of trade, business or commerce’, the functions of the Institute ipso facto does not fall within the description of such ‘prohibited activities’. The fees charged by the Institute and the manner of its utilisation are entirely controlled by law. Furthermore, the material on record shows that the amounts received by it are not towards providing any commercial service or business but are essential for the providing of service to the society and the general public.

Similarly, there are several other regulatory bodies that discharge functions which are otherwise within the domain of the State. A singular characteristic of ICAI and other statutory bodies which can be said to regulate specific functions and professions (including the profession of Cost and Work Accountants, and Company Secretary, etc.) is the powers conferred upon them by the statutes to prescribe standards and enforce them through disciplinary sanctions. Therefore, it is held that bodies which regulate professions and are created by or under statutes which are enjoined to prescribe compulsory courses to be undergone before the individuals concerned is entitled to claim entry into the profession or vocation, and also continuously monitor the conduct of its members do not ipso facto carry on activities in the nature of trade, commerce or business, or services in relation thereto.”

Further, we also find that the coordinate Bench of Pune Tribunal in the case of Nashik District Security Guards Board vs. CIT in dated 20.02.2015 had, under similar circumstances, decided the issue in favour of the assessee. For the sake of convenience, the relevant operative portion of the said Tribunal order is reproduced hereunder:- “2. The applicant before us is constituted as per the Maharashtra Private Security Guards (Regulation of Employments and Welfares) Act, 1981. The basic object of establishing the assessee Board is to regulate the employment of Private Security Guards in factories and establishments in the State of Maharashtra and for making better provisions for the terms and conditions of their employment and welfare. The objects of the assessee have noted by the Commissioner in para 2 of his order, as under:-- (i) Protect the casual, unorganized Pvt. Guards, from the exploitation by ensuring full and proper payments of wages due to them and provide security of work. (ii) Ensure that the guards are employed properly. (iii) Ensure benefits to the guards in the form of Provident fund, gratuity, bonus, compensation for injury, medical benefits, etc. (iv) Ensure welfare and safety measures such as housing for the guards, providing scholarships to the wards of the guards, providing full fledge Hospitalization facility, maternity benefits and free medical treatment to the guards, etc. 3. The claim of the assessee was that its activities are falling within the purview of section 2(15) of the Act, which defines 'charitable purpose', as its activities are towards advancement of an object of general public utility. The Commissioner has denied the registration to the assessee by way of the impugned order. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 9. We have considered the aforesaid objection and find that the activities of the assessee Board have not been appreciated by the Commissioner in its correct perspective. It is abundantly clear as per the provisions of the Maharashtra Private Security Guards (Regulation of 9

Respectfully following the aforesaid decision, we hold that any trust that has been created for the purpose of managing the statutory obligations of employees of the parent trust would certainly fall within the ambit of ITA No.1201/Del/2022; & advancement of general public utility and, hence, to be considered as a charitable activity as defined u/s 2(15) of the Act. 14. In view of the aforesaid observations, we direct the ld.CIT(E) to grant registration u/s 12AA of the Act to the assessee trust. Accordingly, the grounds raised

We find that the assessee in this case had filed yet another application in Form No.10A seeking registration u/s 12AA of the Act before the ld.CIT(E) which was also rejected by the ld. CIT(E) vide its order dated 23.03.2021 stating the same reasons as was done earlier which is discussed hereinabove in the previous year. The decision rendered by us hereinabove shall apply mutatis mutandis to this appeal also. In any case, the registration u/s 12AA of the Act granted to the assessee for AY 2018-19 shall be applicable for AY 2021-22 also. Accordingly, the grounds raised by the assessee in are allowed.

In the result, the appeal of the assessee in is allowed. AY 2020-21 (ICLEI South Asia Group Gratuity Trust)

The facts and discussions made by us in for AY 2021-22 in the case of ICRW Group Gratuity Trust (supra) are exactly identical with the facts of this appeal also, save that, this assessee trust has been created for the purpose of managing the statutory obligations in the form of gratuity payable to the employees of “ICLEI” instead of ICRW. Hence, the decision 11

In the result, the appeal of the assessee in is allowed.

To sum up, all the appeals of the assessee are allowed. Order pronounced in the open court on 01.06.2023