NAAZ BUILDERS P.LTD,FARIDABAD vs. DCIT, CENTRAL CIRCLE-II, FARIDABAD

The captioned appeals in the case of 12 different assessees are by the assessee and the revenue preferred against the very same order of the CIT(A)-2, Gurgaon dated 27.02.2018 pertaining to A.Y.2008-09.

“In terms of proviso to Section 153C of the Act, a reference to the date of the search under the second proviso to Section 153A of the Act has to be construed as the date of handing over of assets/documents belonging to the Assessee (being the person other than the one searched) to the AO having jurisdiction to assess the said Assessee. Further proceedings, by virtue of Section 153C(1) of the Act, would have to be in accordance with Section 153A of the Act and the reference to the date of search would have to be construed as the reference to the date of recording of satisfaction. It would follow that the six assessment years for which assessments/reassessments could be made under Section 153C of the Act would also have to be construed with reference to the date of handing over of assets/documents to the AO of the Assessee. In this case, it would be the date of the recording of satisfaction under Section 153C of the Act, i.e., 8th September, 2010. In this view, the assessments made in respect of assessment years 2003-04 and 2004-05 would be beyond the period of six assessment years as reckoned with reference to the date of recording of satisfaction by the AO of the searched person. It is contended by the Revenue that the relevant six assessment years would be the assessment years prior to the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted. If this interpretation as canvassed by the Revenue is accepted, it would mean that whereas in case of a person searched, assessments in relation to six previous years preceding the year in which the search takes place can be reopened but in case of any other person, who is not searched but his assets are seized from the searched person, the period for which the assessments could be reopened would be much beyond the period of six years. This is so because the date of handing over of assets/documents of a person, other than the searched person, to the AO would be subsequent to the date of the search. This, in our view, would be contrary to the scheme of Section 153C (1) of the Act, which construes the date of receipt of assets and documents by the AO of the Assessee (other than one searched) as the date of the search on the Assessee. The rationale appears to be that whereas in the case of a searched person the AO of the searched person assumes possession of seized assets/documents on search of the Assessee: the Page 5 of 8 seized assets/documents belonging to a person other than a searched person come into possession of the AO of that person only after the AO of the searched person is satisfied that the assets/documents do not belong to the searched person. Thus, the date on which the AO of the person other than the one searched assumes the possession of the seized assets would be the relevant date for applying the provisions of Section 153A of the Act. We, therefore, accept the contention that in any view of the matter, assessment for AY 2003-04 and AY 2004-05 were outside the scope of Section 153C of the Act and the AO had no jurisdiction to make an assessment of the assessee's income for that year.

“The decision in RRJ Securities Ltd. (supra) is categorical that under Section 153C of the Act, the period of six years as regards the person other than the searched person would commence only from the year in which the satisfaction note is prepared by the AO of the searched person and a notice is issued pursuant thereto. The date of the Satisfaction Note is 21st July, 2014 and the notice under Section 153C of the Act was issued on 23rd July2014. The previous six AYs would therefore be from AY 2009-10 to AY 2014-15. This would therefore not include AYs 2007-08 and 2008-09. The decision in RRJ Securities Ltd. (supra) is also an authority for the proposition that for the proceedings under Section 153C to be valid, there had to be a satisfaction note recorded by the AO of the searched person. The Court also stated that - This position again stands settled by the decision in RRI Securities Ltd (supra). The fact that the Revenue's SLP against the said decision is pending in the Supreme Court does not make a difference sine the operation of the said decision has not been stayed.”

“The Assessing Officer of the search party and the respondent assessee was the same. In such a factual matrix, the Assessing Officer could not have been initiated and passed an Assessment Order under Section 153C of the Act for the Assessment Year 2007- 08 as the same was beyond the period of six years from the end of Page 6 of 8 the financial year in which the satisfaction note was recorded by the Assessing Officer.”

“Mr. Ashok Manchanda, learned Senior Standing counsel for the Appellant, sought to pursue this Court to reconsider its view in RRJ Securities (supra). The Court declines to do so for more than one reason. First, for reasons best known to it, the Revenue has not challenged the decision of this Court in RRJ Securities (supra) in the Supreme Court. The said decision has been consistently followed by the authorities under this Court as well as by this court. Thirdly, the recent amendment to Section 153 C(l) of the Act states for the first time that for both the searched person and the other person the period of reassessment would be six AYs preceding the year of search. The said amendment is prospective.

14. This proposition has also been upheld and followed by this Tribunal in catena of judgment as cited by the ld. Counsel. Thus, respectfully following the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court we hold that is a terminal date for determining of six preceding assessment years for the purpose of Section 153C r.w.s. 153A would be the date of handing over the documents or the dated of recording of the satisfaction. Admittedly, the six preceding assessment years in the case of the assessee is from Assessment Year 2009-10 and ending on 2014-15. Accordingly, we hold that ld. CIT (A) was correct in law that no assessment u/s.153C was made in respect of Assessment Year 2007-08 and is barred by limitation.

15. Similarly in Assessment Year 2008-09 also we need the same fate which is also beyond the limitation period of six years as stated above. Accordingly, the order of the ld. CIT(A) is upheld and the Revenue’s Appeal is dismissed.”