SHRI SHYAM SUNDER AGRAWAL, HUF,JANJGIR CHAMPA vs. THE INCOME TAX OFFICER, WARD-2(2),BILASPUR, BILASPUR(CG)

The present appeal filed by the assessee is directed against the order passed by the CIT(Appeal), Bilaspur dated 09.03.2016, which in turn arises from the order passed by the A.O under Sec. 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (in short ‘the Act’) dated 28.03.2013 for the assessment year 2010-11.

At the very outset, it transpired that this appeal is time-barred by 339 days. The assessee has filed an “affidavit” explaining the reasons leading to the delay. On a perusal of the affidavit, I find that there is no genuine cause leading to the substantial delay in filing of the appeal. The Ld. Authorized Representative (for short ‘AR’) for the assessee also could not come forth with any plausible explanation as regards the inordinate delay involved in preferring of the present appeal. It was claim of the Ld. AR that the delay involved in filing of the appeal had occasioned, for the reason that the assessee’s regular counsel was not well versed as regards the procedure involved in filing of the present appeal. However, the lackadaisical conduct of the assessee can safely, or in fact inescapably be gathered from the fact that he had even in the course of the proceedings before the CIT(Appeals) adopted a callous approach and had despite having

Pre contra, the Ld. Departmental Representative (for short ‘DR’) vehemently submitted that the inordinate delay of 339 days did not merit to be condoned, specifically considering the past conduct of the assessee appellant.

On a careful perusal of the orders of the lower authorities, and the material available on record, I find that the assessee has not been able to come forth with any justifiable reason leading to the substantial delay of 339 days in filing of the present appeal. Be that as it may, considering the fact that the assessee had without any justifiable reason evaded his participation in the proceedings before the CIT(Appeals), it can safely be concluded that the assessee is habitually adopting a lackadaisical approach before the appellate authorities. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances into consideration, I am of the considered view that as there is an inordinate delay in filing of the present appeal, for which the assessee had pathetically failed to come forth with any justifiable reason, therefore, as stated by the Ld. DR and, rightly so, the same does not 4 Shyam Sunder Agrawal HUF Vs. ITO-2(2), Bilaspur (C.G.) ITA No.60/RPR/2017 merit condonation. The assessee has not given any genuine reasons for the delay in filing of the present appeal either in affidavit filed before us; or in the course of the hearing of the appeal. In fact, if we condone the inordinate delay involved in the present case where the assessee had consistently adopted a non-cooperative attitude and had been evading participation in the proceedings before the lower appellate authority, then, it would send a wrong message and would lay down a wrong precedent for the times to come. I am of a strong conviction that as the assessee had on account of his callous conduct and a habitual lackadaisical approach delayed the filing of the present appeal by a substantial period of 339 days, therefore, the application filed by him seeking condonation of the delay therein involved does not merit acceptance and is liable to be rejected at the threshold.

The Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, Mumbai in the case of M/s. Phoenix Mills Ltd. Vs. Asstt. CIT in for A.Y.1999-2000, dated 23.03.2020, had held that where an application for condonation of delay has been moved bonafide, then, the Court would normally condone the delay, but where the delay has not been explained at all and in fact there is an unexplained and inordinate delay coupled with negligence or sheer

I may herein observe that in the case of State of West Bengal Vs. Administrator, Howrah 1972 AIR SC 749, the Hon’ble Apex Court had held that the expression “sufficient cause” should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, particularly when there is no motive behind the delay. The expression “sufficient cause” will always have relevancy to reasonableness. The action

Also, I may herein draw support from a Third Member decision of co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal, Chennai in the case of Jt. CIT Vs. Tractors and Farm Equipments Ltd. (2007) 104 ITD 149 (Chennai), wherein a distinction was drawn between normal delay and inordinate delay. It was held as under: “A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach, but in the latter case no such consideration may arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach.”

Also, as observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chotelal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR (1962) 361 (SC) that seeker of justice must come with clean hands, therefore, now when in the present case the reasons advanced by the assessee do not reveal any good and sufficient reason justifying condonation of the substantial delay involved in preferring of the present appeal, therefore, I decline to condone the delay of 339 days and, thus, without adverting to the merits of the case dismiss the appeal of the assessee as barred by limitation.

In the result, appeal of the assessee is dismissed in terms of my aforesaid observations.