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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, PUNE BENCH “B”, PUNE
Before: SHRI INTURI RAMA RAO & Ms. ASTHA CHANDRA
PER INTURI RAMA RAO, AM:
This is an appeal filed by the assessee directed against the order of National Faceless Appeal Centre, Delhi, dated 20.12.2023 for the assessment year 2014-15.
Briefly, the facts of the case are that the appellant is a company incorporated under the provisions of Companies Act, 1956. It is engaged in the business of dealing in Four Wheeler vehicles of different Automobile companies. The Return of Income for the A.Y. 2014-15 was not filed voluntarily filed under the provisions of section 139(1) of the Act. Subsequently, based on the information that the appellant was in receipt of income under the heads “Income from House Property” and “Income from Other Sources” on which tax was deducted at sources
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under the provisions of section 194B and 194A, the Assessing Officer (AO) formed opinion that income escaped assessment of tax. Accordingly, the AO issued notice u/s.148 to the appellant on 19.03.2021. The said notice was remained uncomplied with. Even the notice issued u/s.143(2) was also remained uncomplied. In the circumstances, the AO was constrained to pass the ex parte order u/s.147 r.w.s.144 of the Act assessing the rental income of Rs.72,00,000/- and interest income of Rs.23,391/-. The AO also initiated penalty proceedings u/s.271(1)(c) by holding that the appellant is guilty of ‘concealment of particulars of income’. Accordingly, show cause notice u/s.274 was issued to the appellant. In response to the show cause notice the appellant had not filed any explanation. In the circumstances, the AO vide order dated 22.09.2022 levied penalty of Rs.22,32,030/- /s.271(1)(c) of the Act.
Being aggrieved by the above penalty order, an appeal was filed before the CIT(A)/NFAC who vide impugned order dismissed the appeal in limine by holding that the appeal was filed with a delay of 312 days and there was no sufficient or good reason for condoning the inordinate delay of more than 312 days.
Being aggrieved, the appellant is in appeal before the Tribunal in the present appeal.
Before us, the ld. AR submits that the appellant filed a petition before the CIT(A)/NFAC praying for condonation of delay. It was stated that the appellant had the knowledge of passing the penalty order only 17.07.2023 when he visited the Income-tax office and collected the penalty order. The appeal was filed before the CIT(A)/NFAC on 31.08.2023, within 30 days from the date of its receipt of the penalty order, thus resulting in the delay of 14 days, which was recorded on page
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7 of the impugned order. He further submits that the period of limitation should be reckoned from the date of knowledge of the order but not from the date on which the impugned order was passed.
We heard the rival submissions and perused the relevant material on record. The ld. Sr. DR had not controverted the averments made in the petition submitted before the CIT(A)/NFAC praying for condonation of delay. We are in agreement with the argument of the ld. AR that, for computing the period of limitation, the date of knowledge of the order alone has to be reckoned and not the date on which the order has been passed. Further, we find that the appellant company had the knowledge of passing of the impugned order only on 17.07.2023 and the appeal came to be filed on 31.08.2023. It is trite law that for the purpose of reckoning the period of limitation, it is the date of the knowledge/receipt of the appellate order which has to be taken into consideration and not the date of passing the order. We would like to make reference to a judgment passed by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Golden Times Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs. DCIT in W.P.(C) No.402/2020, dt. 13-01-2020 wherein the Hon’ble High Court held that “A person who is aggrieved or concerned with an order would legitimately be expected to exercise his rights conferred by the provision and unless the order is communicated or is known to him, either actually or constructively, he would not be in a position to avail such a remedy”. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced below:
“10. Be that as it may, the real question before us is as to what would be the relevant date for the purpose of commencement of period of limitation. To hold the date of the order to be the relevant date for the purpose of calculating the period of six months envisaged under Section 254(2) of the Act, can lead to several absurd and anomalous situations. An order passed without the knowledge of the aggrieved party, would render the remedy against the order meaningless as the same would be lost by limitation while the person aggrieved would not even know that an order has been passed. Such an interpretation would
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not advance the cause of justice and would not be the correct approach and thus cannot be countenanced. A person who is aggrieved or concerned with an order would legitimately be expected to exercise his rights conferred by the provision and unless the order is communicated or is known to him, either actually or constructively, he would not be in a position to avail such a remedy. The words “six months from the end of the month in which the order was passed” therefore, cannot be given a narrow and restrictive interpretation. There are several decisions of the Apex Court and other High Courts, where similar question came up for consideration. The Courts have always leaned in favour of an interpretation which would enable an aggrieved party to avail its remedy in a meaningful manner, so that the right conferred by a provision does not remain fanciful or illusionary”. In view of the settled position of law, we are of the considered opinion that there is a delay of 14 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), the period of limitation should be reckoned from the date of knowledge of the order. The CIT(A)/NFAC ought not to have dismissed the appeal in limine without condonation of delay. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the CIT(A)/NFAC ought to have condoned the delay of 14 days and adjudicated the issues in appeal. In the circumstances, we deem it appropriate to remit the matter back to the file of CIT(A)NFAC for denovo disposal of the issues in accordance with law, after affording due opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is partly allowed for statistical purposes.
Order pronounced on this 05th day of June, 2024.
Sd/- Sd/- (ASTHA CHANDRA) (INTURI RAMA RAO) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER पुणे / Pune; �दनांक / Dated : 05th June, 2024 Satish
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आदेश क� �ितिलिप अ�ेिषत / Copy of the Order forwarded to : अपीलाथ� / The Appellant. 1. ��यथ� / The Respondent. 2. 3. The Pr.CIT concerned 4. िवभागीय �ितिनिध, आयकर अपीलीय अिधकरण, “B” ब�च, पुणे / DR, ITAT, “B” Bench, Pune. गाड� फ़ाइल / Guard File. 5. आदेशानुसार / BY ORDER, // True Copy // Senior Private Secretary आयकर अपीलीय अिधकरण, पुणे / ITAT, Pune