YESHWANT CHABAJI DHANKUDE,PUNE vs. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE-2(4), PUNE

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ITA 825/PUN/2024Status: HeardITAT Pune21 June 2024AY 2009-10Bench: SHRI SATBEER SINGH GODARA (Judicial Member), SHRI INTURI RAMA RAO (Accountant Member)3 pages

In favour of the assessee: the assessee's appeal was allowed. From the AI summary of this appeal.

AI SummaryAllowed

What did the Tribunal hold?

The Tribunal held that the initiation of Section 153C proceedings was beyond the statutory limit of six assessment years preceding the search. Therefore, the proceedings and the consequent assessment were quashed.

What were the facts?

The Assessing Officer initiated proceedings under Section 153C for Assessment Year 2009-2010 based on a search conducted on 19.12.2017 and satisfaction dated 17.01.2020. The assessee argued that these proceedings were initiated beyond the prescribed six assessment years.

What were the issues?

The primary issue was the validity of Section 153C proceedings initiated beyond the prescribed time limit of six assessment years from the date of search or satisfaction.

Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?

Section 153C,Section 143(3),Section 148

AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, PUNE “B” BENCH : PUNE

Before: SHRI SATBEER SINGH GODARA & SHRI INTURI RAMA RAO

Hearing: 20.06.2024Pronounced: 21.06.2024

Order No. ITBA/APL/S/250/2023-24/1062317848(1), dated 09.03.2024, in proceedings u/s.153C r.w.s.143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short “the Act”).

Heard both the parties. Case file perused.

2.

It emerges during the course of hearing that there arises a fundamental question of validity of the impugned sec.153C proceedings itself. There could be hardly any dispute that sec.153C(1) prescribes the period of six assessment years

2 ITA.No.825/PUN./2024 as “immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is conducted or requisition is made”. This is further followed by the first proviso thereto that the date of such initiation of search shall be construed “as reference to the date of receiving the books of account or documents or assets seized or requisitioned by the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person”.

3.

We notice keeping in mind this clinching statutory provision that the departmental authorities herein had carried out the impugned search on 19.12.2017 followed by the Assessing Officer satisfaction dated 17.01.2020 initiating sec.153C proceedings against the assessee for the impugned assessment year 2009-2010 which admittedly is well beyond the period of six assessment years counted from the date of satisfaction u/sec.153C(1) read with the foregoing first proviso.

3.1. Faced with this situation, Mr. Sourabh Nayak vehemently argued that such proceedings could be indeed treated as to have been issued u/sec.148 of the Act or the same do not get invalidated in above terms. We are afraid that such an interpretation of the foregoing statutory provision is hardly permissible once the legislative mandate is very much clear regarding the clinching aspect of “six assessment years”.

We thus deem it as a fit case to quash the impugned sec.153C

3 ITA.No.825/PUN./2024 assessment herein dated 11.05.2021 itself for this precise reason. Ordered accordingly.

All other pleadings on merits stand rendered academic.

4.

This assessee’s appeal is allowed in above terms.

Order pronounced in the open Court on 21.06.2024.

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