V HANUMANTHARAYAPPA vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF MARCH, 2020

PRESENT

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.N. SATYANARAYANA

AND

THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM

WRIT PETITION NO.44577 OF 2017(S-KAT)

BETWEEN:

V HANUMANTHARAYAPPA AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS, S/O VENKATACHALAIAH, WORKING AS TAHSILDAR GRADE-I BANGALORE NORTH TALUK BANGALORE DISTRICT ...PETITIONER (BY SRI.P.S.RAJAGOPAL, SR.COUNSEL FOR SRI.JAYANTH DEV KUMAR, ADVOCATE)

AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL & ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS VIDHANA SOUDHA, DR B.R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI BENGALURU-560 001

(BY SRI.VENKATESH DODDERI, AGA FOR R1 & R2; SMT.A.D.VIJAYA, ADVOCATE FOR R3)

THIS PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO CALL FOR THE ENTIRE RECORDS LEADING TO THE ORDER DATED 24.08.2016 IN APPLICATION NO.3297 OF 2017 PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL AND QUASH ORDER DATED 04.07.2017 PASSED BY THE KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, BENGALURU IN APPLICATION NO.3297 OF 2017 (UNDER ANNEXURE-A TO THE WRIT PETITION) AND CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE APPLICATION NO.3297 OF 2017, AND GRANT ALL CONSEQUENTIAL RELIEFS.

THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON 10.12.2019 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER THIS DAY, SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM J., MADE THE FOLLOWING:

ORDER

The petitioner joined the services of State Government as Tahsildar Grade-I with effect from 03.06.2008. The petitioner worked as Tahsildar Grade-I between 01.03.2010 and 22.11.2011 in Coorg District, which is the relevant period of time, wherein the acts done during the course of his official duty is the subject matter of joint departmental inquiry. The petitioner approached the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal (for short ‘the Tribunal’) being aggrieved by the order dated 10.05.2017 passed by the respondent No.2, by which departmental inquiry was entrusted to the Upa-Lokayukta under Section 14(A) of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, on the basis of report of Upa-Lokayukta dated 02.07.2015 submitted under Section 12(3) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 (for short ‘the Act’).

Tribunal was that it is after conclusion of this proceedings, more particularly conducting of survey and consequently, on receipt of survey report and sketch, the present petitioner directed the Revenue Inspector one Jayakumar to conduct inspection again and prepare checklist in that regard for further action. In terms of the said order of the petitioner, the Revenue Inspector Jayakumar conducted the inspection and furnished checklist along with his note stating that the land could be granted in terms of law as the applicant had been in possession for a long time. The contention of the petitioner that entire file relating to grant of land in Form No.53 in Sy.No.219/1 was placed before the Committee for approval of said grant. It is only in terms of proceedings of the Committee, the petitioner issued an order indicating the decision of the Committee granting land in favour of Smt. M.C.Tara. The contention of the petitioner

before the Tribunal was that it was not a solitary decision taken by the Committee on 01.04.2011 as there were 69 grants made on the day and the proceedings of the Committee would indicate that it was a collective decision of the Committee on collective files and not selective files.

power of judicial review is permissible only (i) where the disciplinary proceedings are initiated by an incompetent authority; (ii) such proceedings are in violation of any statutory rule of law; (iii) where there has been gross violation of principles of natural justice; and (iv) on account of proven bias and mala fides. The Tribunal while rejecting the application has proceeded to hold that none of the above grounds are present in the case on hand which would warrant interference and on these set of reasonings, the Tribunal rejected the application.

(2006) 3 SCC 251 2. Babu Verghese & Others v. Bar Council of Kerala & Others

(1999) 3 SCC 422 3. Sukhdev Singh & Others v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi & Another

(1975) 1 SCC 421 4. Mohinder Singh Gill & Another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Others

(1978) 4 SCC 405 5. Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India & Others

(1987) 4 SCC 611 6. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K.Ratna & Others

(1986) 4 SCC 537 7. Chief of Army Staff & Others v. Major Dharam Pal Kukrety

(1985) 2 SCC 412 8. The Barium Chemical Ltd & Another v. SH.A. J. Rana & Others

(1972) 1 SCC 240 9. Chairman, Life Insurance (2013) 6 SCC 530

Corporation of India & Others v. A.Masilamani 10. M/s. Maharana Mills (Private) Ltd v. The Income Tax Officer, Porbander AIR 1959 SC 881 11. Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India & Others (1999) 7 SCC 409

and would point out several laches and infractions of mandatory procedure. He would vehemently argue and submit that under Section 9 of the Act which is a pre-investigation stage, the authorities are required to notify and secure explanation from the Government servant against whom the investigation is initiated and relying on Section 9 of the Act, he would submit to this Court that though the petitioner had submitted reply, the authority has not conducted investigation post petitioner offering explanation and in this background, learned Senior Counsel would submit that the report prepared under Section 12(3) of the Act stands vitiated for want of investigation as per Section 9(3)(b) of the Act. Learned Senior Counsel would also

rely on Rule 14(A)(iii) of Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 and would submit to this Court that an employee against whom an investigation is initiated is required to be heard at two stages, one at pre-investigation stage and the second which would be of much significance is after seeking an explanation.

contentions of the petitioner. While relying on this laches on the part of authority, he would contend that the authority has not at all attended the case of the petitioner, let alone consideration and examination of such contention. Learned Senior Counsel while questioning the reasoning assigned by the Tribunal would contend before us that the very Tribunal in earlier application No.2266/2016 had rightly allowed the application and set aside earlier order recommending departmental inquiry. In fact after remand, the order of the respondent – authority is a reproduction of earlier order and there is absolutely no reference to the case of the petitioner. On the contrary, there are some fresh allegations attributed towards the petitioner which were not at all notified to the petitioner. Learned Senior Counsel would further contend that the Tribunal has not at all examined all these material aspects which goes to the root of the

case. He would further submit that the impugned order passed by the respondent – State as per Annexure-A24 to the writ petition is biased and on perusal of the order it only indicates that the authority has given stress more on the case of Jayakumar and there is absolutely no reference to the petitioner’s case and in this background, he would submit that the Tribunal erred in rejecting the application and would request this Court to quash the order of the Tribunal.

violation of the procedure contemplated under Sections 7, 9(3), 10 and 12(3) & (4) of the Act, he would request this Court to dismiss the writ petition. Learned AGA in support of his contention would rely on the judgments of this Court in Vijay Kumar G. Sulakhe .vs. State of Karnataka and others[LAWS(KAR)2018 9 242] and also on the proposition relied on by this Court in the case of The State of Karnataka, Dept. of Transport and another .vs. Sri. Shivanand B. Magadum and others[WP.No.104460 of 2018 and connected matter disposed of on 10.9.2018].

order has not at all meticulously examined the report sent by Upa-Lokayukta and the order dated 15.10.2015 is only confined to Jayakumar, Revenue Inspector. The Tribunal further proceeded to hold that the mandatory requirement of examining the petitioner’s case was not done. The Tribunal was of the view that the respondent – authority though did examine the case of Jayakumar, Revenue Inspector, however, found that similar exercise was not carried in regard to petitioner’s case and the Tribunal on this set of material facts, proceeded to hold that the entrustment of departmental inquiry against the petitioner stands vitiated on account of non- compliance of Section 12(4) of the Act and accordingly, the order dated 15.10.2015 was set aside by the Tribunal reserving liberty to the authority to take further action in the matter in accordance with law.

of the petitioner in the impugned order under challenge. Leave out considering the case of the petitioner and his objections, the respondent No.1 – authority has not taken note of the explanation submitted and the grievance of the petitioner are also not examined and since there is absolutely no attempt made by the authority to attend the case of the present petitioner herein, question of examination of the report would not arise in the present case on hand.

Commission/Commission for Women/Commission for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes have inherent power to take suo motu cognizance of any offence and order for investigation and hence, the entrustment of departmental inquiry would not warrant interference is contrary to the provisions of Section 12(4) of the Act. The Tribunal while coming to the above said conclusion has not at all examined its earlier order which was passed in Application No.2266/2016. The Tribunal has not examined the order of entrustment which was earlier set aside by the Tribunal. The earlier order dated 15.10.2015 and the present impugned order of entrustment dated 10.05.2017 are replica of each other and in spite of the earlier order of the Tribunal setting aside entrustment for non- examination which is a mandatory requirement under Section 12(4), the Tribunal in the second round of litigation was required to examine the impugned order

passed by the authority under Section 12(4). In spite of direction by the Tribunal, the authority for the reasons best known, has not at all taken up the case of the present petitioner and hence, the finding of the Tribunal that entrustment of departmental inquiry is in accordance with law is not at all sustainable.

paragraph of the impugned order dated 10.05.2017 and if this specific averment made at para 4 of the application in Application No.3297/2017 is examined, then the finding of the Tribunal that the order of the authority under Section 12(4) thereby ordering for entrustment does not suffer from any infirmities is contrary to the material on record and also there is a specific pleading which clearly demonstrates that even on the second occasion, the respondent – authority has not at all examined the case of the petitioner.

fides. The findings of the Tribunal that none of the above grounds are present warranting interference is palpably erroneous. The impugned order dated 10.05.2017 passed by the authority clearly discloses gross non-application of mind and the same is vitiated by absence of reasons and gross discrimination while dropping the case against Jayakumar. The impugned order does not indicate that the authority has examined the report sent by the Lokayukta under Section 12(3) of the Act and this would clearly indicate that there is violation of mandatory provision contemplated under Section 12(4) of the Act. The petitioner has submitted a detailed reply on 10.09.2014 and has raised several vital defence in his reply. There is absolutely no reference to the reply submitted by the petitioner and on this count, the impugned order passed is in gross violation of principles of natural justice and the Tribunal erred in

not interfering with the same. The authorities have taken pain to consider the case of Jayakumar on both occasions and no reasons are forthcoming insofar as the petitioner’s case is concerned. This clearly indicates the bias and malafides on the part of the authority and on this count also the Tribunal ought to have interfered and set aside the impugned order dated 10.05.2017. The Tribunal has also not examined the material fact that after remand, the authority has added an additional paragraph attributing fresh allegations and without notifying the present petitioner and affording an opportunity, the impugned order is passed. On this count also, the Tribunal ought to have set aside the order of entrustment of departmental inquiry.

legal submissions in regard to powers of the Upa- Lokayukta and it is bounden duty to exercise powers strictly within the four corners of statutes and by relying on the Hon’ble Apex Court judgment, learned counsel has taken us to the impugned order and has been able to demonstrate that the strict procedure for taking up investigation and conduct investigation and the mandatory rules which requires the authority to examine and pass orders have been meticulously examined by us. Learned Senior Counsel has also cited judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court and has taken us to the order under challenge thereby demonstrating that the validity of the order must be judged by the reasons mentioned in the order itself and while doing so, has tried to convince us that natural justice is applicable to both administrative orders and quasi judicial orders and that natural justice cannot be stumped out when there is right to

the statutory procedure. It is also relevant to note that several questions are raised by the learned Senior Counsel in regard to the provisions of Sections 6, 7(2), 9(3)(a), 8(b) and 10 of the Karnataka Lokayuktha Act. However, all these grounds are not urged in the application filed by the petitioner before the Tribunal. However, the authority while accepting the report submitted by the Lokayuktha under Section 12(3), is required to examine Section 12(3) report in terms of Sections 7(2), 9(3)(a) and Section 10 of Karnataka Lokayuktha Act and thereafter pass appropriate orders.

departmental inquiry, we are of the view that there is breach of fundamental procedure and we hold that the impugned order dated 10.05.2017 is not only contrary to its earlier order, but the same is contrary to the proposition laid down by this Court in the case of Karnataka Lokayuktha, Bangalore vs. H.N. Niranjan & Another reported in 2017 (2) AKR 463 and similar identical cases.

appropriate orders under Section 12(4) of the Act by following due procedure as contemplated under the Act. With these observations, the writ petition is disposed of.

Sd/- JUDGE

Sd/- JUDGE