G K RUDRAMUNISWAMY vs. THE DISTRICT CASTE VERIFICATION COMMITTEE

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 17TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2020 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE P.B. BAJANTHRI WRIT PETITION NO.56187/2013(GM-CC) BETWEEN:

G.K. RUDRAMUNISWAMY LATE G.K VEERABHADRIAH, AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS., SENIOR ASSISTANT, NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD., R/O HARIHARA TQ AND DIST. DAVANAGERE

… PETITIONER

(BY SRI. PRAVEEN KUMAR RAIKOTE, ADVOCATE)

AND:

COMMITTEE, SHIMOGA DISTRICT,

SHIMOGA BY ITS CHAIRMAN,

AND DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,

SHIMOGA – 577 201.

BANGALORE DIVISION,

BANGALORE – 01

PODIUM BLOCK AMBEDIKAR VEEDI

BANGALORE - 01

... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI. C JAGADISH FOR R1 & R2 (MA NOT FILED))

THIS WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER AT ANN-A DT.16.1.2001 PASSED BY THE R1 AND ETC.,

THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING - B GROUP PHYSICAL HEARING/VIDEO CONFERENCING HEARING (OPTIONAL), THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-

ORDER

In the instant petition, petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs:-

a) A writ of certiorari and quash the impugned order at Annexure-A dated 16.01.2001 passed by the respondent No.1.

b) A writ of certiorari and quash the impugned order at Annexure-B dated 15.11.2002 passed by the respondent No.2 vide VC Appeal No.22/2000-2001.

c) Any other appropriate writ order or direction that this Hon’ble Court deems just in the circumstances of the case.

the SC category. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 16.01.2001, petitioner preferred an appeal before the Divisional Commissioner, Bangalore Division. Consequently, petitioner filed W.P.No.46226/2002 (GM-CC) and it was withdrawn on 30.06.2003 (Annexure-D) seeking permission to file a fresh writ petition or to challenge the proceedings in respect of which he had grievance before the appropriate forum. Thus, present petition is presented on 07.12.2013. In support of challenge to Annexures-A and B dated 16.01.2001 and 15.11.2002, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that petitioner has not been provided notice and it is further contended that Annexure-A is not in accordance with the Rule 5(A) of the Karnataka SC/ST and other BC (Reservation of Appointments, etc). Rules, 1992 (for short, Rules, 1992). On these two counts, impugned Annexures-A and B are liable to be set aside.

undisputed that petitioner’s father caste is Lingayat. Even the petitioner’s birth certificate reveals that he belongs to Lingayath. In such circumstances, if notice is issued to the petitioner he cannot improve the things. No doubt, there is a procedure lapse in not complying Rule 5(A) of Rules, 1992 at the same time it is to be noted that even for a defective order, to set aside such defective order one must approach within a reasonable period of three years.

a. B.M.Kotresh and others Vs. The Tahsildar and another in W.P.No.7314/2008 (GM-CC) decided on 30.06.2008 has held as under:-

“The 1st petitioner is aged 17 years, 2nd petitioner is aged 15 years and the 3rd petitioner is aged 10 years. All of them are studying in school. In the school records, their caste is shown as Hindu Veerashaiva Jangam. That is the caste shown in the school records even in respect of the petitioners’ father B.M.Gurubasavarajaiah and also his brother B.M.Rudraiah. The petitioners’ father is a Government servant. In the service records, his caste is shown as Hindu Veerashaiva Jangam. The caste of the sons cannot be different from the caste of the father. Therefore, taking into consideration the entries made in the school records, official records in respect of the petitioners’ father, his brother and the petitioners, the authorities have held as they belong to Hindu

Veerashaiva Jangam which is not a Scheduled Tribe and the petitioners are not entitled to caste certificate showing their caste as Beda Jangam of Scheduled Tribe. The said order is passed on legal evidence. The contention of the petitioner that no opportunity was given and no enquiry was conducted, is without any substance as their own records show to which caste they belong to.

In these circumstances, I do not find any merit in this writ petition.

Accordingly, petition is dismissed.”

b. Prabhudev Mallikarjunaiah Vs. Ramachandra Veerappa and another reported in AIR 1996 SC 1962, in paragraph 3 has held as under:-

“3. It is seen that under Art. 341 of the Constitution, the Presidential Notification is conclusive subject to the amendment under clause (2) of Art. 341. In 1976, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes (Amendment) Act had been made. Admittedly, under Item. 19, in relation to the State of Karnataka, Beda Jangamma or Budaga Jangamma are declared as Scheduled Castes. As a fact, the finding recorded by the High Court is that the appellant belongs to Veerashiva Lingayath Community and he is a Jangamma. The question, therefore, is: whether Veerashiva Lingayath would be considered to be a Scheduled Caste (Beda Jangamma) within the notification issued by the President? It is settled law that the courts cannot give any declaration that the status with synonimous names of castes claimed by the party is conformable to the names specified in the Presidential Notification issued under Article 341 of the Constitution.”

c. K.D.Sharma Vs. Steel Authority of India Limited and others reported in (2008) 12 SCC 481 in paragraph 39 has held as under:-

“39. If the primary object as highlighted in Kensington Income Tax Commrs. is kept in mind, an applicant who does not come with candid facts and “clean breast” cannot hold a writ of the court with “soiled hands”. Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, manoeuvring or misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the court, the court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If the court does not reject the petition on that ground, the court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for contempt of court for abusing the process of the court.”

(i). Delay and laches in challenge to Annexures-A and B would come in the way of granting relief to the petitioner or not?

(ii). Non-compliance of Rule 5(A) of the Karnataka SC/ST and other BC (Reservation of Appointments, etc) Rules, 1992.

Undisputed facts are that petitioner had obtained caste certificate of ‘Beda Jangama’ caste which would fall under SC category. It has been invalidated on 16.01.2001 vide Annexure-A and it was subject matter of appeal before the Appellate Authority and it was rejected on 15.11.2002. Petitioner had filed writ petition questioning the aforesaid orders in W.P.No.46226/2002 (GM-CC) and it was dismissed as withdrawn reserving liberty to challenge afresh on 30.06.2003. Whereas the present petition is presented on 07.12.2013. The reasons assigned in paragraph 4 of the pleadings would not suffice to question Annexures-A and B. Annexures-A and B is relating to taking out the status of the petitioner that he belongs to ‘Beda Jangama’ caste and claiming any reservation with the employer for his service benefits. Petitioner should have approached this Court within a reasonable period of three years with reference to filing of a suit read with the limitation. Thus, he should have approached this Court at the best in the year 2007. Thus, there is delay and laches for about six years for which there is no explanation. If there is any delay in taking action by his employer that does not give him right to question the orders at Annexures -A and B belatedly.

“20. Having stated thus, it is useful to refer to a passage form City and Industrial Development Corporation V/s.Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala and others {(2009) 1 SCC 168}, wherein this Court while dwelling upon jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, has expressed thus:-

“The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty-bound to consider whether:

(a) Adjudication of writ petition involves any complex and disputed question of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved;

(b) The petition reveals all material facts;

(c) The petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute;

(d) Person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches;

(e) Ex facie barred by any laws of limitation;

(f) Grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors”.

(Emphasis supplied)

(1975) 1 SCC 152, in paragraph 2 has held as under: “2. The main grievance of the appellant is that the second respondent who was junior to him as Assistant Engineer was promoted as Divisional Engineer in 1957 by relaxing the relevant rules regarding the length of service necessary for promotion as Divisional Engineer and that his claim for a similar relaxation was not considered at that time. The learned Judge of the Madras High Court who heard the writ petition was of the view that the relaxation of the rules in favour of the second respondent without considering the appellant's case was arbitrary. In view of the statement on behalf of the Government that such relaxation was given only in the case of overseas scholars, which statement was not controverted, it is not possible to agree with the view of the learned Judge. Be that as it may, if the appellant was aggrieved by it he should have approached the Court even in the year 1957, after the two representations made by him had failed to produce any result. One cannot sleep over the matter and come to the Court questioning that relaxation in the year 1971. There is the further fact that even after respondents Nos.3 and 4 were promoted as Divisional Engineers over the head of the appellant he did not come to the Court questioning it. There was a third opportunity for him to have come to the

Court when respondents Nos.2 to 4 were again promoted as Superintending Engineers over the head of the appellant. After fourteen long years because of the tempting prospect of the Chief Engineership he has come to the Court. In effect he wants to unscramble a scrambled egg. It is very difficult for the Government to consider whether any relaxation of the rules should have been made in favour of the appellant in the year 1957. The conditions that were prevalent in 1957, cannot be reproduced now. In any case as the Government had decided as a matter of policy, as they were entitled to do, not to relax the rules in favour of any except overseas scholars it will be wholly pointless to direct them to consider the appellant’s case as if nothing had happened after 1957. Not only respondent No.2 but also respondents Nos.3 and 4 who were the appellant's juniors became Divisional Engineers in 1957, apparently on the ground that their merits deserved their promotion over the head of the appellant. He did not question it. Nor did he question the promotion of his juniors as Superintending Engineers over his head. He could have come to the Court on every one of these three occasions. A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion: It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner's petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the Court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work

of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant's petition as well as the appeal.”

(1986) 4 SCC 566 at paragraph 22 has held as under: “ Before we proceed to consider this question, we may point out that Acting Chief Justice, J.S. Verma, who delivered the main judgment in the writ petitions, did not make any comments against the conduct of the State Government in granting to the existing contractors the right to construct distilleries and manufacture and make wholesale supply of country liquor from such distilleries but merely proceeded to invalidate what he called the second part of the policy decision dated December 30, 1984 on the ground that it violated Article 14 of the Constitution. But Justice B.M. Lal delivered a separate concurring opinion and in this opinion, he made certain observations which have been strongly objected to by the learned Attorney-General appearing on behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh. It is necessary to set out in extenso what the learned Judge has said in this connection because an application has been made to us by the learned Attorney-General that the objectionable remarks made by the learned Judge should be expunged:

This new mischievous device gives scope to respondents 5 to 11 to monopolize the entire trade of liquor distillery in Madhya Pradesh and also make the State dance at their tips while fixing the rates according to their wishes.

However, it appears that the sinister of underhand dealing of the agreement has

persuaded the State Government to make the statement before this Court during the course of second day of arguments, that they have reduced the period of the agreement dated February 2, 1985 from 30 years to a mere of 5 years period i.e. w.e.f. April 1, 1986 to March 31, 1991 with no condition of renewing it thereafter without adhering to the provisions of rule XXII (Supra). By making this statement at the bar, I presume that, the State is trying to minimise the extent of depletion of public revenue, but still the loss of 56 crores, as argued by Shri Venugopal, continues if licence in D.1 form is granted to the respondents 5 to 11 even for a period of five years.

Making any relaxation in contracts illegally arrived at by violating statutory provisions of Rule XXII (Supra) which gives abnoxious smell of mala fide involving public revenue in crores, then, in my opinion, even for a moment it cannot be allowed to stand in the eye of law.

It appears that by reducing the period of 30 years to a mere five years period, the State still wants to extend benefit to respondents 5 to 11, so that the amount so far spent by them in working out the contract in approaching the concerning authorities of the State may be compensated. Why this undue favour is being tried to be extended to the respondents5 to 11, speaks in itself in volume and is really a matter of the domain of the State Government.

The facts relating to underhand dealing brought to our notice during the course of arguments by pointing out from the record are so startling."

These are undoubtedly strong and highly disparaging remarks attributing mala fides,

corruption and underhand dealing to the State Government. Are they justified by the record, is a question which we have to consider.”

“6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.”

Laches or reasonable time are not defined under any Statute or Rules. "Laches" or "Lashes" is an old french word for slackness or negligence or not doing. In general sense, it means neglect to do what in the law should have been done for an unreasonable or

unexplained length of time. What could be the latches in one case might not constitute in another. The latches to non-suit, an aggrieved person from challenging the acquisition proceedings should be inferred from the conduct of the land owner or an interested person and that there should be a passive inaction for a reasonable length of time. What is reasonable time has not been explained in any of the enactment. Reasonable time depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

reference to any material information. Petitioner has not apprised on this issue. So also in the present petition, petitioner’s father status reveals that he is a Lingayath by caste. Consequently, petitioner’s caste would be Lingayath only and it cannot be ‘Beda Jangama’. In fact, Apex Court time and again held that show cause notice/opportunity of hearing would be dispensed where it is admitted fact. In the present case, it is undisputed that petitioner’s father status with reference to caste as Lingayath and not ‘Beda Jangama’. Consequently petitioner’s claim that he belong to ‘Beda Jangama’ cannot be improved even if enquiry is held in the presence of the petitioner. Mere non- observance of the principles of natural justice would not vitiate an act unless prejudice is proved as held by the Apex Court in the case of Securities and Exchange Board of India Vs. Akshya Infrastructure Private Limited reported in (2014) 11 SCC 112. The contention of the respondents that petitioner had suppressed his father’s status with reference to caste as a Lingayath and cited decision in the case Kulkarni Geeta M. would not assist at this stage, since this Court is not examining on merit whether petitioner has proved that he belongs to ‘Beda Jangama’ caste. Therefore, the aforesaid cited citation do not

assist the petitioner at this juncture. Petitioner relied on in the case of Kulkarni Geeta M. Vs. The State of Karnataka and others reported in ILR 1996 KAR 2672 (Annexure-C) with reference to merit that ‘Beda Jangama’ sub-caste of Veerashaiva read with the State circular. In view of the Apex Court decision in the case of Prabhudev Mallikarjunaiah cited supra in Paragraph 3. Kulkarni Geetha’s case is no more good law.

(2009) 15 SCC 705 in paragraphs 70 and 71 and similar view was expressed in the case of Vishal Properties (P) Ltd., Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2007) 11 SCC 172 in paragraphs 13 and 17.

It is defined to mean “A reasonable time, looking at all the circumstances of the case; a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances;

as soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than ‘directly’; such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea.”

“6. We do not understand as to how the industrial reference with regard to the entitlement of the respondent workman to reinstatement etc. could have been made in the year 1995 in a situation where the respondent workman after dismissal from service in the year 1968 had superannuated from the service in the year 1992. While it is correct that the said facts were not pointed out before the Labour Court hearing the industrial reference, the same, which go to the root of the matter, were easily verifiable from the admitted facts of the case if an attempt was to be made.”

“13. The High Court erred in placing absolute reliance on Dev Dutt and Sukhdev without noticing the fact situation of the respondents. In Union of India V.

Bahadur Singh, it was observed: (Bahadur Singh case, SCC p 373, para 9)

“9. The courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in the with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of the courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of the courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments…”

“29. Not for nothing, has it been said that everything may stop but not the time, for all are in a way slaves of time. There may not be any provision providing for limitation but a grievance relating to promotion cannot be given a new lease of life at any point of time”.

In view of these facts and circumstances, petitioner has not made out case. Accordingly, writ petition stands dismissed.

Sd/- JUDGE KPS