SMT. S. JALAJA vs. UNION OF INDIA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF AUGUST 2021

PRESENT

THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK ARADHE

AND

THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE HEMANT CHANDANGOUDAR

W.A.No.1105 OF 2019 (LA-KIADB) IN W.P.Nos.11209-212 of 2019 (LA-KIADB) C/W W.A.No.2392 OF 2017 (LA-KIADB) IN W.P.Nos.41641-642 OF 2015 (LA-KIADB),

W.A.No.4053 OF 2017 (LA-KIADB) IN W.P.Nos.2907/2015 & 46915/2016 (LA-KIADB),

W.A.No.4054 OF 2017 (LA-KIADB) IN W.P.Nos.59461-462 OF 2014 (LA-KIADB),

W.A.No.4055 OF 2017 (LA-KIADB) IN W.P.No.35461 OF 2014 (LA-KIADB),

W.A.No.4056 OF 2017 (LA-KIADB) IN W.P.Nos.58807-809 OF 2015 (LA-KIADB),

W.A.No.4057 OF 2017 (LA-KIADB) IN W.P.No.32416 OF 2015 (LA-KIADB),

W.A.No.4058 OF 2017 (LA-KIADB) IN W.P.Nos.49228 & 50925-936 OF 2013 (LA-KIADB),

W.A.No.4059 OF 2017 (LA-KIADB) IN W.P.No.30920 OF 2013 (LA-KIADB),

W.A.No.4060 OF 2017 (LA-KIADB) IN W.P.No.18861 OF 2013 (LA-KIADB),

W.A.No.4061 OF 2017 (LA-KIADB) IN W.P.Nos.20367-373/2013 & W.P.Nos.20375-380 & 20382/2013 & W.P.Nos.20384-388/2013 (LA-KIADB),

W.A.No.4062 OF 2017 (LA-KIADB) IN W.P.Nos.40473-474 OF 2015 (LA-KIADB),

W.A.No.4063 OF 2017 (LA-KIADB) IN W.P.Nos.51805-807 OF 2015 (LA-KIADB),

W.A.No.4064 OF 2017 (LA-KIADB) IN W.P.No.859 OF 2016 (LA-KIADB),

W.A.No.4065 OF 2017 (LA-KIADB) IN W.P.Nos.48824-840/2015 & 7094-7109/2017 (LA-KIADB),

W.A.No.4066 OF 2017 (LA-KIADB) IN W.P.Nos.44987-988 OF 2015 (LA-KIADB),

W.A.No.4067 OF 2017 (LA-KIADB) IN W.P.No.17272 OF 2014 (LA-KIADB),

W.A.No.4068 OF 2017 (LA-KIADB) IN W.P.Nos.18890 & 23750-752 OF 2013 (LA-KIADB),

W.P.No.55704 OF 2017 (LA-KIADB),

W.P.No.19222 OF 2018 (LA-KIADB),

W.P.No.22707 OF 2018 (LA-KIADB),

W.P.No.30905 OF 2018 (LA-KIADB),

W.P.No.12283 OF 2019 (LA-KIADB),

W.P.No.27081 OF 2019 (LA-KIADB),

W.P.No.49536 OF 2019 (LA-KIADB),

W.P.No.52298 OF 2019 (LA-KIADB)

IN W.A. No.1105 OF 2019 IN W.P.Nos.11209-212 of 2019

BETWEEN:

AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS R/AT KOLALUKUNTE, KORA HOBLI HALDODDRI POST TUMAKOORU TALUK AND DIST-572128.

... APPELLANTS (BY SRI. P.N. RAJESWARA, ADV.,)

AND:

B H ROAD TUMAKURU-572102.

... RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. PRABHULING K. NAVADAGI, AG A/W SRI. B.B. PATIL, ADV., FOR R3 & R4 SRI. SHIVAKUMAR, CGC FOR R1 SRI. SHIVAPRABHU S. HIREMATH, AGA FOR R2) - - - THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 05/04/2019 IN WP NOS.11209-212/2019 [LA-KIADB] PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE AND CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE SAID WP NOS.11209-212/2019 [LA-KIADB] AS PRAYED FOR.

IN W.A.No.2392 OF 2017 IN W.P.Nos.41641-642 OF 2015

BETWEEN

AND 1. SRI. MANJU S/O LATE MALLESHIAH AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS RESIDENT OF NO.284

HALAGEVARDERAHALLI RAJARAJESHWARI NAGAR BANGALORE-560 098.

…RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI. SHIVAPRABHU S. HIREMATH, AGA FOR R3 & R4 SRI. K.L. ASHOK, ADV., FOR R1 & R2) ----- THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED IN THE WRIT PETITION 41641-462/2015 DATED 19/4/17.

IN W.A.No.4053 OF 2017 IN W.P.Nos.2907/2015 & 46915/2016

BETWEEN

AND

THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED IN THE WRIT PETITION 2907/2015 & 46915/2016 DATED 19/04/2017.

IN W.A.No.4054 OF 2017 IN W.P.Nos.59461-462 OF 2014

BETWEEN

AND

IN W.A.No.4055 OF 2017 IN W.P.No.35461 OF 2014

BETWEEN

AND

…RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. C. SHANKAR REDDY, ADV., FOR R1 SRI. SHIVAPRABHU S. HIREMATH, AGA FOR R3 R2 SERVED) ----- THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED IN THE WRIT PETITION 35461/2014 DATED 19/04/2017.

IN W.A.No.4056 OF 2017 IN W.P.Nos.58807-809 OF 2015

BETWEEN

...APPELLANTS (BY SRI. PRABHULING K. NAVADAGI, AG A/W SRI. B.B. PATIL, ADV.,)

AND

SRI. N.K. RAMESH, ADV., FOR R4 R2 SERVED) ----- THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED IN THE WRIT PETITION 58807-58809/2015 DATED 19/04/2017.

IN W.A.No.4057 OF 2017 IN W.P.No.32416 OF 2015

BETWEEN

THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD NRUPATHUNGA ROAD BANGALORE-560 001. ...APPELLANT (BY SRI.PRABHULING K. NAVADAGI, AG A/W SRI. B.B. PATIL, ADV.,)

AND

IN W.A.No.4058 OF 2017 IN W.P.Nos.49228 & 50925-936 OF 2013

BETWEEN

AND

APPELLANT NOS.1 TO 7 ARE R/AT JAKKASANDRA VILLAGE KASABA HOBLI, MALUR TALUK KOLAR DISTRICT-563 101.

IN W.A.No.4059 OF 2017 IN W.P.No.30920 OF 2013

BETWEEN

...APPELLANTS (BY SRI. PRABHULING K. NAVADAGI, AG A/W SRI. B.B. PATIL, ADV.,)

AND

W/O MANJUNATHA

AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS

DEAD, REP. BY LR'S.

1(a) SRI. MANJUNATH N

S/O LATE NANJAPPA

AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS.

1(b) SMT. SOUMYA

W/O PRAKASH

D/O MANJUNATH N

AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS.

1(c) SRI. SAGUN M

S/O MANJUNATH N

AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS.

ALL ARE R/AT. HUSKUR VILLAGE

BIDARAHALLI HOBLI

BENGALURU EAST TALUK.

REP. BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY

VIDHANA SOUDHA

BANGALORE-560001.

DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIES AND COMMERCE

KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS

DEVELOPMENT BOARD

M.S. BUILDING, BANGALORE-560001. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. SHIVAPRABHU S. HIREMATH, AGA FOR R2 R3 SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED) ---- THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED IN THE WRIT PETITION 30920/2017 DATED 19/04/2017.

IN W.A.No.4060 OF 2017 IN W.P.No.18861 OF 2013

BETWEEN

THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER KIADB NO 14/3 ARAVINDA BHAVANA NRUPATHUNGA ROAD BANGALORE - 01. ...APPELLANT (BY SRI. PRABHULING K. NAVADAGI, AG A/W SRI. B.B. PATIL, ADV.,)

AND

IN W.A.No.4061 OF 2017 IN W.P.Nos.20367-373/2013 & W.P.Nos.20375-380 & 20382/2013 & W.P.Nos.20384-388/2013

BETWEEN

...APPELLANTS (BY SRI. PRABHULING K. NAVADAGI, AG A/W SRI. B.B. PATIL, ADV.,)

AND

APPELLANTS ARE ALL R/AT JAKKASANDRA VILLAGE KASABA HOBLI, MALUR TALUK KOLAR DISTRICT-563 101.

(BY SRI. M. SHIVAPRAKASH, ADV., FOR R1 TO R5 & R8 TO R19 R6, R7 AND R20 ARE SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED) ----- THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED IN

THE WRIT PETITION 20367-373/2013 & 20375-380/2013 & 20382/2013 & 20384-388/2013 DATED 19/04/2017.

IN W.A.No.4062 OF 2017 IN W.P.Nos.40473-474 OF 2015

BETWEEN

AND

…RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. RAJESWARA P.N., ADV., FOR R1 V/O DTD:6.1.2020 SERVICE OF NOTICE TO R2 IS ACCEPTED AS GOOD SERVICE) ----- THIS WRIT IS APPEAL FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED IN THE WRIT PETITION 40473-40474/2015 DATED 19/04/2017.

IN W.A.No.4063 OF 2017 IN W.P.Nos.51805-807 OF 2015

BETWEEN

...APPELLANTS (BY SRI. PRABHULING K. NAVADAGI, AG A/W SRI. B.B. PATIL, ADV.,)

AND

PRESENTLY RESIDING AT NO.641 8TH MAIN, VINAYAKA LAYOUT BANGALORE - 560072.

RESPONDENT NOS.2 & 3 ARE R/AT PILLE KARANAHALLI VILLAGE M D HALLI POST , KASABA HOBLI CHITRADURGA TALUK & DISTRICT.

…RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. RAJESWARA P.N. ADV., FOR R1 R2, R3 & R4 ARE SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED) ----- THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED IN THE WRIT PETITION 51805-51807/2015 DATED 19/04/2017.

IN W.A.No.4064 OF 2017 IN W.P.No.859 OF 2016

BETWEEN

SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD MARUTHI GROUP BUILDING II FLOOR, NEAR SIT COLLEGE B H ROAD, TUMAKURU-572 103.

...APPELLANT (BY SRI. PRABHULING K. NAVADAGI, AG A/W SRI. B.B. PATIL, ADV.,)

AND

S. NARAYANAPPA AGE 53 YEARS S/O SEETHARAMAIAH RESIDING AT SANTHEPETE SIRA TOWN TUMAKURU DISTRICT-572103. …RESPONDENT (BY SRI. S. NARAYANAPPA, SERVED) ----- THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 19/4/17 PASSED IN THE WRIT PETITION 859/2016.

IN W.A.No.4065 OF 2017 IN W.P.Nos.48824-840/2015 & 7094-7109/2017

BETWEEN

...APPELLANTS (BY SRI. PRABHULING K. NAVADAGI, AG A/W SRI. B.B. PATIL, ADV.,)

AND

R/O CHIKKASEEBI, BELLAVI HOBLI TUMKUR TALUK & DISTRICT-572 128.

…..RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. M. RAJAGOPAL, ADV., FOR R2, R6 AND R15 SRI. D.C. PRAKASH, ADV., FOR R6 SRI. M.N. KUMAR SHARMA, ADV., FOR R18 & R19 SRI. SHIVAPRABHU S. HIREMATH, AGA FOR R20 TO R22 R3, R4, R5, R7, R8, R9, R10, R11, R13, R14, R16 ARE SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED)

THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED IN THE WRIT PETITION 48824-48840/2015 DATED 19/04/2017.

IN W.A.No.4066 OF 2017 IN W.P.Nos.44987-988 OF 2015

BETWEEN

BANGALORE - 560 001 REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND EXECUTIVE MEMBER NOW REPRESENTED BY SPECIAL DC.

...APPELLANTS (BY SRI. PRABHULING K. NAVADAGI, AG A/W SRI. B.B. PATIL, ADV.,)

AND

(BY SRI. RAJESWARA P.N., ADV., FOR R1 V/O DTD:6.1.2020 SERVICE OF NOTICE TO R2 IS ACCEPTED AS GOOD SERVICE) ----- THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED IN THE WRIT PETITION 44987-988/2015 DATED 19/4/17.

IN W.A.No.4067 OF 2017 IN W.P.No.17272 OF 2014

BETWEEN

DEVELOPMENT BOARD, (KIADB) NRUPATHUNGA ROAD, BANGALORE-560 001.

AND

REPRESENTED BY HIS GPA HOLDER SRI. KIRAN, S/O ANJANAPPA AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS R/AT NO.444, BAGALUR BANGALORE NORTH (ADDL.) TALUK BANGALORE-562 149.

VIAKASA SOUDHA DR. B.R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BANGALORE - 560 001.

…RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. SHIVAPRABHU S. HIREMATH, AGA FOR R2 & R3 V/O DTD:6.1.2020 SERVICE OF NOTICE TO R4 IS ACCEPTED AS GOOD SERVICE) ----- THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED IN THE WRIT PETITION 17272/2014 DATED 19/04/2017.

IN W.A.No.4068 OF 2017 IN W.P.Nos.18890 & 23750-752 OF 2013

BETWEEN

...APPELLANTS (BY SRI. PRABHULING K. NAVADAGI, AG A/W SRI. B.B. PATIL, ADV.,)

AND

KASABA HOBLI, MALUR TALUK KOLAR DISTRICT-563101.

(BY SRI. SHIVAPRABHU S. HIREMATH, AGA FOR R2 & R3 V/O DTD:6.1.2020 SERVICE OF NOTICE TO R1 TO R3 IS ACCEPTED AS GOOD SERVICE) ----- THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED IN THE WRIT PETITION 18890/2013 & 23750-752/2013 DATED 19/04/2017.

IN W.P.No.55704 OF 2017 BETWEEN

AND 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY VIDHANA SOUDHA, BANGALOE 560001.

BYKAMPADY, MANGALROE 575011.

….RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. BASAVARAJ V. SABARAD, ADV., FOR R6 & R7 SRI. NATARAJU T, ADV., FOR R9 SRI. SHIVAPRABHU S. HIREMATH, AGA FOR R1 TO R5 SMT. K.S. GIRIJAMMA, ADV., FOR R11 SRI. H.L. PRADEEP KUMAR, ADV., FOR R12 SRI. HAREESH BHANDARY T, ADV., FOR R8 SRI. SATYANARAYANA SINGH, ADV., FOR R9

SRI. SHIVAKUMAR, CGC FOR R10) -----

THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO CALL FOR THE RECORDS PERTAINING TO THE ISSUE OF NOTIFICATIONS PRODUCED AT ANNEX-C, C1 AND C2. QUASH/DECLARE THAT THE NOTIFICATION DATED 20.12.2016 UNDER SEC. 3(1) AT ANNEX-C, THE NOTIFICATION DATED 20.12.2016 UNDER SEC. 1(3) OF THE KIADB ACT 1966 AT ANNEX- C1 AND THE NOTIFICATION DATED 20.12.2016 ISSUED UNDER SEC. 28(1) AT ANNEX-C2 AS ULTRA VIRES OF THE POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA AND ALSO IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 14, 19, 21 AND 300A OF THE CONSTITUTION AND ALSO ARE VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE " RIGHT TO FAIR COMPENSATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN LAND ACQUISITION REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT ACT 2013 " (CENTRAL ACT 30 OF 2013).

IN W.P.No.19222 OF 2018 BETWEEN

S/O MARKEVEREST D SOUZA AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS R/AT DEVASTANA KODI MANE PERMUDE POST MANGALURU DISTRICT-574509.

MANGALURU DISTRICT-575030.

D/O LATE ZOOVAM D SOUZA AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS R/AT NEKKARE BALLE HOUSE BAJPE, MANGALURU DISTRICT-574142.

R/AT KUTHETHOOR BAJAVAU POST MANGALURU DISTRICT-575030.

R/AT KALLOLI BALIKE KUTHETHOOR, BAJAVAU POST MANGALURU DISTRICT-575030.

AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS R/AT PERMUDE VILALGE AND POST MANGALURU DISTRICT-574509.

...PETITIONERS (BY SRI. NARAYANA BHAT M, ADV.,)

AND

DAKSHINA KANANDA DISTRICT DEPUTY COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE HAMILTON CIRCLE, MANGALURU-575001.

(BY SRI. BASAVARAJ V. SABARAD, ADV., FOR R6, R7 AND R12 SRI. SHIVAPRABHU S. HIREMATH, AGA FOR R1 TO R5 SRI. SATYANARAYANA SINGH, ADV., FOR R9 SRI. MAYA HOLLA, ADV., FOR R12 SRI. HAREESH BHANDARY T, ADV., FOR R8 SRI. S.R. DODAWAD, ADV., FOR R1 SMT. GIRIJAMMA K.S. ADV., FOR R11) ----- THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO, CALL FOR RECORDS PERTAINING TO THE ISSUE OF NOTIFICATIONS PRODUCED AT ANNEXURES-C, C1 AND C2. QUASH THE NOTIFICATION DATED 20.12.2016 UNDER SEC.3(1), PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-C, THE NOTIFICATION DATED 20.12.2016 UNDER SEC.1(3) OF THE KIADB ACT 1966, PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-C1 AND THE NOTIFICATION DATED 20.12.2016 ISSUED UNDER SEC.28(1) PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-C-2 AS ULTRA VIRES OF THE POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA AND ALSO IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 14, 19, 21 AND 300A OF THE CONSTITUTION AND ALSO ARE VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE "RIGHT TO FAIR COMPENSATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN LAND ACQUISITION, REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT ACT 2013 (CENTRAL ACT 30 OF 2013) & ETC.

IN W.P.No.22707 OF 2018 BETWEEN

AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS D/O LATE SHRI LINGAMMA SHETTIGARA.

PETITIONERS NO.1 TO 5 ARE RESIDING AT PANJURLI KODI MANE PERMUDE VILLAGE AND POST MANGALORE TALUK D K DISTRICT PIN CODE: 574509.

PETITIONERS NO.7 TO 11 ARE RESIDENTS OF THOTA MANE POST PERMUDE, MANGALORE TALUK

D K DISTRICT - 574509.

PETITIONERS NO.12 AND 13 ARE RESIDING AT THANNIKER HOUSE PERMUDE VILLAGE AND POST MANGALORE TALUK D K DISTRICT - 574509.

PETITIONERS NO.14 TO 17 ARE RESIDING AT GOVINDA BHAVANA POST BAJAVU, KUTHETHOOR MANGALORE TALUK, D K DISTRICT.

S/O LATE SRI. RAMAYYA SHETTY.

PETITIONERS NO.18 TO 19 ARE RESIDING AT MATHRU KRIPA HOUSE AMBADE GURI, BAJAVU POST KUTHETHOOR, MANGALORE TALUK D K DISTRICT - 575030. ...PETITIONERS (BY SMT. MAITREYI KRISHNAN, ADV.,)

AND 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA VIDHANA SOUDHA BENGALURU - 560001 REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY.

BAIKAMPADI, MANGALORE - 575011.

THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO DECLARE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS DEVELOPMENT ARE ULTRA VIRES ARTICLE 14, 19, 21 & 300A OF THE CONSTITUTION & REPUGNANT TO RIGHT TO THE FAIR COMPENSATION & TRANSPARENCY IN LAND ACQUISITION, REHABILITATION & RESETTLEMENT ACT 2013 AND HENCE INOPERABLE. IN W.P.No.30905 OF 2018 BETWEEN

INCORPORATED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE COMPANIES ACT, 1956) REGISTERED OFFICE AT 1-11-252/5/A PLOT NO.156, MOTILAL NEHRU NAGAR BEGUMPET, HYDERABAD - 500016 TELANGANA STATE REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORISED PERSON SRI. RAJENDRA PRASAD SHARMA S/O MADAN LAL SHARMA AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS.

AND 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIES AND COMMERCE M S BUILDING, AMBEDKAR VEEDHI BANGALORE-560001, BANGALORE CITY BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY.

BENGALURU, BENGALURU CITY.

IN W.P.No.12283 OF 2019

BETWEEN

MANGALURU-574509

13 . INDIRA D/O. NARAYANA BHAT AGED ABOUT 90 YEARS RESIDING AT NOVI GUTTHU KUTHETHAOOR POST BAJAVU POST MANGALURU

MANGALURU-574509

PERMUDE POST MANGALURU-574509

MANGALURU-574509

DAKSHINA KANNADA-575030

AND 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA REP BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY VIDHANA OSUDHA BENGALURU-560001

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTORATE OF INDUSTRIES & COMMERCE II FLOOR, KHANIJA BHAVAN (SOUTH WING) NO.49 RACE COURSE ROAD BENGALURU-560001

IN W.P.No.27081 OF 2019

BETWEEN

5 . SMT. SANDHYA SHETTY D/O. RAJU SHETTY AND LATE ASHALATHA AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS

6 . SMT. VIDYA D/O. RAJU SHETTY AND LATE ASHALATHA AGED ABOUT 23 YEARS

PETITIONERS NO.2 TO 6 ARE RESIDING AT KODAPPA BALIKE BAJAVU POST KUTHETHOOR MANGALURU TALUK D.K. DISTRICT-575030. ...PETITIONERS

(BY SRI. CLIFTON D. ROZARIO, ADVOCATE)

AND 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA VIDHANA SOUDHA BENGALURU-560001 REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY

REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN.

IN W.P.No.49536 OF 2019

BETWEEN

(SITE NO. 304, SURVEY NO. 49)

AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS RESIDING AT NO.289, 7TH A MAIN HEBBAL I STAGE METAGALLI POST MANDYA DIST (SITE NO.375, SURVEY NO.88/1)

22.

THIPPEGOWDA S/O KEMPEGOWDA, AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS, RESIDING AT NO.60, 2ND A MAIN, LOKANAYAKA NAGARA, HEBBAL MYSURU -16 (SITE NO.386,. SURVEY NO.88/1)

MYSURU-22 (SITE NO.384. SY NO.88/1)

CHALUVAMBA AGRAHARA, MYSURU (SITE NO.297, SY NO.49)

AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS, NO.2866, LASHKAR MOHALLA, HALLADA KERI, MYSURU-02 (SITE NO.394, SY NO.88/1)

VIKRANTH TYRES, MYSURU-16, (SITE NO.355, SY NO.49)

RESIDING AT NO.11/2, P BLOCK, NEW EXTENSION, KUMBARAKOPPAL OPP GOVT SCHOOL, MYSURU-16 (SITE NO.301,SY NO.49)

65 . SRI MOHAMMED JOHN S/O LATE ABDUL RAVOOF AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS EMPLOYEE NO.2398 VIKRANT TYRES LTD. MYSURU-16 (SITE NO.382, SY.NO.88/1)

AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS NO.579, 14TH CROSS, 1ST MAIN, B.M. SHRENAGARA, METAGALLI POST, MYSURU 570016 (SITE NO.289, SY NO.49

HEBBAL 1ST STAGE, MYSURU 570016.

AND

OPP. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, N.R. ROAD, BENGALURU 560002

IN W.P.No.52298 OF 2019 BETWEEN

ROBUST MARKETING SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED A COMPANY WITHIN THE MEANING OF COMAPNIES ACT 2013 HAVINAG ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT FLAT NO.502, 5TH FLOOR STERLING HERITAGE, PLOT NO.388 SRI SANKARA MATTAM ROAD MATUNGA, MUMBAI-400 019.

REP BY ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY MR. G. CHANDRASEKAR S/O MR. G. GOVINDARAJULU AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS. ...PETITIONER (BY SRI. SANJANTHI SAJAN POOVAYYA, ADV.,)

AND 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA VIDHANA SOUDHA DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI BENGLAURU-560 001 REP BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTORATE OF INDUSTRIES AND COMMERCE, 2ND FLOOR, KHANIJA BHAVAN NO.49, RACE COURSE ROAD BENGLAURU-560 01 REP BY ITS SECRETARY.

THESE WRIT APPEALS AND WRIT PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON 18.08.2021, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, ALOK ARADHE J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

JUDGMENT

In these intra Court appeals, the appellant namely Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (hereinafter referred to as 'the Board', for short) has assailed the validity of the interim order dated 19.04.2017 by which learned Single Judge has held as follows: “POINT NO. (i) : The State Government cannot any longer exercise power under Section 3 of the KIAD Act without conforming to the pre-requisites as prescribed under the 2013 Act, nor work the other provisions of the Act without also adhering to other mandatory provisions of the 2013 Act and the Rules there under. The Scheme under the KIAD Act as it prevails is inconsistent with the provisions of the 2013 Act in terms of Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India and is hence no longer valid as an independent enactment.

POINT NO. (ii) : Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is applicable to an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the KIAD Act. POINT NO. (iii) : By virtue of Section 24(2) at whatever point of time the vesting of land may have taken place, there is a divesting, in terms thereof, as it provides for a ‘lapsing’ of the acquisition proceedings, if the conditions specified therein are satisfied. POINT NO. (iv) : The recent decision of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 353/2017, the Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB, Mysore vs. Anasuya Bai, dated 25.01.2017 did not involve a challenge to the constitutional validity of the provisions of the KIAD Act and hence does not advance the case of the respondents. The petitions to be posted for hearing on facts and the merits of each case for final disposal.”

In the writ petitions, the petitioners have assailed the validity of the notifications issued under the

Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1966 Act' for short) and have also sought the relief that provisions of 1966 Act have been impliedly repealed on commencement of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 2013 Act' for short).

Hosahalli, Dodballa Taluk Bangalore Rural District, Madhugiri village, Sira Taluk District Tumkur, Konappana Agrahara Bangalore South Taluk, Archakarahalli, Balveeranna Halli villages, Ramnagara Taluk Bangalore, Madihelli East Bangalore Taluk, Arebinnamangala Bangalore North (Addl.) Taluk. The lands of the respondent are required by the Board for a public purpose and were notified for acquisition under the provisions of Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1966 Act') and preliminary notifications under Section 28(1) of the 1966 Act dated 15.04.1997, 06.07.2001, 07.08.2006, 27.02.2007, 13.03.2012, 27.10.2012, 14.06.2013, 07.12.2015, 09.12.2016 were issued. The respondents filed the objections and after consideration of the objections, final notifications under section 28(4) of the 1966 Act dated 15.07.1997, 27.08.2003, 18.06.2007, 28.06.2008, 15.09.2008, 19.08.2010, 04.12.2012, 04.01.2013, 30.01.2015, 20.07.2018 and 29.12.2018,

were issued. The respondents challenged the validity of section 3, Chapter II and provisions of Chapter VII of the 1966 Act as well as the validity of Notifications issued under 1966 Act and sought the relief that provisions of 1966 Act have been impliedly repealed on commencement of 2013 Act, before the learned Single Judge.

preferred these appeals. In writ petitions, since the issues pertaining to validity of the provisions of the 1966 Act arise for consideration, the writ petitions with consent of parties were heard analogously with these writ appeals. SUBMISSION OF LEARNED ADVOCATE GENERAL IN WRIT APPEALS:

1966 Act have been repealed, the respondents are required to demonstrate that both legislations operate in respect of same subject matter and provisions of both the laws cannot coexist. It is also urged that question of repugnancy on the ground of 1966 Act having occupied, the field does not arise. It is also pointed out that Entry 24 of List II to the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India deals with ‘industry’ which is a subject of State list and therefore, the question of Parliament evincing interest in respect of a subject matter of a State List does not arise. It is also pointed out that during pendency of the appeal, the State Government by Amending Act No.16 of 2019 namely Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition and Resettlement (Karnataka Amendment) Act 2019, has amended the 2013 Act. In support of aforementioned submissions reliance has been placed on decisions of the Supreme Court in 'STATE OF ORISSA AND ANR. V. M.A. TULLOCH', AIR 1964 SC 1284, 'RAMTANU CO-

OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. AND ANR. V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.', (1970) 3 SCC 323, 'M. KARUNANIDHI V. UNION OF INDIA', (1979) 3 SCC 431, 'M/S HOECHST PHARMACEUTICALS LTD. AND OTHERS V. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS', (1983) 4 SCC 45, 'VIJAY KUMAR SHARMA AND OTHERS V. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS', (1990) 2 SCC 562.

and First Schedule of the 2013 Act submitted that even provisions pertaining to determination of compensation contained in both the enactments are not in conflict with each other. Our attention has also been invited to resolution dated 27.08.2016 passed by the Board by which it has resolved to take into account the components mentioned in First Schedule appended to the 2013 Act for computation of market value of the land in respect of land which has to be acquired under 1966 Act. It is therefore submitted that grievance of the owners of land insofar as it pertains to challenge to provisions pertaining to determination of compensation in fact does not survive. It is also urged that 1966 Act is a self contained code. In support of aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on the decisions of Supreme Court in 'MAGANLAL CHHAGANLAL (P) LTD. V. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER BOMBAY AND ORS.', (1974) 2 SCC 402 AND 'GIRNAR TRADERS V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

AND ORS.', (2011) 3 SCC 1. It is also contended that issue with regard to applicability of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act to the proceeding under 1966 Act is no longer res integra and it has been held that Section 24(2) does not apply to the proceeding under 1966 Act. In this connection, reference has been made to decision of Supreme Court in 'SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, MYSORE V. ANASUYA BAI', (2017) 3 SCC 313. SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENTS IN WRIT APPEALS:

Act has been enacted under Entry 42 of List-III of Seventh Schedule and not under Entry 24 of List-II of Seventh Schedule of Constitution of India. It is also urged that the power to legislate for acquisition of property can be exercised only under Entry 42 of List-III to the Seventh Schedule of Constitution of India. It is also urged that after enactment of 2013 Act, 1966 Act is deemed to have repealed and is repugnant to the provisions of 2013 Act. In this connection, our attention has been invited to the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘RUSTOM CAVASJEE COOPER VS. UNION OF INDIA’, 1970(1) SCC 248 as well as in the case of ‘M. NAGABHUSHANA VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA’, 2011(3) SCC 408, and it is contended that the 1966 Act is a self contained code and primarily a law regulating acquisition of land for public purpose and for payment of compensation. It is also urged that the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘SHRI RAMTANU CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING

SOCIETY LTD is not binding on this Court per incuriam as the aforesaid decision has been rendered in ignorance of the decision rendered by a bench of 11 Judges in RUSTOM CAVASJEE COOPER’S case.

case in hand, cannot be accepted. In support of aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on the decisions of Supreme Court in 'CALCUTTA GAS COMPANY (PROPRIETARY) LTD. Vs. STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS' AIR 1962 SC 1044, 'RUSTOM CAVASJEE COOPER Vs. UNION OF INDIA' (1970) 1 SCC 248 AND 'ISHWARI KETAN SUGAR MILLS (P) LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS' (1980) 4 SCC 136 AND FORUM FOR PEOPLE'S COLLECTIVE EFFORTS (FPCE) AND ANOHER VS. STATE OF WEST BENGAL', (2021) SCC ONLINE 361.

pointed out that the Supreme Court has recognized the power of eminent domain in 'KEDARNATH YADAV Vs. STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS', AIR 2016 SC 4156, 'LAXMAN LAL (DEAD) THROUGH LRS AND ANR. Vs,. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.', (2013) 3 SCC 764 as well as by Madras High Court in 'SUDARSHAN CHARITABLE TRUST Vs. THE GOVT. OF TAMIL NADU', (2018) LAWS (MAD)3 918. It is further submitted that right to property has been recognized by Article 17 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the year 1948 itself which was diluted by the Parliament by inserting Article 31A in the Constitution. It is further submitted that right to hold property is still a Constitutional right as prescribed under Article 300A of the Constitution of India and has been recognized by the Supreme Court as a human right in 'HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD. Vs. DARIUS SHAPUR CHENAI' (2005) 7 SCC 627, 'PADMAMMA Vs. RAMKRISHNA REDDY' (2008) 15

SCC 517, 'K.T.PLANTATION PVT. LTD. & ANR Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA' (2011) 9 SCC 1 AND 'DELHI AIRTECH SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ORS. Vs. STATE OF U.P. & ORS.' (2011) 9 SCC 354.

the assent given by the President, the 1966 Act was protected under Article 254 of the Constitution of India. It is also argued that Parliament, in exercise of powers under the concurrent list enacted 2013 Act on 26.09.2013, which came into force on 01.01.2014 and therefore, the 1966 Act was impliedly repealed in view of proviso to Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India.

legislative power but is subject to Entry 7 and 52 of List I of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India and there is no encroachment of power by the Parliament. It is also argued that 2013 Act is a dominant legislation occupying the entire field relating to acquisition and development of industrial corridor and is intended to confer benefits to the land losers and affected persons by providing for fair compensation as well as rehabilitation and resettlement to the affected families.

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'KAISER-I-HIND PVT. LTD. AND ORS. Vs. NATIONAL TEXTILE CORPORATION' AIR (SC) 3404, 'ZAVERBHAI AMAIDAS Vs. THE STATE OF BOMBAY AIR 1954 SC 742, 'P.L.MEHRA Vs. D.R.KHANNA' 1971 AIR (DEL) 1, 'M.KARUNANIDHI Vs. UNION OF INDIA' AIR 1979 SC 898, 'T.BARAI Vs. HENRY AH HOE AND ANR.' (1983) 1 SCC 177, 'RESERVE BANK OF INDIA Vs. PEERLESS GENERAL FINANCE' 1987 1 SCC 424, 'THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. Vs. ANANTHI AMMAL & ORS.' 1994 SCC (11) 75, 'PT.RISHIKESH AND ANR. Vs. SMT.SALMA BEGUM' 1995 4 SCC 718, 'VASU DEV SINGH & ORS Vs. UNION OF INDIA & ORS' (2006) 12 SCC 753, 'SHAYARA BANO Vs. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.' (2017) 8 SCC 39, 'PRANAV BAJPE Vs. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA' IN W.P.No.27761/2019, 'VIJAY KUMAR SHARMA & ORS. Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.' (1990) 2 SCC 562, 'ANITHA KISHORI D'SILVA Vs. THE LAND ACQUISITION

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OFFICER & ORS.' ILR 2015 KAR 3769, 'MESSERS RAYALA CORPORATION (P) LTD. & ANR. Vs. DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT, NEW DELHI' (1969) 2 SCC 412, 'KOLHAPUR CANECUGAR WORKS LTD. & ANR. Vs. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.' (2000) 2 SCC 536, 'GENERAL FINANCE CO. & ANR. Vs. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, PUNJAB (2002) 7 SCC 1 AND DECISION OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED 03.07.2019 PASSED IN W.P.No.22448/2018 AND OTHER CONNECTED MATTERS.

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rendered unconstitutional on account of passage of time. It is also argued that right of the farmer to cultivate the land, is part of his right to livelihood and if two views are possible, the one which protects the constitutional right must be preferred. In support of aforesaid submission, reliance has been placed on the decisions in 'ASSOCIATION OF NATURAL GAS Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT' (2004) 4 SCC 489, 'CHAIRMAN, INDORE VIKAS PRADHIKARAN Vs. PURE INDUSTRIAL COKE AND CHEMICALS LTD. & ORS.' (2007) 8 SCC 705, 'DEVINDER SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB' (2008) 1 SCC 728, 'JOHN VALLAMATTOM Vs. UNION OF INDIA' (2003) 6 SCC 611, 'KAPILA HINGO RANI Vs. STATE OF BIHAR' (2003) 6 SCC 1, 'SAHARA INDIA REAL ESTATE Vs. SEBI' (2013) 1 SCC 1, 'RAJENDRA SHANKAR SHUKLA Vs. STATE OF CHATTISGARH' (2015) 10 SCC 400 AND 'KEDARNATH YADAV Vs. STATE OF WEST BENGAL' (2017) 11 SCC 601.

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SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENTS IN WRIT PETITION

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concept of occupied field is only relevant in case of a law enacted under the entries of list III of Seventh Schedule of Constitution of India. It is further contended that since, 1966 Act and 2013 Act have been enacted respectively under List II and List III of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, the question of repugnancy does not arise and since, the State Legislature is competent to enact the provisions of the 1966 Act. In support of aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on decisions in 'SHRI RAMTANU CO- OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. AND ANOTHER VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS', (1970) 3 SCC 323, 'GIRNAR TRADERS (3) VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS', (2011) 3 SCC 1, 'SHORT NOTES OF CASES', 1975 (1) KAR L.J. 94, 'OFFSHORE HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED VS. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHOIRTY AND OTHERS', (2011) 3 SCC 139, 'SHORT NOTES ITEM 273', 1974(1) KKAR L.J.112,

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'HMT LTD. REPRESENTED BY ITS DY.GENERAL MANAGER (HRM) AND ANOTHER VS. MUDAPPA AND OTHERS', (2007) 9 SCC 768, 'S.S.DARSHAN VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS', (1996) 7 SCC 302, 'SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER , KIADB, MYSORE AND ANOTHR VS. ANASUYA BAI (DEAD) BY LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS', (2017) 3 SCC 313, 'STATE OF A.P. AND OTHERS VS. MCDOWELL & CO. AND OTHERS', (1996) 3 SCC 709, and 'SECURITY ASSOCIATION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER VS. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS', (2014) 12 SCC 65.

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care of by the Board in the light of the Government Order issued in the year 1992.

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Constitution of India and has also been recognized as Human right and cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. [See: 'PADMAMMA VS. RAMKRISHNA REDDY', (2008) 15 SCC 517]. After having noticed the power of 'eminent domain' and nature and right of an individual to own property, ISSUES:

The issues, which arise for consideration in these bunch of cases are as under: (1) Whether the provisions of Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 are repugnant to the provisions of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013? (2) Whether the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 is impliedly repealed on coming into force of the Right to Fair Compensation ad Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013?

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(3) Whether Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 is a special enactment vis a vis Right to Fair Compensation and transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013? (4) Whether the sanction given by the President on 26.05.1966 to Karnataka Act No.18 of 1966, stood lapsed or come to end on coming into force of the 2013 Act? (5) What is the effect of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 2019 (Act No.16 of 2019) on Right to Fair Compensation and transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013? (6) Whether provisions of Section 24(2) of 2013 Act apply to proceeding under 1966 Act?

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ISSUE NO.1. (1) Whether the provisions of Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 are repugnant to the provisions of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013?

At this stage, it is apposite to take note of well settled legal propositions with regard to repugnancy. The Supreme Court in 'DEEP CHAND VS. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH', AIR 1959 SC 648 laid down following three principles to ascertain the question of repugnancy between two statutes and held as under:

(1) Whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions;

(2) Whether Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the subject-matter replacing the Act of the State Legislature and

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(3) Whether the law made by Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature occupy the same field.

Repugnancy arises when two enactments both within the competence of the two Legislatures collide and when the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication provides that the enactment of one Legislature has superiority over the other then to the extent of the repugnancy the one supersedes the other. But two enactments may be repugnant to each other even though obedience to each of them is possible without disobeying the other. The test of two legislations containing contradictory provisions

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is not, however, the only criterion of repugnancy, for if a competent legislature with a superior efficacy expressly or impliedly evinces by its legislation an intention to cover the whole field, the enactments of the other legislature whether passed before or after would be overborne on the ground of repugnance. Where such is the position, the inconsistency is demonstrated not by a detailed comparison of provisions of the two statutes but by the mere existence of the two pieces of legislation.

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growth, development and organization of industries in Maharashtra and the same does not fall within Entry 7 and Entry 52 of Union List but is within State List of Industries and therefore, the State Legislature was competent to enact the aforesaid law. The relevant extract of para 15 reads as under:

It is in the background of the purposes of the act and powers and functions of the Corporation that the real and true character of the legislation will be determined. That is the doctrine of finding out the pith and substance of an Act. IN deciding the pith and substance of the legislation, the true test is not to find out whether the Act has encroached upon or invaded any forbidden field but what the pith and substance of the Act is. It is that true intent of the Act which will determine the validity of the Act. Industries come within Entry 24 of the State List subject to the provision of Entry 7 and Entry 52 of the Union List of the Constitution. Entry 7 of the Union List relates to industries declared by Parliament by law to be necessary for the

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purpose of defence or for the prosecution of war. Entry 52 of the Union List relates to industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest. The establishment, growth and development of industries in the State of Maharashtra does not fall within Entry 7 and Entry 52 of the Union List. Establishment, growth and development of industries in the state is within the State List of industries. Furthermore, to effectuate the purposes of the development of industries in the State is necessary to make land available. Such land can be made available by acquisition or requisition.

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inconsistency between the two enactments observed as follows:- "An obvious inconsistency arises when the two enactments produce different legal results when applied to the same facts".

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Issacs, J. observed as follows:- "There can be no question that the Commonwealth Navigation Act, by its own direct provisions and the Regulations made under its authority, applies upon construction to the circumstances of the case. It is inconsistent with the State Act in various ways, including (1) general supersession of the regulations of conduct, and so displacing the State regulations, whatever those may be; (2) the jurisdiction to convict, the State law empowering the Court to convict summarily, the Commonwealth Law making the contravention an indictable offence, and therefore bringing into operation sec. 80 of the Constitution, requiring a jury; (3) the penalty, the State providing a maximum of $ 50 the Commonwealth Act prescribing a maximum of $ 100, or imprisonment, or both; (4) the tribunal itself".

Starke, J. observed as follows:- "It is not difficult to see that the Federal Code would be 'disturbed or deranged' if the State Code applied a different sanction in respect of the same act. Consequently the

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State regulations are, in my opinion, inconsistent with the law of the Commonwealth and rendered invalid by force of sec. 109 of the Constitution".

"In Cowburn's case (supra) is stated the reasoning for that conclusion and we will now refer to those statements without repeating them. In short, the very same conduct by the same persons is dealt with in conflicting terms by the Commonwealth and State Acts. A Court, seeing that, has no authority to inquire further, or to seek to ascertain the scope or bearing of the State Act. It must simply apply sec. 109 of the Constitution, which declares the invalidity protanto of the State Act".

Similarly Dixon, J. observed thus:- "When the Parliament of the Commonwealth and the Parliament of a State

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each legislate upon the same subject and prescribe what the rule of conduct shall be, they make laws which are inconsistent, notwithstanding that the rule of conduct is identical which each prescribes, and sec. 109 applies. That this is so is settled, at least when the sanctions they impose are diverse Hume v. Palmer (supra)".

"The important thing to consider with reference to this provision is whether the legislation is 'in respect of the same matter'. If the later legislation deals not with the matters which formed the subject of the earlier legislation but with other and distinct matters though of a cognate and allied character, then Article 254 (2) will have no application. The principle embodied in section 107 (2) and Article 254 (2) is that when there is legislation covering the same ground both by

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the Centre and by the Province, both of them being competent to enact the same, the law of the Centre should prevail over that of the State". "It is true, as already pointed out, that on a question under Article 254(1) whether an Act of Parliament prevails against a law of the State, no question of repeal arises; but the principle on which the rule of implied repeal rests, namely, that if subject-matter of the later legislation is identical with that of the earlier, so that they cannot both stand together, then the earlier is repealed by the later enactment, will be equally applicable to a question under Article 254(2) whether the further legislation by Parliament is in respect of the same matter as that of the State law".

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"(1) There may be inconsistency in the actual terms of the competing statutes R. Brisbane Licensing Court(1). (2) Though there may be no direct conflict, a State law may be inoperative because the Commonwealth law, or the award of the Commonwealth Court, is intended to be a complete exhaustive code Clyde Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Cowburn (supra). (3) Even in the absence of intention, a conflict may arise when both State and Commonwealth seek to exercise their powers over the same subject matter Victoria v. Commonwealth(2) Wenn v. Attorney General(3) This Court also relied on the decisions in the case of Hume v. Palmer as also the case of Ex Parte Mclean (supra) referred to above. This Court also endorsed the observations of Sulaiman, J. in the case of Shyamakant Lal v. Rambhajan Singh (4) where Sulaiman, J. observed as follows: "When the question is whether a Provincial legislation is repugnant to an existing Indian law, the onus of showing its repugnancy and the extent to which it

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is repugnant should be on the party attacking its validity. There ought to be a presumption in favour of its validity, and every effort should be made to reconcile them and construe both so as to avoid their being repugnant to each other, and care should be taken to see whether the two do not really operate in different fields without encroachment. Further, repugnancy must exist in fact, and not depend merely on a possibility".

"It seems to us, therefore, that the two offences are distinct and separate. This is the view taken in Amarendra Nath Roy v. The State(1) and we endorse the opinion of the learned Judges, expressed therein. Our

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conclusion, therefore, is that the offence created under section 5 (1) (c) of the Corruption Act is distinct and separate from the one under section 405 of the Indian Penal Code and, therefore, there can be no question of section 5 (1) (c) repealing section 405 of the Indian Penal Code. If that is so, then, Article 14 of the Constitution can be no bar".

[…]

(1) Ayyangar J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:- "Repugnancy arises when two enactments both within the competence of the two Legislatures collide and when the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication provides that the enactment of one Legislature has superiority over the other then to the extent of the repugnancy the one supersedes the other. But two enactments may be repugnant to each other even though obedience to each

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of them is possible without disobeying the other. The test of two legislations containing contradictory provisions is not, however, the only criterion of repugnancy, for if a competent legislature with a superior efficacy expressly or impliedly evinces by its legislation an intention to cover the whole field, the enactments of the other legislature whether passed before or after would be overborne on the ground of repugnance. Where such is the position, the inconsistency is demonstrated not by a detailed comparison of provisions of the two statutes but by the mere existence of the two pieces of legislation". […]

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impugned. If the Act, when so viewed, substantially falls within the powers expressly conferred upon the legislature which enacted it, then it cannot be held to be invalid merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters which have been assigned to another Legislature.

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general law, since the new statute is enacted knowing fully well the existence of the earlier law and yet it has not repealed it expressly. The decision further lays down that for examining whether the two statutes cover the same subject matter, what is necessary to examine is the scope and the object of the two enactments, and that has to be done by ascertaining the intention in the usual way and what is meant by the usual way is nothing more or less than the ascertainment of the dominant object of the two legislations. […]

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subject matters. If the subject matters covered by the legislations are thus different, then merely because the two legislations refer to some allied or cognate subjects they do not cover the same field. The legislation, to be on the same subject matter must further cover the entire field covered by the other. A provision in one legislation to give effect to its dominant purpose may incidentally be on the same subject as covered by the provision of the other legislation. But such partial coverage of the same area in a different context and to achieve a different purpose does not bring about the repugnancy which is intended to be covered by Article 254(2). Both the legislations must be substantially on the same subject to attract the Article.

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within any Entries in List II and if it does not, further question arises and attack on the ground of legislative competence must fail. In 'OFFSHORE HOLDINGS (P.) LTD. VS. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHOIRTIY', (2011) 3 SCC 139, the constitution bench of the Supreme Court, held tat one of the settled principles to examine the repugnancy or conflict between provisions of law enacted by two legislatures is to apply doctrine of pith and substance. It was further held that entries in legislative fields are not powers of legislation but fields of legislation and have to be construed liberally. It was also held that developmental of land does not find place in concurrent list or List I and Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 is a law relatable to Entry 5 and 18 of List II, whereas, Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is relatable to Entry 42 of List III. In 'SECURITY ASSOCIATION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER VS. UNION OF INDIA', (2014) 12 SCC 65, it was held that before determining the issue of

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repugnancy between State Act & Central Act one has to see whether both Acts related to same entry in List III and whether there is direct and irreconcilable conflict between the two.

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absence of an actual conflict, repugnancy may arise when both the State and Central statutes seek to exercise power over the same subject matter.

(ii) In order to decision the question of repugnancy or conflict, the doctrine of pit and substance has to be invoked.

(iii) In order to attract doctrine of repugnancy it must be shown that both the enactments have been enacted in respect of same subject matter and operated in the same field.

(iv) The doctrine of implied repeal applies when legislature with superior efficacy evinces an interest to cover whole field and is

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an exhaustive code in respect of subject matter of State Legislation.

(v) Clear and Direct inconsistency must exist between two enactments and such inconsistency should be absolutely irreconcilable.

(vi) Every effort should be to made to reconcile both enactments and to construe them in such a manner so as to avoid their being repugnant to each other.

(vii) Validity of an Act is not affected if it incidentally trenches on matters outside the authorized field and therefore, it is necessary to determine the pith and substance of every enactment and to find out whether Act substantially falls within powers expressly conferred by the legislature.

(viii) An enactment cannot be said to be invalid merely because it incidentally encroaches on the matters which have been assigned to another legislation.

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List II :

and 52 of List I.

List III:

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of List II of Seventh Schedule to Constitution. The legislative power of State under Entry 24 of List II is evaded only to the extent, control is assumed by the Parliament pursuant to a declaration. [See: 'ISHWARI KHETAN SUGAR MILLS (P) LTD. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & OTHERS', (1980) 4 SCC 136].

An Act to make special provisions for securing the establishment of industrial areas in the State of Karnataka and generally to promote the establishment and orderly development of industries therein, and for that purpose to establish an Industrial Areas Development Board and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid.

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establishment of an industrial area, for promoting the establishment and orderly development of industries and establishment of Industrial Areas Development Board. Section 3 of the 1966 Act empowers the State Government to declare any area in the State to be an industrial area for the purposes of 1966 Act. Section 4 of the 1966 Act empowers the State Government to alter the industrial area by including or excluding any area from industrial area. Section 5 of the Act deals with establishment and incorporation of Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board, which is a Body Corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal. Section 6 of the 1966 Act provides for constitution of the Board, whereas, Section 7 of the 1966 Act deals with terms of office and conditions of service for members of the Board. Section 11 of the 1966 Act provides for appointment of Chief Executive Officer of the Board as well as other employees. Section 13 of the 1966 Act defines the functions of the Board, whereas, Section 14

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of the 1966 Act defines the general power of the Board. Chapter V of the Act, which contain Sections 18 to 24 of the 1966 Act deal with 'Finance, Accounts and Audit' of the Board. Chapter VI, which contain Sections 25 & 26 of the 1966 Act provide that provisions of Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1974 apply to premises of the Board, whereas, the provisions of Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 do not apply to the premises of the Board. Chapter VII deals with acquisition and disposal of land. Chapter VII contains Section 27 to 31 of the 1966 Act, which are extracted below for the facility of reference:

Section 27. Application - The provisions of this Chapter shall apply to such areas from such dates as have been notified by the State Government under sub-Section (3) of Section 1.

Section 28. Acquisition of land - (1) If at any time, in the opinion of the State Government, any land is required for the

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purpose of development by the Board, or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of this Act, the State Government by Notification, give notice of its intention to acquire such land.

(2) On a publication of a Notification under sub-Section (1), the State Government shall serve notice upon the owner is not the occupier, on the occupier of the land and on all such persons known or believed to be interested therein to show cause, within thirty days from the date of service of the notice, why the land should not be acquired.

(3) After considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of the land and by any other person interested therein, and after giving such owner and person an opportunity of being heard, the State Government may pass such orders as it deems fit.

(4) After orders are passed under sub- Section (3), where the State Government is satisfied that any land should be acquired for the purpose specified in the Notification issued

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under sub-Section (1), a declaration shall, by Notification in the Official Gazette, be made to that effect.

(5) On the publication in the official gazette of the declaration under sub-Section (4), the land shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances.

(6) Where any land is vested in the State Government under Sub-Section (5), the State Government may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of the land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or any person duly authorized by it in this behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice.

(7) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub-Section (5), the State Government or any Officer authorized by the State Government in this behalf may take possession of the land and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary.

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(8) Where the land has been acquired for the Board, the State Government, after it has taken possession of the land, may transfer the land to the Board for the purpose for which the land has been acquired.

(2) Where the amount of compensation has been determined by agreement between the State Government and the person to be compensated, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement.

(3) Where no such agreement can be reached, the State Government shall refer the case to the Deputy Commissioner for determination of the amount of compensation to be paid for such acquisition as also the person or persons to whom such compensation shall be paid.

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(4) On receipt of a reference under sub- section (3), the Deputy Commissioner shall serve notice on the owner or occupier of such land and on all persons known or believed to be interested herein to appear before him and state their respective interests in the said land.

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Act. No.30 of 2013 - 1. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is the general law relating to acquisition of land for public purposes and also for companies and for determining the amount of compensation to be made on account of such acquisition. The provisions of the said Act have been found to be inadequate in addressing certain issues related to the exercise of the statutory powers of the State for involuntary acquisition of private land and property. The Act does not address the issues of rehabilitation and resettlement to the affected persons and their families.

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desirability of such State intervention when land could be arranged by the company through private negotiations on a "willing seller-willing buyer" basis, which could be seen to be a more fair arrangement from the point of view of the land owner. In order to streamline the provisions of the Act causing less hardships to the owners of the land and other persons dependant upon such land, it in proposed repeal the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and to replace it with adequate provisions for rehabilitation and resettlement for the affected persons and their families.

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of land acquisition and rehabilitation and resettlement has become necessary. Hence the proposed legislation proposes to address concerns of farmers and those whose livelihoods are dependent on the land being acquired, while at the same time facilitating land acquisition for industrialization, infrastructure and urbanization projects in a timely and transparent manner.

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been ensured that consent of at least 80 per cent of the project affected families is to be obtained through a prior informed process. Acquisition under urgency clause has also been limited for the purposes of national defence, security purposes and Rehabilitation and Resettlement needs in the event of emergencies or natural calamities only.

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industries therein and for matters incidental thereto. The 1966 Act has been enacted under Entry 24 of List II to the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. Both the enactments i.e., 1966 Act and 2013 Act taken together, as well as its objects and effect of provisions of the Act it is evident that the establishment, growth and development of industries in the State of Karnataka or development of land for the Board does not fall either within Entry 7 or Entry 52 of List I to Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. It is pertinent to note that no declaration under Entry 52 of List I relating to 2013 Act or relating to matters covered by 1966 Act has been made. Both the Acts have been enacted under different Entries. Merely because 1966 Act incidentally provides for acquisition of land for industries, it cannot be held that 1966 Act has been enacted under Entry 43 of List III of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. Since, both the statutes have been enacted under

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different entries in different Lists, therefore, the question of repugnancy does not arise.

may by Notification, give notice of its intention to acquire such land.

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(a) For strategic purposes relating to naval, military, air force, and armed forces of the Union, including central paramilitary forces or any work vital to national security or defence of India or State police, safety of the people; or (b) For infrastructure projects, which includes the following, namely:— (i) All activities or items listed in the notification of the Government of India in the Department of Economic Affairs (Infrastructure Section) number 13/6/2009-INF, dated the 27th March, 2012, excluding private hospitals, private educational institutions and private hotels; (ii) Projects involving agro-processing, supply of inputs to agriculture, warehousing, cold storage facilities, marketing infrastructure for agriculture and allied activities such as dairy, fisheries, and meat processing, set up or owned by the appropriate Government or by a farmers' cooperative or by an institution set up under a statute; (iii) Project for industrial corridors or mining activities, national investment and

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manufacturing zones, as designated in the National Manufacturing Policy; (iv) Project for water harvesting and water conservation structures, sanitation; (v) Project for Government administered, Government aided educational and research schemes or institutions; (vi) Project for sports, heath care, tourism, transportation of space programme; (vii) Any infrastructure facility as may be notified in this regard by the Central Government and after tabling of such notification in Parliament; (c) Project for project affected families; (d) Project for housing, or such income groups, as may be specified from time to time by the appropriate Government; (e) Project for planned development or the improvement of village sites or any site in the urban areas or provision of land for residential purposes for the weaker sections in rural and urban areas; (f) Project for residential purposes to the poor or landless or to persons residing in areas affected by natural calamities, or to persons

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displaced or affected by reason of the implementation of any scheme undertaken by the Government, any local authority or a corporation owned or controlled by the State.

(b) For infrastructure projects, which includes the following, namely:—

(i) xxxxxxxx

(ii) xxxxx

(iii) Project for industrial corridors or mining activities, national investment and manufacturing zones, as designated in the National Manufacturing Policy;

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2013 Act. It is noteworthy that provisions of 2013 Act apply in respect of project for industrial corridor for mining activities, national investment and manufacturing zones, as designed by the National Manufacturing Policy by virtue of Section 2(b)(iii) of the 2013 Act, whereas, the provisions of 1966 Act apply to an industrial area which may be declared to be so by a Notification by a State Government under the 1966 Act. Thus, both the Act operate in different fields.

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Section 28 to 30 of 1966 Act Section 11 to 19, 26 & 28 of 2013 Act 28. Acquisition of land.— (1) If at any time, in the opinion of the State Government, any land is required for the purpose of development by the Board, or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of this Act, the State Government may by notification, give notice of its intention to acquire such land. (2) On publication of a notification under sub-section (1), the State Government shall serve notice upon the owner or where the owner is not the occupier, on the occupier of the land and on all such persons known or believed to be interested therein to show cause, within thirty days from the date of service of the notice, why the land should not be acquired. (3) After considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of the land and by any other person interested therein, and after giving such owner and person an opportunity of being heard, the State Government may pass such orders as it deems fit. (4) After orders are passed under sub-section (3), where the State Government is 11. Publication of preliminary notification and power of officers thereupon.—(1) Whenever, it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any area is required or likely to be required for any public purpose, a notification (hereinafter referred to as preliminary notification) to that effect along with details of the land to be acquired in rural and urban areas shall be published in the following manner, namely:— (a) in the Official Gazette; (b) in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality of such area of which one shall be in the regional language; (c) in the local language in the Panchayat, Municipality or Municipal Corporation, as the case may be and in the offices of the District Collector, the Sub-divisional Magistrate and the Tehsil; (d) uploaded on the website of the appropriate Government; (e) in the affected areas,

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satisfied that any land should be acquired for the purpose specified in the notification issued under sub-section (1), a declaration shall, by notification in the official Gazette, be made to that effect. (5) On the publication in the official Gazette of the declaration under sub-section (4), the land shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. (6) Where any land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (5), the State Government may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of the land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or any person duly authorised by it in this behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice. (7) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub-section (5), the State Government or any officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf may take possession of the land and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary. (8) Where the land has been acquired for the Board, the State Government, after it has in such manner as may be prescribed. (2) Immediately after issuance of the notification under sub-section (1), the concerned Gram Sabha or Sabhas at the village level, municipalities in case of municipal areas and the Autonomous Councils in case of the areas referred to in the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, shall be informed of the contents of the notification issued under the said sub-section in all cases of land acquisition at a meeting called especially for this purpose. (3) The notification issued under sub-section (1) shall also contain a statement on the nature of the public purpose involved, reasons necessitating the displacement of affected persons, summary of the Social Impact Assessment Report and particulars of the Administrator appointed for the purposes of rehabilitation and resettlement under Section 43. (4) No person shall make any transaction or cause any transaction of land specified in the preliminary notification or create any encumbrances on such land from the date of publication of such notification till such time as the proceedings

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taken possession of the land, may transfer the land to the Board for the purpose for which the land has been acquired.

under this Chapter are completed: Provided that the Collector may, on the application made by the owner of the land so notified, exempt in special circumstances to be recorded in writing, such owner from the operation of this sub-section: Provided further that any loss or injury suffered by any person due to his wilful violation of this provision shall not be made up by the Collector. (5) After issuance of notice under sub-section (1), the Collector shall, before the issue of a declaration under Section 19, undertake and complete the exercise of updating of land records as prescribed within a period of two months.

(2) Where the amount of compensation has been determined by agreement between the State Government and the person to be 12. Preliminary survey of land and power of officers to carry out survey.—For the purposes of enabling the appropriate Government to determine the extent of land to be acquired, it shall be lawful for any officer, either generally or specially authorised by such Government in this behalf, and for his servants and workmen,—

(a) to enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in such

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compensated, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement. (3) Where no such agreement can be reached, the State Government shall refer the case to the Deputy Commissioner for determination of the amount of compensation to be paid for such acquisition as also the person or persons to whom such compensation shall be paid. (4) On receipt of a reference under sub-section (3), the Deputy Commissioner shall serve notice on the owner or occupier of such land and on all persons known or believed to be interested herein to appear before him and state their respective interests in the said land.

locality; (b) to dig or bore into the sub-soil; (c) to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is adapted for such purpose; (d) to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and the intended line of the work (if any) proposed to be made thereon; and (e) to mark such levels, boundaries and line by placing marks and cutting trenches and where otherwise the survey cannot be completed and the levels taken and the boundaries and line marked, to cut down and clear away any part of any standing crop, fence or jungle: Provided that no act under clauses (a) to (e) in respect of land shall be conducted in the absence of the owner of the land or in the absence of any person authorised in writing by the owner: Provided further that the acts specified under the first proviso may be undertaken in the absence of the owner, if the

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owner has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to be present during the survey, by giving a notice of at least sixty days prior to such survey: Provided also that no person shall enter into any building or upon any enclosed court or garden attached to a dwelling- house (unless with the consent of the occupier thereof) without previously giving such occupier at least seven days' notice in writing of his intention to do so.

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made in this behalf.

Assessment report submitted by the Expert Group under Section 7, then, such report shall be deemed to have lapsed and a fresh Social Impact Assessment shall be required to be undertaken prior to acquisition proceedings under Section 11: Provided that the appropriate Government, shall have the power to extend the period of twelve months, if in its opinion circumstances exist justifying the same: Provided further that any such decision to extend the period shall be recorded in writing and the same shall be notified and be uploaded on the website of the authority concerned.

(1) of Section 11, as being required or likely to be required for a public purpose, may within sixty days from the date of the publication of the preliminary notification, object to— (a) the area and suitability of land proposed to be acquired; (b) justification offered

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for public purpose; (c) the findings of the Social Impact Assessment report. (2) Every objection under sub-section (1) shall be made to the Collector in writing, and the Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard in person or by any person authorised by him in this behalf or by an Advocate and shall, after hearing all such objections and after making such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, either make a report in respect of the land which has been notified under sub-section (1) of Section 11, or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land, to the appropriate Government, containing his recommendations on the objections, together with the record of the proceedings held by him along with a separate report giving therein the approximate cost of land acquisition, particulars as to the number of affected families likely to be resettled, for the decision of that Government. (3) The decision of the appropriate Government on the objections made under sub- section (2) shall be final.

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(a) particulars of lands and immovable properties being acquired of each affected family; (b) livelihoods lost in respect of land losers and landless whose livelihoods are primarily dependent on the lands being acquired;

(c) a list of public utilities and Government buildings which are affected or likely to be affected, where resettlement of affected families is involved; (d) details of the amenities and infrastructural facilities which are affected or likely to be affected,

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where resettlement of affected families is involved; and (e) details of any common property resources being acquired. (2) The Administrator shall, based on the survey and census under sub-section (1), prepare a draft Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme, as prescribed which shall include particulars of the rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements of each land owner and landless whose livelihoods are primarily dependent on the lands being acquired and where resettlement of affected families is involved— (i) a list of Government buildings to be provided in the Resettlement area; (ii) details of the public amenities and infrastructural facilities which are to be provided in the Resettlement Area. (3) The draft Rehabilitation and Resettlement scheme referred to in sub-section (2) shall include time limit for implementing Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme; (4) The draft Rehabilitation

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and Resettlement scheme referred to in sub-section (2) shall be made known locally by wide publicity in the affected area and discussed in the concerned Gram Sabhas or Municipalities. (5) A public hearing shall be conducted in such manner as may be prescribed, after giving adequate publicity about the date, time and venue for the public hearing at the affected area: Provided that in case where an affected area involves more than one Gram Panchayat or Municipality, public hearings shall be conducted in every Gram Sabha and Municipality where more than twenty-five per cent of land belonging to that Gram Sabha or Municipality is being acquired: Provided further that the consultation with the Gram Sabha in Scheduled Areas shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (40 of 1996). (6) The Administrator shall, on completion of public hearing submit the draft Scheme for Rehabilitation and Resettlement along with a specific report on the claims and objections raised in the public hearing to the

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Collector.

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and uploaded on the website of the appropriate Government.

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Provided that no declaration under this sub-section shall be made unless the summary of the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme is published along with such declaration: Provided further that no declaration under this sub- section shall be made unless the Requiring Body deposits an amount, in full or part, as may be prescribed by the appropriate Government toward the cost of acquisition of the land: Provided also that the Requiring Body shall deposit the amount promptly so as to enable the appropriate Government to publish the declaration within a period of twelve months from the date of the publication of preliminary notification under Section 11. (3) In projects where land is acquired in stages, the application for acquisition itself can specify different stages for the rehabilitation and resettlement, and all declarations shall be made according to the stages so specified. (4) Every declaration referred to in sub-section (1) shall be published in the following manner, namely:—

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(a) in the Official Gazette; (b) in two daily newspapers being circulated in the locality, of such area of which one shall be in the regional language; (c) in the local language in the Panchayat, Municipality or Municipal Corporation, as the case may be, and in the offices of the District Collector, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and the Tehsil; (d) uploaded on the website of the appropriate Government; (e) in the affected areas, in such manner as may be prescribed. (5) Every declaration referred to in sub-section (1) shall indicate,— (a) the district or other territorial division in which the land is situated; (b) the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area; and (c) where a plan shall have been made for the land, the place at

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which such plan may be inspected without any cost. (6) The declaration referred to in sub-section (1) shall be conclusive evidence that the land is required for a public purpose and, after making such declaration, the appropriate Government may acquire the land in such manner as specified under this Act. (7) Where no declaration is made under sub-section (1) within twelve months from the date of preliminary notification, then such notification shall be deemed to have been rescinded: Provided that in computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court shall be excluded: Provided further that the appropriate Government shall have the power to extend the period of twelve months, if in its opinion circumstances exist justifying the same: Provided also that any such decision to extend the period shall be recorded in writing and

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the same shall be notified and be uploaded on the website of the authority concerned.

(a) the market value, if any, specified in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899) for the registration of sale deeds or agreements to sell, as the case may be, in the area, where the land is situated; or

(b) the average sale price for similar type of land situated in the nearest village or nearest vicinity area; or

(c) consented amount of compensation as agreed upon under sub-section (2) of Section 2 in case of acquisition of lands for private companies or for public private partnership projects, whichever is higher: Provided that the date for

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determination of market value shall be the date on which the notification has been issued under Section 11. Explanation 1.—The average sale price referred to in clause (b) shall be determined taking into account the sale deeds or the agreements to sell registered for similar type of area in the near village or near vicinity area during immediately preceding three years of the year in which such acquisition of land is proposed to be made. Explanation 2.—For determining the average sale price referred to in Explanation 1, one-half of the total number of sale deeds or the agreements to sell in which the highest sale price has been mentioned shall be taken into account. Explanation 3.—While determining the market value under this section and the average sale price referred to in Explanation 1 or Explanation 2, any price paid as compensation for land acquired under the provisions of this Act on an earlier occasion in the district shall not be taken into consideration. Explanation 4.—While determining the market value under this section and the average sale price referred to in

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Explanation 1 or Explanation 2, any price paid, which in the opinion of the Collector is not indicative of actual prevailing market value may be discounted for the purposes of calculating market value. (2) The market value calculated as per sub-section (1) shall be multiplied by a factor to be specified in the First Schedule. (3) Where the market value under sub-section (1) or sub- section (2) cannot be determined for the reason that— (a) the land is situated in such area where the transactions in land are restricted by or under any other law for the time being in force in that area; or (b) the registered sale deeds or agreements to sell as mentioned in clause (a) of sub- section (1) for similar land are not available for the immediately preceding three years; or (c) the market value has not been specified under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of

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1899) by the appropriate authority, the State Government concerned shall specify the floor price or minimum price per unit area of the said land based on the price calculated in the manner specified in sub-section (1) in respect of similar types of land situated in the immediate adjoining areas: Provided that in a case where the Requiring Body offers its shares to the owners of the lands (whose lands have been acquired) as a part compensation, for acquisition of land, such shares in no case shall exceed twenty-five per cent of the value so calculated under sub-section (1) or sub- section (2) or sub-section (3) as the case may be: Provided further that the Requiring Body shall in no case compel any owner of the land (whose land has been acquired) to take its shares, the value of which is deductible in the value of the land calculated under sub-section (1): Provided also that the Collector shall, before initiation of any land acquisition proceedings in any area, take all necessary steps to revise and update the market value of the land on the basis of the

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prevalent market rate in that area: Provided also that the appropriate Government shall ensure that the market value determined for acquisition of any land or property of an educational institution established and administered by a religious or linguistic minority shall be such as would not restrict or abrogate the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.

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any) sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of severing such land from his other land; fourthly, the damage (if any) sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other property, movable or immovable, in any other manner, or his earnings; fifthly, in consequence of the acquisition of the land by the Collector, the person interested is compelled to change his residence or place of business, the reasonable expenses (if any) incidental to such change; sixthly, the damage (if any) bona fide resulting from diminution of the profits of the land between the time of the publication of the declaration under Section 19 and the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land; and seventhly, any other ground which may be in the interest of equity, justice and beneficial to the affected families.

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(1) xxxx

(2) Where a law made by the legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent list contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law

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so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State:

Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State.

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For the aforementioned reasons, we answer issue No.1 in the negative and hold that provisions of 1966 Act are not repugnant to 2013 Act.

ISSUE NO.2

(2) Whether the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 is impliedly repealed on coming into force of the Right to Fair Compensation ad Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013? 39. The principle that a prior special law is held to be impliedly repealed by later general law has been dealt with succinctly by Justice G.P.Singh in Principles of Statutory Interpretation 14th Edition Page 741, which read as under:

As an application of the above principles a prior particular or special law is not readily held to be impliedly repealed by later general enactment. The particular or special law deals only with a particular phase of the subject covered by the general law and, therefore, a reconciliation is normally possible between a prior particular Act and a

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later general Act and so the particular Act is construed as an exception or qualification of the general Act. To quote the words of Lord Philimore, "it is a sound principle of all jurisprudence that a prior particular law is not easily to be held to be abrogated by a posterior law, expressed in general terms and by the apparent generality of its language applicable to and covering a number of cases, of which the particular law is but one. This, as a matter of jurisprudence, as understood in England, has been laid down in a great number of cases, whether the prior law be an express statute, or be the underlying common or customary law of the country. Where general words in a later Act are capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, that earlier and special legislation is not be held indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so.

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177

(2015) 17 SCC 65 and 'UNION OF INDIA VS. RANJEET KUMAR SAHA', (2019) 7 SCC 505.

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schedule to the Constitution of India. Thus, 2013 Act does not deal with the prohibited field viz., industries and therefore, the doctrine of occupied field does not apply to the fact situation of the case. Similarly, 2013 Act is not a special law and therefore, it is not a case where special law is enacted in respect of field, which general law occupies. Therefore, 2013 Act not being a special law does not occupy the field in respect of subject matter in respect of which 1966 Act has been enacted. Thus, the issue No.2 is also answered in the negative and it is held that provisions of 1966 Act are not impliedly repeal on coming to force of 2013 Act.

ISSUE NO.3.

(3) Whether Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 is a special enactment vis a vis Right to Fair Compensation and transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013?

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ISSUE NO.4 (4) Whether the sanction given by the President on 26.05.1966 to Karnataka Act No.18 of 1966, stood lapsed or come to end on coming into force of the 2013 Act?

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(1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.

(2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of a law which provides for acquisition or requisitioning of the property for an amount which may be fixed by such law or which may be determined in accordance with such principles and given in such manner as may be specified in such law; and no such law shall be called in question in any Court on the ground that the amount so fixed or determined is not adequate or that the whole or any part of such amount is to be given otherwise than in cash:

Provided that in making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of any property

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of an educational institution established and administered by a minority, referred to in clause (1) of article 30, The State shall ensure that the amount fixed or determined under such law for the acquisition of such property in such as would not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed under that clause.

(2-A) Where a law does not provide for the transfer of the ownership or right to possession of any property to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by the State, it shall not be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property, notwithstanding that it deprives any person of his property.

(2-B) Nothing in sub-clause (f) of clause (1) of article 19 shall affect any such law as is referred to in clause (2).

(3) No such law as is referred to in clause (2) made by the Legislature of a State shall have effect unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent”.

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Thus in respect of law which provided for compulsory acquisition of a property for a public purpose enacted by legislature of a state, and assent of the president was required to be taken, in order to make such a law effective. The 1966 Act received assent of the President of India on 14th May, 1966.

(a) the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights, or

(b) the taking over of the management of any property by the State for a limited period either in the public interest or in order to

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secure the proper management of the property, or (c) the amalgamation of two or more corporations either in the public interest or in order to secure the proper management of any of the corporations, or (d) the extinguishment or modification of any rights of managing agents, secretaries and treasurers, managing directors, directors or managers of corporations, or of any voting rights of shareholders thereof, or (e) the extinguishment or modification of any rights accruing by virtue of any agreement, lease or licence for the purpose of searching for, or winning, any mineral or mineral oil, or the premature termination or cancellation of any such agreement, lease or licence, shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19: Provided that where such law is a law made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of

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the President, has received his assent: Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof”

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187

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the Constitution and Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India. The assent of the President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution is required to be taken when there is a repugnancy between the law enacted by the State legislature and the Parliament. In the instant case, the 1966 Act as well as 2013 Act have been enacted under Entry 24 of List II and Entry 42 of List III of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. A part of the state legislation affects property rights, therefore the assent of President of India is taken under Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India and no assent was required to be taken under Article 254(2) of the Constitution as there is no repugnancy between the 1966 Act and 2013 Act. Even otherwise merely because assent of the President has been taken, the presumption with regard to repugnancy does not arise as the burden to prove that there has been repeal by implication lies on the party asserting the same which has not been discharged in this case.

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For the aforementioned reasons, the fourth issue is also answered in the negative and it is held that assent granted by the President on 26.05.1996 to 1966 Act did not lapse on coming into force of 2013 Act.

ISSUE NO.5. (5) What is the effect of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 2019 (Act No.16 of 2019) on Right to Fair Compensation and transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013?

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By the aforesaid Amendment Act, several provisions of 2013 Act have been amended, however, the amendments which are relevant for decision of the controversy involved in these appeals are, Amendment of Section 2, insertion of Sections 10A, 23A, 30A and 31A. The aforesaid provisions are extracted below for the facility of reference: 10-A. Power of State Government to exempt certain projects.- The State Government may in the public interest, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt any of the following projects from the application of the provisions of Chapter II and Chapter III of this Act, namely:- (a) such projects vital to national security or defence of India and every part thereof, including preparation for defence or defence production; (b) infrastructure projects including educational institutions, Hospitals, Government or Local Self Government Offices electrification, irrigation projects and drinking water projects; and (c) affordable housing and housing for the poor people." (d)

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industrial corridors set up by the State Government and its undertaking (in which case the land shall be acquired up to such distance on both sides of designated railway lines or roads and as specified by the State Government for specific projects from time to time and notified as such in State Gazette); and (e) infrastructure projects, including projects under public-private partnership where the ownership of the land continues to vest with the State Government: Provided that, the State Government shall, before the issue of notification, ensure the extent of land for the proposed acquisition keeping in view the minimum land required for such project”

“23-A. Award of Deputy Commissioner without enquiry in case of agreement of interested persons:- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 23, if at any stage of the proceedings, the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that all the persons interested in the land who appeared before him have agreed in writing on the matters to be included in the award of the Deputy

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Commissioner in the form prescribed by rules made by the State Government, he may, without making further enquiry, make an award according to the terms of such agreement”. (2) The determination of compensation for any land under sub-section (1) shall not in any way affect the determination of compensation in respect of other land in the same locality or elsewhere in accordance with the other provisions of this Act. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Registration Act, 1908(Central Act 16 of 1908), no agreement made under sub-section (1) shall be liable to registration under that Act.

30-A. Acquisition of land by the State Government by entering into agreement voluntary Acquisition of Land.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, or any other law, whenever it appears to the State Government that the land is needed in any area for any public purpose, the State Government or its Authorised Officer may enter into an agreement with the willing land owner to sell the land in favour of the State

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Government for the matters specified therein in a prescribed form. (2) The State Government or its authorized officer shall pass an order in terms of agreement under sub-section (1) for acquisition, and the substance of the order shall be notified in the official Gazette. On such publication of notification, the title, ownership and all interests of the land owner who enters into agreement shall vest with the State Government free from all encumbrances. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Registration Act, 1908(Central Act16 of 1908) no agreement entered under sub-section (1) shall be liable for registration under that Act. (4) If any family, other than the family of the land owner who entered into an agreement, is affected by the acquisition of land under this section, the State Government shall pay a lump-sum amount towards rehabilitation and resettlement if any, as prescribed in the rules made thereunder: 5 Provided that, no agreement or the lump-sum amount towards rehabilitation and resettlement as may be

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prescribed, shall be abnormally at variance to the disadvantage of the land owners.

"31-A. Payment of Lump-sum amount by State Government.- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, whenever the land is to be acquired for any projects as notified in section 10-A, it shall be competent for the State Government to pay such lump sum amount as may be prescribed in the rules in lieu of Rehabilitation and Resettlement: Provided that the payment of such lump-sum amount in lieu of Rehabilitation and Resettlement as may be prescribed, shall not be abnormally at variance to the disadvantage of the affected families.

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may be acquired under 1966 Act as per Schedule I of 2013 Act. Therefore, the grievance of the owners of the land in so far as it pertains to payment of lesser compensation under 1966 Act does not survive. It has been urged on behalf of the owners of the land that the provisions of the Karnataka Amendment Act 2019 are arbitrary and are opposed to all canons of law and voilative of Article 21. However, except for making such a statement no material has been brought on record to show as to how the provisions of Amendment Act are either arbitrary, voilative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India or unconstitutional. The provisions of the Amendment Act cannot also be said to be in violation of section 108 of 2013 Act which provides an option to the affected families to avail better compensation an rehabilitation and resettlement, if state law or policy so provides. Thus, it is held that provisions of 2013 Act have been validly amended by the State legislature. Accordingly the issue No.5 is answered.

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ISSUE NO.6

(6) Whether provisions of Section 24(2) of 2013 Act apply to proceeding under 1966 Act?

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“13. It is also noted that the acquisition proceedings including preliminary and final declaration have been passed under the provisions of the KIAD Act. But there is no provision under the KIAD Act to pass an award and award has to be passed only under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. If the award has to be passed under the LA Act, whether the new Act can be pressed into service to hold the acquisition proceedings are lapsed on account of non-passing of award within a period of 5 years under Section 11. If the award is passed under the LA Act, the enquiry has to be conducted by the Deputy Commissioner or Collector before passing the award. Section 11-A contemplates that if the award is not passed within 2 years from the date of publication of the final declaration, the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land shall automatically stands lapsed. It is no doubt true that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M. Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka [M. Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 3 SCC 408 : (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 733] has held that Section 11-A of the Act is no

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application in respect of the land acquired under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act. We have to consider in this appeal as to whether Section 24(2) of the new Act is applicable in order to hold that the acquisition proceedings deemed to be lapsed due to non-payment of compensation and non-passing of the award within a period of five years from the date of declaration and with effect from non-payment of compensation to the landowners.

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required to be passed under the LA Act, the respondents cannot contend that the provisions of the new Act cannot be made applicable on account of non-payment of compensation within a period of five years.”

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3 SCC 408 : (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 733] , SCC pp. 420-22, paras 29-36) “29. The appellant has not challenged the validity of the aforesaid provisions. Therefore, on a combined reading of the provisions of Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act, it is clear that on the publication of the Notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act i.e. from 30-3-2004, the land in question vested in the State free from all encumbrances by operation of Section 28(5) of the KIAD Act, whereas the land acquired under the said Act vests only under Section 16 thereof, which runs as under: ‘16. Power to take possession.—When the Collector has made an award under Section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.’ 30. On a comparison of the aforesaid provisions, namely, Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act with Section 16 of the said Act, it is clear that the land which is subject to acquisition proceeding under the said Act gets vested with the Government only when the

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Collector makes an award under Section 11, and the Government takes possession. Under Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act, such vesting takes place by operation of law and it has nothing to do with the making of any award. This is where Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act are vitally different from Sections 4 and 6 of the said Act. 31. A somewhat similar question came up for consideration before a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pratap v. State of Rajasthan [Pratap v. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 3 SCC 1] . In that case the acquisition proceedings commenced under Section 52(2) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 and the same contentions were raised, namely, that the acquisition notification gets invalidated for not making an award within a period of two years from the date of notification. Repelling the said contention, the learned Judges held that once the land is vested in the Government, the provisions of Section 11-A are not attracted and the acquisition proceedings will not lapse. (Pratap

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case [Pratap v. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 3 SCC 1] , SCC p. 8, para 12.) 32. In Munithimmaiah v. State of Karnataka [Munithimmaiah v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 326] this Court held that the provisions of Sections 6 and 11-A of the said Act do not apply to the provisions of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (the BDA Act). In SCC para 15 at p. 335 of the Report this Court made a distinction between the purposes of the two enactments and held that all the provisions of the said Act do not apply to the BDA Act. Subsequently, the Constitution Bench of this Court in Offshore Holdings (P) Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority [Offshore Holdings (P) Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority, (2011) 3 SCC 139 : (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 662] , held that Section 11-A of the said Act does not apply to acquisition under the BDA Act. 33. The same principle is attracted to the present case also. Here also on a comparison between the provisions of the said Act and the KIAD Act, we find that those two Acts were enacted to achieve substantially different

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purposes. Insofar as the KIADB Act is concerned, from its Statement of Objects and Reasons, it is clear that the same was enacted to achieve the following purposes: ‘It is considered necessary to make provision for the orderly establishment and development of industries in suitable areas in the State. To achieve this object, it is proposed to specify suitable areas for industrial development and establish a Board to develop such areas and make available lands therein for establishment of industries.’ 34. The KIAD Act is of course a self- contained code. The said Act is primarily a law regulating acquisition of land for public purpose and for payment of compensation. Acquisition of land under the said Act is not concerned solely with the purpose of planned development of any city. It has to cater to different situations which come within the expanded horizon of public purpose. Recently, the Constitution Bench of this Court in Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra [Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 3 SCC 1 : (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 578] held that

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Section 11-A of the said Act does not apply to acquisition under the provisions of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. 35. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the judgment of this Court in Mariyappa v. State of Karnataka [Mariyappa v. State of Karnataka, (1998) 3 SCC 276] . The said decision was cited for the purpose of contending that Section 11-A is applicable to an acquisition under the KIAD Act. In Mariyappa [Mariyappa v. State of Karnataka, (1998) 3 SCC 276] before coming to hold that provision of Section 11-A of the Central Act applies to the Karnataka Acquisition of Land for Grant of House Sites Act, 1972 (hereinafter “the 1972 Act”), this Court held that the 1972 Act is not a self- contained code. The Court also held that the 1972 Act and the Central Act are supplemental to each other to the extent that unless the Central Act supplements the Karnataka Act, the latter cannot function. The Court further held that both the Acts, namely,

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the 1972 Act and the Central Act deal with the same subject. But in the instant case, the KIAD Act is a self-contained code and the Central Act is not supplemental to it. Therefore, the ratio in Mariyappa [Mariyappa v. State of Karnataka, (1998) 3 SCC 276] is not attracted to the facts of the present case. 36. Following the aforesaid well-settled principles, this Court is of the opinion that there is no substance in the contention of the appellant that acquisition under the KIAD Act lapsed for alleged non-compliance with the provisions of Section 11-A of the said Act. For the reasons aforesaid, all the contentions of the appellant, being without any substance, fail and the appeal is dismissed.”

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Narasimhan [State of M.P. v. M.V. Narasimhan, (1975) 2 SCC 377 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 589] in this behalf where following proposition is laid down: (SCC p. 385, para 15) “15. … ‘Where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act, then the borrowed provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. This principle, however, will not apply in the following cases: (a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other; (b) where the two Acts are in pari materia; (c) where the amendment in the previous Act, if not imported into the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual; and (d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act.’”

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comprehensive Entry 42 in List III was substituted to read : “Acquisition and requisitioning of property”. Accordingly, the power to acquire property could be exercised concurrently by the Union and the States. Even if prior to the deletion of Entry 33 in List I and Entry 36 in List II an argument could possibly have been advanced that as power of acquisition of property was conferred both on Union and the States to be exercised either for the purpose of the Union or for the State, it was incidental to any other legislative power flowing from various entries in the three lists and not an independent power, but since the deletion of Entry 33 in List I and Entry 36 in List II and substitution of a comprehensive entry in List III, it could hardly be urged with confidence that the power of acquisition and requisitioning of property was incidental to other power. It is an independent power provided for in a specific entry. Therefore, both the Union and the State would have power of acquisition and requisitioning of property. This position is unquestionably established by the majority

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decision in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 248, 282 : AIR 1970 SC 564 : (1970) 3 SCR 530, 567] where Shah, J., speaking for the majority of 10 Judges held as under: (SCC p. 282, para 38)

“Power to legislate for acquisition of property is exercisable only under Entry 42 of List III, and not as an incident of the power to legislate in respect of a specific head of legislation in any of the three lists.”

In reaching this conclusion reliance was placed on Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [AIR 1954 SC 251 : 1954 SCR 779 : 1954 SCJ 310] . It was, however, urged that the proposition culled out from Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation case [(1970) 1 SCC 248, 282 : AIR 1970 SC 564 : (1970) 3 SCR 530, 567] by Shah, J., in R.C. Cooper case [(1970) 1 SCC 248, 282 : AIR 1970 SC 564 : (1970) 3 SCR 530, 567] is not borne out by the observation in the first mentioned case. In Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation case [AIR 1954 SC 251 : 1954

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SCR 779 : 1954 SCJ 310] the challenge was to the Madras Electric Supply Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1949, on the ground that the Madras Legislature was not competent to enact the legislation because at the relevant time there was no entry in the Government of India Act, 1935, relating to compulsory acquisition of anycommercial or industrial undertaking. This challenge failed in the High Court but on appeal the challenge was accepted by a Constitution Bench of this Court. Now, it must be remembered that the impugned legislation in that case was a pre- Constitution legislation then governed by the Government of India Act, 1935. The challenge was that the State Legislature had no power to enact a legislation for acquisition of an electrical undertaking. On behalf of the State the Act was sought to be sustained on the ground that the Act was in pith and substance a law with respect to electricity under Entry 31 of the Concurrent List and, therefore, the State Legislature was competent to enact the same. After scrutinising the Act this Court came to the conclusion that in pith and

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substance the Act was one to provide for acquisition of electrical undertaking and, therefore, the State Legislature lacked competence to enact the same. Now, in that case the Advocate General of Madras in his effort to save the impugned legislation advanced an argument before the Constitution Bench that:

“There was implicit in every entry in the legislative lists in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, an inherent power to make a law with respect to a matter ancillary or incidental to the subject-matter of each entry.”

His further argument was that each entry in the list carried with it an inherent power to provide for the compulsory acquisition of any property, land or any commercial or industrial undertaking, while making a law under such entry. This argument was in terms repelled relying upon an earlier decision of the Constitution Bench in State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh [AIR 1952 SC 252 : 1952 SCR 889 :

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1952 SCJ 354] . Repelling this contention of the Advocate-General of Madras would mean that the power of acquisition of property is not ancillary or incidental to the subject- matter of each entry but in substance it is an independent power by itself. This also becomes clear from Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh case [AIR 1952 SC 252 : 1952 SCR 889 : 1952 SCJ 354] wherein Das, J., in his concurring judgment repelled the argument of the learned Attorney General appearing for the State contending that the Bihar Land Reforms Act was a law made with respect to matters mentioned in Entry 18 List II and not in Entry 36 List II. Entry 18 in List II read: “Land and Land tenures, etc.” and it was contended that the impugned legislation was on the subject of land and land tenures and would cover acquisition of land also. Negativing this contention it was held that in that event Entry 36 in List II would become redundant. The pertinent observation is as under:

“In my opinion, to give a meaning and content to each of the two legislative heads

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under Entry 18 and Entry 36 in List II the former should be read as a legislative category or head comprising land and land tenures and all matters connected therewith other than acquisition of land which should be read as covered by Entry 36 in List II.”

The aforesaid interpretation by the Supreme Court binds this court, therefore, it cannot be held that

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decision of Supreme Court in SHRI RAMTANU CO- OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD does not bind this court.

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entire field of establishment of industrial areas is covered by 2013 Act, also does not deserve acceptance.

CONCLUSION:

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(5) The Karnataka Amendment Act No.16/2019 to the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 is constitutionally valid.

Let the writ petitions be listed before learned single judge to examine the validity of the proceedings initiated under the 1966 Act.

The interim order dated 19.04.2017 passed by the Learned Single Judge in Writ Petition Nos.11209- 212/2019, Writ Petition Nos.41641-642/2015, Writ Petition Nos.2907/2015 & 46915/2016, Writ Petition Nos.59461-462/2014, Writ Petition No.35461/2014, Writ Petition Nos.58807-809/2015, Writ Petition No.32416/2015, Writ Petition Nos.49228 & 50925- 936/2013, Writ Petition No.30920/2013, Writ Petition No.18861/2013, Writ Petition Nos.20367-373/2013 & Writ Petition Nos.20375-380 & 20382/2013 & Writ

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Petition Nos.20384-388/2013, Writ Petition Nos.40473- 474/2015, Writ Petition Nos.51805-807/2015, Writ Petition No.859/2016, Writ Petition Nos.44987- 988/2015, Writ Petition Nos.44987-988/2015, Writ Petition No.17272/2014, Writ Petition Nos.18890 & 23750-752/2013 cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Even otherwise, the learned Single Judge should not have dealt with the issue of constitutionality of provision of law by an interim order. The order dated 19.04.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby quashed.

In the result, writ appeals are allowed.

Sd/- JUDGE

Sd/- JUDGE

RV/SS