KRISHAK BHARATI COOPERATIVE LTD. vs. JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX SPECIAL RANGE 12

With the introduction of Sec. 80I w.e.f. 1.4.81, the legislature has substituted the word „attributable to‟ with the words „derived from‟ which have been construed to have a definite, narrow and restrictive meaning as compared to the word „attributable to‟. For this purpose, industrial undertaking must itself be the source of profits and gains and it would not be sufficient if commercial connection is established between the profit and gains earned and industrial undertaking. The aforesaid view was held by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Cambay Electric Supply Indl. Co. Ltd. Vs. CIT, Gujrat-II 113-ITR-84.

The assessee has placed reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in the case of M/s Vellore Electric Corp. Ltd. Vs. CIT (1997) 227- ITR-557. This decision interprets Sec. 80I when the term „attributable to‟ was existing. This term has since been omitted and the words „derived from‟ substituted. Accordingly, the ratio of this decision would not be applicable. On the other hand, the term „derived from‟ has been interpreted by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Paras Oil Extraction Ltd. (1997) 230- ITR-280. In this case the Hon‟ble High Court has held that where the assessee was engaged in the business of oil extraction, the income earned by it from letting out weighing machine and granting loan on interest would not be entitled for deduction u/s 80I, as such activities would not be incidental to the activity of the industrial undertaking of the assessee.

The ITAT, Jabalpur Bench in the case of Dy. CIT Vs. Vindhya Telelinks Ltd. reported in 63-ITD-127 (1997) has also categorically defined the phrase „attributable to‟ and „derived from‟. It was held that an income can be said to be derived from an industrial undertaking only if it is directly related to the running of the industrial undertaking

In view of the above, it is clear that the earning of interest and tank hire charges have no direct and proximate nexus with the industrial activities or the carrying of business profit as envisaged in Section 80I. Therefore, the income from these two items earned by the assessee company cannot be said to be „derived from‟ the industrial undertaking.”

Similarly, for the assessment year 1994-95, the Commissioner in the order dated 30th March, 1999 after considering the case law on the subject and examining the expression “derived from”, has held as under:- 15. The facts of the assessee‟s case are that the assessee has included interest income earned by it on deposits with different banks and financial institutions and has included the same as eligible profit for calculation of deduction under section 80 I. The facts of the case cited above are identical to the facts of the assessee‟s case since earning of interest income by the assessee has no direct nexus with the activity of the industrial undertaking of the assessee and hence interest income earned cannot be said to be derived from industrial undertaking. The words „derived from an industrial undertaking‟ mean that the income has been derived from industrial activity of the undertaking and it does not mean any commercial activity undertaken by the assessee. The words „industrial undertaking‟ have to be construed narrowly and cannot be given a wide meaning. In the instant case, the industrial undertaking of the assessee was involved in the manufacture of urea and ammonia and not in the business of making deposits for interest. Hence, interest earned on deposits cannot be considered to be an income

The Ld. counsel has argued that the provisions of the Act should be liberally construed so as to promote economic growth. It has been held by the Delhi High Court in the case of Escorts Ltd. Vs. Union of India 189 ITR 81 that “merely because of provision of Act is harsh …. this is no ground for discarding one of the cardinal rules of interpretation of statue(sic) that if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, then resort cannot be bad to the aims and objects or to the minister‟s speech with a view to interpret the provisions of the statue(sick).”

In the case of K.P.Verghees Vs. ITO 131 ITR 597, the hon‟ble Supreme court has held that “Statue (sick) may be interpreted by reference to the exposition it has received from contemporary authority though such exposition must give way where the language of the statue (sic) is plain and unambiguous. Similar view was also taken by the hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of CWT vs. Hasmatunnisa Begum 176 ITR 98 that if the words of the statue(sick) on a proper construction can be read in a particular way than they cannot be read in another way by a Court of construction anxious to avoid its unconstitutionality.

Once the provisions of the Act are clear, they have to be strictly construed and not be disputed that the expression “attributable to” is certainly wider in import than the expression “derived from”. Whenever the legislature has intended to a restrictive meaning it has used the expression “derived from” as in Section 80 J (Combay Electric Supply co. Ltd. Vs. CIT 113 ITR 84). In the present case, word used is “derived from” which has to be strictly interpreted to mean anyone having direct nexus to the industrial activity of the undertaking.

By admitting the claim of the assessee society for asstt. year 1995-95, the assessee has been allowed deduction under section 80 I in excess of what is legally permissible. I am of the opinion that the aforesaid assessment order dated 27.2.1997 passed by DCIT, Special Range-12 is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue. I, therefore, set aside the assessment order for asstt. year 1994-95 with the direction to recalculate the deduction u/s 80 I after excluding the interest income of Rs.375882341/- received by the assessee society.”

A reading of the aforesaid paragraphs clearly elucidates that the Commissioner has not gone into the question whether or not the Assessing Officer had conducted inquiries in the original assessment proceedings and whether it a case of failure of the Assessing Officer to conduct enquiries, which itself makes an assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. The Commissioner has examined the merits of the claim and then opined that the deduction allowed and the order passed was erroneous and prejudicial. 11. In the order relating to the assessment year 1994-95, the Commissioner may have made a reference that the Assessing Officer should have conducted further inquiries, but the primary and core reasoning and the ground for invoking jurisdiction under Section 263 was that the Assessing Officer had wrongly interpreted the expression “derived from” and the narrow meaning and interpretation given by the Supreme Court was applicable. The reasoning and the grounds given

The Assessing Officer is both an investigator and an adjudicator. If the Assessing Officer as an adjudicator decides a question or aspect and makes a wrong assessment which is unsustainable in law, it can be corrected by the Commissioner in exercise of revisionary power. As an investigator, it is incumbent upon the Assessing Officer to investigate the facts required to be examined and verified to compute the taxable income. If the Assessing Officer fails to conduct the said investigation, he commits an error and the word „erroneous‟ includes failure to make the enquiry. In such cases, the order becomes erroneous because enquiry or verification has not been made and not because a wrong order has been passed on merits.

This distinction must be kept in mind by the CIT while exercising jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Act and in the absence of the finding that the order is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of Revenue, exercise of jurisdiction under the said section is not sustainable. In most cases of alleged „inadequate investigation‟, it will be difficult to hold that the order of the Assessing Officer, who had conducted enquiries and had acted as an investigator, is erroneous, without CIT conducting verification/inquiry. The order of the Assessing Officer may be or may not be wrong. CIT cannot direct reconsideration on this ground but only when the order is erroneous. An order of remit cannot be passed by the CIT to ask the Assessing Officer to decide whether the order was erroneous. This is not permissible. An order is not erroneous, unless the CIT hold and records reasons why it is erroneous. An order will not become erroneous because on remit, the Assessing Officer may decide that the order is erroneous. Therefore CIT must after recording reasons hold that the order is erroneous. The jurisdictional precondition stipulated is that the CIT must come to the conclusion that the order is erroneous and is unsustainable in law. We may notice that the material which the CIT can rely includes not only the record as it stands at the time when the order in question was passed by the Assessing Officer but also the record as it stands at the time of examination by the CIT [see CIT vs. Shree Manjunathesware Packing Products, 231 ITR 53 (SC)]. Nothing bars/prohibits the CIT from collecting and relying upon new/additional material/evidence to show and state that the order of the Assessing Officer is erroneous.

It is in this context that the Supreme Court in Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, (2000) 243 ITR 83 (SC), had observed that the phrase „prejudicial to the interest of Revenue‟ has to be read in conjunction with an erroneous order passed by the Assessing Officer.