SH. MANOJ GOYAL,AGRA vs. DY CIT ,CC, AGRA

Section 153D of the Act relevant for our purposes is to be noted hereinunder: "Prior approval necessary for assessment in cases of search or requisition. 153D.—No order of assessment or reassessment shall be passed by an Assessing Officer below the rankof Joint Commissioner in respect of each assessment year referred to in clause (b) of [sub-section (1) of]section 153A or the assessment year referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 153B, except with the prior approval of the Joint Commissioner. Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply where the assessment or reassessment order, as the case may be, is required to be passed by the Assessing Officer with the prior approval of the[Principal Commissioner or] Commissioner under sub-section (12) of section 144BA."

The Tribunal while quashing the assessment order had relied upon its earlier decision in Navin Jain and Others (supra) wherein a detailed discussion has been made with regard to the requirement of prior approval of superior authority on the draft assessment order under section 153D, before passing the assessment order by the Assessing Officer. It was noted that the word 'approval' though has not been defined in the Income-tax Act but the general meaning of the word 'approval' in Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition was to be seen. The decision of the Apex Court in Vijayadevi Naval Kishore Bharatia v. Land Acquisition Officer (2003) 5 SCC83 wherein the distinction between Approving Authority and Appellate Authority was drawn, had been noted. The decision of the High Court of Gauhati in Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. Union of India [2019] 366 ELT 253 has been noted to record that grant of approval means due application of mind on the subject matter approved which satisfies all the legal and procedural requirements. There is an exhaustive discussion on the requirement of prior approval under section 153D of the Act and it was noted that the requirement of approval cannot be treated as mere formality and the mandate of the Act that the Approving Authority has to act in a judicious manner by due application of mind in a manner of a quasi judicial authority, has been considered.

It was held therein that if an approval has been granted by the Approving Authority in a mechanical manner without application of mind then the very purpose of obtaining approval under section 153D of the Act and mandate of the enactment by the legislature will be defeated. For granting approval under section153D of the Act, the Approving Authority shall have to apply independent mind to the material on record for "each assessment year" in respect of "each assessee" separately. The words 'each assessment year' used in sections 153D and 153A have been considered to hold that effective and proper meaning has to be given so that underlying legislative intent as per scheme of assessment of sections 153A to 153D is fulfilled. It was held that the "approval" as contemplated under 153D of the Act, requires the approving authority, i.e. Joint Commissioner to verify the issues raised by the Assessing Officer in the draft assessment order and apply his mind to ascertain as to whether the required procedure has been followed by the Assessing Officer or not in framing the assessment. The approval, thus, cannot be a mere formality and, in any case, cannot be a mechanical exercise of power.

It was noted that the obligations of the approval of the Approving Authority serves two purposes:(i) On the one hand, he has to apply his mind to ensure the interest of the revenue against any ommission or negligence by the Assessing Officer in taxing right income in the hands of right person and in right assessment year.(ii) On the other hand, superior authority is also responsible and duty-bound to do justice with the tax-payer by granting protection against arbitrary or creating baseless tax liability on the assessee.

The Tribunal has further noted that the provisions contained in section 153A to section 153D provide for separate notice to be given to assessee for assessment for each year as specified in section 153A of the Act; the assessee has to file separate ITR for each year as specified in section 153A of the Act; separate assessment orders are to be passed for each year as specified in section 153A of the Act.

It was observed that this is an important concept mentioned in section 153A of the Act, which is peculiar rto the scheme of the said section. Keeping in view of this basic fundamental features of section 153A, if section 153D is scrutinized, then, it would become manifest that an important phrase is employed in the textof section 153D, which is "each assessment year". The reading of the provisions in section 153A and 153Dconjointly makes it clear that separate approval of draft assessment order for each year is to be obtained under section 153D of the Income-tax Act. In its erudite judgement with the discussion on the legislative intent of sections 153A to 153D and the meaning of the "approval" as defined in Black's Law Dictionary as also the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Sahara India(Firm) v. CIT [2008] 169 Taxman 328/300 ITR 403where the discussion on the requirement of prior approval of Chief Commissioner or Commissioner in terms of provision of section 142(2A) of the Act had been made, it was noted that the Apex Court has held therein that the requirement of previous approval of the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner in terms of the said provision being an in-built protection against arbitrary or unjust exercise of power by the Assessing Officer casts a very heavy duty on the said high ranking authority to see that the approval envisaged in the section is not turned into an empty ritual. The Apex Court has held therein that the approval must be granted only on the basis of material available on record and the approval must reflect the application of mind to the facts of the case. The above discussion made in the judgement of Tribunal dated 3-8-2021 in the case of Navin Jain (supra) has been relied by the Tribunal, in the instant case, to arrive at the conclusion that the mechanical approval under section 153D of the Act would vitiate the entire proceedings in the instant case.

For the reasoning given in the case of Navin Jain (supra), as extracted in the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, as noted above, there cannot be any two opinion to the requirement of prior approval of the Joint Commissioner to the draft assessment order prepared by the Assessing Officer, as per the mandate of section153D of the Income-tax Act.

The approval of draft assessment order being an in-built protection against any arbitrary or unjust exercise of power by the Assessing Officer, cannot be said to be a mechanical exercise, without application of independent mind by the Approving Authority on the material placed before it and the reasoning given in the assessment order. It is admitted by Sri Gaurav Mahajan, learned counsel for the appellant-revenue that the approval order is an administrative exercise of power on the part of the Approving Authority but it is soughtto be submitted that mere fact that the approval was in existence on the date of the passing of the assessment order, it could not have been vitiated. This submission is found to be a fallacy, in as much as, the prior approval of superior authority means that it should appraise the material before it so as to appreciate on factual and legal aspects to ascertain that the entire material has been examined by the Assessing Authority before preparing the draft assessment order. It is trite in law that the approval must be granted only on the basis of material available on record and the approval must reflect the application of mind to the facts of the case. The requirement of approval under section 153D is pre-requisite to pass an order of assessment or re-assessment. Section 153D requires that the Assessing Officer shall obtain prior approval of the Joint Commissioner in respect of "each assessment year" referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 153A which provides for assessment in case of search under section 132. Section 153A(1)(a) requires that the assessee on a notice issued to him by the Assessing Officer would be required to furnish the return of income in respect of "each assessment year" falling within six assessment years (and for the relevant assessment yearor years), referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 153A. The proviso to section 153A further provides for assessment of the total income in respect of each assessment year falling within such six assessment years (and for the relevant assessment year or years).

The careful and conjoint reading of section 153A(1) and section 153D leave no room for doubt that approval with respect to "each assessment year" is to be obtained by the Assessing Officer on the draft assessment order before passing the assessment order under section 153A.

In the instant case, the draft assessment order in 38 cases, i.e. for 38 assessment years placed before the Approving Authority on 31-12-2017 was approved on same day i.e. 31-12-2017, which not only included the cases of respondent-assessee but the cases of other groups as well. It is humanly impossible to go through the records of 38 cases in one day to apply independent mind to appraise the material before the Approving Authority. The conclusion drawn by the Tribunal that it was a mechanical exercise of power, therefore, cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to the material on record.

As the facts are admitted before us, the questions of law framed on the factual issues related to the findings recorded by the Assessing Officer are not open to agitate within the scope of the present appeal being in the nature of second appeal. No substantial question of law arises for consideration before us.

The Appeal is dismissed being devoid of merit.

All the appeals stand allowed in terms of our above order. Order pronounced u/r 34(4) of Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963.