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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, DELHI BENCH “B”NEW DELHI
Before: SHRIMAHAVIR SINGH, HON’BLE & SHRISANJAY AWASTHI
सुनवाईक�तारीख/ Date of hearing: 10.12.2025 10.12.2025 उ�ोषणाक�तारीख/Pronouncement on आदेश /O R D E R PER SANJAY AWASTHI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER:
This is a batch of five appeals belonging to the same Assessee and hence, the adjudication in these five cases is being taken up simultaneously. It is seen that all these five appeals are delayed by 351 days to 382 days. The Assessee has filed petitions for condoning the said delay in all these five matters separately. However, for the sake of convenience the petition filed in 4441/Del/2025 is being considered since the language in the other petitions is virtually the same:
“Respected Sir/Madam, The Appellant respectfully submits this application seeking condonation of delay in filing the present appeal. The delay has occurred due to circumstances beyond the control of the Appellant, as detailed below:
1. 1. The order passed by the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [CIT(A)] was inadvertently not acted upon within the prescribed time limit, as the said order was communicated via email to an official email ID of an employee who had since left the organization.
2. The oversight came to light only recently during the process of preparing the TDS summary and reviewing the status of ongoing cases, whereupon it was discovered that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal.
3. The delay in filing the appeal is purely unintentional and occurred due to a bona fide mistake. There was neither any willful negligence nor any deliberate attempt to delay the proceedings.
4. The Appellant humbly prays that the Hon’ble Tribunal may kindly take a sympathetic and humanitarian view of the situation and condone the delay in the interest of justice and equity.
5. The Appellant is keen to pursue the matter on merits and would be severely prejudiced if denied the opportunity to present its case due to this inadvertent delay. Prayer: In view of the above, the Appellant respectfully prays that the Hon’ble Tribunal may be pleased to condone the delay in filing the appeal and admit the same for hearing on merits.”
1.1 Considering the reason given for the said delay, the delay in filing all these appeals is hereby condoned and all these five matters are taken up for adjudication.
For the sake of conveniences, since the facts are more or less identical in all these appeals, the case pertaining to AY 2013-14 [4441/Del/2025] is being taken as the lead case. It may be mentioned that on the last date of hearing, none appeared on behalf of the assessee but it was decided to carry on with the adjudication with the assistance of Ld. DR. 2.1 In the lead case, the appeal arises from order of Ld. CIT(A)-NFAC, Delhi, dated 30.05.2024, passed u/s 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). In this case the first appeal was filed with a delay of2529 days and the Ld. CIT(A) found that the reason given for the said delay was not satisfactory. It is seen from the body of the impugned order that the assessee had mentioned that they were made aware of adverse orders against them u/s 200A of the Act only when demand of tax was sought to be recovered from the assessee by the Income Tax Department. Thereafter, the assessee has mentioned that they did not find any communication from the IT Department prior to framing of the order u/s 200A of the Act. The Ld. CIT(A) has given a detailed finding on page 11 of the impugned order that the huge delay on the part of the assessee was not readily acceptable for the purposes of section 249(3) of the Act. At this stage the relevant findings of the Ld. CIT(A) deserve to be extracted: -
“5.2 In the case of appellant, there is delay of 2529 days in filing the appeal. In Form No.35/condonation petition, appellant mentioned the reason for delay in filing the appeal stating that it was not aware about passing intimation and levying late filing fees as no communication in this respect was received by the appellant either through email or any other mode of communication. 3
5.2.1 Appellant’s contention was considered but found not acceptable as TDS statement (26Q) for Quarter-4 of F.Y. 2012-13 was furnished on 16.03.2017 which was processed electronically on 30.03.2017. Intimation regarding late fee was issued through TRACES Portal and served to the appellant online. However, appellant was not vigilant and it was when a demand notice was received from the department, appellant came to know about the outstanding demand and thereafter appellant downloaded the intimation order from Traces portal and filed appeal. This shows negligence on the part of appellant. Appellant through contended that no communication was received on e-mail/id or mobile about issuance of notice but failed to disclose details of e-mail or mobile number registered with e- filing portal or Traces. In fact, appellant failed to furnish screen shot of inbox of registered e-mail id showing that during the relevant period it had not received any intimation u/s 200A. In its reply, appellant pasted screenshot of traces inbox however query raised in the said inbox is in respect of defaults if any occurred pertaining to FY 2012-13 (Q-3) and not the Q-4 of said financial year. In its reply, appellant admitted of downloading the intimation form the TRACES portal which suggest that intimation u/s 200A was sent to appellant and also available on Traces Portal for downloading. It was the appellant who was not vigilant and failed to check status of processing/demand raised in its case. The appellant has not furnished any plausible reason with documentary evidence which can explain the inordinate delay of 2529 days in filing the appeal. In view of facts discussed above, it is evident that appellant has no sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time. In absence of documentary evidence regarding delay in filing appeal during the relevant period, it cannot be presumed that there was reasonable and sufficient cause for delay in filing the appeal.” On the basis of above observations and after relying on several authorities, the Ld. CIT(A) did not condone the delay and dismissed the appeal in limine.
2.2 Aggrieved with this order the assessee has approached the ITAT with grounds which challenge the action of Ld. AO in levy of tax u/s 234E of the Act. The assessee has also challenged the impugned order on the grounds of denial of opportunity.
The Ld. DR pointed out that a delay of this magnitude could not be simply wished any by saying that the assessee was aware of the proceedings only when the demand was sought to be recovered from him.
It was pointed out by the Ld. DR that the assessee is a Private Limited Company and hence would be expected to be mindful of compliances regarding the Companies Act and the Income Tax Act and other statutory enactments. The Ld. DR thereafter relied on the findings given in the impugned order.
We have considered the records before us and have heard the Ld. DR. While it is a settled position that the Courts would take a liberal view in terms of condoning delays in filing of appeals, it is also a settled position that each and every delay is not condonable simply because the assessee has given some general reasons for the same. In this regard a Coordinate Bench decision in the case of Liberal Association for Movement of People Vs. CIT(Exemptions) [2024] 164 taxmann.com 83 (Kolkata Tribunal) would help in deciding the case in hand.The following finding is relevant:
“3. The Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of decisions has held that the law of limitation being substantive, the power of discretion to condone the delay is to be exercised judiciously and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. The parties are expected to approach the Court in adherence to this general principle. Thus, filing an appeal is the rule and condoning the delay is the exception, wherein the Courts have to exercise their discretionary power judiciously and by recording reasons. Excessive delay, as in this case, cannot be simply missed away by casually mentioning that the Principal Officer was hard pressed for time. Such casually explained delay is to be construed as an un-condonable delay. Once there is a delay, the person who is filing the condonation petition is expected to furnish the reason which must be acceptable to this Bench. 3.1. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji 1987 taxmann.com 1072/28 ELT 185, has observed that it is for the assessee to explain each and every day of delay in filing of appeal. Before us in the present case, no such petition/prayer/application for condonation of delay is filed much less a sufficient and satisfactory explanation to prove that there is a reasonable cause for the said delay.
4. In this case, it is evident that the appellant has conveniently decided not to justify the delay in filing by informing this Bench on the detailed reasons, even on day-to-day basis, for which the appeal could not be filed in time. 4.1. At this juncture, it is necessary to delve into the genesis of limitation and how a judicial forum needs to deal with matters pertaining to condonation of delay. 4.2. Almost all the tax laws, whether they relate to direct taxes or Indirect taxes, contain provisions for condonation of delay in filing appeals, if the appellant (whether it is the taxpayer or the revenue) proves to the satisfaction of the appellate authority that he had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within time. The genesis for such provisions can be traced to section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which reads as follows: "Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. — Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation: The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section." 4.3. The two essential ingredients for condoning delays are: (a) the existence of 'sufficient cause', and (b) the satisfaction of the competent authority that such sufficient cause was proved as existing. Thus, the first issue about the existence of sufficient cause covers the factual matrix in respect of which the onus to prove is squarely on the litigant, while the second issue about 'satisfaction' covers the discretionary area in which the competent authority, this Bench, is expected to act. It is by now well settled that the expression 'sufficient cause' has to be understood to mean a cause beyond the control of the appellant or one which the appellant, even with the exercise of due care and attention, could not avoid. The expression is required to be interpreted liberally so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant. Further, it is a general principle of law that whenever a Court is vested with a discretionary power, such a discretion must be exercised not in an arbitrary, vague or fanciful manner but on judicial principles. The fundamental principle, which has been universally recognized as the true rule of guidance for the exercise of discretion to condone delays is to see whether the party claiming indulgence has been reasonably diligent in prosecuting his appeal. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Sayed Mohd. Baquir El Edross AIR 1981 SC 1921, the Supreme Court laid down the following principles that should govern the exercise of powers of condonation under section 5: The party seeking relief has to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal, etc., within the prescribed time. The explanation has to cover the entire period of delay. A litigant should not be permitted to take away a right which has accrued to his adversary by lapse of time. The proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court under section 5. After sufficient cause is shown, the Court is to inquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. The discretion conferred on the Court is a judicial discretion and must be exercised to advance substantial justice. No liberal view should be taken merely because the defaulting party is a Government. Even if there was a strong case for acceptance of the appeal on merits that could not be a ground for condonation of delay. When there is remiss on the part of the advocate, the question that comes up for consideration is whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose such as latches on the part of the litigant or an attempt to save limitation in an underhand way. 4.4. It was also held in an earlier decision in the case of Ramlal Motilal v. Rewa Coalfields AIR 1962 SC 361, that 'every day's delay must be explained'. Another important requirement is that the 'cause' for the delay must have arisen before the expiry of the limitation period, and, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat AIR 1981 SC 733, "no
event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation period can constitute sufficient cause". 5. Considering the detailed discussion above, it is our considered opinion that the appellant has not been able to demonstrate any reasonable cause to allow condonation of delay in the matter. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed on the point of limitation, without any decision on the merits of the case.”
4.1 Considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the case and the discussion above, especially keeping in mind the authorities discussed in the case of Liberal Association for Movement of People (supra), it deserves to be held that the Ld. CIT(A) was fully justified in not condoning the massive delay before him. Thus, we support his decision.
Considering the findings given for above, and considering that the facts are largely similar in the remaining four appeals, it is held that the matter in shall,mutatis mutandis,apply in ITAs 4442 to 4445/Del/2025 also.
In the result, the appeals filed by the Assessee are all dismissed.
Order pronounced in the open court on 10.12.2025