B.B. NIGADE AND SONS AND UMA CONSTRUCTIONS JV,KOLHAPUR vs. TDS GHAZIABAD, TDS CPC GHAZIABAD

1.1 Considering the reasons given in the said petition the delay is hereby condoned and the appeal is admitted for adjudication.

“It is observed that the assessment order passed by TDS-CPC, Ghaziabad was served electronically and as such the taxpayer was required to file appeal within 30 days. Delays cannot be routinely excused. Where the delay is prolonged and the assessee is not able to show that the delay had occurred in spite of exercise of due attention and diligence, the assessee cannot complain, if the delay is not condoned. The reasons for the delay in filing the appeal mentioned by the Appellant cannot be termed as a 'sufficient cause” due to which the said delay was caused. Ignorance of law and their tax consultant being unable to spare time cannot be termed as a “sufficient cause" It is observed that there is a delay of 3312 days in filing the appeal. “Sufficient cause” is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion for condoning the delay. When the mandatory provision is not complied with and the delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the delay cannot be condoned on sympathetic grounds alone.”

2.2 Aggrieved with this action, the assessee has approached the ITAT with grounds challenging the action of Ld. CIT(A) mainly on the ground that the assessee had put forth sufficient reasons for the Ld. CIT(A) to exercise his discretion u/s 249(3) of the Act.

The Ld. DR pointed out that delay cannot be condoned in each and every case and the reasons given by the assessee for his delay are generic and do not adequately explain the delay to the tune of 3312 days. Thereafter the Ld. DR read out from various portions of the Ld. CIT(A)’s order.

“3. The Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of decisions has held that the law of limitation being substantive, the power of discretion to condone the delay is to be exercised judiciously and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. The parties are expected to approach the Court in adherence to this general principle. Thus, filing an appeal is the rule and condoning the delay is the exception, wherein the Courts have to exercise their discretionary power judiciously and by recording reasons. Excessive delay, as in this case, cannot be simply missed away by casually mentioning that the Principal Officer was hard pressed for time. Such casually explained delay is to be construed as an un-condonable delay. Once there is a delay, the person who is filing the condonation petition is expected to furnish the reason which must be acceptable to this Bench. 3.1. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji 1987 taxmann.com 1072/28 ELT 185, has observed that it is for the assessee to explain each and every day of delay in filing of appeal. Before us in the present case, no such petition/prayer/application for condonation of delay is filed much less a sufficient and satisfactory explanation to prove that there is a reasonable cause for the said delay.

4. In this case, it is evident that the appellant has conveniently decided not to justify the delay in filing by informing this Bench on the detailed reasons, even on day-to-day basis, for which the appeal could not be filed in time.

4.1. At this juncture, it is necessary to delve into the genesis of limitation and how a judicial forum needs to deal with matters pertaining to condonation of delay. 4.2. Almost all the tax laws, whether they relate to direct taxes or Indirect taxes, contain provisions for condonation of delay in filing appeals, if the appellant (whether it is the taxpayer or the revenue) proves to the satisfaction of the appellate authority that he had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within time. The genesis for such provisions can be traced to section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which reads as follows: "Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. — Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation: The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section." 4.3. The two essential ingredients for condoning delays are: (a) the existence of 'sufficient cause', and (b) the satisfaction of the competent authority that such sufficient cause was proved as existing. Thus, the first issue about the existence of sufficient cause covers the factual matrix in respect of which the onus to prove is squarely on the litigant, while the second issue about 'satisfaction' covers the discretionary area in which the competent authority, this Bench, is expected to act. It is by now well settled that the expression 'sufficient cause' has to be understood to mean a cause beyond the control of the appellant or one which the appellant, even with the exercise of due care and attention, could not avoid. The expression is required to be interpreted liberally so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant. Further, it is a general principle of law that whenever a Court is vested with a discretionary power, such a discretion must be exercised not in an arbitrary, vague or fanciful manner but on judicial principles. The fundamental principle, which has been universally recognized as the true rule of guidance for the exercise of discretion to condone delays is to see whether the party claiming indulgence has been reasonably diligent in prosecuting his appeal. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Sayed Mohd. Baquir El Edross AIR 1981 SC 1921, the Supreme Court laid down the following principles that should govern the exercise of powers of condonation under section 5:

The party seeking relief has to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal, etc., within the prescribed time. The explanation has to cover the entire period of delay. A litigant should not be permitted to take away a right which has accrued to his adversary by lapse of time. The proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court under section 5. After sufficient cause is shown, the Court is to inquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. The discretion conferred on the Court is a judicial discretion and must be exercised to advance substantial justice. No liberal view should be taken merely because the defaulting party is a Government. Even if there was a strong case for acceptance of the appeal on merits that could not be a ground for condonation of delay. When there is remiss on the part of the advocate, the question that comes up for consideration is whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose such as latches on the part of the litigant or an attempt to save limitation in an underhand way. 4.4. It was also held in an earlier decision in the case of Ramlal Motilal v. Rewa Coalfields AIR 1962 SC 361, that 'every day's delay must be explained'. Another important requirement is that the 'cause' for the delay must have arisen before the expiry of the limitation period, and, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat AIR 1981 SC 733, "no event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation period can constitute sufficient cause".

5. Considering the detailed discussion above, it is our considered opinion that the appellant has not been able to demonstrate any reasonable cause to allow condonation of delay in the matter. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed on the point of limitation, without any decision on the merits of the case.”

4.1 Considering the totality of facts & circumstances of the case and the discussion above, especially following the authorities relied upon in the case of Liberal Association for Movement of People (supra), it deserves to be held that the Ld. CIT(A) was justified in not condoning the massive delay in filing of the first appeal. On the basis of observations above, we support his decision.

Order pronounced in the open court on 10.12.2025