ITO 23(2)(3), MUMBAI vs. MILESTONE ARMY NAY TRUST, MUMBAI

On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld.CIT(A) has grossly erred in not directing to assess the income of the contributory fund managed by the assessee in the hands of the Association of Person (AOP) of the Contributors to the fund managed by the assessee since all the contributors had common objective, common goal and common management with the sole purpose of earning income from the funds managed on their behalf by the assessee.

Ld. DR fairly submitted that the issue has been decided in favour of the assessee in assessee’s own case for the Assessment Year 2009-10. However, he strongly placed reliance on the orders of the Assessing Officer.

We have heard the rival submissions, perused the orders of the authorities below and the decision of the Coordinate Bench. Identical situation arouse for the Assessment Year 2009-10 in assessee’s own case where the Revenue raised the following grounds:

The Tribunal after considering the rival submissions sustained the order of the Ld.CIT(A), income of the assessee is taxable in the hands of contributors and not in the hands of the AOP by following the order of the Coordinate Bench in the case of M/s. India Advantage Fund–VII in ITA.No. 178/Bang/2012 dated 17.10.2014 observing as under: - "2. Rival contentions have been heard and record perused. Facts in brief are that the assessee is a private revocable trust, filed its return at NIL income. In the Profit & Loss account, the assessee declared interest income of Rs.3.67 crores. The AO asked the assessee to explain as to why interest income should not be taxed in the hands of the Trust/ AOP. The assessee, vide reply dtd 04.07.2011 and 24.10.2011 submitted that as per section 61 & 63 of the LT. Act, all income generated by the trust will be assessed in the hands of the contributors and the entire tax liability on account of income/capital gain generated from the investee company will be to the account of contributors. It was further submitted that the trust and the trustees of the Fund will not be liable to pay tax on account of income/capital gain generated from the investee company and, further, the income earned during the period is from dividend on mutual fund, interest on debentures placed with investee company, hence, entire income is claimed as exempt. However, A.O. did not agree with the assessee’s contention and taxed the entire income in assessee hands.

By the impugned order, the CIT(A) deleted the addition after observing as under:- “5.1 The first two grounds of appeal taken by the appellant are general in nature and covered by specific grounds of appeal, 3rd ground of appeal is the main ground of appeal, which has three sub parts. Ground of appeal no 4 & 5 without prejudice to the main ground of appeal no .3 and the last two grounds of appeal are against interest levied u/s 234B & C of the Act. Grounds of appeal no. 8, 9 & 10 actually not being in the nature of a ground of appeal are not taken up for discussion and disposal. I, therefore, take the main ground of appeal no. 3 for discussion and disposal. 5.2 The first sub part of ground of appeal no. 3 is against the action of A.O. in not treating the appellant as a private revocable trust as per the provisions of section 61 of the Act. The second sub-part is against the AO's

On the above facts, which are on par with the facts of the present case before us, the AAR held as follows:- “At the time of hearing, a doubt was expressed by the Authority as to how far a provision conferring an absolute discretion on the trustees to add names of beneficiaries to the trust would be justified in law. Though the authorised representative of the applicant (AR) contended that this (A. Y: 2012-13) M/s. Milestone Army Navy Trust. clause was perfectly in order (citing O.P. Agarwalla on Trust, p. 220-2), he also expressed his willingness to modify cl. 7(a) as follows in order to obviate any kind of objection :- 7.(a) The trustee shall during the trust period, have the power at their discretion to admit as beneficiary any institutional investor which agrees to enter into a contribution agreement." and, consequent on the above, to insert a definition of the expression "institutional investor" in cl. 1 to the following effect : "(1) `Institutional Investor' means any entity other than an individual, being a natural person including but not limited to financial institution, company or corporation, Government, State or Political sub-division or local authority, that trustees may consider a reputable investor." After a little discussion he was willing also to drop the last seven words which were considered to be somewhat vague.

One may pause here to consider whether there could be any valid objections to the constitution of a trust in this manner. The authors of the trust are the IC, the Indian financial service company and others contributing to the trust by the date of the trust deed. Indeed even institutional investors contributing to the trust, in helping the CT achieve its target of 50 million dollars can be considered as supplemental authors of the trust, the CA constituting r/w the trust deed, the instruments constituting the trust in their cases. The purposes of the trust are, as stated in the TD, to invest the trust funds and distributing the proceeds to the beneficiaries. This is, in a sense, nothing more than an arrangement by which certain parties agreed to contribute funds for a common purpose and divide the profits amongst themselves. No doubt the same objective could be achieved by the constitution of a firm or a company but, equally, there seems to be no valid objection if the parties wish to do it in the form of a trust which, under the Trust Act, merely represents certain obligations annexed to the ownership of property in the form of the contributed funds. The purposes of the trust cannot be said to be forbidden by law or likely to defeat the provisions of any law or fraudulent or involving injury to any person or property or opposed to public policy : vide s. 4 of the Indian Trusts Act (IV of 1882). It will appear later that, in entering into the present transactions, the parties took into account certain difficulties if the same transactions had been put through the format of a company and also took into account certain financial and tax implications. But these cannot render the purposes of the trust unlawful within the meaning of the Indian statute. The clause which enabled the trustees to admit any one as a beneficiary, the Authority felt, might introduce a degree of uncertainty regarding the element of beneficiaries under the trust. The parties have agreed to modify the clause as indicated above. The result is that now the trustee's choice of beneficiaries is restricted (a) by the overall limit of the fund; (b) only to institutional investors; and (c) to persons who agree to subscribe to the CA. The criteria for persons to become beneficiaries and the shares of income they are entitled to are clearly defined in the deed. The Authority is of opinion, that with the introduction of the modifications referred to above and in the light of the statement on law contained in the passages from (A. Y: 2012-13) M/s. Milestone Army Navy Trust. Agarwalla's Trust Act cited by learned counsel, there can be no objection to the validity of the modified trust deed. [Parenthetically, however, it may be observed that, in the definition in cl. (a) proposed to be inserted, the words "being a natural person" appears to be a surplusage and may be omitted without detracting from the meaning of the clause. But this has no impact on the validity of the trust deed.” (emphasis supplied) 47. We agree with the aforesaid observations of the AAR and we proceed further to decide the various issues raised by the Revenue in its appeal.

Private Trusts could be Fixed or Discretionary Trusts. A fixed trust is a trust in which the beneficiaries have a current fixed entitlement to such income as remains after proper exercise of the trustee’s powers. On the other hand, a discretionary trust is one in which the beneficiaries have no such current fixed entitlement, but only a hope (spes) that the trustees in carrying out their duty to consider how much income might be paid to such beneficiaries will in their discretion pay that income to a particular beneficiary or beneficiaries. The beneficiaries have no interest in possession under the trust. There are various reasons why a settler prefers to establish a discretionary trust rather than a fixed trust. Some of the important one’s being – to protect the beneficiary against creditors; to continue to exercise control over young or improvident beneficiaries; to make adjustment according to circumstances. “When a trust is set up, there is no way of knowing how the beneficiaries will fare in the future; which of them will be most in need, which will be deserving, which spendthrift, which inebriate, which will marry millionaires and which missionaries”. The trustee can take all these factors into consideration in making their decisions.

When it comes to tax on income received by the Trust on behalf of the beneficiaries, there are some implications depending on whether the trust is a discretionary trust or a non-discretionary trust. As we have already seen in terms of Sec.164(1) a trust is assessed as a representative assessee in respect of income which it receives on behalf of its beneficiaries and if the beneficiaries are not certain or shares of beneficiaries are indeterminate, tax shall be charged on the relevant income or part of relevant income at the maximum marginal rate. Explanation 1 to Sec.164 deems that in certain situations beneficiaries shall be deemed to be not identifiable or their shares are unascertained or indeterminate or unknown. These provisions have already been set out in the earlier part of this order and are not being repeated. The legislative history of the above provisions needs to be examined to find out the object of introduction of the Explanation. Sec. 164(1) was in the Act when it was enacted in 1962 but its wording underwent a change, introducing a concept of taxation at marginal rate in 1970 by the Finance Act of 1970 w.e.f. 1st April, 1970. The object and scope of this amendment were elaborated in a circular of the CBDT (Circular No. 45 dt. 2nd Sept., 1970) as under :- "Private discretionary trusts. — Under the provisions of s. 164 of the IT Act before the amendment made by the Finance Act, 1970, income of a trust in which the shares of the beneficiaries are indeterminate or unknown, is chargeable to tax as a single unit treating it as the total income of an AOP. This provision affords scope for reduction of tax liability by transferring property to trustees and vesting discretion in them to accumulate the income or apply it for the benefit of any one or more of the beneficiaries, at their choice. By creating a multiplicity of such (A. Y: 2012-13) M/s. Milestone Army Navy Trust. trusts, each one of which derives a comparatively low income, the incidence of tax on the income from property transferred to the several trusts is maintained at a low level. In such arrangements, it is often found that one or more of the beneficiaries of the trust are persons having high personal incomes, but no part of the trust income being specifically allocable to such beneficiaries under the terms of the trust, such income cannot be subject to tax at a high personal rate which would have been applicable if their shares had been determinate.

In order to put an effective curb on the proliferation of such trusts, and to reduce the scope of tax avoidance through such means, the Finance Act, 1970, has replaced s. 164 of the IT Act by a new section. Under s. 164 as so replaced, a ‘representative assessee’ who receives income for the benefit of more than one person whose shares in such income are indeterminate or unknown, will be chargeable to income-tax on such income at the flat rate of 65% or the rate which would be applicable if such income were the total income of an AOP, whichever course would be more beneficial to the Revenue.

When the Explanation was added in 1980, the CBDT issued the following circular [see (1980) 123 ITR (St) 159] [The quotation has been taken from the Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance (No. 2) Bill, 1980 and not from the relevant circular, which is Circular No. 281 dt. 22nd Sept., 1980 reported in (1981) 131 ITR (St) 4, though the Circular uses similar language —Ed.] : "49. xxx xxx xxx (iv) Under the existing provisions, the flat rate of 65% is not applicable where the beneficiaries and their shares are known in the previous year, although such beneficiaries or their shares have not been specified in the relevant instrument of trust, order of the Court or wakf deed. This provision has been misused in some cases by giving discretion to the trustees to decide the allocation of the income every year and in other ways. In such a situation, the trustees and beneficiaries are able to manipulate the arrangements in such a manner that a discretionary trust is converted to a specific trust whenever it suits them tax-wise. In order to prevent such manipulation, it is proposed to provide that unless the beneficiaries and their shares are expressly stated in the order of the Court or the instrument of trust or wakf deed, as the case may be, and are ascertainable as such on the date of such order, instrument or deed, the trust will be regarded as a discretionary trust and assessed accordingly."

From the above extracts it can be seen that the object of the amendments to the provision was only that the distribution of the income should not be entirely at the discretion of the trustees and that the trust deed should regulate the shares.

Having noticed the tax implications of discretionary trusts, we may now revert to the various issues raised by the Revenue in the grounds of appeal and the facts of the present case. The issue raised in grounds No.1 is general, calling for no specific adjudication. The issue raised by the Revenue in Ground No.2 is with regard to the applicability of the provisions of Sec.60, 61 and 63 of the Act to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In this regard it needs to be clarified that the Assessee in its reply dated 15.12.2010 to the AO in the course (A. Y: 2012-13) M/s. Milestone Army Navy Trust. of assessment proceedings pointed out the above provisions and submitted that it is only the beneficiaries who have to be assessed to tax in respect of income arising from a revocable transfer. The AO in the order of assessment did not consider the above argument nor has he given any reasons why the same are rejected. The submission made by the Assessee before CIT(A) on this aspect have been accepted by the CIT(A) but he has not discussed or given any reasons as to how the submissions are being accepted. The basic scheme of section 61 r/w section 62 and section 63 is as follows : where under a settlement any income arises to the settlor, it has to be assessed in the hands of settlor, whether the settlement is revocable or irrevocable. If under a settlement any income arises to any other person apart from the settlor such income can still be assessed in the hands of the settlor provided the settlement is revocable. Even if a settlement on the face of it is stated to be irrevocable, if the same provides for direct or indirect retransfer of income or assets of the settlement to the settlor or gives the settlor a right to resume power directly or indirectly over such income or asset, the settlement should be deemed to be revocable.

Under clause-2 of the contribution Agreement, the contributor/beneficiary/investor agrees to contribute a specified sum to the trust/fund. Clause-2.6 of the contribution agreement specifies that the contributor/investor/beneficiary shall not have any right to demand the return of his/her/its fund contributor, other than upon dissolution of the fund. Clause-2.6.2 provides that the trustee may refund the fund contributor to the contributor, without interest, within a period of 3 months from the date hereof, in the event the minimum fund commitment is not received. Clause2.9 of the contributor agreement also lays down that the redemption of units by the beneficiary shall be at the sole discretion of the Trustees in consultation with the investment manager.

In the light of the aforesaid clauses in the contribution agreement, can it be said that transfer of funds by the beneficiary to the trust/fund is a revocable transfer? 57. The answer to the above question cannot be given by merely reading the clauses in the contribution agreement alone. The contention of the learned counsel for the Assessee before us was that the Contribution agreement has to be read along with the Trust Deed as well as the Investment Management agreement and offer document for private placement issued by the Investment Manager. Article-13 of the Trust Deed provides for termination of the Trust. Though such a power is not with the beneficiary/transferor, it is not the requirement of Sec.61 that the power of revocation must be at the instance of the beneficiary/transferor. The power of revocation under Clause13 of the Deed of Trust is a general power of revocation and the same would be sufficient for construing the transfer in the present case as a revocable transfer. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the Assessee it is not necessary that the power of revocation should be at the instance of the contributors/beneficiaries/transferor and it can be at the instance of any person either settlor, trustee, transferee or the beneficiaries. Provisions of Sec.61 of the Act do not contemplate a power of revocation only at the instance of the transferor. In this regard the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the Assessee on the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Surat Art Silk Cloth Mfrs. Association (supra) support the plea taken by him. As rightly contended by him the existence of a power to revoke the transfer that has to be seen and not the manner in which/ or at whose instance such revocation is brought about.

The alternative submission of the learned counsel for the Assessee that the provisions of Sec.63(a) of the Act, which deems existence of power of revocation in certain circumstances, are also acceptable. In this regard prospectus inviting contribution from contributors clearly lay down in certain circumstances 75% of the contributors can revoke their contribution to the fund at any point of time and the trustees shall then terminate the fund. Though the above power of the transferor/beneficiary to revoke the transfer is not in the instrument of transfer but by virtue of the power conferred in a document by which the investment manager appointed by the trust by virtue of powers conferred under the trust deed, would be sufficient to conclude that the transferor/beneficiary had deemed powers of revocation. In this regard the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the Assessee on the ration laid down in the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jyothendrasinhji (supra) is squarely applicable to the present case. In the aforesaid decision the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Sec. 63(1) of the Act does not say that the deed of transfer must confer or vest an unconditional or an exclusive power of revocation in the transferor. It was further held that the fact that concurrence of the trustee had to be obtained by the transferor/settler for revocation will not make the trust an irrevocable transfer. In such circumstances it must be held that the deed contains a provision giving the transferor a right to re-assume power directly or indirectly over the whole or any part of income or assets within the meaning of s. 63(a)(ii) of the Act.

For the reasons given above we hold that Sec.61 read with Sec.63 of the Act which mandates that income arising to any person by virtue of a revocable transfer of assets shall be chargeable to income tax as income of the transferor will apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case and therefore the (A. Y: 2012-13) M/s. Milestone Army Navy Trust. assessment in the hands of the transferee/representative assessee was not proper. 60. The issues raised by the Revenue in Grounds 4 to 7 of the grounds of appeal

In the present case the AO has not invoked the provisions of Sec.161(1A) of the Act or the proviso to Sec.164(1) of the Act and therefore, we need not examine those provisions. As far as identification of individual shares of the Sec.164(1) of the Act will not get attracted for the reason that the beneficiaries are not identifiable.

The question for our consideration therefore is regarding applicability of Sec.164(1) of the Act. There are two aspects to be noticed in the above provisions. The first aspect is the identification of the beneficiaries. The second aspect is with regard to ascertainment of the share of the beneficiaries.

On the aspect of identification of the beneficiaries, it is the plea of the learned counsel for the Assessee that so long as the trust deed gives the details of the beneficiaries and the description of the person who is to be benefited, the beneficiaries cannot be said to be uncertain. CBDT Circular No.281 dated 22.9.1980 wherein the CBDT has explained the scope of Sec.164 with regard to stating the name of the beneficiaries in the trust deed. In the said circular the provisions of Expln.-1 to Sec.164 of the Act regarding identification of beneficiaries has been explained to the effect that for identification of beneficiaries it is not necessary that the beneficiary in the relevant previous year should be actually named in the order of the Court or the instrument of trust or wakf deed, all that is necessary is that the beneficiary should be identifiable with reference to the order of the Court or the instrument of trust or wakf deed on the date of such order, instrument or deed. We find that Clause 1.1.13 of the Trust Deed clearly lays down that beneficiaries means the Persons, each of whom have made or agreed to make contributions to the Trust in accordance with the Contribution Agreement. We are of the view that the above clause is sufficient to identify the beneficiaries.

On the aspect of ascertainment of share of the beneficiaries, we find that Article 6.5 of the Trust Deed clearly specifies the manner in which the income of the Assessee is to be distributed. The said clause details formula with respect to the share of each beneficiary. As rightly contended on behalf of the Assessee it is not the requirement of law that trust deed should actually prescribe the percentage share of the beneficiary in order for the trust to be determinate. It is enough if the shares are capable of being determined based on the provisions of the trust deed. In the case of the Assessee the trustee have no discretion to decide the share of each beneficiary and are bound by the provisions of the trust deed and is duty bound to follow the distribution mechanism specified in the trust deed. The further aspect that may require consideration in the present case is with regard to the clause in the Trust Deed which authorises addition of further contibutors to the trust at different points of time in addition to initial contributors. From this clause can it be said that share income of the beneficiaries cannot be (A. Y: 2012-13) M/s. Milestone Army Navy Trust. determined or known from the trust deed. On the above aspect, we find the AAR in the case of XYZ In re (supra) has considered similar clause in a trust deed with specific reference to the provisions of Sec.164(1) of the Act and has held that if the trust deed sets out expressly the manner in which the beneficiaries are to be ascertained and also the share to which each of them would be entitled without ambiguity, then it cannot be said that the Trust deed does not name the beneficiaries or that their shares are indeterminate. The persons as well as the shares must be capable of being definitely pin-pointed and ascertained on the date of the trust deed itself without leaving these to be decided upon at a future date by a person other than the author either at his discretion or in a manner not envisaged in the trust deed. Even if the Trust deed authorises addition of further contributors to the trust at different points of time, in addition to initial contributors, than the same would not make the beneficiaries unknown or their share indeterminate. Even if the scheme of computation of income of beneficiaries is complicated, it is not possible to say that the share income of the beneficiaries cannot be determined or known from the trust deed. In view of the aforesaid decision of the AAR, with which we respectfully agree, we hold that the provisions of Sec.164(1) of the Act would not be attracted in the present case. We also find that the Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of P.Sekar Trust (supra) and Manilal Bapalal (supra) has taken a view that identity by reference to the terms of the trust deed is sufficient and it is not necessary that the beneficiaries should be specifically named in the deed of trust. Consequently, Grounds 4 to 7 raised by the Revenue are held to be without merit.

In ground No.8, the Revenue has challenged the order of the CIT(A) whereby the CIT(A) held that the Assessee cannot be assessed as an “AOP”. In Ground No.9 the Revenue has contended that there is no separate status of Trust for making assessment envisaged under the Act. In this regard the definition of person u/s. 2(31) of the Act which does not specifically refer to “Trust” is being highlighted in the grounds raised

It can thus be seen that the beneficiaries contributed their money to the Assessee and a separate agreement was entered into between the Assessee and each beneficiary. There is no inter se arrangement between one contributory/ beneficiary and the other contributory/beneficiary as each of them enter into separate contribution arrangement with the Assessee. Therefore it cannot be said that two or more beneficiaries joined in a common purpose or common action and therefore the tests for considering the Assessee as AOP was satisfied. The beneficiaries have not set up the Trust. Therefore it cannot be said that the beneficiaries have come together with the object of carrying on investment in mezzanine funds which is the object of the trust. The beneficiaries are mere recipients of the income earned by the trust. They cannot therefore be regarded as an AOP. Ground No.8 raised by the Revenue is therefore held to be without any merit.

Another reason assigned by the AO for treating the status of the Assessee as AOP was that in the return of income filed by the Assessee the status was shown in return of income. In this regard it is not in dispute before us that the form of return of income as it existed for the relevant assessment year did not contain a clause for filing return of income by a “Trust” in the status other than AOP. The CBDT realised this difficulty faced by 'private discretionary trusts' (A. Y: 2012-13) M/s. Milestone Army Navy Trust. having total income exceeding ten lakh rupees facing problem in filing their return of income electronically in cases where they are filing their return in the status of an individual because status of a private discretionary trust has been held in law as that of an 'individual' gave instructions in Circular No.6/2012 dated 3.8.2012 to the effect that it will not be mandatory for 'private discretionary trusts', if its total income exceeds ten lakh rupees, to electronically furnish the return of income for assessment year 2012-13. Form No.49A which was the prescribed form of application for allotment of Permanent Account Number (PAN) also did not contain a separate status “Trust” but contained a column “AOP (Trust)”. The revised Form No.49A later notified contains a column for status as “Trust”. Therefore the argument of the revenue that all “Trusts” are AOPs is not correct. If the contention of the Revenue as raised in Ground No.9 is accepted than the provisions of Sec.161(1) of the Act would become redundant. The charge to tax in the hands of the representative Assessee has to be in accordance with Sec.161(1) of the Act and therefore the status of the Assessee cannot be that of AOP. Ground No.9 raised by the Revenue is therefore held to be without any merit.

In ground No.10 the Revenue has raised issue that income has to be brought to tax in the hands of the right person in the right status. In this regard there are circulars dt. 24th Feb., 1967, 26th Dec., 1974 and 24th Aug., 1966 on the issue wherein it has been opined that once the choice is made by the Department to tax either the trust or the beneficiary, it is no more open to the Department to go behind it and assess the other at the same time.

In the case of David Joseph (supra) the Hon’ble Kerala High Court after making a reference to the above circulars held that once a beneficiary is assessed and his assessment is completed prior in point of time, and his assessment is an element of finality, it is a natural consequence flowing there from that the Department does not get any permission to go behind it for the purpose of scrutinising the procedure, for finding out faults in regard thereto, the sole object of which is to justify the subsequent action taken by the Department. These are in fact the normal consequences that flow from the principle of finality. This principle especially emerges from three circulars and has established into a settled practice, any time a deviation therefrom cannot be permitted, even on the ground of a mistake with regard to the merits of the situation that received finality. Similar view has been taken by the Hon’ble M.P.High Court in the case of Rai Sahe Seth Ghisalal Modi Family Trust (supra) and Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Trustees Of Chaturbhuj Raghavji Trust (supra).

The Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Trustees of Chaturbhuj Raghavji Trust (supra) held that under sub-s. (2) of s. 41, it is permissible for the IT authorities to make direct assessment on the person on whose behalf income, profits and gains from a trust are receivable. Sec. 41 having provided for two alternative methods, namely, either to tax the income in the hands of the trustees or directly in the hands of the person on whose behalf the income was receivable under the trust, and one of them having been availed of by the IT Department in directly assessing beneficiary in respect of the income, the other was no longer available to the Department. It was contended on behalf of the Revenue that the option was of the ITO who was assessing the trust to decide whether he would assess the income in the hands of the trustees or directly in the hands of the beneficiary. This contention was rejected by the Hon’ble High Court which held that Sec. 41 was a special enabling provision which permitted the assessment in the hands of the trustees but did not preclude the direct assessment in the (A. Y: 2012-13) M/s. Milestone Army Navy Trust. hands of the beneficiaries. There is nothing in s. 41 which would indicate that the choice between the alternative methods provided therein has to be made only at the time of the assessment of the trustees or that the choice only belongs to the ITO who is assessing the trust. In Circular No.157 dated 26.12.1974 of CBDT the CBDT has clarified on assessment of trust where share of beneficiaries are unknown. It has been clarified therein that the ITO should at the time of raising the initial assessment either of the trust or the beneficiaries adopt a course beneficial to the Revenue. Having exercised his option once, it will not be open to the ITO to assess the same income for that assessment year in the hands of the other person (i.e., the beneficiary or the trustee). In CBDT Circular No.13/2014 dated 28.7.2014 the Board has however given instructions that as per the SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012 funds which are not venture capital funds and which are non-charitable trusts where the investors name and beneficial interest are not explicitly known on the date of its creation- such information becoming available only when the funds starts accepting contribution from the investors, have to be treated as falling within Sec.164(1) of the Act and the fund should be taxed in respect of the income received on behalf of the beneficiaries at the maximum marginal rate.

The reliance placed on the aforesaid circular, in our view, will not be of any use for the reason that the said Circular was not in force at the relevant AY when the assessment was made by the AO on the present Assessee. Circulars not in force in the relevant Assessment year cannot be applied as held by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of BASF (India) Ltd. & Anr. vs. W. Hasan, CIT & Ors. 280 ITR 136 (Bom). The decision of the Hon’ble Supreme in the case of Ch. Atchaiah (supra) on which the AO placed reliance in making assessment on the Assessee in our view is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the said decision the status of the Assessee as that of an AOP was not disputed but it was argued that the ITO had option to assess either the AOP or the individual member of the AOP. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that unlike under s. 3 of the 1922 Act, the ITO did not have an option under s. 4 of the IT Act, 1961, to assess either the AOP or the individual members thereof. If the ITO has assessed a wrong person, say individual instead of AOP, he is not precluded, in contradistinction to the 1922 Act, to seek to assess the right person under the 1961 Act. The Hon’ble Court made it clear that wherever such on option is given under the 1961 Act, it has been specifically provided, as in s.183 and that under the 1961 Act, tax has to be levied on the right person, irrespective of benefit to Revenue. In the present case, however, we are concerned with a case of assessment of representative assessee or the person in respect of whom some other person is considered as representative assessee. Sec.161(1) by implication permits assessment of either the beneficiary or the Trustee. When the Trustee is assessed as representative assessee in respect of income received on behalf of the beneficiary, the section provides that tax shall be levied upon and recovered from him in like manner and to the same extent as it would be leviable upon and recoverable from the person represented by him. In our view, therefore, the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ch. Atchaiah (supra) will not be of any assistance to the plea of the revenue in the present case.

For the reasons stated above, we find no grounds to interfere with the order of the CIT(A). Consequently, the appeal by the Revenue is dismissed.

In the result, the appeal by the revenue is dismissed.

Since, facts and circumstances are identical following the order of the Coordinate Bench in assessee’s own case for the Assessment Year 2009-10 we uphold the order of the Ld.CIT(A) in holding that the interest income was not liable to be taxed as business income in the hands of the assessee trust being a revocable trust and such income is to be taxed in the hands of the contributors.

In the result, appeal of the Revenue is dismissed.