ANOOP TEA CO. PVT. LTD.,KOLKATA vs. D.C.I.T,CIRCLE-6(2), KOKATA

Coming to the main case, it transpires at the outset that the ld. CIT(A) has refused to condone 7 years and 202 days’ delay in filing of assessee’s appeal preferred against the relevant intimation dated 09/02/2011 stated to have been received through email on 27.08.2014. The assessee appears to have filed a condonation petition its person in charge/accounted had quit the job and therefore, it could not institute the lower appeal within limitation. The CIT(A) holds the assessee to be negligent, careless and having acted without any application of mind. He has not considered the merits of the addition under challenge of Rs.21,35,606/- arising from the processing in issue. We notice in this backdrop hon’ble apex court’s decision in Collector Land Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors (1987) 167 ITR 471(SC) settled the law regarding condonation of delay as follows:

Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinary (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on mertis in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides. Appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs.”

This assessee’s appeal is allowed for statistical purposes in foregoing terms.