NAYAN MUKHERJEE,KOLKATA vs. ACIT (IT), CIRCLE-1(2), KOLKATA, KOLKATA

Briefly stated the facts of the lead case is that the assessee (Shri Bodhisattva Chattopadhyay) was sent by his employer IBM on short term assignment to Switzerland

It is noted that IBM had deducted tax at source (TDS) of Rs.16,94,180/- on the entire emoluments paid to the assessee including the foreign assignment allowance u/s. 192(1) of the Act. The assessee filed his return of income for the Asst. Year 2014-15 declaring taxable income of Rs.17,52,360/- (comprising only of the salary of Rs.18,65,767/- received in India) after claiming the deduction of Rs.1,01,405/- under chapter VIA of the Act. After claiming the credit of taxes deducted at source by the employer u/s 192, the assessee claimed a refund of Rs.13,27,800/- in his return of income. According to the assessee, the foreign assignment allowance of Rs.42,97,092/- had been received outside India in connection with the services he rendered outside India and therefore he did not offer it to tax in the return of income filed in India since it did not form part of his total income chargeable u/s. 5(2) of the Act.

We note from the documents on record that the case of the assessee was selected for complete scrutiny under CASS wherein one of the parameters for selection was that the income declared under the head ‘Salary’ in the return of income was lower than the ‘salary’ reported in Form 26AS. In the course of assessment the AO called for several details in his notice issued u/s 142(1) dated 11.11.2016 along with write-ups on the issues for which the assessee’s case was selected under CASS. Before the AO the assessee explained the modalities of receipt of foreign assignment allowance through his TCC issued by Axis Bank which showed that the foreign assignment allowance was received outside India. The assessee also furnished a certificate from his employer that such allowance was paid for the services rendered outside India. Additionally, the assessee furnished the Switzerland tax documents for 2013 & 2014 evidencing that the foreign assignment allowance had been 5 SA Nos. 99-104/Kol/2019 & AY- 2014-15 taxed in Switzerland. Taking note of the replies furnished by the assessee, the AO in his assessment order dated 23.12.2016 had accepted the Return of Income (‘ROI’) filed by the assessee claiming the assignment allowance received by the assessee at Switzerland, as not taxable in India in terms of Section 5(2) of the Act. The AO accordingly assessed the total income of the assessee at Rs.17,61,110/-. Subsequent to passing of the order u/s 143(3)of the Act, the ld. CIT issued show cause notice dt. 13-03-2019 to the assessee stating that the taxability of the foreign assignment allowance required reconsideration in view of the provisions of Section 5(2)(b) of the Act which was held erroneously to be non-taxable by the AO in the assessment order passed u/s 143(3) of the Act.

In reply, the assessee furnished his objections to the SCN. The ld. CIT however did not agree with the contentions put forth by the assessee. According to the CIT the contract of employment of the assessee was with IBM which was located in India and therefore any and all rights arising from the contract inter alia including the ‘right to receive’ salary arose only in India. Referring to the term ‘receive’ or ‘deemed to receive’ as used in Section 5(2)(b)of the Act, the Ld. CIT observed that the situs of ‘income received’ would be the place of delivery of cash/cheque. According to Ld. CIT, the ‘point of receipt’ is the ‘point of payment’. He observed that the income was received by the assessee in India when the employer transferred his foreign assignment allowance from their bank account held in Bangalore to Axis Bank’s Nostro Account for top-up to the Travel Currency Card (‘TCC’) which was earlier made available to the assessee in India. He thus held that in real terms the income was received in India. To support his case, the Ld. CIT further referred to the salary statement of the assessee wherein the allowance was denominated in Indian currency. The Ld. CIT also emphasized that the assessee had not offered the foreign assignment allowance in Switzerland nor claimed the benefit of the DTAA and therefore the assessee had allegedly not paid taxes on the foreign assignment allowance either in India or in Switzerland. Relying on the decision of this Tribunal in the case of Tapas Kr Bandopadhyay Vs DDIT (159 ITD 309), the ld. CIT observed that the income paid/loaded in TCC was actually received in India and hence taxable in terms of Section 5(2)(a) of the Act. The Ld CIT in his order u/s. 263 of the Act dated 29.03.2019 thus concluded the order passed by the AO u/s. 143(3) of the Act dated 23.12.2016 for AY 2014-15 is erroneous and prejudicial to 6 SA Nos. 99-104/Kol/2019 & AY- 2014-15 the interest of revenue since in his opinion the assessment order was passed without examining the legal issues involved and interpretation, examination of material on record etc. and accepting the assessee’s claim that the income of Rs.42,97,092/- had not been received in India. Invoking Explanation (2) of Section 263of the Act, the ld. CIT set aside the assessment order of the AO directing him to pass a fresh assessment order after making necessary enquiries on all the issues, including the points on which the assessee has not furnished as discussed supra, after examining the various case laws and correct interpretation of the law in the facts of the case to examine and decide the issue of exemption from taxation on salary amounting to Rs.42,97,092/-. Being aggrieved by the order of the ld. CIT, the assessee is in appeal before us.

In the grounds taken in the appeal, the assessee has challenged the legal validity of usurpation of revisional jurisdiction by the ld. CIT u/s 263 of the Act. According to assessee the ld. CIT has wrongly exercised the revisional jurisdiction u/s 263of the Act since the AO's order on this issue cannot be held to be erroneous as well as prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. It is the assessee’s case that the AO passed the assessment order after considering the issue of taxability of foreign allowance and it was only after the AO examined the facts and the relevant documents that the AO took a plausible view on this issue, which is in consonance with this Tribunal’s view laid on this precise issue in the case of DCIT Vs SudipMaity & Others in 416 & 425/Kol/2017. According to the assessee therefore, on the facts of the case, the AO’s action of accepting the assessee’s claim for exclusion of foreign allowance from the computation of total income cannot be said to an unsustainable view in law and, hence the assessment order cannot be held to be erroneous as well as prejudicial to the interest of revenue, which is a condition precedent to usurp/invoke the revisional jurisdiction u/s 263 of the Act, by the ld. CIT. In the circumstances since the conditions precedent to usurp the revisionary jurisdiction u/s 263of the Act is claimed to be absent in the present case, the assessee has contended that the impugned order is wholly without jurisdiction and is, therefore, bad in law.

Having heard both the parties, and on a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the ld. CIT invoked the revisionary jurisdiction on 7 SA Nos. 99-104/Kol/2019 & AY- 2014-15 the broad allegation that the AO had failed to conduct enquiries which the facts of the case required the AO to conduct. According to ld. CIT before passing of the assessment order, there was lack of application mind to the facts and incorrect application of applicable legal provisions in the facts of the case. As a result the AO passed an order which in the opinion of ld. CIT was unsustainable in law and therefore liable for revision u/s 263 of the Act. Before adjudicating the issues arising from the impugned order of the ld. CIT, we have to remind ourselves as to the scope of revisional jurisdiction u/s. 263 of the Act. For that, let us take the guidance of judicial precedence laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Malabar Industries Ltd. vs. CIT [2000] 243 ITR 83(SC) wherein their Lordship have held that twin conditions should be satisfied before jurisdiction u/s 263 of the Act is exercised by the ld. CIT. The twin conditions which need to be satisfied are that (i) the order of the Assessing Officer must be erroneous and(ii) as a consequence of passing an erroneous order, prejudice is caused to the interest of the Revenue. In the following circumstances, the order of the AO can be held to be erroneous i.e. (i) if the Assessing Officer's order was passed on assumption of incorrect facts; or assumption of incorrect law; (ii) Assessing Officer's order is in violation of the principles of natural justice; (iii) if the AO's order is passed by the without application of mind; or (iv) if the AO has not investigated the issue before him. In the circumstances enumerated above only the order passed by the Assessing Officer can be termed as erroneous for the purpose of S.263 of the Act. Coming next to the second limb, the AO's erroneous order can be revised by the Ld. CIT only when it is shown that the said order is prejudicial to the interest of Revenue. When this aspect is examined one has to understand what is prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Malabar Industries (supra) held that this phrase i.e. "prejudicial to the interest of the revenue'' has to be read in conjunction with an "erroneous" order passed by the Assessing Officer. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, held that for invoking powers conferred by S.263; the CIT should not only show that the AO's order is erroneous as a result of any of the situations enumerated above but CIT must also further show that as a result of an erroneous order, some loss is caused to the interest of the revenue. Their Lordship in the said judgment held that every loss of revenue as a consequence of an order of Assessing Officer cannot be treated as prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. It was further observed that when the Assessing Officer adopts one of the course permissible in 8 SA Nos. 99-104/Kol/2019 & AY- 2014-15 law and it has resulted in loss to the revenue, or where two views are possible and the Assessing Officer has taken one view with which the Ld. CIT does not agree, it cannot be treated as an order prejudicial to the interest of the revenue unless the view taken by the Assessing Officer is unsustainable in law.

In the given facts of the present case, we find that the primary fault found by the ld. CIT to interfere with the order of AO was the alleged non-examination of the relevant facts concerning taxability of the foreign assignment paid through TCC. We are aware of the fact that the Assessing Officer's role while framing an assessment is not only as that of an adjudicator but he is also an investigator. The AO has a dual role to perform i.e. he is an investigator as well as an adjudicator and therefore, if he fails in any one of the two roles as afore-stated, his order can be termed as erroneous. From the order of the Ld. CIT, we note that he firstly found fault with the AO's role of an investigator because in his subjective opinion the AO did not properly conduct the investigation of the relevant facts and legal aspects concerning taxability of foreign assignment allowance. We however note that the assessee’s case was selected for scrutiny assessment on the CASS parameter of “salary income shown in ITR is less than the salary income as per Form 26AS”. We find that the assessee’s employer, IBM had deducted on the gross salary inter alia including foreign assignment allowance and the TDS was reported in statement 26AS in the assessee’s name. In the return furnished, the assessee however did not include the said allowance in his total income on the plea that it was not income earned or accrued in India and therefore not forming part of the total income in terms of Section 5(2) read with Section 9(1)(ii) of the Act. Consequently therefore there appeared difference between the salary income reported in Form 26AS with the salary income declared in the return of income. As a result the assessee’s case was selected for scrutiny assessment for making enquiries about such differential amount. We note that in the notice u/s 142(1) of the Act dated 11.11.2016, the AO raised specific query requiring the assessment to explain the said difference and furnish his explanation along with supporting documents. In response, the ld. AR of the assessee furnished detailed replies through letters dated 30.11.2016, 05.12.2016&15.12.2016. In his letter dated 30.11.2016, available at Pages 54 to 55 of paper book, the AR explained during the relevant year the assessee was physically present outside India for more than 182 days

From the foregoing discussion it is abundantly clear that prior to completion of the assessment u/s 143(3)of the Act, the AO had required the assessee to furnish his explanations with regard to his claim for exclusion of foreign assignment allowance from the ambit of his taxable total income in India. In response the ld. AR of the assessee had furnished before the AO the relevant documentary evidences and also substantiated his explanations in support of his contentions by placing reliance on the relevant applicable legal provisions of the Act. The ld. AR of the assessee had also furnished before the AO requisite documentary evidences which proved the foreign assignment allowance which was excluded from the ambit of total income taxable in India, had suffered applicable tax in Switzerland being the country where the services were actually rendered. Having considered these evidences, explanations and applicable legal provisions, the AO recorded the specific finding that “the assessee was in India only for 16 days and the rest of the period he was in assignment to Switzerland and had received foreign assignment allowance”. All these facts and documents considered harmoniously go on to show that the AO had indeed called for information and documents and after due application of mind passed the assessment order u/s 143(3) of the Act in which he accepted the assessee’s plea for exclusion of foreign assignment allowance was not chargeable to tax in India. In such a scenario, the finding recorded by the ld. CIT that the action of the AO in allowing the amount of Rs.42,97,092/- as exempt from taxation (i.e. the foreign assignment allowance) is in violation of the provision of sec. 5(2)(a) of the Act without any enquiry, is factually erroneous.

In order to understand the difference between "lack of inquiry" and "inadequate inquiry" and when it can be termed as erroneous, let us look at the judgment of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in the case of CIT Vs J.L. Morrison (I) Ltd (366 ITR 593), wherein on similar facts & circumstances, their Lordships explained the difference between the two as follows:-

He drew our attention to the notice under Section 142(1) of the Act and in particular to the annexure thereto from which it would appear that the assessing officer wanted the assessee to "furnish in writing and verified in the prescribed manner information called for as per annexures and on the points or matters specified therein before me at my office at 18, RabindraSarani, Poddar Court, 5th Floor, on 04.02.2008 at 11.30 AM.". The annexure to the notice under Section 142(1) of the Act reads as follows:-- 'Requisition u/s 142(1) of the IT Act '61.

Mr. Poddar also drew our attention to the reply dated 19th March 2008 given by the assessee to the notice, dated 21st January 2008, under Section 142(1) of the Act. He contended that all the requisite particulars were furnished together with documents.

Mr. Poddar contended that the fact that the Assessing Officer had issued the notice under Section 142(1) of the Act requiring the assessee to give particulars and to furnish documents in respect of seventeen items indicates that the Assessing Officer had in fact applied his mind. Without application of mind, according to him, the aforesaid notice itself could not have been issued. The fact that all the requisite papers required by the Assessing Officer were duly furnished and the matter was discussed from time to time on the various days indicated above, appearing from the assessment records produced by Mr. Nizamuddin, leave no scope for any doubt as regards the fact that the Assessing Officer after satisfying himself passed the order dated 28th March, 2008.

Mr. Poddar also drew our attention to the impugned judgment of the learned Tribunal which reads as follows:--

Mr. Poddar contended that neither before the Tribunal nor in the present appeal has any question has been suggested that the assessment order was bad because the same did not disclose any reasons. The contention raised and the judgments cited by Mr. Nizamuddin, as regards exercise of power u/s. 263 of the Act, are misconceived, and also out of the context.

Mr. Poddar contended that the finding of the learned Tribunal that the order dated 28th March, 2008 was not passed without application of mind has not been challenged before this Court. No attempt far less any serious attempt was made on behalf of the revenue to demonstrate that the order passed on 28th March, 2008 by the Assessing Officer was wrong either on facts or law. The appellant has also not been able, nor in fact has made any attempt to establish that the finding of the learned Tribunal that the order dated 28th March, 2008 was not passed without the application of mind is based otherwise than on evidence. On the contrary, the records of assessment, the list of dates produced by Mr. Nizamuddin go to establish that the assessment order was passed after due application of mind.

Mr. Poddar contended that there is no provision in the Income Tax Act which requires the Assessing Officer while accepting the claim of the assessee to pass a reasoned order. The reasons, according to him, are required only when an issue is decided against the assessee. He also drew our attention to the judgment in the case of S.S Gadgil v. Lal & Co. [1964] 53 ITR 231, wherein the Apex Court held as follows :-- "A proceeding for assessment is not a suit for adjudication of a civil dispute. That an income tax proceeding is in the nature of a judicial proceeding between contesting parties, is a matter which is not capable of even a plausible argument. The Income Tax authorities who have power to assess and recover tax are not acting as judges deciding a litigation between the citizen and the State: they are administrative authorities whose proceedings are regulated by statute, but whose function is to estimate the income of the taxpayer and to assess him to tax on the basis of that estimate. Tax legislation necessitates the setting up of machinery to ascertain the taxable income, and to assess tax on the income, but that does not impress the proceeding with the character of an action between the citizen and the State."

The aforesaid views expressed by the Bombay High Court was quoted in the case of CIT v. Sunbeam Auto Ltd. [2011] 332 ITR 167/[2010] 189 Taxman 436 (Delhi).

He also drew our attention to a judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Hari Iron Trading Co. v. CIT [2003] 263 ITR 437/131 Taxman 535, wherein the following views were expressed:-- "The expression "record" has also been defined in clause (b) of the Explanation so as to include all records relating to any proceedings available at the time of examination by the Commissioner. Thus, it is not only the assessment order but the entire record which has to be examined before arriving at a conclusion as to whether the Assessing Officer had examined any issue or not. The assessee has no control over the way an assessment order is drafted. The assessee on its part had produced enough material on record to show that the matter had been discussed in detail by the Assessing Officer. The least that the Tribunal could have done was to refer to the assessment record to verify the contentions of the assessee. Instead of doing that, the Tribunal has merely been swayed by the fact that the Assessing Officer has not mentioned anything in the assessment order. During the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer examines numerous issues. Generally, the issues which are accepted do not find mention in the assessment order and only such points are taken note of on which the assessee's explanations are rejected and additions/disallowances are made. As already observed, we have examined the records of the case and find that the Assessing Officer had made full inquiries before accepting the claim of the assessee qua the amount of Rs.10 lakhs on account of discrepancy in stock. Not only this, he has even gone a step further and appended an office note with the assessment order to explain why the addition for alleged discrepancy in stock was not being made. In the absence of any suggestion by the Commissioner as to how the inquiry was not proper, we are unable to uphold the action taken by him under section 263 of the Act."

Whether the assessment order dated 28th March, 2008 was passed without application of mind is basically a question of fact. The learned Tribunal has held that the assessment order was not passed without application of mind. The records of the assessment including the order sheets go to show that appropriate enquiry was made and the assessee was heard from time to time. In deciding the question Court has to bear in mind the presumption in law laid down in Section 114 Clause - e of the Evidence Act:-- "that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed;"

Therefore, the Court has to start with the presumption that the assessment order dated 28th March 2008 was regularly passed. There is evidence to show that the assessing officer had required the assessee to answer 17 questions and to file documents in regard thereto. It is 14 SA Nos. 99-104/Kol/2019 & AY- 2014-15 difficult to proceed on the basis that the 17 questions raised by him did not require application of mind. Without application of mind the questions raised by him in the annexure to notice under Section 142 (1) of the Act could not have been formulated.

The Assessing Officer was required to examine the return filed by the assessee in order to ascertain his income and to levy appropriate tax on that basis. When the Assessing Officer was satisfied that the return, filed by the assessee, was in accordance with law, he was under no obligation to justify as to why was he satisfied. On the top of that the Assessing Officer by his order dated 28th March, 2008 did not adversely affect any right of the assessee nor was any civil right of the assessee prejudiced. He was as such under no obligation in law to give reasons.

The fact, that all requisite papers were summoned and thereafter the matter was heard from time to time coupled with the fact that the view taken by him is not shown by the revenue to be erroneous and was also considered both by the Tribunal as also by us to be a possible view, strengthens the presumption under Clause (e) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act. A prima facie evidence, on the basis of the aforesaid presumption, is thus converted into a conclusive proof of the fact the order was passed by the assessing officer after due application of mind.

The judgments cited by Mr. Nizamuddin do not really support his contention. The judgment in the case of Meerut Roller Flour Mills (P.) Ltd. (supra) does not apply because the High court in that case was satisfied that the assessment order was passed without enquiry.

The judgment of Cochin Bench of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in /Coch/ 2012 relied upon by Mr. Nizamuddin is evidently based on an erroneous impression that "the proceedings before the Assessing Officer are judicial proceedings". This impression, which is patently contrary to the views expressed by Apex Court in the case of S.S. Gadgill (supra), was responsible for the views taken by the Tribunal. When the premise is wrong, the conclusion is bound to be wrong.

The judgment in the case of Infosys Technologies Ltd. (supra) is distinguishable on facts. The step taken by the CIT under Section 263 in that case was justified because the Income Tax records produced before him did not show that the assessing officer had considered the double taxation avoidance agreement on the basis whereof the claims were made by the assessee. Therefore, that was a clear case to show that the assessment order was passed without considering the relevant pieces of evidence.

The judgment in the case of Anusayaban. A. Doshi (supra) does not apply because the High Court in that case was dealing with the need on the part of the learned Tribunal to give reasons in support of its order.

The judgment in the case of Hindusthan Tin Works Ltd. (supra) also does not apply because there the Delhi High Court was dealing with the duty of the learned Tribunal to disclose reasons in support of its appellate order.

The judgment in the case of S.N. Mukherjee (supra) is clearly distinguishable. The point for consideration in that case was whether it was incumbent for the Chief of Army Staff while confirming the findings and the sentence of the General Court Martial, and for the Central Govt. while rejecting the post confirmation petition of the appellant, to record reasons for the orders passed by them.

The function of an Assessing Officer is to estimate the income of the assessee and to recover tax on the basis of such estimate as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of S.S Gadgil (supra). Their Lordships opined that the income tax proceedings do not partake the character of a judicial proceeding between the State and the citizen. Therefore, the principles applicable to a proceeding before a judicial or a quasi-judicial authority where there are two contesting parties cannot be made applicable to the proceedings before an Assessing Officer.

Mr. Nizamuddin contended the judgments cited by Mr. Poddar indicate that the Assessing Officer is not required to write an elaborate judgment. He contended that the assessing officer may not have any such obligation but it cannot be said, according to him, that the Assessing Officer is under no obligation to record anything in his assessment order. It is not in the first place a fact that he has not recorded anything. From the assessment order, the following facts and circumstances appear:-- "Return was filed on 29/11/06 showing total income of Rs.3,80,66,940/-. In response to notices u/s. 143(2) and 142(1) of the I. T. Act, 1961, Sri P. R. Kothari, A/r appeared from time to time and explained the return. Necessary details and particulars were filed. The business of the assessee is manufacturing and trading of cosmetics and dental care products as in earlier years. In view of above total income is computed is under:"

Unless the aforesaid recital is factually incorrect or the computation is legally wrong, it is not possible to hold that the assessment order was passed without application of mind. On the top of that when the Assessing Officer accepted the contention of the assessee there was no occasion for him to make any discussion in his order.

If the assessing officer cannot be shown to have violated any form prescribed for writing an assessment order, it would not be correct to hold that he acted illegally or without applying his mind. The third question is, for the reasons discussed above, answered in the negative."

We note that the sheet anchor on which the ld. CIT has found fault with the AO's order in the present case is the lack of enquiry on the part of the AO in not enquiring into the nature of foreign assignment allowance and its taxability in terms of Section 5(2) of the Act. In this context we find that there is a clear distinction between "lack of enquiry" and "inadequate enquiry". If there is an enquiry, even if inadequate, that would not by itself give occasion to the ld. CIT to interdict and interfere by exercising his revisional jurisdiction merely because he is of the opinion that some more enquiries should have been conducted in the matter. In a case where the ld. CIT finds that the enquiry conducted by the AO is not in accordance with his subjective standards, then the ld. CIT should himself conduct the investigation and thereafter record a clear finding in his order u/s. 263 that the view followed or acted upon by the AO in his order was unsustainable in law and therefore the 16 SA Nos. 99-104/Kol/2019 & AY- 2014-15 order of the AO was erroneous. In addition, the ld. CIT should also prima facie show that the erroneous order caused prejudice to the Revenue and thereby twin conditions prescribed by Section 263 are satisfied. If even one condition is not satisfied, then it is open for the ld. CIT to usurp the revisionary jurisdiction u/s 263 of the Act.

In the given facts of the present case, as noted earlier, the AO had made due enquiries into the nature and mode of receipt of foreign assignment allowance as also about its taxability in India. The AO had also obtained declaration from the employer to the effect that the allowance in question was paid in relation to services rendered in Switzerland. The AO had also obtained requisite documentary evidence in support of fact that the applicable taxes on such allowance was paid in Switzerland. After examining the specific details furnished by the assessee, the AO did not find any fault with the claim of the assessee that the foreign assignment allowance was not taxable in India. On these facts, we are therefore of the firm view that not only did the AO enquire into the issue of taxability of foreign assignment allowance but had consciously applied his mind to the facts made available before him and adopted the view permissible in law. For these reasons, we are of the considered view that the assessment order did not suffer from the error of non-enquiry or non-application of mind or assumption of wrong facts.

In the impugned order the ld. CIT placed emphasis on the fact that the allowance in question was received by the assessee from an entity established in India. He further emphasized on the fact that the assessee’s employment contract was with Indian company and the contract of the employment which gave rise to the payment in question was executed in India. Accordingly the assessee’s right to receive remuneration inter alia including foreign assignment allowance had accrued in India and consequently therefore the assessee was liable to pay tax on such allowance in India. The ld. CIT further observed that the allowance in question was computed in INR denomination which clearly showed that the payment was intended to be made in India. The ld. CIT also found that the payment of the allowance was made from the employer’s Deustche Bank Account which was located in India. In his opinion, the ‘point of payment’ was the ‘point of receipt’ and consequently therefore the income was deemed to be received at the place where the payment originated. According to the ld. CIT the payment of allowance from Deustche Bank, Bangalore to Axis

After due consideration of the facts and material on record as also applicable legal provisions, we however do not find substance in the reasons adduced by the ld. CIT in his order justifying his interference under Section 263 of the Act. It may be true that the allowance in question was received by the assessee pursuant to his employment contract with a company which was tax resident in India. It may also be true that the contract of employment was executed in India. However for such fact alone it cannot be held that assessee’s right to receive the entire remuneration accrued or deemed to accrue in India. Admittedly the assessee would not have been entitled to receive the allowance in question if the services were rendered or performed by the assessee in India. The essential pre-requisite for receiving the foreign assignment allowance was that the assessee was required to render his services in a foreign country viz., Switzerland in this case. In other words, it was only in the event that the assessee left the place where his employment contract was signed and he migrated to a foreign country for rendering services that such foreign assignment allowance was receivable by him. It is not in dispute that the amount in question was received by the assessee in connection with the services which the assessee actually rendered to his employer outside India. In the circumstances therefore before the said foreign assignment allowance was brought within the taxing net, it was necessary for the authorities below to demonstrate that the income chargeable under the salary accrued or deemed to accrue in India, as defined in Section 9(1)(ii) of the Act, which read as follows:

We also do not see any merit in the ld. CIT’s finding that the assessee had received the impugned sum in India. According to ld. CIT the ‘point of payment’ was the ‘point of receipt’ as well and therefore since the payment originated from the employer’s bank account in India with Deutsche Bank, the income was received by the assessee in India and therefore liable for tax in India under Section 5(2)(b) of the Act. We have no hesitation in holding that this interpretation of the facts and legal position by the ld. CIT is patently wrong. Going by the ld. CIT’s conclusion in case of every international transaction where the payment made to non-resident originates from a bank situated in India, the income of the non-resident shall be deemed to be received in India, and therefore liable to tax in India in terms of Section 5(2) of the Act. Accordingly, even where the assessee’s make payments for import of goods and for which the payment is made by the Indian importer from his Indian bank account, the foreign supplier of the goods shall be liable to be taxed in India since the ‘point of payment’ as well as ‘receipt’ is in India and therefore the income is received in India. Such proposition is devoid of any merit.

It is also noted that the ld. CIT was factually incorrect in concluding that the payment of foreign assignment allowance was first received by the assessee in India and thereafter remitted to his TCC at his express directions. We note that there no material or evidence

From the foregoing, it is evident that the funds were transferred outside India to the foreign currency denominated account of the employer at the express direction of the employer and even the payment towards TCC was made on the instructions of the employer. We therefore do not find any merit in the ld. CIT’s finding that the impugned allowance was first received by the assessee in India and thereafter at his instance the amounts were remitted outside India in the form of TCC.

Another issue which weighed on the ld. CIT’s mind was that the impugned allowance did not suffer any tax in the country of residence i.e. Switzerland and therefore it was a case of double non-taxation which could not be permitted in law. In the first instance we do not find much force in this plank of the ld. CIT’s reasoning. The question for determination by the ld. CIT was whether in law the amount received by the assessee for rendering services outside India was legally chargeable to tax in India. For deciding this question, it was wholly immaterial whether or not, such income suffered tax in the country of residence i.e. Switzerland. Double taxation of income is not alien phenomenon in cross border transactions. In the circumstances in deciding the issue of taxability of the particular

In the impugned order the ld. CIT relying on the decision of the coordinate Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Tapas Kumar Bandyopadhyay (supra) held that the amount received by the assessee from his Indian employer which he had received in India was chargeable to tax in terms of Section 5(2) of the Act. According to ld. CIT, the judgment of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court reported in 397 ITR 406, overturning the decision of the Tribunal in that case was of no help to the assessee because the Hon’ble High Court had reversed the decision of the Tribunal keeping in view the concession granted by the Board to the specific class of assessee’s being sea-farers. Since the assessee in the present case was not a ‘seafarer’, it was the ld. CIT’s stand that the benefit of the CBDT Circular No.13 of 2017 as well as the judgment of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court was of no help to the assessee. After due consideration of the facts and material on record, we are unable to agree with the ld. CIT’s such contention. In the first instance we find that the facts of the case are materially different from the facts involved in the case of Tapas Kumar Bandyopadhyay (supra). In that case the assessee a marine engineer was rendering his services in international waters and his salary from the employer was admittedly deposited in his bank account maintained in India. Further such salary did not suffer any tax in any other country. On these facts, the Tribunal held that the income was chargeable to tax in India since the 21 SA Nos. 99-104/Kol/2019 & AY- 2014-15 salary was deposited in bank account maintained in India. In the present case however, as noted in the preceding paragraphs, no money was found deposited in assessee’s account maintained in India and the foreign assignment allowance received for services rendered in Switzerland, the due taxes were paid in that country. Moreover, Section 9(1)(ii) makes it abundantly clear that income chargeable under the head ‘Salary’ constitutes income deemed to accrue in India only if the services are rendered in India. Since in the present case, admittedly no services were rendered in India for which the foreign assignment allowance was received by the assessee, the same was not chargeable to tax in India even in terms of the deeming provisions of Section 9(1)(ii) of the Act.

We note that in the impugned order the ld. CIT has not made any discussion with regard to application of Section 9(1)(ii) which was the most appropriate legal provision in deciding whether the foreign assignment allowance received for rendering of services outside India, was taxable in India or not. We note that the ld. CIT discussed several reasons for holding the amount to be taxable in India but surprisingly his order is conspicuously silent about the applicability of Section 9(1)(ii) of the Act according to which the income could be made liable to tax if and only if the income was received for services rendered in India. We note that this specific issue was adjudicated by the coordinate Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Shri SudiptaMaity (supra) which involved identical facts. In the decided case, the Tribunal has noted the following facts:

With reference to the foregoing facts, the issue for adjudication before the Tribunal was whether the Ld. CIT(A) was justified in deleting the addition made of Rs.51,84,489/- which was brought to tax by the AO by applying the provisions of section 5(2) of the Act. So, we note that this issue, on similar facts and applicable provisions of law, was adjudicated in respect of an assessee who was working with the same company IBM as that of the assessee in this case; and the AO had taxed the foreign assignment allowance by invoking provisions of Section 5(2) of the Act, which was deleted by the Ld. CIT(A). This action of the Ld. CIT(A) was challenged by the Revenue before the Tribunal and the Tribunal upholding the action of the ld. CIT(A) held as under:

We note that in the impugned order, the Ld. CIT has fortified his usurpation of revisionary jurisdiction u/s 263 of the Act, by relying on the amendment to Section 263 whereby second Explanation to sub-section (1) of sec. 263 of the Act was inserted with effect from 01.06.2015. The said amendment inserted the words “in the opinion of Principal commissioner or Commissioner”. According to ld. CIT, after this amendment was brought into statute, the order passed by the AO can be deemed to be erroneous insofar as prejudicial to the interest of the revenue if in the opinion of the Pr. CIT or CIT, the order has been passed without making enquiries or verification which should have been made. According to us, however, the insertion of the amendment which has brought in the word ‘in the opinion of Principal commissioner or Commissioner” cannot be read in isolation. And it has to be kept in mind that “Explanation” cannot over-ride the substantive provision of the law which the Explanation only tries to explain/clarify. Before we advert further, let us look at Section 263 of the Act, which is reproduced as under:-

A reading of Section 263 of the Act and the Explanations as well as the amendments brought in by the Finance Act, 2015, w.e.f. 01.06.2015, by inserting Explanation 2, we note that Explanation -2, is a deeming provision and the well settled position of law is that while construing a deeming provision, it has to be strictly interpreted and that the legal fictions should not be stretched beyond the purpose for which they were enacted and should not extend that legitimate field (Raymond Vs. State of Chattisgarh AIR 20-07 SC 2854) and it should be kept in mind that deeming provision should be in respect of facts, from which 27 SA Nos. 99-104/Kol/2019 & AY- 2014-15 legal consequences will follow. However, a legal consequence cannot be deemed[DCM Vs. State of Rajasthan (1996) 2 SCC 449. AIR 1996 SC 2930 (3 judges of Hon’ble Supreme Court) and same view reiterated in State of Karnataka Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2017) 3 SCC 362. So when we look at Explanation-2, we note that deeming fiction of law that the order of the Assessing Officer is deemed to be erroneous insofar as it is prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue only if in the opinion of the ld. CIT, which necessarily has to be a finding of fact in the following four events. Then legal consequence follows, if not it does not. So, the CIT has to make a finding of fact in the following:

So, the amendment brought by the Finance Act, 2015, by way of insertion of Explanation-2, can come to the aid of the ld. Pr. CIT or ld. CIT only when any of the four conditions is satisfied and there is a clear finding of fact to that effect is recorded by the Ld. CIT, then only the legal consequence that AO’s order is erroneous insofar as prejudicial to the revenue can be deemed or else it cannot be deemed. Then in that case only the assessment order framed by the Assessing Officer can be deemed to be erroneous insofar as prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue, not otherwise. To say it differently, the “opinion of Ld. Pr. CIT or CIT” cannot be read in isolation, and it has to be read with the four conditions stipulated under Explanation-2 as (a) to (d) and has to be read along with it. And only in the event that any one of the situation is satisfied and there is a finding of fact by the Ld. CIT to that effect in his sec. 263 order, then only the deeming provision of Explanation- 2 can be pressed into service for rendering an assessment order as erroneous, insofar as 28 SA Nos. 99-104/Kol/2019 & AY- 2014-15 prejudicial to the Revenue, which is the jurisdictional fact & law required for the ld. Pr. CIT/CIT to invoke revisional jurisdiction u/s 263 of the Act.

Coming to the expression in Explanation -2 “in the opinion of the Ld. CIT”, it cannot be an arbitrary opinion bereft of facts or law by the Ld CIT. It must be the considered opinion of the CIT which is based on the correct facts and in accordance to well established principles of law. The aforesaid clause only provides for situation where inquiries or verifications should be made by reasonable and prudent officer in the context of the case. Such clause cannot be read to authorize or give unfettered powers to the Commissioner to revise each and every assessment order. The applicability of the clause is thus essentially contextual. It has to be the opinion of a prudent person instructed in law. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India reported in 1978 AIR (SC) 597 has laid down the law that a public authority should discharge his duties in a fair, just and reasonable, manner and the principle of due process of law was recognized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Therefore the opinion of the Ld. CIT has to be in consonance with that of the well settled judicial principles and cannot be arbitrarily made discarding the judicial precedent on the subject. The opinion of the Ld. Pr. CIT has to be reasonable and that of a prudent person instructed in law. Moreover, it has to be kept in mind that an Explanation to substantive section should be read as to harmonize with and clear up any ambiguity in the main section and should not be so construed as to widen the ambit of the section as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bihta Cooperative Development Cane Marketing Union Ltd. Vs. Bank of Bihar, AIR 1967 SC 389 and M/s. Oblum Electrical Industries Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad vs. Collector of Customs, Bombay - AIR 1997 SC 3467 at page 3471 and also see Justice G. P. Singh, Principal of Statutory Interpretation 234 Lexus 2016. It has to be kept in mind that while the Commissioner is exercising his revisional jurisdiction over the assessment order, he has to exercise his power in an objective manner and not arbitrarily or subjectively since he is discharging quasi-judicial powers vested in him while doing so. Thus according to us, Explanation (2) inserted by the Parliament u/s. 263 cannot override the main section i.e. sec. 263(1) of the Act. The Ld. CIT can exercise his revisional jurisdiction in the event the assessment order is erroneous as well as prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue as discussed above and not otherwise.

As we discussed above, the opinion of the Ld. CIT based on the deeming provision of Explanation 2 to sec. 263 of the Act should be on the bedrock of the finding of fact that AO’s order falls in the infirmities/condition stipulated under the Explanation 2(a) to (d) and then only the opinion of the ld. CIT should prevail and not that of any other person. Therefore, when the issue of assumption of jurisdiction of the Ld.CIT is tested on the back- drop of the judicial precedent of the subject, we note that the AO had called for documents from the assessee vide notice issued u/s. 142(1) dated 11.11.2016 and has passed the order on 23.12.2016 after perusal of replies of assessee, as discussed. The AO had acknowledged to have received the same in the assessment order itself, by recording a specific finding in the assessment order that the assessee had received foreign assignment allowance. So, the issue of foreign assignment allowance to the tune of Rs.42,97,092/- which is the bone of contention in this case was indeed considered and examined by the AO. We also note that the assessee had also furnished before the AO requisite documentary evidences which proved the foreign assignment allowance which was excluded from the ambit of total income taxable in India, had suffered applicable tax in Switzerland being the country where the services were actually rendered. Having considered these evidences, explanations and applicable legal provisions, the AO recorded the specific finding that “the assessee was in India only for 16 days and the rest of the period he was in assignment to Switzerland and had received foreign assignment allowance”. In such a scenario, the finding recorded by the AO, cannot be termed as a case of no-enquiry at all in respect of foreign assignment allowance of the assessee. Therefore, the ld. CIT’s view that the action of the AO in allowing the amount of Rs.42,97,092/- as exempt from taxation is in violation of the provision of sec. 5(2) of the Act without any enquiry, is factually incorrect. We note that this issue was considered by the AO and after enquiry he has taken a view to allow the claim of the assessee that this foreign assignment allowance is not taxable in India. We therefore hold that the AO’s view cannot be held to be erroneous for want of enquiry.

We further find that when confronted with the reasons set out in the SCN, the assessee had led before the ld. CIT sufficient documentary evidence which proved that the SCN had proceeded on assumption of incorrect facts and wrong interpretation of applicable

In the light of the above, we are of the firm view that not only did the AO enquire into the issue of taxability of foreign assignment allowance received by the assessee but had consciously applied his mind to the facts made available before him and adopted the permissible view in law. For these reasons, we are of the considered view that the assessment order is not the result of non-enquiry or non-application of mind or assumption of wrong facts. We are also of the considered opinion that while passing the assessment order the AO had followed the permissible view in law which cannot be said to be 'unsustainable in law'. In the circumstances therefore, the jurisdictional facts for usurping the jurisdiction u/s 263 of the Act, being absent, we hold that the action of Ld. CIT was without jurisdiction and all subsequent actions are 'null' in the eyes of law. We therefore quash the order impugned before us. Since all the appeals itself has been decided, therefore, the stay applications become infructuous and stands dismissed.