KUMUD BAJAJ,HYDERABAD vs. ITO, WARD-1, KHAMMAM

3. Aggrieved, the assessee carried the matter in appeal before the CIT(A). As the appeal filed by the assessee before the CIT(A) involved a delay of 01 year and 07 months, therefore, the CIT(A) declined to condone the same and dismissed the appeal as inadmissible.

4. The assessee being aggrieved with the order of the CIT(A) has carried the matter in appeal before us.

Kumud Bajaj vs. ITO condonation of the delay involved in filing of the present appeal accompanied with an affidavit of the assessee, dated 11/10/2025. The Ld.AR submitted that the delay in filing of the appeal had crept in because of the serious medical ill health of the assessee who during the relevant period, i.e., December, 2024 to 30/04/2025 was suffering with Chronic Sinusitis and Asthma leading to number of side effects, i.e., acute exacerbation requiring hospitalization and oxygen support which necessitated medical treatment with New Life Hospital, Khammam. The Ld.AR to support her contention had drawn our attention to the Certificate, dated 25/08/2025 issued by the New Life Hospital, Khammam. The Ld.AR submitted that as the delay in filing of the appeal was due to the aforementioned compelling circumstances which were beyond the control of the assessee, therefore, the same in all fairness and in the interest of justice be condoned.

6. Per contra, Shri K. Vamsi Krishna, Learned Senior Departmental Representative (for short, “Ld. Sr-DR”) objected to the seeking of the condonation of delay by the assessee.

Kumud Bajaj vs. ITO i.e., December, 2024 to 30/04/2025 was prevented from filing the present appeal within the stipulated time period, therefore, the delay of 64 days therein involved merits to be condoned.

2. Decision During the course of appellate proceedings, the Notices were issued u/s 250 of the Act to the Appellant for hearing. The detailed chart regarding this is given as under:

Kumud Bajaj vs. ITO Section 249 (2) of the Income Tax Act 1961, mentions as under: The appeal shall be presented within thirty days of the following date, that is to say- (a) Where the appeal is under section 248, the date of payment of the tax, or (b) Where the appeal relates to any assessment or penalty, the date of service of the notice of demand relating to the assessment or penalty: Further, section 249(3) reads as under: The Commissioner (Appeals) may admit an appeal after the expiration of the said period if he is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period. 3.1 There is an abnormal delay of around 01 year 07 months which is not acceptable as it appears to be only due to the lax approach of the appellant. The appellant assessee has not forwarded any valid reason for the delayed appeal which is not acceptable in absence of any cogent evidence. It is nothing else but camouflage for the gross negligence and inaction of the appellant assessee. The appellant assessee has mislead the fact that the appeal was due to file on 01.07.2023 whereas the same was to be filed on or before 30.04.2022. For such delay no documentary evidence in support was filed during the ongoing appellate proceedings. The appellant assessee has miserably failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence for non- filing the appeal within due time. When an appeal is filed beyond the statutory time limit, the Appellant needs to provide a valid reason or demonstrate exceptional circumstances for the delay. It is the duty of the assessee to file the appeal within the stipulated time provided under the Act unless the assessee is prevented by a reasonable cause from filing the appeal in time. 3.2 The appellant ought to have filed the appeal within the prescribed time limit of 30 days from date of service as per section 249(2) of the Act and any delay therein may be condoned only subject to the satisfaction that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period, as evident from the plain language of section 249 extracted as under: “249(2) the appeal shall be presented within thirty days of the following date, that is to say, — (a) Where the appeal is under section 248, the date of payment of the tax, or Kumud Bajaj vs. ITO (b) Where the appeal relates to any assessment or penalty, the date of service of the notice of demand relating to the assessment or penalty: Provided that, where an application has been made under section 146 for reopening an assessment, the period from the date on which the application is made to the date on which the order passed on the application is served on the assessee shall be excluded: Provided further that where an application has been made under sub- section (1) of section 270AA, the period beginning from the date on which the application is made, to the date on which the order rejecting the application is served on the assessee, shall be excluded, or (1). In any other case, the date on which intimation of the order sought to be appealed against is served.

1. Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), where an order has been made under section 201 on or after the 1st day of October, 1998 but before the 1st day of June, 2000 and the assessee in default has not presented any appeal within the time specified in that sub-section, he may present such appeal before the 1st day of July, 2000.

Kumud Bajaj vs. ITO the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant." (Emphasis supplied) . The aforesaid view was reiterated in the case of Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685, where in the Court held that: “25. We may state that even if the term “sufficient cause" has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of “reasonableness as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favor of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly." The Courts in the abovementioned cases, highlighted upon the importance introducing the concept of "reasonableness" while giving the clause “sufficient cause" a liberal interpretation. In furtherance of the same, the Courts has cautioned regarding the necessity of distinguishing cases where delay is of few days, as against the cases where the delay is inordinate as it might accrue to the prejudice of the rights of the other party. In such cases, where there exists inordinate delay and the same is attributable to the party’s inaction and negligence, the Courts have to take a strict approach so as to protect the substantial rights of the parties. The Division bench of the Hon’ble Bombay HC in Ornate Traders Private Limited v. The income Tax Officer, Mumbai emphasized the need for reasonableness and hence, the actions which can be condoned by the court should fall within the scope of normal human conduct or normal conduct of a litigant. The Hon’ble Bombay HC further observed that while Section 5 of the Limitation Act is being interpreted liberally, it cannot be so liberally that it is without any justification, since condonation of delay in a mechanical or routine manner will jeopardize the legislative intent behind Section 5.

Kumud Bajaj vs. ITO The Hon’ble SC in the case of Shiv Dass v. Union of India (UOl) and Ors., AIR 2007 SC 1330 held that the High Courts, while exercising their discretionary powers under Article 226, should consider delay or laches and, refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if it is found that the applicant had neglected/omitted to assert its rights in a timely manner; however, this discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 3.4 From the above decisions it becomes clear that in the case of condonation of delay where the appeal was filed beyond the limitation of period, the courts/authorities are empowered to condone the delay, provided that the Appellant can prove his claim of inability to file appeal within the prescribed period. Litigant must be able to demonstrate that there was “sufficient cause" which obstructed his action to file Appeal beyond the prescribed time limit. The law of limitation is found upon the maxims “Interest ReipublicaeUt Sit FinisLitium ” that litigation must come to an end in the interest of society as a whole and “vigilantibus non dormientibus Jura subveniunt" that the law assists those that are vigilant with their rights, and not those that sleep thereupon. The law of limitation in India identifies the need for limiting litigation by striking a balance between the interests of the state and the litigant. 3.5 The delay should not be condoned simply because the appellant’s case is hard and calls for sympathy or merely out of benevolence to the party seeking relief. In granting the indulgence and condoning the delay it must be proved beyond the shadow of doubt that the appellant was diligent and was not guilty of negligence whatsoever. The sufficient cause within the contemplation of the limitation provision must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the provisions. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361 has held that the cause for the delay in filing the appeal which by due care and attention could have been avoided cannot be a sufficient cause within the meaning of the limitation provision. Where no negligence, nor inaction, or want of bona fides can be imputed to the appellant a liberal construction of the provisions has to be made in order to advance substantial justice. Seekers of justice must come with clean hands. [JCIT Vs Tractors & Farm Equipment Ltd. (ITAT, Chennai) 104 ITD 149 followed]. 3.6 Thus, there exists no sufficient and good reason for an abnormal delay of around 01 years and 7 months. Such a delay cannot be condoned as condonation in the present case would not be in accordance with the exposition emanating out of the Hon’ble apex Court and Hon’ble High Court decisions. It will rather be grave prejudice to the Department. As already expressed by the apex Court in the case cited supra that the State is also a litigant and need not be given a step-motherly treatment. In this context, the decision of Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of CIT vs. Ram Mohan Kabra (2002) 178 CTR (P& H) 274 is relevant, which reads as under:

Kumud Bajaj vs. ITO 3.7 The provisions relating to prescription of limitation in every statute must not be construed so liberally that it would have the effect of taking away the benefit accruing to the other party in a mechanical manner. Where the legislature spells out a period of limitation and provides for power to condone the delay as well, then such delay can be condoned only for sufficient and good reasons supported by cogent and proper evidence. 3.8 Now, it is a settled principle of law that the provisions relating to specified period of limitation must be applied with their rigour and effective Since the appellant has failed to show any “sufficient cause" u/s.249(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for the appellant’s failure to file the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation u/s.249(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 r.w.s. 5 of Limitation Act. The abnormal delays cannot be condoned. 3.9 In a recent judgment in the case of University of Delhi Vs Union of India & Ors. In Civil Appeal No. 9408 of 2019 vide order dated 17/12/2019, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has refused to condone delay by holding that, "The entire explanation as noted above, depicts the casual approach unmindful of the law of limitation despite being aware of the position of law. That apart when there is such a long delay and there Is no proper explanation, laches would also come into play while noticing as to the manner in which a party has proceeded before filing an appeal. In the matter of condonation of delay and laches, the well accepted position is also that the accrued right of the opposite party cannot be lightly dealt with." I, therefore, hold that the appeal has been filed beyond the prescribed time limit of section 249(2) of the Act, hence the Delay cannot be condoned, and appeal cannot be admitted for adjudication hence rendered as inadmissible.

5. Therefore, the present appeal is not maintainable on this issue alone. In view of the above discussion appeal is rendered inadmissible. Hence stands dismissed.

Kumud Bajaj vs. ITO has suffered from April, 2022 to November, 2023; (ii) cervical spondylitis; (iii) chronic sinusitis with asthma with the recent episode that occurred between December, 2024 and 30/04/2025; and (iv) frequent breathlessness, nausea, dizziness and generalized fatigue because of COVID-19 in February, 2023, but the same does not justify the failure on the part of the assessee to file the appeal against the order passed by the AO under section 147 r.w.s 144 r.w.s 144B of the Act, dated 28/03/2022, therefore, the same would not come to her rescue for explaining the inordinate delay of 594 days in filing the present appeal.

Kumud Bajaj vs. ITO a liberal approach or justice oriented approach to condone the delay. We are of the view that as in the case before us, the assessee had failed to sufficiently explain the reason leading to the inordinate delay of 594 days involved in filing of the appeal before the CIT(A), therefore, the latter had rightly declined to condone the same and dismissed the appeal as inadmissible. In support of our decision, we rely on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balwant Singh vs. Jagdish Singh & Ors, Civil Appeal No. 1166 of 2006, for the proposition that delay cannot be condoned in the absence of demonstrable diligence.

Order pronounced in the open court on 06th February, 2026.