Loading judgment…
Facts
The assessee filed his return of income for AY 2016-17 and was selected for limited scrutiny regarding cash deposits. The AO completed assessment accepting the returned income. Subsequently, the Additional/Joint Commissioner (AJC) issued a notice under Section 271D for accepting cash of Rs. 33,34,000 on sale of land, violating Section 269SS. The AJC imposed a penalty of Rs. 33,34,000.
Held
The Tribunal held that the property was owned and sold by the assessee's spouse, and the sale consideration was deposited in a joint account. Therefore, imposing a penalty on the assessee for the mode of receipt of sale consideration was incorrect. Furthermore, the Assessing Officer (AO) had not recorded satisfaction for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271D in the assessment order, which is a mandatory requirement as per Supreme Court judgments.
Key Issues
Whether penalty under Section 271D is leviable when the transaction was by the spouse and deposited in a joint account, and whether the penalty is valid without satisfaction recorded by the AO in the assessment order.
Sections Cited
271D, 269SS, 143(3)
AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad ‘B’ Bench, Hyderabad
Before: Shri Manjunatha G. & Shri Ravish Sood
ORDER PER. RAVISH SOOD, J.M: The present appeal filed by the assessee is directed against the order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), National Faceless Appeal Centre, Delhi, dated 27/10/2025, which in turn arises from the order passed by the Additional/Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Range-13, Hyderabad under section 271D of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short, “the Act”), dated 30/06/2022 for the Assessment Year
Venkata Ramana Murthy Bollapragada vs ITO (AY) 2016-17. The assessee has assailed the impugned order of the CIT(A) on the following grounds of appeal:
1. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld CIT(A) erred in rejecting the request of the appellant to condone the delay of meagre 2 days, in filing the appeal before him without considering the reasons given by the appellant.
2. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. JCIT and Ld. CIT(A) erred in not considering the responses and documents filed by the appellant before them, thereby violating the principles of natural justice. The penalty order is void ab initio.
3. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the notice U/s 274 r.ws 2710 dated 31-12-2021 be held invalid being issued after the expiry of the financial year in which the assessment proceedings are completed, particularly in absence of the imposition of penalty in the course of assessment proceedings, completed vide order dated 25-10-2018. Thus, the penalty order is barred by limitation
4. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, Ld. JCIT and Ld. CIT(A) failed to appreciate that: (a) The seller party to the regd. Power of Attorney dated 07-11-2025 for a consideration of Rs.33,34,000/- is Mrs. B. Vara Lakshmi, Spouse of appellant. (b) The appellant is neither a buyer nor a seller in the Power of Attorney. (c) The property under the Power of Attorney is not owned by the appellant. (d) The cash is deposited by the buyer directly into the joint account held by the appellant with his spouse. (e) The consideration does not relate to the appellant, but relates to the spouse of the appellant. (f) The assessment proceedings completed vide order dated 25/10/2018 in the hands of the appellant does not refer to any violation of compliance to the provisions of Section 269SS. (g) The spouse of the appellant had purchased / invested in another property vide deed dated 27-08-2015 for Rs. 34,00,000/- being eligible for claim for benefit U/s 54F of the Act. The appellant prays that the penalty levied U/s 271D be deleted.
5. The Appellant craves leave to add, amend and/or after the above ground of appeal, at any time before or at the time of hearing of the appeal.”
2. Succinctly stated, the assessee had filed his return of income for AY 2016-17 on 28/07/2016 declaring an income of Rs.4,57,977/-. Subsequently, the case of the assessee was selected for “limited
Thereafter, the AO vide his order passed under section 143(3) of the Act, dated 25/10/2018 after making necessary verifications had accepted the returned income of the assessee as such.
The Additional/Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Range-13, Hyderabad, based on the information received from the AO that the assessee had during the subject year accepted cash of Rs.33,34,000/- on sale of land vide sale deed, dated 07/11/2015, and thus violated the provisions of section 269SS of the Act, issued a notice under section 274 r.w.s 271D of the Act, dated 31/12/2021, wherein the assessee was called upon to explain as to why the penalty may not be imposed upon him under section 271D of the Act.
As the assessee failed to respond to the show cause notice (SCN) issued by the Additional/Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, therefore, the latter vide his order passed under section 271D of the Act, dated 30/06/2022 imposed upon him a penalty of Rs.33,34,000/-, i.e., a sum equal to the amount of the sale consideration so accepted in cash.
Aggrieved, the assessee carried the matter in appeal before the CIT(A) but without success.
Shri H. Srinivasulu, Advocate, Learned Authorized Representative (for short, “Ld. AR”) for the assessee, assailed the penalty imposed under section 271D of the Act on two-fold reasons, viz., (I) that the subject property, viz., land admeasuring 333.33 square yards located at Madhurawada, Survey No.97/1-3, Visakhapatnam had been transferred/sold by the assessee’s spouse, viz., Smt. Bollapragada Vara Lakshmi vide a General Power of Attorney (GPA) on 07/11/2015 to Shri Nagothi Appala Raju for a sale consideration of Rs.33.34 lakhs, and the sale consideration was deposited by her in the joint bank account that was held along with the assessee, i.e., Account No.0122101001468 with Andhra Bank, Dilsukhnagar Branch, Hyderabad in three tranches, viz., 02/11/2015: Rs.5 lakhs; (ii) 07/11/2015: Rs.20 lakhs; and (iii) 12/11/2015: Rs.8 lakhs; AND (II) that the AO while framing the assessment in the case of the assessee vide his order under section 143(3) of the Act, dated 25/10/2018 had not recorded any satisfaction for initiating penalty proceedings under section 271D of the Act. Elaborating on his contentions, the Ld. AR submitted that as the subject property had been sold not by the assessee but by his wife, viz., Smt. Bollapragada Vara Lakhshmi (supra), therefore, there could be no Venkata Ramana Murthy Bollapragada vs ITO justification for imposing the penalty in the hands of the assessee for the standalone reason that the sale consideration was deposited in the aforementioned joint bank account. Apart from that, the Ld. AR submitted that as the AO while framing the assessment in the case of the assessee under section 143(3) of the Act, dated 25/10/2018 had not recorded his satisfaction for initiating the penalty in the body of the assessment order, therefore, as per the binding judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills Ambala City, (2015) 379 ITR 521 (SC), the Additional/Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Range-13, Hyderabad was divested of his jurisdiction to impose the penalty in the hands of the assessee vide his order under section 271D of the Act, dated 30/06/2022.
Per contra, Dr. Sachin Kumar, Learned Senior Departmental Representative (for short, “Ld. Sr-DR”) vehemently objected to the contentions advanced by the Ld. AR. The Ld. Sr-DR submitted that the sale consideration had been deposited in the bank account of the assessee and to support his contention has taken us through the bank account statement, wherein the aforementioned amount was deposited, Page No.51 of APB. Apart from that, the Ld. Sr-DR submitted that as the assessee’s wife neither had any independent source of income nor held a PAN, therefore, the transactions of purchase/sale of property could not Venkata Ramana Murthy Bollapragada vs ITO be related to her. Also, the Ld. Sr-DR submitted that in the registered sale deed executed on 27/08/2015 against the name of the assessee’s spouse, the PAN of the assessee, i.e., ABMPB7770R was mentioned.
We have heard the Learned Authorized Representatives of both parties, perused the orders of the lower authorities and the material available on record.
At the threshold, we may herein observe that a perusal of the Sale- cum-General Power of Attorney, dated 07/11/2015, Page Nos.27 to 33 of APB, reveals that the subject property, viz., land admeasuring 333.33 square yards located at Madhurawada, Survey No.97/1-3, Visakhapatnam had been sold by Smt. Bollapragada Vara Lakshmi, i.e., the assessee’s spouse to Shri Nagothi Appala Raju. Apart from that, a perusal of the purchase deed, dated 11/02/2003 for the subject property reveals that the same was purchased by Smt. Bollapragada Vara Lakshmi, i.e., the assessee’s spouse. Insofar, the depositing of the amount in Account No. 0122101001468 with Andhra Bank, Dilsukhnagar Branch, Hyderabad is concerned, we find that a perusal of the said bank account reveals that the same is a joint bank account held by the assessee along with his wife, i.e., Smt. Bollapragada Vara Lakshmi, Page No.49 of APB.
Venkata Ramana Murthy Bollapragada vs ITO 12. Considering the aforesaid facts, we are unable to comprehend that now when the subject property was owned and thereafter sold by Smt. Bollapragada Vara Lakshmi, i.e., the assessee’s spouse and the sale consideration was deposited by her in her aforementioned joint bank account, then how the penalty regarding the impugned mode of receipt of the sale consideration could have been imposed in the hands of the assessee before us. We thus, in terms of our aforesaid observations find substance in the contentions advanced by the Ld. AR and vacate the penalty of Rs.33.40 lakhs imposed by the Additional/Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Range-13, Hyderabad under section 271D of the Act.
Apart from that, we find substance in the Ld. AR’s alternate contention that as the AO while framing the assessment in the case of the assessee vide his order under section 143(3) of the Act, dated 30/06/2022 has not recorded any satisfaction for initiating the penalty under section 271D of the Act in the body of the assessment order, therefore, he was divested of his jurisdiction to impose the subject penalty in the hands of the assessee. Our aforesaid view is supported by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills Ambala City, (2015) 379 ITR 521 (SC). In the case before the Hon’ble Apex Court, the AO had framed the original
Venkata Ramana Murthy Bollapragada vs ITO assessment vide an ex-parte order dated 26.02.1996, determining the income of the assessee at Rs. 18.34 lacs (approx.). The A.O., while framing the assessment, had in the body of the assessment order taken cognizance of the fact that the assessee had contravened the provisions of Section 269SS of the Act and recorded his satisfaction for initiating penalty proceedings u/s. 271D of the Act. On appeal, the CIT(Appeals) set-aside the assessment order with a direction to frame the assessment de-novo after affording an adequate opportunity to the assessee. After remand, the A.O. passed a fresh assessment order but failed to record his satisfaction regarding the initiation of the penalty proceedings u/s. 271D of the Act. During the pendency of the assessee’s quantum appeal, which had not yet come up before the CIT(Appeals), the Jt. CIT, based on the original assessment order dated 26.02.1996, issued a “Show cause notice” (“SCN”) to the assessee and imposed the penalty under Section 271D of the Act dated 23.09.1996. It was, thus, in the backdrop of the aforesaid facts that the sustainability of the penalty imposed under Section 271D of the Act, based on the original assessment order that no more survived had surfaced. On being tested on the touchstone of the fact that the original assessment order, wherein satisfaction for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271D of the Act was recorded, having been set-aside, thus, did no more survive, the Venkata Ramana Murthy Bollapragada vs ITO Tribunal and the High Court concluded that the penalty imposed under Section 271D of the Act could not be sustained.
On further appeal, the Hon’ble Apex Court concluded that as the A.O. in the fresh assessment order had not recorded his satisfaction regarding penalty under Section 271D of the Act, therefore, in the absence of recording of the requisite satisfaction, the penalty imposed under Section 271D of the Act could not be sustained and was liable to be quashed. For the sake of clarity, the relevant observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court is culled out as under:
“6. As pointed out above, insofar as, fresh assessment order is concerned, there was no satisfaction recorded regarding penalty proceeding under Section 271E of the Act, though in that order the Assessing Officer wanted penalty proceeding to be initiated under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act. Thus, insofar as penalty under Section 271E is concerned, it was without any satisfaction and, therefore, no such penalty could be levied.”
We find that the aforesaid view taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court had, thereafter, been followed by the Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of Grandhi Sri Venkata Amrendra Vs. Joint Commissioner of Income-tax, CWP No. 32872/2023, dated 04.10.2024. The Hon'ble High Court, drawing support from the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra), had held as under:
Venkata Ramana Murthy Bollapragada vs ITO “9. In our view, the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer is required to be recorded because the officer, who passed the assessment order would not be levying the penalty under Sec. 271D of the Act. unless it is recorded in the assessment order, he cannot refer the file to superior officer i.e., Joint Commissioner, for initiating levy of penalty. Unless the Assessing Officer, who is the primary authority, based on the material before it, during assessment proceedings, arrives at a finding that there has been a violation of the provisions, like in the present case, of Section 269SS, there will not be any occasion to the Joint Commissioner, who is not the Assessing Officer, to exercise his jurisdiction to levy Penalty under Section 271D. Following the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jai Laxmi Rice Mills referred supra, we set aside the order passed by the 1" respondent dated 23.11.2023 under Sec.271D of the Act.” We find that the aforesaid view taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, had, thereafter, been followed by the Hon’ble High Court of Telangana in the case of Shrinivasa Reddy Reddeppagari Vs. JCIT, WP No.44285 of 2022 dated 26.12.2022, wherein the substantial question of law for which the indulgence of the Hon’ble High Court was sought, read as under:
“14. Issue raised in the writ petition is whether without satisfaction being recorded in the assessment order, penalty can be levied by the Jt. CIT under S. 271D of the Act?”
Answering the aforesaid question, the Hon’ble High Court, after drawing support from the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of CIT Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills Ambala City (supra), had held as under:
“15. Insofar the present case is concerned, we find that in the assessment order dated 24.03.2022 passed under Section 153A of the Act, return of income filed by the petitioner was accepted by the assessing officer and accordingly, the total income was assessed. In the return of income, petitioner had admitted receiving total income of Rs. 80,84,180.00 which was also accepted by the assessing officer.
Venkata Ramana Murthy Bollapragada vs ITO 16. Subsequently, respondent No.1 took the view that petitioner had sold immovable properties for a total sale consideration of Rs. 92,13,000.00 out of which he had accepted cash to the tune of Rs. 87,80,000.00 which was in violation of Section 269SS of the Act, attracting penalty under Section 271D of the Act.
17. Before we advert to the reply submitted by the petitioner, we may mention that under Section 269SS of the Act, no person shall take or accept from any other person (referred to as a depositor) any loan or deposit or any specified sum otherwise than by an account payee cheque or account payee bank draft or use of electronic clearing system through a bank account or through such other electronic mode as may be prescribed, if the amount of such loan or deposit or specified sum is twenty thousand rupees or more. However, as per the first proviso, the rigor of Section 269SS is not applicable to the Government, banking company, post office savings bank or cooperative bank etc. As per the second proviso, this provision would also not be applicable where both the depositor and the receiver are having agricultural income and neither of them has any income chargeable to tax under the Act.
Section 271D of the Act deals with penalty for failure to comply with the provisions of Section 269SS of the Act. Section 271D of the Act being relevant is extracted hereunder: Penalty for failure to comply with the provisions of section 269SS. 271D. (1) If a person takes or accepts any loan or deposit [or specified sum] in contravention of the provisions of section 269SS, he shall be liable to pay, by way of penalty, a sum equal to the amount of the loan or deposit [or specified sum] so taken or accepted.] [(2) Any penalty imposable under sub-section (1) shall be imposed by the [Joint] Commissioner.] 19. Thus, what sub-section (1) of Section 271D provides for is that if a person takes or accepts any loan or deposit or specified amount in contravention of the provisions of Section 269SS, he shall be liable to pay by way of penalty, a sum equal to the amount of the loan or deposit or specified sum so taken or accepted. Sub-section (2) clarifies that any penalty imposable under sub-section (1) shall be imposed by the Joint Commissioner.
It would be useful to refer to Section 271E of the Act also at this stage which deals with penalty for failure to comply with the provisions of Section 269T of the Act. Be it stated that Section 269T of the Act provides that no branch of a banking company or a cooperative bank and no other company or cooperative society and no firm or other person shall repay any loan or deposit made with it or any specified advance received by it otherwise than by an account payee cheque or account payee bank draft drawn in the name of the person who had Venkata Ramana Murthy Bollapragada vs ITO made the loan or deposit or who had paid the specified advance or by use of electronic clearing system through a bank account or through such other electronic mode as may be prescribed, if such an amount is twenty thousand rupees or more. As in the case of Section 269SS, Section 269T of the Act also does not apply to the Government, banking company, post office savings bank etc. Section 271E of the Act reads as under: Penalty for failure to comply with the provisions of section 269T. 271E. [(1)] If a person repays any [loan or] deposit [or specified advance] referred to in section 269T otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of that section, he shall be liable to pay, by way of penalty, a sum equal to the amount of the [loan or] deposit [or specified advance] so repaid.] [(2) Any penalty imposable under sub-section (1) shall be imposed by the [Joint] Commissioner.] 21. Thus, sub-section (1) of Section 271E of the Act provides that if a person repays any loan or deposit or specified advance referred to in Section 269T of the Act otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of that section, he shall be liable to pay by way of penalty a sum equal to the amount of the loan or deposit or specified advance so repaid. (2) any penalty imposable under sub-section (1) shall be imposed by the Joint Commissioner.
From an analysis of Sections 271D and 271E of the Act, it is seen that both the provisions are pari materia to each other. While Section 271D of the Act would be attracted on a person accepting loan or deposit or specified sum in contravention of Section 269SS of the Act, penalty under Section 271E of the Act would be imposable on a person who makes or repays the loan or deposit or specified advance in contravention of Section 269T. Therefore, in a way, the two provisions are complimentary to each other.
In Jai Laxmi Rice Mills Ambala City (supra), Supreme Court considered the question as to whether penalty proceedings under Section 271D of the Act is independent of the assessment proceeding ? In the facts of that case, it was found that the penalty order was issued following the assessment order. However in appeal, Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) had set aside the original assessment order with a direction to frame assessment de novo. In the fresh assessment order, no satisfaction was recorded by the assessing officer regarding initiation of penalty proceedings under Section 271E of the Act. It was noticed that the penalty order was passed before the appeal of the assessee was allowed by the Commissioner of Income Venkata Ramana Murthy Bollapragada vs ITO Tax (Appeals). It was in that context that Supreme Court held as follows: The Tribunal as well as the High Court has held that it could not be so for the simple reason that when the original assessment order itself was set aside, the satisfaction recorded therein for the purpose of initiation of the penalty proceeding under Section 271E would also not survive. This according to us is the correct proposition of law stated by the High Court in the impugned order. As pointed out above, insofar as, fresh assessment order is concerned, there was no satisfaction recorded regarding penalty proceeding under Section 271E of the Act, though in that order the Assessing Officer wanted penalty proceeding to be initiated under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act. Thus, insofar as penalty under Section 271E is concerned, it was without any satisfaction and, therefore, no such penalty could be levied. These appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.
Reverting back to the facts of the present case, we find that petitioner had submitted reply to the show cause notice on 02.06.2022. In his reply, petitioner mentioned that no satisfaction was recorded by the assessing officer in the assessment order as to infraction of Section 269SS of the Act. Therefore, no penalty could be levied under Section 271D of the Act without recorded satisfaction. In this connection, reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jai Laxmi Rice Mills Ambala City (1 supra) wherein it was clarified that provisions of Section 271E are in pari materia with the provisions of Section 271D of the Act. However, this aspect of the matter was not considered by respondent No.1 while passing the impugned order. Respondent No.1 relying upon the Kerala High Court decision in Grihalaxmi Vision (2 supra) noted that competent authority to levy penalty is the Joint Commissioner. He has also referred to an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in CIT V. Mac Data Ltd.3 wherein it was observed that assessing officer has to satisfy himself as to whether penalty proceedings should be initiated or not. Assessing officer is not required to record his satisfaction in a particular manner or reduce it into writing. Therefore, respondent No.1 imposed the penalty under Section 271D of the Act.
We are afraid respondent No.1 had completely overlooked the decision of the Supreme Court in Jai Laxmi Rice Mills Ambala City (1 supra). In the said decision as extracted above, Supreme Court had concurred with the view taken by the High Court holding that satisfaction must be recorded in the original assessment order for the purpose of initiation of penalty proceedings under Section 271E of the Act. We have already discussed above that provisions of Section 271E and 271D of the Act are in pari materia. When there is a decision of the Supreme Court, it is the bounden duty of an adjudicating authority, be it an income tax authority or any other civil authority or for that Venkata Ramana Murthy Bollapragada vs ITO matter any court in the country, to comply with the decision of the Supreme Court.
Article 141 of the Constitution of India is clear that law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. This is further clarified in Article 144, which says that all authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court. We are therefore, of the unhesitant view that respondent No.1 overlooked the relevant considerations while passing the impugned order dated.29.11.2022.
Further, issue in the present writ petition is not the competence of the Joint Commissioner in issuing the order of penalty. Therefore, reference to Grihalaxmi Vision (2 supra) was wholly unnecessary.
Consequently, we set aside the impugned order dated 29.11.2022 and remand the matter back to the file of respondent No.1 to pass a fresh order in accordance with law after giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Writ Petition is accordingly allowed. No costs.”
Also, a similar view had been taken by the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat in the case of Pr. CIT Vs. Parivar Television, Tax Appeal No.674/2023 dated 09.10.2023, wherein the Hon’ble High Court had approved the view taken by the Tribunal and observed that as no satisfaction regarding initiation of penalty proceedings u/s. 271E of the Act was recorded in the assessment order, therefore, no penalty under the said statutory provision could have been levied. Apart from that, we find that a similar view had been taken by the ITAT, Hyderabad Bench in the case of ACIT Vs. Bapu Reddy Jala Nizamabad, dated 15.06.2023 and Raja Reddy Nalla Vs. Addl. CIT, dated 31.05.2023 and also by the ITAT, Raipur in the case of Shri Bhowmick Raj Singh Vs. Jt. CIT, Bhilai- Range, Bhilai 29 and the ITAT, Amritsar in the
We are of the view that as the issue before us is no more res- integra in light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills Ambala City (supra), therefore, in the backdrop of our aforesaid deliberations, the penalty of Rs. 33.34 lacs (supra) imposed by the Addl/Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Range-13, Hyderabad under Section 271D of the Act cannot be sustained and is liable to be struck down for want of valid assumption of jurisdiction.
In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed in terms of our aforesaid observations.
Order pronounced in the open court on 26th February, 2026.