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Facts
The assessee filed an appeal before the ITAT with a delay of 806 days, claiming non-receipt of the CIT(A) order due to notices being sent to incorrect email IDs and only learning about it after receiving a recovery notice. An earlier appeal before the CIT(A) was also delayed by 463 days. The primary ground of appeal regarding an addition of Rs.15,75,000/- was not addressed.
Held
The Tribunal found the reasons for delay insufficient and unsupported by evidence, deeming them general and self-serving. Citing Supreme Court precedents, it emphasized that a 'liberal approach' for condoning delay cannot override the law of limitation when negligence and lack of diligence are apparent. Consequently, the Tribunal refused to condone the 806-day delay.
Key Issues
Whether there was "sufficient cause" to condone the 806-day delay in filing the appeal before the ITAT under Section 253(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Sections Cited
Income-tax Act, 1961: Sections 250, Income-tax Act, 1961: Section 253(3), Income-tax Act, 1961: Section 253(5), Income-tax Act, 1961: Section 147, Income-tax Act, 1961: Section 144, Limitation Act: Section 3, Limitation Act: Section 5, ITAT Rules, 1963: Rule 34
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Before: SHRI SANJAY GARG & SHRI BIJAYANANDA PRUSETH
आदेश / O R D E R
PER BIJAYANANDA PRUSETH, AM:
This appeal by the assessee emanates from the order passed under section 250 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (in short, ‘the Act’), dated 27.07.2022 by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), National Faceless Appeal Centre, Delhi [in short ‘CIT(A)’] for the Assessment Year (AY) 2012-13.
Grounds of appeal
raised by the assessee are as under: “1. The AO was biased in making huge addition of Rs.15,75,000/- by only considering cash deposits and not considering withdrawal bank entries of bank statement.”
3. The appeal filed by the assessee is delayed by 806 days. The assessee has filed an affidavit for condonation of delay in filing of appeal before this Tribunal. In the affidavit, the assessee stated that she filed appeal against the order u/s /AY.2012-13 Sushila Rajesh yadav 147 r.w.s. 144 of the Act on 30.10.2019 and the same was confirmed by CIT(A) on 27.07.2022. Thereafter, the appellant filed appeal before the Tribunal on 09.12.2024, which is time barred by 806 days. The appellant submitted that e- mail id given in the Form No.35 is ‘hkpant129@gmail.com’. However, notices u/s 250 of the Act were sent on ‘hkpantassociates@gmail.com’ and ‘hkp2012itr@gmail.com’. She received the recovery notice in the month of December, 2024 and informed his Authorised Representative (AR), who advised him to file appeal before ITAT. The appellant submitted that the delay in filing appeal was not due to any malafide intention. She requested to condone the delay in the interest of justice.
On the other hand, learned Senior Departmental Representative (ld. Sr. DR) for the revenue opposed the request for condonation of delay. The ld. Sr. DR submitted that the reasons given by the assessee would not constitute “sufficient cause” within the meaning of section 253(3) of the Act.
We have heard both parties on this preliminary issue of condonation of delay. There was a delay of 806 days in filing appeal before the ITAT. In the affidavit, the appellant has stated that the CIT(A) issued the notices on e-mail addresses, i.e., ‘hkpantassociates@gmail.com’ and ‘hkp2012itr@gmail.com’. The appellant has stated that she was unaware of the appellate proceedings and she come to know about order u/s 250 only when she received the recovery notice in the month of December, 2024. The reasons given by the assessee are general, self-serving and not convincing. She has not given any evidence in /AY.2012-13 Sushila Rajesh yadav support of the claim made in the affidavit. We also find that there was delay of 463 days in filing appeal before CIT(A). Before him, it was stated that the AR of the assessee misplaced the assessment order and the assessee was unaware of the assessment order. It is thus clear that the appellant is in habit of filing appeals late on some pretext or other. The reasons given by the appellant before the appellate fora are very general in nature without any supporting documents. They would not constitute sufficient cause within the meaning of section 253(3) of the Act.
At this stage, it would be proper to discuss the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court on the issue of limitation. The Hon’ble Court in the following decisions, namely, (i) P. K. Ramachandran vs State of Kerala & Anr. (1997) 7 SCC 556, (ii) Pundik Jalam Patil vs. Executive Engineers, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 and (iii) Basawaraj and Anr vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, (iv) Pathapati Subba Reddy (dies) By L. Rs. & Ors. Vs The Special Deputy Collector (LA), SLP(C) No.31248 of 2018 (SC), dated 08.04.2024 held that condonation of delay should not be granted only on the ground that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. The Hon'ble Court in the case of Basawaraj (supra) summarized the law on the subject issue by stating that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation of time, the applicant has to explain as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason, which prevented him to approach the Court within the limitation. In case a party is /AY.2012-13 Sushila Rajesh yadav found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay.
We find that in a subsequent decision in the case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (dies) & Ors. vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA), in SLP (Civil) No. 31248 of 2018 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to and discussed various decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court namely (i) Bhag Mal (Alias) Ram Bux & Ors vs. Munshi (Dead) by LRs & Ors (2007) 11 SCC 285 (SC), (ii) Collector, Land Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC), (iii) Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. (1962) 2 SCR 762, (iv) Maqbul Ahmad and Ors vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, AIR 1935 PC 85 (v) Brijesh Kumar and Ors vs. State of Haryana and Ors. 2014 (4) SCALE 50 (vi) Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors, (2011) 4 SCC 363 (vii) State of Jharkhand & Ors vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors. AIR 2009 SC 1927 (viii) Basawaraj and Anr. (supra) and held as under: “7. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the legal maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” i.e. it is for the general welfare that a period of limitation be put to litigation. The object is to put an end to every legal remedy and to have a fixed period of life for every litigation as it is futile to keep any litigation or dispute pending indefinitely. Even public policy requires that there should be an end to the litigation otherwise it would be a dichotomy if the litigation is made immortal vis-a-vis the litigating parties i.e. human beings, who are mortals.” 7.1 It has also discussed the case of Collector, Land Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji (supra) and held that the phrases “liberal approach”, “justice-oriented /AY.2012-13 Sushila Rajesh yadav approach” and “cause of advancement of substantial justice” cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation. 7.2 After discussion on various cases in its order, the Hon'ble Supreme Court at Para 26, has summed up the law laid down by it as under: “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice- oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 7.3 The Hon'ble Supreme Court refused to interfere with the decision of the Hon'ble High Court in refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeal.
/AY.2012-13 Sushila Rajesh yadav 8. In a very recent decision in case of H. Guruswamy & Ors vs. A.Krishnaiah Since Deceased by LRS, in Civil Appeal No.317 of 2025, dated 08.01.2025, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows: “ ………………. Time and again, the Supreme Court has reminded the District judiciary as well as the High Courts that the concepts such as “liberal approach”, “justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” should not be employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation”
The facts and circumstances of the present case are similar. The assessee has filed the appeal after a delay of 806 days. The appellant had also filed appeal before the CIT(A) after 463 days from the due date. In the affidavit for condonation of delay, the assessee has submitted that the delay was due to non-receipt of the appellate order, which were issued on wrong e-mail id. However, no supporting evidence has been filed to substantiate the said claim in the affidavit. In any case, it was an appeal filed by the assessee and the appellant was required to be vigilant and alert in pursuing the appeal effectively. The appellant is found to be negligent, inactive and casual in his approach towards the appellate proceedings before the ITAT as well as CIT(A). Hence, the explanation given by the assessee in this regard is not at all acceptable. Such assertion in only a feeble attempt to explain away the inordinate delay in filing the appeal. Such negligent, casual and lackadaisical approach to file appeal cannot constitute “sufficient cause” within the meaning of section 253(5) of the Act.