THE PRINCIPAL OFFICER, LORDS DISTILLERY LIMITED,NEW DELHI vs. DCIT, NEW DELHI

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ITA 2578/DEL/2010Status: DisposedITAT Delhi14 December 2018AY 2005-06157 pages

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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, DELHI ‘E’ BENCH,

Before: SHRI N.K. BILLAIYA, & MS. SUCHITRA KAMBLE

For Appellant: Shri C.S. Agarwal, Senior Advocate

For Respondent: Shri S.S. Rana, CIT DR

The Jurisdictional High Court of Delhi, vide order dated 22.01.2015, has considered a batch of appeals preferred by the Revenue, challenging the common order of the Tribunal dated 23.11.2012.

The question of law, sought to be urged by the Revenue is as to whether section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short], to the extent it, inter alia, enables the Assessing Officer to issue notice to third parties, on the basis of satisfaction that “any money, bullion, any jewellery or other valuable article or thing or books of account or documents seized or requisitioned belongs or belong to a person other than the person” referred to in section 153A i.e. the person searched, is wide enough to lead to a notice only on the basis of entries in some documents.

3. The relevant findings of the Hon'ble High Court read as under:

“The revenue urges that the Assessing Officer and the CIT(Appeals) took note of not merely the document which listed out the payments made in a tabular form for different purposes, but also other documents and materials in the form of production figures, the statement of Mr. R K Miglani, and the circumstance that the production figures coincide with the figures available with the revenue in the pending proceedings. It appears that the ITAT has not rendered any specific findings on the status of such documents. For instance, if the production figures were in fact forwarded by the concerned unit under a letter or some other form connecting it with the material form seized, inference would be of particular kind.

Having regard to these factors, this Court is of the opinion that the ITAT should render specific findings as to the status of the documents and in that sense, connect with the concerned assessee's third parties who were issued notice under Section 153C, and not merely the general nature of the documents in the form of production figures or amounts tabulated in a chart. This would give a clearer picture as to whether any document or material seized during the course of the proceedings belonged to any of the assessees.

“Allowing the petitions, that the seized documents mentioned in the satisfaction note were the ledger account maintained by the assessee showing the commission payments made by the assessee to R and the letter written by the assessee to R. Since the letter was written by assessee to R to be treated as a document belonging to R and not to the assessee. Whether it might or might not be related to the assessee was not relevant since the amendment to section 153C of the Act in that regard was prospective with effect from June 1,2015 i.e. subsequent to the date of preparation of the satisfaction note. With regard to the extract of the ledger account maintained by the assessee concerning the payments of commission made by it to R, even if it was held to "belong" to the assessee, it could not be an “incriminating" document. This was a document relevant only for the assessment year 2010- 11. It could not have been used for reopening the assessments of the earlier assessment years 2007-08 to 2009-10, 2011-12 and 2012-13. While the ledger account extract might be relevant for the assessment year 2010-11, it could not be an incriminating material warranting reopening of the assessment. The return originally filed by the assessee for the assessment year 2010- 11 was picked up for scrutiny and finalised by an assessment order under section 143(3) of the Act. The payments of commission to R as reflected in the ledger account were already disclosed in the assessee's accounts which were examined while finalising the regular assessment. Therefore, the ledger account could not have led the Assessing Officer to be satisfied that any income had escaped assessment for the assessment year 2010-11. Thus, neither of the documents mentioned in the satisfaction note could have formed a valid basis for the Assessing Officer to initiate proceedings against the assessee under section 153C of the Act for the assessment year 2010-11 or any of the other years as proposed. Therefore, the notice dated July 23, 2014 issued by the Assessing Officer to the assessee under section 153A read with section 153C of the Act and all proceedings consequent thereto were to be quashed.”

SC 1300, 1304, where their Lordships had gone into this material question as to whether the act in breach of the mandatory provision is per force a nullity. The passage in Macnamara on Nullities and Irregularities, referred to in Ashutosh Sikdar v. Bihari Lai Kirtania [1907] ILR 35 Cal 61 [FB], at page 72, was in terms relied upon as under: "...no hard and fast line can be drawn between a nullity and an irregularity; but this much is clear, that an irregularity is a deviation from a rule of law which does not take away the foundation or authority for the proceeding, or apply to its whole operation, whereas a nullity is proceeding that is taken without any foundation for it, or is so essentially defective as to be of no avail or effect whatever, or is void and incapable of being- validated."Thereafter, their Lordships pointed out that whether a provision fell under one category or the other was not easy of discernment as in the ultimate analysis, it depended upon the nature, scope and object of the particular provision. Their Lordships in terms approved a workable test laid down by Justice Coleridge in Holmes v. Russel [1841] 9 Dowl 487 as under: "It is difficult sometimes to distinguish between an irregularity and a nullity; but the safest rule to determine what is an irregularity and what is a nullity is to see whether the party can waive the objection; if he can waive it, it amounts to an irregularity; if he cannot, it is a nullity." Thereafter it was pointed out that a waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right, but obviously an objection to jurisdiction could not be waived, for consent could not give a court jurisdiction where there was none. Even if there was inherent jurisdiction, certain provisions could not be waived. What can be waived would be only those provisions which are for the private benefit and protection of an individual in private capacity, which might be dispensed with without infringing any public right or public policy." This settled legal position was again reiterated in Superintendent of Taxes v. Onkarmal Nathmal Trust, AIR 1975 SC 2065, where the question had arisen in the context of the Assam Taxation (on Goods Carried by Road and on Inland Waterways) Act, 1961. The assessee had obtained an injunction order against the State in a writ petition challenging the validity of the Act. The assessee had not submitted the return under section 7(1) and under section 7(2) a notice had to be issued only within two years from the end of the return period. The procedure of best judgment assessment was laid down in section 9(4) and the question arose whether, in view of the injunction order obtained by the assessee, ignoring the two years' limit laid down as a fetter for issuance of the notice under section 7(2), the best judgment assessment procedure was permissible. At page 2070, the learned Chief Justice first held that if a return under section 7(1) was not made, the service of a notice under section 7(2) of the Act was the only method for initiation of a valid assessment proceeding under the Act. The period of two years under section 7(2) was a fetter on the power of the authority and was not just a bar of time. It was the scheme of the Act that the service of notice within two years from the end of the return period was an imperative requirement for initiation of assessment proceeding as also reassessment proceeding under the Act. Further proceeding, at page 2071, their Lordships pointed out the settled legal distinction between the provisions which conferred jurisdiction and provisions which regulated procedure, because jurisdiction could neither be waived nor created by consent, while a procedural provision could be waived by conduct or agreement. Their Lordships pointed out that in that case the assessee could not be said to have waived the provisions of the statute because there could not be any waiver of a statutory requirement or provision which went to the jurisdiction of assessment. The origin of assessment was either an assessee filing a return as contemplated in the Act or an assessee being called upon to file a return as contemplated in the Act. The respondents challenged the Act. The order of injunction did not amount to a waiver of the statutory provisions. The issue of a notice under the provisions of the Act related to the exercise of jurisdiction under the Act in all cases. The learned Chief Justice in terms pointed out that the revenue statutes are based on public policy. The revenue statutes protect the public on the one hand and confer power on the State on the other. Therefore, even in the context of such a revenue statute like a taxation measure such fetter on the jurisdiction being a fetter laid to protect public, on wider ground of public policy, it was held that such provisions which confer jurisdiction on assessment and reassessment could never be waived for the simple reason that jurisdiction could neither be waived nor created by consent. In the concurring judgment his Lordship, Beg. J., at page 2077, also pointed out that if the notice under section 7(2) was a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction to make the best judgment assessment, the doctrine of waiver could never confer jurisdiction so as to enable the parties to avoid the effect of violating a mandatory provision on a jurisdictional matter even by agreement. This decision completely settles the legal position. It makes a distinction between the provisions which confer jurisdiction and provisions which merely regulate the procedure by holding that such provisions which confer jurisdiction or such mandatory provisions which are enacted in public interest on ground of public policy even in such revenue statutes could not be waived, because of the underlying principle that jurisdiction could neither be waived nor created by consent. The decision in Director of Inspection of Income-tax v. Poor an Mall & Sons [1974] 96 ITR 390 (SC), which is so vehemently relied upon by the learned standing counsel, does not detract from the aforesaid ratio, and in fact, reiterates the same. In that case, the question had arisen regarding the waiver of a provision in section 132(5) of the Income-tax Act which permitted the Income-tax Officer to pass an order of seizure within 90 days. The provision was held to be not a mandatory provision and at page 400 it was also pointed out that there was no question of the period of limitation under section 132(5) involving public interest. It was intended for the benefit of the parties. The settled principle which had been stated on Crates on Statute Law, 6th edition, at page 259, was as under: "As a general rule, the conditions imposed by statutes which authorize legal proceedings are treated as being" indispensable to giving the court jurisdiction. But if it appears that the statutory conditions were inserted by the legislature simply for the security or benefit of the parties to the action themselves, and that no public interests are involved, such conditions will not be considered as indispensable, and either party may waive them without affecting the jurisdiction of the court." Therefore, the period of limitation prescribed under section 132(5) being intended for the benefit of the person concerned, it was held that the assessee could waive that provision. That decision could not, therefore, be invoked in the present context of such a jurisdictional provision which is also a mandatory provision enacted in public interest in this revenue statute as earlier pointed out and which could never be waived. Besides, the question of waiver could never be raised if the person had no knowledge of his legal rights so that he could make any such conscious waiver. In the present case, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in his order had pointed out that it was when he perused the order sheet that he found that there were no reasons recorded by the Income- tax Officer for issuing notice under section 148. The entry on the order sheet dated September 3, 1963, simply contained the direction: "Issue notice under section 148", and no reasons were recorded by the Income-tax Officer before reopening the assessment. Even the relevant sub- section of section 147 under which the assessment was sought to be reopened was not mentioned. These facts, prima facie, disclosed that the reasons came to the notice of the assessee for the first time when the Appellate

Assistant Commissioner perused this order sheet and brought this fact to the notice of the assessee. Even on that ground, therefore, there can be no question of any waiver on the facts of the present case. Even the alternative ground of finality of this order of the Tribunal suffers from the same infirmity, as the Tribunal has failed to notice this material distinction between a mere procedural provision which could be waived and such jurisdictional provision or a mandatory provision enacted in public interest which could not be waived, because by consent no jurisdiction could be conferred on the authority unless the conditions precedent were first fulfilled. In Dasa Muni Reddy v. Appa Rao, AIR 1974 SC 2089, 2092, such a question of waiver was examined also in the context of the bar of estoppel or of res judicata. At page 2091, it was pointed out that want of jurisdiction must be distinguished from irregular or erroneous exercise of jurisdiction. If there is want of jurisdiction the whole proceeding is coram non judice. The absence of a condition necessary to found the jurisdiction to make an order or give a decision deprives the order or decision of any conclusive effect. (See Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edition, volume 15, paragraph 384). Further proceeding at page 2092, it was pointed out that just as the courts normally did not permit contracting out of the Acts so there could be no contracting in. A status of control of premises under the Rent Control Acts could not be acquired either by estoppel or by res judicata. Their Lordships in terms held that the principle was that neither estoppel nor res judicata could give the court jurisdiction under the Acts which those Acts said it was not to have. Therefore, bar of res judicata or estoppel or waiver were negatived in such a case where the plea was outside the ambit of the Rent Control Act, for the simple reason that as one could not confer jurisdiction by consent, similarly one could not by agreement waive exclusive jurisdiction of the rent courts over the buildings in question. It is true that section 254(4) in terms provides that save as provided in section 256 (which provides for the reference to the High Court), orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal on appeal shall be final. That finality or conclusiveness could only arise in respect of orders which are competent orders with jurisdiction and if the proceedings of reassessment are not validly initiated at all, the order would be a void order as per the settled legal position which could never have any finality or conclusiveness. If the original order is without jurisdiction it would be only a nullity confirmed in further appeals. If the essential distinction is borne in mind in such cases when there is such defect of jurisdiction because the conditions to found jurisdiction are absent, the Tribunal also would be suffering from the same defect and it could not confer any jurisdiction on the Income-tax Officer by making the remand order, because of the settled legal principle that consent could not confer jurisdiction when jurisdiction could be created only by fulfilment of the condition precedent as in the present case. Therefore, no question of finality of the remand order could ever arise in the present context, if the mandatory conditions for founding jurisdiction for initiating reassessment proceeding were absent. This is the view in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Nanalal Tribhovandas [1975] 100 ITR 734 (Guj), agreeing with the Madras view that there would be no such finality by remand because consent could not confer jurisdiction, and so, such objection in regard to the validity of the notice under section 34 could be raised before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The learned standing counsel in this connection marshalled in aid the decision in Northern Railway Co-operative Credit Society Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1182; 31 FJR 511, which could hardly be invoked in the present case. There the High Court in writ jurisdiction had held at the earlier stage that the dispute in question was an industrial dispute and, therefore, the reference being a competent reference, the writ petition was dismissed. The order of the High Court was a final judgment which terminated the independent writ proceeding. It was held at page 1186 that that order having not been appealed before the Supreme Court, it had become final and it was no longer open to the parties to raise a plea of jurisdiction in appeal against the subsequent award given by the Industrial Tribunal after exercising jurisdiction which the Tribunal was permitted to exercise by the order of the High Court. These were competent proceedings and the independent writ proceeding was also finally terminated and, therefore, this final order precluded the parties from reagitating the same question before the Industrial Tribunal. Their Lordships distinguished the earlier decision in Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Smt. Deora-jin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941, where the question had arisen about the applicability of section 28 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, and the plea having been rejected by the munsif trying a suit, revision, the High Court had held that operation of section 28 of the Act was not affected by the subsequent amendment Act and the case was remanded to the munsif for disposal according to law. After the final decree was passed by the munsif and the appeal finally came to the Supreme Court, it was held by the Supreme Court that the order of the High Court holding section 28 to be applicable could not operate as res judicata in appeal before the Supreme Court, because the High Court's order of remand was merely an interlocutory order, which did not terminate the proceeding pending before the munsif and which had not been appealed from at that stage. Consequently, in the appeal from the final decree or order it was open to the party concerned to challenge the correctness of the High Court's decision. The two special features which distinguished that case were: one, that the order of the High Court which was relied upon to invoke the principle of res judicata was an interlocutory order, and the other, that it was made in a pending suit which as a result of that order did not finally terminate. In the present case also the remand order did not terminate the proceedings at the earlier stage. In fact, no question of any bar of res judicata even at the subsequent stage of the same proceeding could arise in the present case for the simple reason that the original order is said to be without jurisdiction. The first condition in invoking any bar of res judicata is the condition about the competence of the court. Similarly, the provision of finality in this relevant provision in section 254(4) could also not be attracted in such a case, where the question admittedly, went to the root of the jurisdiction and if that contention was upheld, it would have made all the proceedings of reassessment totally void and without jurisdiction. As per the aforesaid settled legal position such a point could not be waived and there can be no question of the earlier remand order operating as a final order, because if such a jurisdictional point could not be waived, even the fact of passing of the remand order by the Tribunal could not confer jurisdiction on the Income-tax Officer, if the conditions to found his jurisdiction were absent. Therefore, if this settled position was borne in mind, the Tribunal's view was clearly erroneous that the matter became final when the Tribunal passed the earlier remand order so that this point of jurisdiction got finally settled, which could not be agitated unless the assessee had come in the reference to this court at that stage. The Tribunal's view was also incorrect that in restoring the case to the file of the Income-tax Officer by the earlier order, the only point left open was in respect of addition of Rs. 19,421 on merits and that the legal or jurisdictional aspect whether the reassessment proceedings were legally initiated was not kept open. Even on the third question the Tribunal's view was erroneous that even though this point went to the root of the jurisdiction and was a. pure question of law, merely because the point was initially raised and not pressed when the matter was taken up before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, it could be waived and it could not be reagitated. Therefore, in view of the settled legal position our answers on questions Nos. 1 and 2 are in the negative, while our answer on question No. 3 is in the affirmative, that is to say, all the questions are answered against the revenue and in favour of the assessee. The reference is accordingly disposed of and the Commissioner shall pay the costs of the assessee.”

Referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) of this sub-section or nine months from the end of the financial year in which books of account or documents or assets seized questioned are handed over under section 153C to the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person, whichever is later: Provided further that in the case where the last of the authorizations for search section 132 or for requisition under section 132 A was executed during the Financial Year commencing on the 1st day of April, 2018,— (i) the provisions of clause (a) or clause ( b) of this sub-section shall have effect, as if for the words "twenty-one months”, the words "eighteen months” had been substituted; (ii) the period of limitation for making the assessment or reassessment in case of other person referred to in section 153C, shall be the period of eighteen months from the end of the financial year in which the last of the authorizations for search under section 132 or for requisition Provided that in case of other person referred to in section 153C, the period of limitation for making the assessment or reassessment shall be the period as referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) of this sub-section or one year from the end of the financial year in which books of account or documents or assets seized or requisitioned are handed over under section 153C to the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person, whichever is later: Provided further that in the case where the last of the authorizations for search under section 132 or for requisition under section 132A was executed during the financial year commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 2004 but before the 1st day of April, 2010,— (i) the provisions of clause (a) or clause (b) of this sub-section shall have effect as if / for the words “two years” the words “twenty-one months” had been substituted; (ii) the period of limitation for making the assessment or reassessment in case of other J person referred to in section 153C, shall be the period of twenty- one months from the end of the financial year in which the last of the authorizations for search under section 132 or for requisition under section 132A was executed or nine months from the end of the financial year in which books of account or documents or assets seized or requisitioned are handed over under section 153C to the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person, whichever is later:.

■ Loose sheets of papers are wholly irrelevant as evidence being not admissible under section 34 so as to constitute evidence with respect to the transactions mentioned therein being of no evidentiary value. The entire prosecution based upon such entries which led to the investigation was quashed by this Court. [Para 20] ■ The Court has to be on guard while ordering investigation against any important constitutional functionary, officers or any person in the absence of some cogent legally cognizable material. When the material on the basis of which investigation is sought is itself irrelevant to constitute evidence and not admissible evidence , whether it would be safe to even initiate investigation? In case it is done, the investigation can be as against any person whosoever high in integrity on the basis of irrelevant or inadmissible entry falsely made, by any unscrupulous person or business house that too not kept in regular books of account but on random papers at any given point of time. There has to be some relevant and admissible evidence and some cogent reason, which is prima facie reliable and that too, supported by some other circumstances pointing out that the particular third person against whom the allegations have been levelled was in fact involved in the matter or he has done some act during that period, which may have co- relations with the random entries. In case all these are not insisted, the process of law can be abused against all and sundry very easily to achieve ulterior goals and then no democracy can survive in case investigations are lightly set in motion against important constitutional functionaries on the basis of fictitious entries, in absence of cogent and admissible material on record, lest liberty of an individual be compromised unnecessarily. The materials which have been placed on record either in the case of Birla or in the case of Sahara are not maintained in regular course of business and thus lack in required reliability to be made the foundation- of a police investigation. [Para 21] ■ In case of Sahara, in addition there is adjudication by the Income Tax Settlement Commission. The order has been placed on record. The Settlement Commission has observed that the scrutiny of entries on loose papers, computer prints, hard disk, pen drives etc. have revealed that the transactions noted on documents were not genuine and have no evidentiary value and that details in these loose papers, computer print outs, hard disk and pen drive etc. do not comply with the requirement of the Indian Evidence Act and are not admissible evidence. It further observed that the department has no evidence to prove that entries in these loose papers and electronic data were kept regularly during the course of business of the concerned business house and the fact that these entries were fabricated, non-genuine was proved. It held as well that the PCIT/DR have not been able to show and substantiate the nature and source of receipts as well as nature and reason of payments and have failed to prove evidentiary value of loose papers and electronic documents within the legal parameters. The Commission has also observed that department has not been able to make out a clear case of taxing such income in the hands of the applicant firm on the basis of these documents. [Para 22] ■ It is apparent that the Commission has recorded a finding that transactions noted in the documents were not genuine and thus has not attached any evidentiary value to the pen drive, hard disk, computer loose papers, computer printouts. [Para 23]

■ Loose sheets of papers are wholly irrelevant as evidence being not admissible under section 34 so as to constitute evidence with respect to the transactions mentioned therein being of no evidentiary value. The entire prosecution based upon such entries which led to the investigation was quashed by this Court. [Para 20] ■ The Court has to be on guard while ordering investigation against any important constitutional functionary, officers or any person in the absence of some cogent legally cognizable material. When the material on the basis of which investigation is sought is itself irrelevant to constitute evidence and not admissible evidence , whether it would be safe to even initiate investigation ? In case it is done, the investigation can be as against any person whosoever high in integrity on the basis of irrelevant or inadmissible entry falsely made, by any unscrupulous person or business house that too not kept in regular books of account but on random papers at any given point of time. There has to be some relevant and admissible evidence and some cogent reason, which is prima facie reliable and that too, supported by some other circumstances pointing out that the particular third person against whom the allegations have been levelled was in fact involved in the matter or he has done some act during that period, which may have co- relations with the random entries. In case all these are not insisted, the process of law can be abused against all and sundry very easily to achieve ulterior goals and then no democracy can survive in case investigations are lightly set in motion against important constitutional functionaries on the basis of fictitious entries, in absence of cogent and admissible material on record, lest liberty of an individual be compromised unnecessarily. The materials which have been placed on record either in the case of Birla or in the case of Sahara are not maintained in regular course of business and thus lack in required reliability to be made the foundation- of a police investigation. [Para 21] ■ In case of Sahara, in addition there is adjudication by the Income Tax Settlement Commission. The order has been placed on record. The Settlement Commission has observed that the scrutiny of entries on loose papers, computer prints, hard disk, pen drives etc. have revealed that the transactions noted on documents were not genuine and have no evidentiary value and that details in these loose papers, computer print outs, hard disk and pen drive etc. do not comply with the requirement of the Indian Evidence Act and are not admissible evidence. It further observed that the department has no evidence to prove that entries in these loose papers and electronic data were kept regularly during the course of business of the concerned business house and the fact that these entries were fabricated, non-genuine was proved. It held as well that the PCIT/DR have not been able to show and substantiate the nature and source of receipts as well as nature and reason of payments and have failed to prove evidentiary value of loose papers and electronic documents within the legal parameters. The Commission has also observed that department has not been able to make out a clear case of taxing such income in the hands of the applicant firm on the basis of these documents. [Para 22] ■ It is apparent that the Commission has recorded a finding that transactions noted in the documents were not genuine and thus has not attached any evidentiary value to the pen drive, hard disk, computer loose papers, computer printouts. [Para 23] ■ Since it is not disputed that for entries relied on in these loose papers and electronic data were not regularly kept during course of business, such entries were discussed in the order passed in Sahara's case by the Settlement Commission and the documents have not been relied upon the Commission against assessee and thus such documents have no evidentiary value against third parties. On the sis of the materials which have been placed on record, it is opined that no case is made out to direct investigation against any of the persons named in the Birla's documents or in the documents of Sahara. [Para 24]