GOPAL BHASKAR CHAUDHARI,VALSAD vs. ITO WARD 3, VAPI

At the very outset, we find from the record that both these appeals have been filed belatedly with a delay of 401 days beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The Registry had duly pointed out this defect and intimated the assessee vide communication dated 05.06.2025, requesting him to file a proper application for condonation of delay, supported by an affidavit and relevant documentary evidence explaining the reasons for such delay.

Despite such opportunity and intimation, the assessee has neither filed any application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, nor submitted any affidavit or explanation for the delay. It is a matter of record that even till the date of hearing before us, no attempt has been made to regularize the delay or to demonstrate any “sufficient cause” for the same.

Despite notifying for hearing also neither anyone attended nor any application for adjournment was filed before us and therefore, we were of the opinion that the assessee is not interested in prosecuting the appeal, hence same was heard exparte qua the assessee after hearing arguments of ld Departmental Representative.

Under Section 253(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, an appeal before this Tribunal is required to be filed within sixty days from the date of communication of the order appealed against. The Tribunal is empowered to condone the delay in filing such appeal only upon satisfaction that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting it within the prescribed time. The term “sufficient cause” is borrowed from Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which mandates that delay may be condoned where the appellant demonstrates bona fide circumstances beyond his control, preventing timely filing.

The law on condonation of delay, though to be construed liberally in furtherance of justice, equally demands that the litigant must show reasonable diligence and bona fides. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the landmark judgment of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji & Others (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC) observed that substantial justice should not be sacrificed on the altar of technicalities; however, the Court simultaneously cautioned that “every day’s delay must be explained” with candour and credibility. Similarly, in Ramlal & Others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [AIR 7. 1962 SC 361], it is held that while the law of limitation is based on sound public policy, prescribing certainty and finality in litigation, the condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right and must be founded upon a satisfactory explanation covering the entire period of default. Again, in Basawaraj & Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition 8. Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that though a liberal approach may be adopted in interpreting “sufficient cause,” such liberality cannot extend to condoning utter negligence or inaction, since limitation statutes are founded on the principle that law helps the vigilant, not those who sleep over their rights (vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt).

Tested on the anvil of these principles, we find that in the present case, the assessee has not even made the bare minimum effort to seek condonation by moving an appropriate application or furnishing any explanation whatsoever. The Registry had clearly intimated the assessee of the delay and the requirement to file a condonation petition, yet no corrective action has been taken. This indifference demonstrates not merely negligence but complete disregard to procedural discipline mandated under the Act.

The delay of 401 days remains wholly unexplained. The assessee’s silence and inaction, even after being notified, clearly disentitle him from seeking any indulgence of this Tribunal. The statutory time-limit is not an empty formality; it ensures certainty and regularity in judicial proceedings.

In view of the above settled legal position and the absence of any application or explanation for the inordinate delay of 401 days, we have no hesitation in holding that these appeals are barred by limitation and hence not maintainable. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such appeals in the absence of a properly filed application for condonation of delay demonstrating sufficient cause.

Accordingly, both the appeals filed by the assessee are dismissed in-limine as infructuous and barred by limitation.

In the result, both the appeals of the assessee are dismissed as not admitted, being time-barred under the provisions of Section 253(3) of the Income-tax Act read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.