SIMHADRI SUNITHA,VIZAKHAPATNAM vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER, WARD-4(2), VISAKHAPATNAM

Per contra, Ld. Departmental Representative [hereinafter in short “Ld.DR”] strongly placed reliance on the order of the Ld.CIT(A) in rejecting the condonation petition. Ld. DR strongly opposed for condonation of delay.

We have heard both the sides and perused the material available on record, we notice that the moot question to be adjudicated is with respect to condonation of delay. Broadly, we are of the view, that the Courts and the quasi-judicial bodies are empowered to condone the delay, if a litigant satisfies the Courts that there was sufficient reason for availing the remedy after the expiry of limitation. Such reasoning should be to the satisfaction of the Court. The expression “sufficient cause or reasons” as provided in sub-section (5) of section 253 of the Act is used in identical position in the Limitation Act 1963, and in CPC. Such expression has also been used in other sections of the Income Tax Act such as section 273, 274, etc. Keeping in mind, the authoritative pronouncement from Hon’ble Apex Court, it is admitted position that the words “sufficient cause” appearing in sub-section (5) of section 253 of the Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapses on the part of the litigant concern. That alone is not enough to turn down the plea and to shut the doors against him, unless and until, it makes a mala- fide or a dilatory statutory, the court must show utmost consideration to such litigant. Further the length of delay is immaterial, it is the acceptability of the explanation and that is the only criteria for condoning the delay.

In such a situation, no doubt filing of an appeal is a right granted under the statute to the assessee and is not an automatic privilege, therefore, the assessee is expected to be vigilant in adhering to the manner and mode in which the appeals are to be filed in terms of the relevant provisions of the Act. Nevertheless, a liberal approach has to be adopted by the appellate authorities, where delay has occurred for “bona fide reasons” on the part of the assessee or the Revenue in filing the appeals. In matters concerning the filing of appeals, in exercise of the statutory right, a refusal to condoned the delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the threshold, which may lead to miscarriage of justice. The judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

The Hon’ble Apex Court in a celebrated decision in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji& Ors. [167 ITR 471] opined that when technical consideration and substantial justice are pitted against each other, the courts are expected to further the cause of substantial justice. This is for the reason that an opposing party, in a dispute, cannot have a vested right in injustice being done because of a non- deliberate delay. Therefore, it follows that while considering matters relating to the condonation of delay, judicious and liberal approach is to be adopted. If “sufficient cause” is found to exist, which is bona-fide one, and not due to negligence of the assessee, the delay needs to condoned in such cases. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ is adequately elastic to enable the courts to Page No. 4

In the result, appeal of the assessee is allowed for statistical purpose.