HALDIA PETROCHEMICALS LIMITED ,KOLKATA vs. A.C.I.T.,CIRCLE-7(1), KOLKATA

This is an appeal filed by the assessee directed against the order of the Learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-10, Kolkata, [hereinafter the “CIT(A)”], passed u/s. 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (the ‘Act’), dated 09.09.2019 for the Assessment Year 2008-09.

The ld. Counsel for the assessee submits that original assessment order was passed u/s 143(3) of the Act on 29.12.2010 and thereafter notice was issued u/s 148 of the Act dated 13.12.2015 for re-opening of the assessment u/s 147 of the Act. He referred to the reasons recorded for re-opening of the assessment and submitted that nowhere in these reasons recorded, there is a whisper or allegation that there was a failure on the part of the assessee to fully and truly disclose the material facts required for assessment, as mandated in the proviso to Section 147 of the Act as the re-opening of assessment was beyond four years from end of assessment year. Thus he argued that the re-opening of assessment is bad in law. He relied on certain case laws that we will be discussing in due course. 3. The ld. D/R supported the order of the AO and the ld. CIT(A) and submitted that the re-opening of assessment cannot be held to be bad in law for the reason that the AO

After hearing rival contentions we find that the assessee has filed its return of income for the AY 2008-09 on 26.09.2008. The scrutiny assessment of the assessee company was completed u/s 143(3) of the Act on 29.12.2010. The reasons recorded for re-opening of the case are as follows:

Examining the proviso [set out above], we find that no action can be taken under section 147 after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year if the following conditions are satisfied: (a) an assessment under sub-section (3) of section 143 or this section has been made for the relevant assessment year; and (b) unless any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for such assessment year by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee: (i) to make a return under section 139 or in response to a notice issued under sub-section (1) of section 142 or section 148; or (ii) to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that assessment year. Condition (a) is admittedly satisfied inasmuch as the original assessment was completed under section 143(3) of the said Act. Condition (b) deals with a special kind of escapement of income chargeable to tax. The escapement must arise out of the failure on the part of the assessee to make a return under section 139 or in response to a notice issued under sub-section (1) of section 142 or section 148. This is clearly not the case here because the petitioner did file the return. Since there was no failure to make the return, the escapement of income cannot be attributed to such failure. This leaves us with the escapement of income chargeable to tax which arises out of the failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that assessment year. If it is also found that the petitioner had disclosed fully and truly all material facts necessary for its assessment, then no action under section 147 could have been taken after the four year period indicated above. So, the key question is whether or not the petitioner had made a full and true disclosure of all material facts? 29. In the reasons supplied to the petitioner, there is no whisper, what to speak of any allegation, that the petitioner had failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment and that because of this failure there has been an escapement of income chargeable to tax. Merely having a reason to believe that income had escaped assessment, is not sufficient to reopen assessments beyond the four year period indicated above. The escapement of income from assessment must also be occasioned by the failure on the part of the assessee to disclose material facts, fully and truly. This is a necessary condition for overcoming the bar set up by the proviso to section 147. If this condition is not satisfied, the bar would operate and no action under section 147 could be taken. We have already mentioned above that the reasons supplied to the petitioner does not contain any such allegation. Consequently, Assessment Year: 2008-09 Haldia Petrochemicals Limited. one of the conditions precedent for removing the bar against taking action after the said four year period remains unfulfilled. In our recent decision in Wel Intertrade Private Ltd (supra) we had agreed with the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Duli Chand Singhania (supra) that, in the absence of an allegation in the reasons recorded that the escapement of income had occurred by reason of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment, any action taken by the Assessing officer under section 147 beyond the four year period would be wholly without jurisdiction. Reiterating our view-point, we hold that the notice dated 29.03.2004 under section 148 based on the recorded reasons as supplied to the petitioner as well as the consequent order dated 02.03.2005 are without jurisdiction as no action under section 147 could be taken beyond the four year period in the circumstances narrated above. 4.8. Applying the propositions laid down in the above case law to the facts to this case, we have to necessarily hold that the re-opening of the assessment proceedings is not valid that there is not even a whisper in the reasons recorded for the reopening of the assessment that there is a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all the necessary material facts required for assessment in view of the 1stproviso to Section 147 of the Act. In this case no tangible materials have come to the possession of the Assessing Officer subsequent to the Assessment Order u/s 143(3). Re-opening is done based on the same material and record and hence it is bad in law. As far as the contention, that there is a change in opinion is concerned, we are unable to agree with the ld. Counsel for the assessee as there was neither a query on this issue by the Assessing Officer during the original assessment proceedings, nor there was a reply by the assessee. Hence there was no opinion formed. Thus, the question of change of opinion does not arise. 4.9. In any event, as we have held that the re-opening is bad in law as it does not fulfil the requirement of the Proviso to Section 147 of the Act, and as no tangible material has come to the possession of the Assessing Officer, we quash the assessment and allow the appeal of the assessee.

In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed. 5.1. Applying the propositions of law laid down in the above referred case-law to the facts of the case on hand, I hold that the re-opening of assessment is bad in law.

In the result appeal of the assessee is allowed.” 4.2. Respectfully following the propositions of law laid down in the above case laws to the facts of this case we hold that the re-opening is bad in law. In the result, the impugned assessment order is hereby quashed.