IMS AG vs. DCIT (INTL. TAX) RANGE 2(2)(1), MUMBAI

ORDER Per Pramod Kumar, VP:

This appeal challenges correctness of the order dated 31st August 2016, passed by the 1. learned Assessing Officer under section 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year 2013-14.

Assessment Year 2013-14 Page 2 of 9 Taxation Avoidance Agreement [(1995) 214 ITR (Stat) 223- as updated till the relevant point - of time; Indo Swiss tax treaty in short].

The assessee had imported business information reports from Dun and Bradstreet, USA, and made remittances in respect thereof without deducting tax at source. The Assessing Officer held that the assessee was liable to deduct tax at Assessment Year 2013-14 Page 3 of 9 source and accordingly passed an order under section 195 read with section 201 of the Act. The appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). On further appeal, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal set aside the order passed under section 195 read with section 201 of the Act by following its decision in the assessee's own case for the assessment year 2002-03 in and the decision of the Authority for Advance Rulings on identical facts in the case of Dun and S.A. Bradstreet Espana In re Authority for Advance Rulings No. 615 of 2003 [2005] 272ITR 99 (AAR)), D and B Europe Authority for Advance Rulings No. 657 of 2005, dated October 27, 2005, and D and B UK Authority for Advance Rulings No. 656 of 2005, dated October 27, 2005. In all these cases the Authority for Advance Rulings held that the sale of very same business information reports by the subsidiaries of Dun and Bradstreet US in Spain, Europe and V. K. to the assessee did not attract the provisions of section 195 of the Act. Though the decision of the Authority for Advance Rulings is not binding in the present case, since the decision of the Authority for Advance Rulings relates to the very same business information reports imported by the petitioner and no fault in the decision of the Authority for Advance Rulings is pointed out, we see no reason to interfere with the decision of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.

The instant case it is not a case of paying consideration for the use of or right to use any copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work or any patent trade mark or for information of commercial experience. The Commissioner sought to bring the payments under royalty/fees for technical service for the reason that the BIRs are copyright protected and end-users are required to use for their own purpose and the analysis of raw data provided in the BIRs would be similar to that of providing a technical or consultancy services. We have already mentioned above that a BIR is a standardized product of D&B, it provides factual information on the existence, operation, financial condition, management and experience line of business, facility and location of a company; it also provides special events like any suit, lien, judgment or previous or pending bankruptcy. Further, banking relationship and accountants, information like whether it is a patent company or authority concerned, has any branches etc. It also gives a rating of the company. The informations that are provided in a BIR are said to be publicly available; they are collected and complied by D&B associates. A BIR is accessible by any subscriber on payment of requisite price with regular internet access for which no particular software or hardware is required. The applicant states that access to data base of the applicant is available to public at large at a price as in case of buying a book and it is not a pre-requisite, that BIR must be downloaded by DBIS only and in fact some clients, such as Expert credit guarantee corporation, in fact, access the server themselves to download BIR. The applicant does not have any server in India for the use of DBIS. Indeed the applicant has specifically averred that the copyright in the BIR would neither be licensed nor assigned to either the DBIS or the Indian customer. From these aspects it is clear that the aforementioned ruling of the Authority is Assessment Year 2013-14 Page 4 of 9 distinguishable on facts. If a group of companies collects information about the historical places and places of interest for tourists in each country and all informations are maintained on a central computer which is accessible to each constituent of the Group in each country, can a supply of such information electronically on payment of price be treated as royalty or fee for technical services ? We think not. The next case relied upon by the Commissioner is also a ruling of the Authority in Ericsson Telephone Corpn. India AB, In re [ 1997] 224ITR 2031. In that case the applicant was a company incorporated in Sweden. It provided, inter alia, services within radio and telecommunication. It entered into contracts with three Indian companies for the introduction of the cellular system of telecommunication in India and opened branch offices in India at New Delhi, Bombay and Madras. The Indian company informed applicant that while making payments under the agreement they would withhold income tax at 55% as provided in the Finance Act, 1995. According to the applicant tax deduction could not have exceeded 5,5% of the gross payments, as the net profit on the contract would not be more 10%, It was, therefore, not a case of whether the amount paid could be termed as fee for technical services. It was admittedly a case of payment of fee for technical services. For the abovementioned reasons, payments made by the DBIS to the applicant for purchases of BIRs do not answer the description of 'royalties' within the meaning of para 3 of article 13 of the treaty. So payments made by the DBIS to the applicant cannot be regarded as royalty payment. In our view, the applicant has rightly equated the transaction of sale of BIRs to sale of a book, which does not involve any transfer of intellectual property or a book.

(5) The pronouncement may be in any of the following manners :—

(a) The Bench may pronounce the order immediately upon the conclusion of the hearing. (b) In case where the order is not pronounced immediately on the conclusion of the hearing, the Bench shall give a date for pronouncement. (c) In a case where no date of pronouncement is given by the Bench, every endeavour shall be made by the Bench to pronounce the order within 60 days from the date on which the hearing of the case was concluded but, where it is not practicable so to do on the ground of exceptional and extraordinary circumstances of the case, the Bench shall fix a future day for pronouncement of the order, and such date shall not ordinarily (emphasis supplied by us now) be a day beyond a further period of 30 days and due notice of the day so fixed shall be given on the notice board.

Assessment Year 2013-14 Page 6 of 9 12. Quite clearly, “ordinarily” the order on an appeal should be pronounced by the bench within no more than 90 days from the date of concluding the hearing. It is, however, important to note that the expression “ordinarily” has been used in the said rule itself. This rule was inserted as a result of directions of Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of Shivsagar Veg Restaurant Vs ACIT [(2009) 317 ITR 433 (Bom)] wherein Their Lordships had, inter alia, directed that “We, therefore, direct the President of the Appellate Tribunal to frame and lay down the guidelines in the similar lines as are laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Anil Rai (supra) and to issue appropriate administrative directions to all the benches of the Tribunal in that behalf.We hope and trust that suitable guidelines shall be framed and issued by the President of the Appellate Tribunal within shortest reasonable time and followed strictly by all the Benches of the Tribunal. In the meanwhile (emphasis, by underlining, supplied by us now), all the revisional and appellate authorities under the Income-tax Act are directed to decide matters heard by them within a period of three months from the date case is closed for judgment”. In the ruled so framed, as a result of these directions, the expression “ordinarily” has been inserted in the requirement to pronounce the order within a period of 90 days. The question then arises whether the passing of this order, beyond ninety days, was necessitated by any “extraordinary” circumstances.

Assessment Year 2013-14 Page 8 of 9 bound by this Court, the period for which the order dated 26th March 2020 continues to operate shall be added and time shall stand extended accordingly”. The extraordinary steps taken suomotu by Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court and Hon’ble Supreme Court also indicate that this period of lockdown cannot be treated as an ordinary period during which the normal time limits are to remain in force. In our considered view, even without the words “ordinarily”, in the light of the above analysis of the legal position, the period during which lockout was in force is to excluded for the purpose of time limits set out in rule 34(5) of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963. Viewed thus, the exception, to 90-day time-limit for pronouncement of orders, inherent in rule 34(5)(c), with respect to the pronouncement of orders within ninety days, clearly comes into play in the present case. Of course, there is no, and there cannot be any, bar on the discretion of the benches to refix the matters for clarifications because of considerable time lag between the point of time when the hearing is concluded and the point of time when the order thereon is being finalized, but then, in our considered view, no such exercise was required to be carried out on the facts of this case.