M/S. ANISHKUMAR MALE CHILD TRUST,CHENNAI vs. ITO, CHENNAI

आदेश /O R D E R PER BENCH: These appeals by the assessees are arising out of the orders of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-13, Chennai in ITA No. 131/19-20/AY 2013-14/CIT(A)13, order dated 26.09.2019, ITA 134/19-20,AY 2014-15/CIT(A)13 order dt. 26.09.2019, ITA No.92/19-20,AY 2013-14/CIT(A)13 order dated 20.09.2019, ITA No.100/19-20, AY 2014-15/CIT(A) 13 order dt. 23.09.2019, ITA No.95/19-20, AY 2013-14/ CIT(A) 13 dt. 19.09.2019, ITA No.96/19-20, AY 2014-15/CIT(A) 13 dt. 23.09.2019, ITA No.93/19-20, AY 2013-14/ CIT(A) 13 dt. 23.09.2019, ITA No.97/19-20, AY 2014-15/CIT(A) 13 dt. 23.09.2019, ITA No.94/19-20, AY 2013-14/ CIT(A) 13 dt. 23.09.2019, ITA No.99/19-20, AY 2014-15/CIT(A) 13 dt. 23.09.2019, ITA No.94/19-20, AY 2013-14/ CIT(A) 13 dt. 23.09.2019, ITA No.98/19-20, AY 2014-15/CIT(A) 13 dt. 23.09.2019, ITA No.132/19-20, AY 2013-14/ CIT(A) 13 dt.

4 I.T.A. No.2849, 3247 to 3259/CHNY/2019 26.09.2019 and ITA No.133/19-20, AY 2014-15/CIT(A) 13 dt. 26.09.2019. Before the CIT(A), the orders under challenge was passed by the ITO, Non-Corporate Ward 11(1), Chennai, rejecting objections to re-opening u/s.147 r.w.s. 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter ‘the Act’) vide his orders in F.No.AAATA6596R/2019-20 dated 09.08.2019, F.No. AAATA6600N/2019-20 dt. 01.07.2019, F.No.AAATA6601N/ 2019-20 dt. 01.07.2019, F.No.AAATA0989J/ 2019-20 dt. 01.07.2019, F.No.AAATA6595N/ 2019-20 dt. 01.07.2019, F.No.AAATA6597Q/2019-20 dt. 01.07.2019 and F.No.AAATA0990R/ 2019-20 dt. 09.08.2019.

5 I.T.A. No.2849, 3247 to 3259/CHNY/2019 The relevant grounds raised are as under:- 1. The Learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) is not justified in dismissing the appeal filed as not maintainable under section 246A of the Act. 2. The Learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) is not justified in alleging that the “speaking order” passed pursuant to reopening of assessment is not an order under section 147 appealable under section 246A (1) of the Act. 3. The Learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) erred in holding that the appellant has no locus standi to question the reopened proceedings under section 147 in a pre-assessment notice alleging that it determines neither the Income nor demand therefor. 4. The Learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) is not justified in rejecting the claim on maintainability of appeal filed which questions the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer to mulct the assessee with a liability under the omnibus character of “denying his liability” to be assessed under the Act. 5. The Learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) has no jurisdiction to direct the Assessing Officer to incorporate the operative part of the “speaking order” in the regular assessment being framed later pursuant to reopened proceedings. 6. The Learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) has no basis to assume or direct an assessment to be framed pursuant to reopened proceedings when rescue provisions against such order is available under section 152 (2) of the Act. 7. The appellant seeks the indulgence of the Hon’ble ITAT to file additional \ supplemental grounds of appeal to bring forth the legal aspects on record for fit and proper adjudication. 8. In any event the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) is illegal, arbitrary and made without due regard to the facts and circumstances of the appellant’s case and the law applicable thereto. 9. For these grounds and for such other grounds that may be adduced at the time of hearing, is prayed that the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) be cancelled and the reopened proceedings be quashed.

6 I.T.A. No.2849, 3247 to 3259/CHNY/2019 ITA No.2849/Chny/2019 for AY 2013-14: 3. Brief facts are that the assessee is a private beneficiary trust. The assessee filed its return of income for the relevant assessment year 2013-14 on 19.03.2013. The return of income was processed by the Income-Tax Department u/s.143(1) of the Act and accepted levying taxes at maximum marginal rate u/s.164(2) of the Act. The assessee preferred appeal before CIT(A) against the processing of return u/s.143(1) of the Act and stated that assessment ought to have been made u/s.161(1) of the Act. The CIT(A) has not accepted the claim of the assessee and dismissed the appeal of the assessee. The assessee preferred appeal before ITAT. The ITAT, in ITA No.2185/Mds/ 2016, vide order dated 27.12.2016 quashed the assessment by holding that the challenge to status and levy of tax at maximum marginal rate does not come within the purview of prima facie adjustment u/s.143(1) of the Act and therefore the processing done by AO u/s.143(1) of the Act was quashed. The Tribunal observed in para No.5 as under:- 5. We have considered the rival submissions on either side and perused the relevant material available on record. The assessees admittedly filed their returns of income electronically and the same

7 I.T.A. No.2849, 3247 to 3259/CHNY/2019 were processed under Section 143(1) of the Act. The question arises for consideration is when the Assessing Officer processed the returns under Section 143(1) of the Act, whether he can change the status of the assessees and levy tax at maximum marginal rate? We have carefully gone through the provisions of Section 143(1) of the Act. Section 143(1) of the Act enables the Assessing Officer to make prima facie adjustment on the basis of the material available on record. Changing of status is something outside the purview of the prima facie adjustment under Section 143(1) of the Act. Therefore, this Tribunal is of the considered opinion that changing of status of the assessees cannot be made while processing return under Section 143(1) of the Act. Therefore, this Tribunal is unable to uphold the orders of the lower authorities. Accordingly, the same are set aside. However, it is made clear that it is open to the Assessing Officer to take up the matter for scrutiny as provided under the provisions of the Income-tax Act.

3.1. Subsequently, ITO, Non-Corporate Ward-11(1) issued notice u/s.148 of the Act dated 28.03.2019, for the reason that there was uncertainty in the assessee trust about vesting of income in the hands of the beneficiary, which in itself are uncertain, according to AO. The assessee vide letter dated 12.04.2019, requested for supply of reasons recorded for reopening of assessment u/s.147 r.w.s. 148 of the Act. The AO vide letter dated 25.04.2019, in F.No.AAATA6596R/2019- 20 supplied reasons for reopening assessment and the relevant reasons reads as under:-

8 I.T.A. No.2849, 3247 to 3259/CHNY/2019 “The return of income filed electronically for the Asst. Year 2014- 15 was processed u/s 143(1) of the income Tax Act, I 61 ai2d while processing, tax was levied u/s 164(1) of the Act at maximum marginal rate. The CIT(Appeals) upheld the order.

The Hon’ble ITAT held that the changing of status of the assessees cannot be made while processing return u/s 143(1) of the Act and set aside the orders of the lower authorities.

Placing reliance on the judgement of Apex Court in CWT Vs. Trustees of H.E.H Nizam’s family (Remainder Wealth) Trust (108 ITR 555), the Revenue had the option to assess the beneficial interest either in the hands of the trustee in a representative capacity or assessee directly in the hands of the beneficiary. In both the cases, what was taxed was the interest of the beneficiary for the trust properties and not the corpus of the trust properties and therefore, it was held that there is uncertainty in the trust and vesting of income in the hands of the future beneficiaries. Hence, the shares of allocation are to be treated as indefinite and uncertain and therefore the income of the Trusts is liable for taxation at maximum marginal rate u/s 164(1) of the Act.”

The assessee vide letter dated 09.05.2019, objected to reasons for reopening of assessment for the impugned assessment year. The AO considered these reasons and rejected the objections vide order in F.No.AAATA6596R/2019- 20 dated 09.08.2019. The AO after rejection of objections raised for reopening of assessment, requested the assessee to appear in the re-assessment proceedings initiated for assessment years 2013-14 & 2014-15.

9 I.T.A. No.2849, 3247 to 3259/CHNY/2019 4. Aggrieved against rejection of reasons, assessee preferred appeal before CIT(A). The CIT(A) dismissed the appeal of the assessee by holding that the appeal filed by the assessee against the communication of rejection of objections is not maintainable because re-assessment proceedings is to be framed u/s.147 r.w.s. 143(3) of the Act. The CIT(A) elaborately discussed from para No.6 to 10, as under:- 6. To call the aforesaid letter of the AO to the appellant / AR as an order u/s 147 to be appealed against as declared by the appellant in Form No. 35 in the strict sense as per the IT Act would be a misnomer and is only a communication / correspondence by the AO to the appellant rejecting his objections raised to such reopening of the assessment as stated earlier and has been used in a manner of ordinary usage in the usual English parlance and is meant as an ‘order’ which speaks for itself the reasons providing therein a live link to the formation of the belief that income had escaped assessment which Section 147, authorises and permits the AO to assess or reassess income chargeable to tax if he has reason to believe that the said income has escaped assessment and further that the formation such belief of the AO being a condition precedent for assuming jurisdiction which precisely the AO has done by issue of notice u/s 148 and further rejecting the objections raised by the appellant thereto, in keeping with the ratio of the judement of GKN Driveshafts 259 ITR 19 (SC) which clearly enjoins upon the AO to dispose of the same by passing a speaking order before proceeding with the assessment and therefore it cannot be the case of the appellant / AR that the AO has reopened the impugned case without complying with the provisions of Section 147 of the Income Tax Act

10 I.T.A. No.2849, 3247 to 3259/CHNY/2019 7. The appellant in the instant impugned case has declared in the appeal Form No.35 that the order appealed is against Sec. 147 which is clearly not factually true / borne out by the facts, since there is admittedly no order passed u/s 147 in the first place in this case and therefore appealing against such “order” is legally untenable and invalid to begin with.

8.1. From a cursory reading of Section 147 as above, it clearly implies that what is stressed therein is the assessment / reassessment of escaped Income which the AR himself has not disputed to have not taken place till date in the instant impugned case by way of a proper assessment order assessing / reassessing escaped income chargeable to tax which is best illustrated by the inescapable fact that the rows vide 6a & 6b relating to ‘assessed income’ and ‘total additions to income’ has been left blank by the appellant itself in the Memo of Appeal in Form No. 35.. Further the so called ‘order’ dated 01.07.2019 by the AO is in fact rejection of the AR’s objection to the reopening u/s 147 is further clearly evident from the subject and reference captioned therein and reproduced as under:

“Subject : Reopened assessment u/s 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 — Your Own - Asst. Years 2013-14 and 2014-15 - Objections to reopening u/s 147 - Speaking order – Regarding

11 I.T.A. No.2849, 3247 to 3259/CHNY/2019 Reference : (i) Notice u/s 148 of the IT Act, 1961 dated 28.03.2019 (ii)Your submissions dated 09.05.2019.”

8.2 From a perusal of the said order it is clear that the AO has only assumed jurisdiction to reopen proceeding as is again clearly evident from the AO’s averments therein as extracted in the foregoing discussion.

8.3. As can be seen from the aforesaid extracts the AO, vide the above ‘order’ construed and argued as an order u/s 147 by the AR has not assessed or reassessed any escaped income or recomputed the loss or the deprecation or any other allowance and therefore the said speaking order as termed by the AR and appealed against is clearly not an order passed in terms of Sec 147 till date and therefore is not caught within the mischief thereof and as such, it is opined that the AR has acted hastily and jumped the gun, as it were, prematurely filing appeal against the said ‘order u/s 147’ as declared in Form no. 35 without waiting for the actual order u/s 147 r.w.s. 143/144 as the case may be, which is still not barred by limitation of time. Therefore the AO’s speaking order rejecting the AR’s objection is only a pre-assessment/ reassessment stage of proceedings, as of now and by no rationale or logic in itself be called an order u/s 147, which the appellant has, it is considered, to have erroneously and prematurely appealed against.

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paraphrasing it in the language of S.Sankappa’s case [1968] 68 ITR 760 (SC), means that he is not liable to be assessed by a proceeding for rectification under Sec. 35, sub-section (1), he is not ‘denying his liability to be assessed under this Act’. His objection then is only against a proceeding for assessment under a particular provision of the Act. He does not say: ‘I am not liable to be assessed at all under any provision of the Act which is what is connoted by the expression denies his liability to be assessed under this Act - these were the words used by the Gujarat High Court in Mandal Ginning and Pressing Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1973] 90 ITR 332 (Guj).

14 I.T.A. No.2849, 3247 to 3259/CHNY/2019 C.I.T.(A) to admit the appeal filed under the omnibus clause in Section 1 and pass orders on the merits of the appeal.”

9.1 However the arguments and the case laws cited / discussed aforesaid are clearly distinguishable from the facts / bone of contention in this case in so far as the issue, is not as to whether the order of the type rendered u/s 246A(1)(a) is appeallable but as to whether when an order u/s 147 has still not been passed or even time barred in the first place, whether the AR can prematurely appeal against such “speaking order” made under Sec. 147, (as termed by him and expressly declared in Form No 35) which as already pointed out is nothing more than a communication rejecting the AR’s objection to such reopening implying in no uncertain terms that the AR has construed the communication of rejection of his objections and reassessment order u/s 147 yet to be passed in the instant case interchangeably which is clearly an erroneous understanding of Sec. 147 in the context of the impugned case. The contention of the AR that a pre—assessment order is also appealable under Sec. 246 is hardly even relevant in the instant case since as seen from Form No. 35 the appeal is made against order u/s 147 and not against any pre-assessment order as the AR characterizes it and therefore the authorities he has placed reliance on in the foregoing para does not come to his aid here.

10.1 It is however mentioned in passing, that the AO would be well advised to incorporate atleast the operational parts of the aforesaid

15 I.T.A. No.2849, 3247 to 3259/CHNY/2019 ‘speaking order’ rejecting the AR’s objections to the reopening in the interests of and while passing a timely well reasoned and logically sound order u/s 147.

Then he goes on to explain the term denial of liability to be assessed in respect of (i) whole or any part of the income (ii)

16 I.T.A. No.2849, 3247 to 3259/CHNY/2019 it may be with reference to rate of taxes applicable i.e., slab rate or maximum marginal rate (iii) it may be based on any ground, whether on facts or in law. (iv) it may be total denial of liability (v) it may be total denial of liability under particular circumstances.

According to ld.counsel, the use of the non-obstante clause in the provisions of section 246 of the Act, ie., not withstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in sub-section (2) of section 246 of the Act would show that the appealable orders

17 I.T.A. No.2849, 3247 to 3259/CHNY/2019 have been excluded for the purpose of sub-section-1, but in sub-section (2), it is clearly mentioned that it would still remain appealable under sub-section-1 with the result that appeals against such pre-assessment orders would lie to be Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The ld.counsel for the assessee also relied on the recent decision of Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of Genpact India Private Limited v. DCIT, [2019] 419 ITR 440 (SC). He particularly referred to page 458 of the journal. In view of the above, ld.counsel stated that apart from the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court, even CBDT had admitted this position that in term of provisions of section 246(2) of the Act, still the pre-assessment orders remains appealable under sub-section (1) of section 246 of the Act. In term of these, he stated that CIT(A) has erred in not entertaining the appeal of assessee as not-maintainable.

18 I.T.A. No.2849, 3247 to 3259/CHNY/2019 no provision in the amended section 246A of the Act, which provides appeal for or against the communication of rejection of objections u/s.147 of the Act, particularly, when reassessment is not framed. Only appeal lies against the re- assessment framed u/s.147 r.w.s. 143(3) of the Act. In term of the above, he supported order of CIT(A) and stated that the CIT(A) has rightly held the appeal of the assessee to be not- maintainable at the present state.

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246A. (1) Any assessee or any deductor or any collector aggrieved by any of the following orders (whether made before or after the appointed day) may appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals) against— (a) an order passed by a Joint Commissioner under clause (ii) of sub-section (3) of section 115VP or an order against the assessee where the assessee denies his liability to be assessed under this Act or an intimation under sub-section (1) or sub- section (1B) of section 143 or sub-section (1) of section 200A or sub-section (1) of section 206CB, where the assessee or the deductor or the collector objects to the making of adjustments, or any order of assessment under sub-section (3) of section 143 except an order passed in pursuance of directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel or an order referred to in sub-section (12) of section 144BAor section 144, to the income assessed, or to the amount of tax determined, or to the amount of loss computed, or to the status under which he is assessed; (aa) an order of assessment under sub-section (3) of section 115WE or section 115WF, where the assessee, being an employer objects to the value of fringe benefits assessed; (ab) an order of assessment or reassessment under section 115WG; (b) an order of assessment, reassessment or recomputation under section 147 except an order passed in pursuance of directions of Dispute Resolution Panel or an order referred to in sub-section (12) of section 144BA or section 150; (ba) an order of assessment or reassessment under section 153A except an order passed in pursuance of directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel or an order referred to in sub-section (12) of section 144BA; (bb) an order of assessment or reassessment under sub-section (3) of section 92CD (c) an order made under section 154 or section 155 having the effect of enhancing the assessment or reducing a refund or an order refusing to allow the claim made by the assessee under either of the said sections [except an order referred to in sub-section (12) of section 144BA]; (d) an order made under section 163 treating the assessee as the agent of a non-resident;

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(e) an order made under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of section 170; (f) an order made under section 171; (g) an order made under clause (b) of sub-section (1) or under sub- section (2) or sub-section (3) or sub-section (5) of section 185 in respect of an assessment for the assessment year commencing on or before the 1st day of April, 1992; (h) an order cancelling the registration of a firm under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (2) of section 186 in respect of any assessment for the assessment year commencing on or before the 1st day of April, 1992 or any earlier assessment year; (ha) an order made under section 201; (hb) an order made under sub-section (6A) of section 206C; (i) an order made under section 237; (j) an order imposing a penalty under— (A) section 221; or (B) section 271, section 271A, section 271AAA, section 271AAB, section271F, section271FB, section 272AA or section 272BB; (C) section 272, section 272B or section 273, as they stood immediately before the 1st day of April, 1989, in respect of an assessment for the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1988, or any earlier assessment years; (ja) an order of imposing or enhancing penalty under sub-section (1A) of section 275; (k) an order of assessment made by an Assessing Officer under clause (c) of section 158BC, in respect of search initiated under section 132 or books of account, other documents or any assets requisitioned under section 132A on or after the 1st day of January, 1997; (l) an order imposing a penalty under sub-section (2) of section 158BFA; (m) an order imposing a penalty under section 271B or section 271BB; (n) an order made by a Deputy Commissioner imposing a penalty under section 271C, section 271CA, section 271D or section 271E;

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(o) an order made by a Deputy Commissioner or a Deputy Director imposing a penalty under section 272A; (p) an order made by a Deputy Commissioner imposing a penalty under section 272AA; (q) an order imposing a penalty under Chapter XXI; (r) an order made by an Assessing Officer other than a Deputy Commissioner under the provisions of this Act in the case of such person or class of persons, as the Board may, having regard to the nature of the cases, the complexities involved and other relevant considerations, direct. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, where on or after the 1st day of October, 1998, the post of Deputy Commissioner has been redesignated as Joint Commissioner and the post of Deputy Director has been redesignated as Joint Director, the references in this sub-section for "Deputy Commissioner" and "Deputy Director" shall be substituted by "Joint Commissioner" and "Joint Director" respectively. (1A) Every appeal filed by an assessee in default against an order under section 201 on or after the 1st day of October, 1998 but before the 1st day of June, 2000 shall be deemed to have been filed under this section. (1B) Every appeal filed by an assessee in default against an order under sub-section (6A) of section 206C on or after the 1st day of April, 2007 but before the 1st day of June, 2007 shall be deemed to have been filed under this section. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of section 246, every appeal under this Act which is pending immediately before the appointed day, before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) and any matter arising out of or connected with such appeals and which is so pending shall stand transferred on that date to the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Commissioner (Appeals) may proceed with such appeal or matter from the stage at which it was on that day: Provided that the appellant may demand that before proceeding further with the appeal or matter, the previous proceeding or any part thereof be reopened or that he be re-heard.

22 I.T.A. No.2849, 3247 to 3259/CHNY/2019 Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, "appointed day" means the day appointed by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette. 9. We noted that the above provisions of section 246A of the Act, was inserted by the Finance No.2 Act, 1998 w.e.f. 01.10.1998. The first legal argument made by ld.counsel for the assessee is that whether an appeal lies under erstwhile section 246 of the Act, in respect of pre-assessment orders as noted by the CBDT vide its Circular No.269 (supra). We noted that the ld.counsel for the assessee has heavily relied on the erstwhile section 246 of the Act and Circular issued therein i.e., dated 24.09.1980, No.269 supra. We noted that the provision has been amended and a new section 246A of the Act, has been inserted w.e.f. 01.10.1998.

23 I.T.A. No.2849, 3247 to 3259/CHNY/2019 objections filed by assessee against reopening of the concluded assessment u/s 147 of the Act. It is also not the case of the assessee that it is denying its liability to be assessed under the Act rather the assessee has voluntarily filed its return of income and offered its status to chargeability to tax as a ‘trust’ and has paid taxes at the rates applicable for ‘individual’. In this bunch of fourteen appeals, wherever the liability to deposit tax was there keeping in view income offered to tax and rates as applicable to individual. The assessee had voluntarily come forward and deposited self assessment tax before filing its return of income with Revenue.

24 I.T.A. No.2849, 3247 to 3259/CHNY/2019 Section 115QA of the Act. Thus in the case of Genpact India (supra), the order passed by AO was not an interlocutory order which was subject matter of challenge in the case of Genpact (supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Genpact India Pvt. Ltd., supra has held in para Nos.12, 13 & 14 as under:-

25 I.T.A. No.2849, 3247 to 3259/CHNY/2019 issues may arise not just confined to the question whether the company is liable at all but may also relate to other facets including the extent of liability and also with regard to computation. If the submission is accepted, every time the dispute will be required to be taken up in proceedings such as a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, which normally would not be entertained in case of any disputed questions of fact or concerning factual aspects of the matter. The assessee may thus, not only lose a remedy of having the matter considered on factual facets of the matter but would also stand deprived of regular channels of challenges available to it under the hierarchy of fora available under the Act.

26 I.T.A. No.2849, 3247 to 3259/CHNY/2019 assessment tax on the rates applicable to individual. Secondly the order passed by AO was not the final assessment order but merely an interlocutory order disposing off objections filed by assessee against reopening of the concluded assessment u/s 147 of the Act and no amount of tax is determined to be payable by the said interlocutory order towards tax and no final reassessment order u/s 147 of the Act was passed by the AO. Merely because objections raised by the assessee to reopening of the concluded assessment u/s 147 of the Act were disposed off by the AO does not mean that the assessee will be finally fastened with additions to income in its hand on merits. The assessee will always have an opportunity to appear before the AO during reassessment proceedings and raise objections on merits of the issue before any prejudice is caused to the assessee by way of adverse reassessment order to be passed u/s 147 read with Section 143(3) of the Act. There is every possibility that the AO may drop reassessment proceedings on the merits of the issue albeit the reopening was upheld by the AO on legal grounds. In any case, even if the reopening is upheld on legal ground by the AO and additions are also sustained on merits, then also the assessee

27 I.T.A. No.2849, 3247 to 3259/CHNY/2019 will not be remedy less as the assessee will always be having remedy available to it by way of filing an appeal with learned CIT(A) u/s 246A of the Act against an reassessment order passed by the AO u/s 147 read with Section 143(3) of the Act. The assessee could challenge the legal ground i.e., re-opening of assessment as well as the issues on merits before CIT(A) after the assessment or re-assessment order is passed u/s.147 r.w.s. 143(3) of the Act. The assessee is entitled to file appeal on both the count i.e., on the jurisdictional issue as well as on merits.

28 I.T.A. No.2849, 3247 to 3259/CHNY/2019 right which emanates from the provisions of the Act and it could not be shown to us by the assessee that there existed any provision in the Act which enables it to file an appeal with learned CIT(A) against aforesaid interlocutory order. More so, the appellant is not remedy less as it will have any opportunity to file an appeal with learned CIT(A) u/s 246A of the Act in case reassessment proceedings culminates into an adverse order u/s 147 read with Section 143(3) of the Act.

29 I.T.A. No.2849, 3247 to 3259/CHNY/2019 appeals filed by respective assessee’s lacks merit and are dismissed.

Order pronounced in the court on 10th March, 2021 at Chennai.

Sd/- Sd/- (महावीर �सह ) (जी. मंजुनाथ) (MAHAVIR SINGH) (G. MANJUNATHA) उपा�य� /VICE PRESIDENT लेखा सद�य /ACCOUNTANT MEMBER चे�ई/Chennai, �दनांक/Dated, the 10th March, 2021 RSR आदेश क� �ितिलिप अ�ेिषत/Copy to: 1. अपीलाथ�/Appellant 2. ��यथ�/Respondent 3. आयकर आयु� (अपील)/CIT(A) 4. आयकर आयु� /CIT 5. िवभागीय �ितिनिध/DR 6. गाड� फाईल/GF.