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Facts
The applicant Trust filed two applications seeking registration and approval under the Income Tax Act. The CIT(E) rejected both applications. The applicant Trust then filed appeals before the Tribunal, which were presented 54 days after the prescribed limitation period.
Held
The Tribunal held that the applicant Trust failed to furnish any reasons or application for condonation of delay. Since the appeals were filed beyond the prescribed limitation period without sufficient cause, they were dismissed.
Key Issues
Whether the delay in filing the appeals beyond the prescribed limitation period can be condoned without sufficient cause being shown by the applicant.
Sections Cited
12A(1)(ac)(iii), 80G
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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, JAIPUR BENCHES,”A-Bench” JAIPUR
Before: SMT. ANNAPURNA GUPTA, AM & SHRI NARINDER KUMAR, JM vk;dj vihyla-@ITA No. 476 & 477/JPR/2025
vkns'k@ORDER PER: NARINDER KUMAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER .
This common order is to dispose of the above captioned two matters filed by the applicant Trust.
The applicant Trust was before Learned CIT(E), Jaipur by way of two application i.e. one u/s 12A(1)(ac)(iii) of the Income Tax Act ( in short “the Act”) to seek its registration.
Vide two separate orders of same date i.e. 29.11.2024, Learned CIT(E) rejected both the application for the reasons recorded therein.
That is how, the impugned orders are challenged by the applicant trust.
Feeling aggrieved by the rejection of the above said two applications, the applicant Trust presented before this Appellate Tribunal, two separate appeals.
On going through the files, the Registry raised objection that both the appeals were barred by limitation by 54 days.
In view of the deficiency notes raised by the Registry, the applicant was required to file application, if any, seeking condonation of delay. However, despite opportunities, no such application seeking condonation of delay came to be filed.
Both the impugned orders are dated 29.11.2024. As mentioned in Forms 36, applicant Trust claims to have been served with/communicated Shri Shanidev Charitable Trust, Ajmer. the impugned orders on 01.02.2025. It was for the applicant trust to establish that the impugned orders were served/ communicated to the said trust on 01.02.2025.
Record reveals that the matters were listed before the Bench on 13.08.2025, 17.09.2025 and 11.11.2025, but none has appeared on behalf of the applicant, what to say of filing of application seeking condonation of delay. Even today, none has appeared on behalf of the applicant despite wait.
In PATHAPATI SUBBA REDDY (DIED) BY L.Rs. & ORS. v. THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COLLECTOR (LA), SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 31248 OF 2018, decided by Hon’ble Apex Court on 8.4.2024, the moot question was whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court was justified in refusing to condone the delay in filing the proposed appeal and to dismiss it as barred by limitation.
After referring to various previous decisions on the point of condonation of delay, Hon’ble Apex Court culled out the guiding principles by observing in the manner as:
“On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
Shri Shanidev Charitable Trust, Ajmer. (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision. “ Hon’ble Apex Court went on to observe: “27. It is in the light of the above legal position that now we have to test whether the inordinate delay in filing the proposed appeal ought to be condoned or not in this case.
The submission of learned counsel for the petitioners is that in somewhat similar situation, delay in filing appeal for the enhancement of compensation had been condoned by this Court. He placed reliance upon the case of Dhiraj Singh (Dead) through Legal Representatives & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Ors. (2014) 14 SCC 127. In this case, delay in Shri Shanidev Charitable Trust, Ajmer. filing appeal was condoned as in other appeals compensation awarded at the rate of Rs.200/- per sq. yd. was upheld and the proposed appellants were also held entitled to the same benefit of compensation at the rate of Rs.200/- per sq. yd. instead of Rs.101/- per sq. yd. as awarded but with the rider that they will not be entitled for interest for the period of delay in approaching the High Court.
The other decision relied upon in this regard is the case of Imrat Lal & Ors. vs. Land Acquisition Collector & Ors. (2014) 14 SCC 133. In this case also the matter was regarding determination of compensation for the acquired land and there was a delay of 1110 days in filing the appeal for enhancement of compensation. Despite findings that no sufficient cause was shown in the application for condoning the delay, this Court condoned the delay in filing the appeal as a large number of similarly situate persons have been granted relief by this Court.
The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra).
Learned counsel for the petitioners next submitted on the basis of additional documents that in connection with the land acquisition in some other Special Leave Petitions, delay was condoned taking a lenient view and the compensation was enhanced with the rider that the claimants shall not be entitled for statutory benefits for the period of delay in approaching this Court or the High Court. The said orders do not clearly spell out the facts and the reasons explaining the delay in filing the appeal(s) but the fact remains that the delay was condoned by taking too liberal an approach and putting conditions which have not been approved of by this Court itself. In the absence of the facts for getting the delay condoned in the referred cases, vis-à-vis, the facts of this case, it cannot be said that the facts or the reasons of getting the delay condoned are identical or similar. Therefore, we are unable to exercise our discretionary Shri Shanidev Charitable Trust, Ajmer. power of condoning the delay in filing the appeal on parity with the above order(s).
Moreover, the High Court, in the facts of this case, has not found it fit to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction of condoning the delay. There is no occasion for us to interfere with the discretion so exercised by the High Court for the reasons recorded. First, the claimants were negligent in pursuing the reference and then in filing the proposed appeal. Secondly, most of the claimants have accepted the decision of the reference court. Thirdly, in the event the petitioners have not been substituted and made party to the reference before its decision, they could have applied for procedural review which they never did. Thus, there is apparently no due diligence on their part in pursuing the matter. Accordingly, in our opinion, High Court is justified in refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeal.
In the above situation, we do not deem it proper and necessary to interfere with the decision of the High Court refusing to condone the inordinate delay in filing the proposed appeal.
The Special Leave Petition, as such, lacks merit and is dismissed.”
In view of the above discussion, when the applicant Trust has not furnished any reasons, whatsoever seeking condonation of delay or any application with such a prayer, we are of the considered view that since the appeals came to be presented 54 days after the prescribed period of limitation and no sufficient cause has been put forth, both the appeals deserve to be dismissed being not maintainable same having been filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation.
As a result, both the appeals are hereby dismissed being barred by limitation. Files be consigned to the record room after the needful is done by the office. Copy of this common order be placed on the connected file.