SEJALBEN PATEL,VADODARA vs. THE PR.CIT, VADODARA-1, VADODARA

3.3 The Assessing Officer examined the details and, in para 3.3 (para 3.4 in case of Binitaben Patel) of the assessment order, observed that the explanation of the assessee was found correct. It was also noted that the SRO Form 61A record tallied with the co-owner structure. The AO concluded the assessment by accepting the returned income without proposing any variation or addition. The final assessment was made under section 147 r.w.s. 143(3)/144B of the Act.

3.4 Details of completed assessment in case of both the assessees are:

Sr. Particulars Smt. Sejalben C. Smt. Binitaben S. No. Patel Patel 1 Date of notice u/s 31.03.2022 31.03.2022 148 2 Date of filing 28.04.2022 28.04.2022 return in response to s.148 3 Returned Total Rs.90,350/- Rs.1,10,350/- Income 4 Share in 4% (jointly held) 4% (jointly held) properties sold 5 Valuation basis for Report of Registered Valuer (FMV as on cost of acquisition 01.04.2001)

6 Date of completion 06.03.2023 01.03.2023 of reassessment (u/s 147 r.w.s. 144B) 7 Assessed Income Rs.90,350/- (same Rs.1,10,350/- as returned) (same as returned)

8 TDS credit claimed Rs.2,400/- under Rs.2,400/- under section 194-IA section 194-IA 9 Refund granted or Denied – ITR filed Denied – ITR filed denied late late 3.5 Subsequently, the PCIT, examined the assessment record under section 263 of the Act and found that the assessment order dated 06.03.2023 was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The PCIT noted that although the AO had referred the matter of valuation of properties to the Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO) under section 55A for ascertaining the fair market value as on 01.04.2001, the final assessment order did not contain any discussion or reference to the said DVO report. The report of the DVO, as later obtained, disclosed substantial variations in the cost of acquisition compared to the figures adopted by the assessee based on registered valuer’s report. The difference in indexed cost of acquisition, attributable to 4% share of the assessee, was quantified at Rs.9,54,475/-. The PCIT held that failure on the part of AO to examine or even mention the DVO report amounted to non-application of mind and inadequate inquiry, thereby rendering the order erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. Accordingly, by order dated 03.03.2025 passed under section 263, the PCIT set aside the assessment order and directed the AO to reframe the assessment after considering the DVO report and after granting proper opportunity to the assessee.

1. The Ld. Pr. CIT has erred in law and on facts in invoking provisions of Section 263 of the Act seeking to revise reassessment order passed U/s 147 r.w.s. 144B of the Act holding it as erroneous and prejudicial to interest of revenue. The order of Ld. A.O. is neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interest of revenue and as such order of Ld. Pr. CIT is unjust, untenable and against principles of natural justice that deserve to be quashed.

2. The Ld. Pr. CIT has erred in law and on facts in holding that valuation report of DVO is part of the records and order passed U/s 147 r.w.s. 144B of the Act without considering that report is erroneous and prejudicial to interest ofrevenue The Ld. Pr. CIT has failed to appreciate that Ld. A.O. has passed the order after proper verification of documents submitted in response to notice U/s 142(1) of the Act and no reference to the Valuation Officer was made during the course of assessment.

3. The appellant craves leave to add, amend, alter, edit, delete, modify or change all or any of the grounds of appeal at the time of or before the hearing of the appeal. 4.1 The learned Authorised Representative (AR) for the assessee vehemently opposed the invocation of revisionary jurisdiction by the learned PCIT under section 263 of the Act and submitted that the reassessment in the present case was initiated based on information available on the Insight Portal, which indicated sale of immovable property. The assessee, upon receipt of notice under section 148 of the Act, filed her return of income, including capital gains arising on sale of immovable property, computed with due regard to indexed cost of acquisition. The entire computation was duly supported by the sale deeds, registered valuer’s report for fair market value (FMV) as on 01.04.2001, cost details, and relevant ownership share (4%) in the said immovable property.

4.2 It was submitted that during the reassessment proceedings, notices under section 142(1) were issued to which detailed replies were filed. The Assessing Officer applied his mind to the documents and explanations furnished, including the registered valuer's report, and thereafter accepted the capital gains computation as correct. It was further emphasized that no reference to the Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO) was made or relied upon during the course of assessment, nor was any such report made available to the assessee at any stage.

4.3 The learned AR further submitted a specific factual chronology to demonstrate that the very foundation of the learned PCIT’s assumption of jurisdiction—namely, the alleged valuation report of the Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO)—was non-existent at the time of completion of reassessment. It was pointed out that the assessment order under section 147 r.w.s. 144B was passed by the Assessing Officer on 06.03.2023 at 12:06:00 IST, whereas the request for valuation made by the Technical Unit for obtaining the fair market value of the impugned property was initiated only later in the evening on the same date, i.e., 06.03.2023 at 17:55:54 IST, as evidenced by the system-generated timestamp. The AR therefore contended that the reference for valuation, assuming it to be under section 55A of the Act, was not made by the Assessing Officer during the course of the assessment proceedings. In fact, it was neither acted upon by the AO nor available at the time of finalisation of the reassessment. It was argued that the so-called DVO report, which subsequently formed the basis for the PCIT’s observations in the revisionary order, was not in existence when the assessment was concluded, and hence, could not constitute part of the "record" as envisaged in Explanation 1 to section 263 of the Act.

4.4 The AR further submitted that this DVO report was never confronted to the assessee during assessment and was made available only during the proceedings under section 263 upon specific request, thereby vitiating the reliance placed thereon. It was submitted that the learned PCIT erred in relying on post-facto material, which was not before the Assessing Officer, and on that basis alone, the assumption of revisionary jurisdiction fails. The AR placed reliance on the principle that the legality of the order must be judged on the basis of the material that was actually before the AO at the time of its passing, and not on any material obtained thereafter.

4.5 Without prejudice to the legal challenge to the assumption of jurisdiction under section 263, the learned AR also submitted that even on merits, the valuation report dated 27.11.2023 relied upon by the learned PCIT is flawed, incomplete, and lacks evidentiary probity, and therefore cannot form the foundation for terming the reassessment order as erroneous or prejudicial to the interest of Revenue. It was pointed out that during the course of reassessment proceedings, the assessee had submitted a detailed valuation report from a registered valuer, which was contemporaneous, supported by sale deed particulars, ownership share of 4%, location features, comparable instances, and cost indexation workings. The Assessing Officer, after due consideration of the same along with the return of income and documentary evidence, had accepted the capital gains computation and passed the reassessment order under section 147 r.w.s. 144B on 06.03.2023. The learned AR drew specific attention to the valuation report prepared by the Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO) dated 27.11.2023, which was obtained post-assessment and was never confronted to the assessee. Referring to Clause 1.4 and Clause 5.1 of the said report, it was submitted that the DVO has categorically recorded that “The Assessee didn’t submit any document.” This, according to the AR, was factually incorrect and highly misleading, as the assessee had in fact furnished a complete valuation report with supporting evidence before the Assessing Officer during reassessment, which formed the basis for the returned capital gains computation. The AR submitted that the DVO proceeded to carry out valuation without examining or considering the report already on record, thereby rendering his exercise one-sided, incomplete, and vitiated in law. It was contended that the DVO's conclusion, made in absence of material placed on record by the assessee and without granting opportunity to respond, could not override the report submitted by the assessee and accepted by the AO.

4.6 The learned AR further submitted that the Assessing Officer was under no statutory obligation to make a reference to the Valuation Officer under section 55A of the Act so long as the officer was satisfied with the cost of acquisition or the fair market value (FMV) as reported by the assessee, particularly where such valuation was backed by a report from a registered valuer. In support of this submission, the learned AR placed reliance on the decision of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench “C” in the case of Jitindar Singh Chadha v. Pr. CIT [ITA No. 2732/Del/2018, order dated 31.12.2018], wherein it was categorically held that the use of the word ‘may’ in section 55A makes it discretionary and not mandatory.

4.7 It was thus urged that the learned PCIT erred in placing reliance on such a valuation report, which neither formed part of the record before the AO nor satisfied the test of fairness or completeness, and therefore the PCIT's inference that the AO failed to consider a crucial piece of information was misconceived and factually untenable. The learned AR submitted that the purported prejudice to the Revenue, if any, is not borne out by facts on record and cannot be presumed based on a post-facto report based on inaccurate assertions. It was further submitted that the conditions precedent for assumption of jurisdiction under section 263, namely, that the order sought to be revised is both erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue, were not satisfied in the present case, and therefore the entire proceedings under section 263 deserve to be quashed.

6.1 The material facts are undisputed. The assessees jointly held immovable property to the extent of 4% share each, which was sold during the previous year relevant to A.Y. 2018–19. Based on the information flagged on the Insight Portal regarding the transaction, the case was reopened and notices under section 148 were issued. In response, the assessees filed their returns of income declaring capital gains on the basis of a valuation report obtained from a registered valuer determining the fair market value as on 01.04.2001. The computation of capital gains was supported by detailed documentary evidence, including sale deeds, co- ownership structure, and cost indexation workings. During the reassessment proceedings, notices under section 142(1) were issued, in response to which the assessees furnished complete details, which were examined by the Assessing Officer. The AO, being satisfied with the explanation and material placed on record, accepted the returned income and did not make any variation in the assessed income.

6.2 The learned PCIT, in the impugned revision order under section 263, has proceeded on the footing that the Assessing Officer failed to consider the DVO’s valuation report which, according to the PCIT, was already part of the records. However, as demonstrated from the system-generated workflow documents placed before us, the request for valuation was made by the Technical Unit only on 06.03.2023 at 17:55:54 IST—several hours after the assessment order had already been finalised and digitally authenticated. We find merit in the contention of the learned AR that the DVO report, which came into existence much later and was never confronted to the assessee, cannot be deemed to form part of the “record” as envisaged under Explanation 1 to Section 263.

6.3 Many judicial forums have consistently held that when the Assessing Officer adopts one of the plausible views after proper application of mind, the order cannot be treated as erroneous merely because the PCIT holds a different opinion. In the present case, the Assessing Officer was in possession of the registered valuer’s report and had examined the same during the reassessment. The PCIT's objection is not based on absence of inquiry but merely on non-referral to the DVO—an act which, as we shall see, is not statutorily mandatory.

6.4 We also take note of the fact that the DVO report dated 27.11.2023, relied upon by the learned PCIT, records in Clauses 1.4 and 5.1 that “The Assessee didn’t submit any document.” This observation is demonstrably incorrect. The assessee had already furnished a detailed valuation report and relevant documentation before the Assessing Officer, which was duly considered while passing the reassessment order. The failure of the DVO to obtain or examine those records—despite their existence in the assessment file—renders the valuation exercise incomplete, one-sided, and lacking in evidentiary reliability. Thus, the learned PCIT’s reliance on such flawed report to brand the assessment as erroneous and prejudicial is, in our view, legally unsustainable.

6.5 As regards the learned DR’s argument that the delay between the assessment order and the DVO reference on the same date was procedural in nature and not fatal, we are unable to agree. In the faceless assessment system, every digital act is timestamped and has legal finality. Once the order is authenticated and uploaded, it constitutes a concluded proceeding.

A reference made by the Technical Unit after the conclusion of assessment cannot retroactively expand the assessment record. This is in consonance with the Explanation to Section 263, which defines “record” to include only the materials available at the time of passing the order—not those obtained subsequently. Therefore, the PCIT’s jurisdiction under section 263, founded on such post-facto material, is vitiated ab initio.

6.6 Further, as rightly argued by the learned AR, the Assessing Officer is not mandatorily required to refer a valuation to the DVO under section 55A of the Act. The statute uses the term “may,” which has been interpreted to confer discretionary power, not a binding obligation. In this context, reliance placed by the assessee on the decision of the Delhi Bench of the Tribunal in Jitindar Singh Chadha v. Pr. CIT [ITA No. 2732/Del/2018, order dated 31.12.2018] is apt. In that case, it was held that when a registered valuer’s report is available and considered by the AO, the mere fact that the AO does not refer the matter to the DVO does not render the assessment order erroneous or prejudicial. It was further held that such an order constitutes a possible view, and hence cannot be interfered with under section 263.

6.7 On the facts of the present case, the Assessing Officer exercised his discretion in a judicious and informed manner. There is no finding by the PCIT that the AO failed to apply his mind or that the order lacks reasoning or inquiry. It is not open for the PCIT to supplant the AO’s opinion with his own on the ground of mere preference. The essential twin conditions under section 263—that the order is (i) erroneous and (ii) prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue—must co-exist. In the present case, neither of the conditions stands satisfied. The AO took a conscious view based on available records. The prejudice alleged is speculative and built upon a valuation report not forming part of the record and not tested for fairness.

6.8 In light of the above discussion, we hold that the assumption of jurisdiction by the learned PCIT under section 263 of the Act is without authority of law and not sustainable either on jurisdictional grounds or on merits. Consequently, the impugned revision order passed under section 263 is quashed.

In our considered opinion, such reliance on third-party material, which did not form part of the record of the assessee’s reassessment proceedings, and which was never referred to or relied upon by the AO in the present assessee’s case, is clearly impermissible in law. The legal scope of “record” as defined in Explanation 1 to Section 263 confines itself to material that was either available to or ought to have been considered by the Assessing Officer in the course of assessment proceedings. In the present case, as specifically recorded by the PCIT himself, no DVO reference was ever made, and thus, the question of the report being part of the record does not arise.

10.1 We further note that during the reassessment proceedings, the assessee had filed her return of income in response to notice under section 148 of the Act, offering capital gains duly computed with reference to the cost of acquisition as on 01.04.2001, based on a detailed report of a registered valuer. Notices under section 142(1) were issued and replied to. The Assessing Officer, after considering the documents and explanation furnished, accepted the returned income and capital gains computation, and passed the reassessment order on 01.03.2023. There is no finding by the PCIT that any of the particulars furnished were false, misleading, or not examined by the AO.

10.2 We also take note of the legal position settled by judicial authority, including the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi Bench of the Tribunal in Jitindar Singh Chadha v. Pr. CIT [ITA No. 2732/Del/2018, dated 31.12.2018], wherein it was held that the Assessing Officer is not mandatorily required to make reference to the Valuation Officer under section 55A, and the use of the word ‘may’ in the provision clearly indicates discretion. So long as the AO is satisfied with the cost of acquisition supported by a registered valuer’s report and no material appears to raise suspicion, the absence of DVO reference per se cannot be equated with an error.

10.3 The PCIT’s reasoning that the AO did not conduct an independent inquiry is untenable in light of the facts of the case. The mere non-referral to the DVO, particularly where the assessee had supported her computation with a registered valuer’s report and sale deed particulars, cannot render the assessment order erroneous or prejudicial to the interest of revenue. More importantly, in the absence of any valuation report forming part of the record, the assumption of jurisdiction under section 263 is fundamentally flawed.

10.4 For these reasons and following our findings in the case of co-owner Smt. Sejalben Patel, we hold that the learned PCIT has exceeded the scope of revisionary powers under section 263 of the Act. The twin conditions of error and prejudice are not satisfied. Consequently, the impugned order passed under section 263 is liable to be quashed.

10.5 Accordingly, the impugned revisionary order passed under section 263 of the Act is quashed, and the appeal of the assessee is allowed.

Order pronounced in the Court on 28th July, 2025 at Ahmedabad.