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Facts
The assessee, a cooperative society, filed an appeal before the CIT(A) with a delay of two days. The assessee cited a hierarchy of approvals and continuous holidays as reasons for the delay. The CIT(A) dismissed the appeal for not being maintainable due to the delay.
Held
The Tribunal held that the reasons provided by the assessee constituted a 'sufficient cause' for the delay and that the CIT(A) should have adopted a pragmatic approach. The Tribunal condoned the delay and remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) to decide the appeal on its merits.
Key Issues
Whether the delay in filing the appeal by the assessee was sufficient to condone, and if the CIT(A) erred in not deciding the appeal on merits.
Sections Cited
143(3), 264, 144B, 249(2), 249(3), 5
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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, ‘B’ BENCH, CHENNAI
Before: HON’BLE SHRI MANOJ KUMAR AGGARWAL & HON’BLE SHRI MANU KUMAR GIRI
(िनधा�रणवष� / Assessment Year: 2018-2019) Salem Starch and Sago Manufacturers Vs. The Assistant Commissioner of Service Industrial Co-Op Society Ltd, Income Tax, 1, Sago Serve, Omalur Main Road, Circle -2, Jagirammapalayam, Salem. Salem 636 302. [PAN:AAAAS 2151B] (अपीलाथ�/Appellant) (��यथ�/Respondent) अपीलाथ� क� ओर से/ Appellant by : Shri T. Vasudevan, Advocate ��यथ� क� ओर से /Respondent by : Ms. R. Kavitha, Addl. CIT. सुनवाई क� तार�ख/Date of Hearing : 18.12.2024 घोषणा क� तार�ख /Date of Pronouncement : 09.01.2025 आदेश / O R D E R PER MANU KUMAR GIRI (Judicial Member) This appeal by the assessee is arising out of the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC), Delhi in order No.ITBA/NFAC/S/250/2024-25/1067930157 (1) dated 23.08.2024. The assessment was framed by the Additional /Joint/Deputy /Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, National Faceless Assessment Centre, Delhi for the assessment year 2018-19 u/s. 143(3) r.w.s.264 r.w.s.144B of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter ‘the Act’), vide order dated 17.01.2023.
We found that the ld. CIT(A) on perusal of form-35 found that the intimation u/s 143(3) r.w.s 264 r.w.s. 144B of the Act was passed on 31.03.2023, while the appeal was filed on 02.05.2023, which is beyond the statutory time limit provided for filing of the appeal. As per section 249(2)(c) of the Act, the appeal shall be presented within 30 days of the following date on which the intimation of the order sought to be appealed against is served. However, the appellant filed appeal beyond the time limit with delay of two days. The assessee before the ld. CIT(A) submitted that the assessee is a Government run co-operative society headed by an IAS Officer, there is an hierarchy of approvals to be taken which involves lot of time. Further, there was continuous holdings concluding with May day which lead to this unavoidable delay and requested to condone the delay and adjudicate the appeal on merits. However, the ld. CIT(A) held that there is no "sufficient cause" in terms of section 249(3) of the Act, for not presenting the appeal within the prescribed period. It is well-settled law that an appellant is not entitled to the condonation as a matter of right. For an appellant to succeed, the existence of sufficient cause is sine qua non and a condition precedent. It is manifestly evident that this ingredient is woefully lacking in this belated appeal filed by the appellant. Thus, the delay in filing the appeal by the appellant, is not considered as sufficient cause and delay is therefore, not condoned. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed without any discussion on merits or on any other aspect. Considering the facts, ld.CIT(A) held that the appeal filed is not in conformity with the provisions of Section 249(2) of the Act, and there is no sufficient cause for condonation of the delay in filing of the appeal, the present appeal is dismissed as not maintainable. Aggrieved, assessee filed an appeal before us.
We heard the rival contention and perused the material available on record. The reason submitted by the assessee for the delay before the ld. CIT(A) is under:- ‘’We are a government run cooperative society which is headed by an IAS officer. There is an hierarchy of approvals to be taken from various officers-based on their availability-which involves a lot of time. Further, the continuous holidays concluding with may day lead to this unavoidable delay. Your appellant begs that the delay of 4 days in filing the appeal may kindly be condoned and the appeal be considered for disposal’’.
4. In the light of above reason, we find that the said approach of the ld.CIT(A) is neither reasonable nor pragmatic. In our view the ld.CIT(A) ought to have condoned the delay and decide the appeal on merit.
How the power of condonation of delay is to be exercised, has been explained by the Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v Mst. Katiji And Others- [167 ITR 471 (SC) @ Pg. 472] as under:- " The Legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting section 51 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on the merits". The expression "sufficient cause” employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice that being the life- purpose of the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that the court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:
1. 1. Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
1. "Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." 2. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common sense and pragmatic manner.
3. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non- deliberate delay.
There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs serious risk.
5. It must be grasped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so."
Here we would also like to refer the finding of the Apex Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan V. M. Krishnamurthy, AIR 1998 SC 3222. The Apex Court held as under:- "11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for laundering the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maximinterest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.
A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delays in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words 'sufficient cause' under section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain V. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 and State of West Bengal V. the Administrator, Howah Muni-capacity, AIR 1972 SC 749."
We have pursued the reasons given by the assessee, we treat such reason as ‘sufficient cause’ and which cannot be termed as dilatory or frivolous. In the light of the above discussions, considering to adopt pragmatic approach and with an intention to render substantial justice, we find that, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of appeal before the ld.CIT(A) by the assessee hence condone the delay. Therefore, without expressing anything on the merit of the case, we incline to remit the file to the ld.CIT(A) with a direction to decide the appeal on merit after providing reasonable opportunity of being heard to assessee.
In the result, appeal filed by the assessee is allowed for statistical purpose. Order pronounced in the open court on 9th day of January, 2025