MOHIT CHANDAK,CHENNAI vs. DCIT CENTRAL CIRCLE 3(3), CHENNAI

AY Expenditure Actual salary Excess claim salary claimed Expenditure of salary (Rs. In lakh) incurred expenditure (Rs. In lakh) (Rs. In Lakh) 2014-15 15.08 0.94 14.14 2015-16 27.79 12.00 15.79 2016-17 43.68 12.84 30.84 2017-18 78.91 13.74 65.17 Total 165.46 39.52 125.94

The appellant had submitted before the AO that the excess Salary expenditure of Rs.1,26,00,000/- had been offered in the year of survey i.e. AY 2018-19. The argument of the appellant was not accepted by the AO for the reason that as provisions of the Income- & 194/Chny/2025 Mohit Chandak :- 3 -: tax Act, 1961, disallowance has to be made in the relevant Assessment Year in which excess claim of expenditure has beert made. Accordingly, an amount of Rs.30,84,000/- was disallowed and added to the total income of the assessee. The AO completed the assessment u/s 147 of the Act on 28.03.2023 determining an assessed income of Rs.42,64,460/- as under: Returned income Rs. 11,80,460/- Add: Disallowance of salary Rs. 30,84,000/- expenditure Assessed income Rs. 42,64,460/-

Aggrieved against the order of assessment u/s. 147 of the Act, the assessee filed an appeal before the ld. Commissioner of Income (Appeals).

3. On the legal issue, the ld. CIT(A) in its order at para 7.2.4 held as under:

“7.2.4 Thus, the Hon'ble Apex court has made it clear that after 1st April, 2021, the Income Tax Act has to be read along with the substituted provisions and that the directions in Ashish Agarwal (supra) will extend to all the ninety thousand reassessment notices issued under the old regime during the period 01.04.2021 to 30.06.2021. Since the notice u/s 148 of the Act in this case was issued between 01.04.2021 to 30.06.2021 as per provisions of un- amended section 148 of the Act, as per direction of the Hon'ble Apex Court, the notice u/s 148 of the Act dated 20.04.2021 has to be treated as Show Cause Notice in terms of section 148A(b) of the Act and the details of material/ information on the basis of which, the assessment was sought to be reopened ought to have been provided to the appellant. From the available records, it is noted that on 01.06.2022, the AO provided the relevant materials used for reopening proceedings subsequent to the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ashish Agarwal (supra) and order u/s 148A(d) of the Act was passed on 31.07.2022 and notice u/s 148 of the Act was also issued on 31.07.2022. Thus, it can be seen that the AO has correctly assumed as per the direction of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ashish Agarwal (supra). It is also to be noted that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajeev Bansal (supra) has also & 194/Chny/2025 Mohit Chandak :- 4 -: held that during the period between the issuance of the deemed notices and the date of judgment in Ashish Agarwal (supra), the assessing officers were deemed to have been prohibited from proceeding with the reassessment proceedings. In view of the same, while considering the appellant's appeal in for AY 2016-17 in dated 29.11.2024, I have held that the assessment order u/s 147 of the Act dated 31.03.2022 is non-est. Thus, the contention of the appellant that the communication dated 01.06.2020 treating the notice u/s 148 of the Act dated 20.04.2021 as notice u/s 148A(b) of the Act and fresh notice u/s 148 of the Act dated 31.07.2022 is without jurisdiction is devoid of any merits.” Aggrieved by the order, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.

Ashish Agarwal [2022] 138 taxmann.com 64 (SC). though an assessment order was already passed and no proceedings as such were pending before the AO and the AO erroneously and without any jurisdiction issued a communication treating the notice u/s 148 of the Act dated 20.04.2021 as notice u/s 148A(b) of the Act and fresh notice u/s 148 of the Act dated 31.07.2022 was issued. The Ld. counsel has & 194/Chny/2025 Mohit Chandak :- 5 -: further stated that it is well settled that once an assessment order is already passed and the assessment proceedings are concluded, there is no provision in the Act for the AO to withdraw/cancel the assessment order and assume jurisdiction to redo the assessment once again. The Ld. counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Anindita Sengupta v. ACIT [2024] 161 taxmann.com 39 (Delhi), wherein it was held that "the Ashish Agarwal judgment neither spoke of completed assessments nor did it embody any direction that could be legitimately or justifiably construed as mandating completed assessments being reopened".

The Ld. counsel has also placed reliance on a similar judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad in the case of Arvind Kumar Shivhare Vs Union of India [2024] taxmann.com 769 (Allahabad).

7. For the adjudication of the legal issue, we have to see the legal pronouncements of the Hon’ble High Courts. On a similar issue, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the cases of Anindita Sengupta v. Asstt.

CIT [2024] 161 taxmann.com 39/467 ITR 624 (Delhi), Akshita Jindal v.

ITO [2024] 162 taxmann.com 313 (Delhi), Satish Chand Jain v. Asstt.

CIT [2024] 166 taxmann.com 447/301 Taxman 27 (Delhi) and Jaswant Singh Juneja v. Income-tax Officer [2024] 166 taxmann.com 661 (Delhi)/[2024] 301 Taxman 371 (Delhi) has quashed the subsequent reopening u/s 148A(b) of the Act basis Union of India v. Ashish Agarwal [2022] 138 taxmann.com 64/286 Taxman 183/444 ITR 1 (SC).

8. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Anindita Sengupta v.

Asstt. CIT [2024] 161 taxmann.com 39/467 ITR 624 (Delhi) has held as under:

"23. The directions issued in Asian Resurfacing1 are obviously issued in the exercise of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, which confers jurisdiction on this Court to pass such a decree or make such order necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it. In Asian Resurfacing1, the first issue was, whether an order framing of charge in a case under the PC Act was in the nature of an interlocutory order. The second question was of the scope of powers of the High Court to stay proceedings of the trial under the PC Act while entertaining a challenge to an order of framing charge. The question regarding the duration of the interim orders passed by the High Courts in various other proceedings did not specifically arise for consideration in the case of Asian Resurfacing. The provisions of Article 142 of the Constitution of India are meant to further the cause of justice and to secure complete justice. The directions in the exercise of power under Article 142 cannot be issued to defeat justice. The jurisdiction under Article 142 cannot be invoked to pass blanket orders setting at naught a very large number of interim orders lawfully passed by all the High Courts, and that too, without hearing the contesting parties. The jurisdiction under Article 142 can be invoked only to deal with extraordinary situations for doing complete justice between the parties before the Court.

24. While dealing with the scope of power under Article 142, a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Prem Chand Garg v. The Excise Commissioner, U.P., in paragraphs 12 and 13 held thus: "12. Basing himself on this decision, the Solicitor- General argues that the power conferred on this Court under Article 142(1) is comparable to the privileges claimed by the members of the State Legislatures under the latter part of Article 194(3), and so, there can be no question of striking down an order passed by this Court under Article 142(1) on the ground that it is inconsistent with Article 32. It would be noticed that this argument proceeds on the basis that the order for security infringes the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 32 and it suggests that under Article 142(1) this Court has & 194/Chny/2025 Mohit Chandak :- 10 -: jurisdiction to pass such an order. In our opinion, the argument thus presented is misconceived. In this connection, it is necessary to appreciate the actual decision in the case of Sharma [(1959) 1 SCR 806 at 859860] and its effect. The actual decision was that the rights claimable under the latter part of Article 194(3) were not subject to Article 19(1)(a), because the said rights had been expressly provided for by a constitutional provision viz. Article 194(3), and it would be impossible to hold that one part of the Constitution is inconsistent with another part. The position would, however, be entirely different if the State Legislature was to pass a law in regard to the privileges of its members. Such a law would obviously have to be consistent with Article 19(1)(a). If any of the provisions of such a law were to contravene any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III, they would be struck down as being unconstitutional. Similarly, there can be no doubt that if in respect of petitions under Article 32 a law is made by Parliament as contemplated by Article 145(1), and such a law, in substance, corresponds to the provisions of Order 25 Rule 1 or Order 41 Rule 10, it would be struck down on the ground that it purports to restrict the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 32. The position of an order made either under the rules framed by this Court or under the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142(1) can be no different. If this aspect of the matter is borne in mind, there would be no difficulty in rejecting the Solicitor General's argument based on Article 142(1). The powers of this Court are no doubt very wide and they are intended to be and will always be exercised in the interest of justice. But that is not to say that an order can be made by this Court which is inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. An order which this Court can make in order to do complete justice between the parties, must not only be consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, but it cannot even be inconsistent with the substantive provisions of the relevant statutory laws. Therefore, we do not think it would be possible to hold that Article 142(1) confers upon this Court powers which can contravene the provisions of Article 32.

& 194/Chny/2025 Mohit Chandak :- 11 -: 13. In this connection, it may be pertinent to point out that the wide powers which are given to this Court for doing complete justice between the parties, can be used by this Court, for instance, in adding parties to the proceedings pending before it, or in admitting additional evidence, or in remanding the case, or in allowing a new point to be taken for the first time. It is plain that in exercising these and similar other powers, this Court would not be bound by the relevant provisions of procedure if it is satisfied that a departure from the said procedure is necessary to do complete justice between the parties."

(Emphasis added)

(Emphasis added)

26. It is very difficult to exhaustively lay down the parameters for the exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India due to the very nature of such powers. However, a few important parameters which are relevant to the issues involved in the reference are as follows:— (i) The jurisdiction can be exercised to do complete justice between the parties before the Court. It cannot be exercised to nullify the benefits derived by a large number of litigants based on judicial orders validly passed in their favour who are not parties to the proceedings before this Court;

(ii) Article 142 does not empower this Court to ignore the substantive rights of the litigants; and (iii) While exercising the jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, this Court can always issue procedural directions to the Courts for streamlining procedural aspects and ironing out the creases in the procedural laws to ensure expeditious and timely disposal of cases. This is because, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 142, this Court may not be bound by procedural requirements of law. However, while doing so, this Court cannot affect the substantive rights of those litigants who are not parties to the case before it. The right to be heard before an adverse order is passed is not a matter of procedure but a substantive right.

(iv) The power of this Court under Article 142 cannot be exercised to defeat the principles of natural justice, which are an integral part of our jurisprudence."

13. Our attention was also invited to the observations of the Constitution Bench when it observed that the jurisdiction under Article 142 is primarily intended to be invoked and exercised to do necessary and complete justice between the parties to a cause and in respect of a matter pending before the Supreme Court. It was pointed out that the petitioner here had neither questioned the invocation of Section 148 of the Act nor had she at any point of time joined the challenge which was laid in respect of notices issued between 01 April 2021 and 30 June 2021 before various High Courts including a batch of writ petitions which were entertained by this Court. Mr. Vohra pointed out that the petitioner had not joined the challenge which came to be laid before this Court in the matter of Mon Mohan Kohli v. CIT [2021] 133 taxmann.com 166/[2022] 441 ITR 207/[2021 SCC ONLine Del 5250] and which came to be finally allowed on 15 December 2021. It was in the aforesaid backdrop that learned senior counsel contended that since the petitioner was not a party to those proceedings, the respondents had clearly erred in seeking to apply the judgment in Ashish Agarwal and reopen a concluded assessment. It was the submission of Mr. Vohra that once the reassessment proceedings culminated in the passing of a final assessment order on 28 March 2022, the respondents were rendered functus officio and could not have possibly reinvented the wheel and commenced proceedings afresh by issuance of fresh notices under Section 148A(b) of the Act.

14. Appearing for the respondents, Mr. Bhattacharya submitted that it has been the consistent understanding of the respondents that the judgment in Ashish Agarwal mandated them to reopen all cases in which notices may have been issued during the period 01 April 2021 to 30 June 2021. According to Mr. Bhattacharya, the judgment of the Supreme Court would apply to all cases irrespective of whether the assessee had chosen to assail a Section 148 notice or not. Learned counsel contended that notwithstanding the initial reassessment proceedings having come to an end on 28 March 2022, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal, & 194/Chny/2025 Mohit Chandak :- 15 -: though rendered on 04 May 2022, would clearly apply and the initiation of reassessment cannot be faulted. It is the aforenoted rival submissions which fall for our consideration.

15. We at the outset note that the fact that the reassessment proceedings initiated pursuant to the notice dated 31 March 2021 (stated to have been issued on 01 April 2021) had attained a closure consequent to a final order of assessment being drawn on 28 March 2022 is not disputed before us. The fact that this order came to be rendered undisputedly prior to the decision in Ashish Agarwal being pronounced also cannot possibly be questioned. The principal question which therefore arises is whether Ashish Agarwal is liable to be viewed as commanding the respondents to reopen even concluded proceedings. The aforesaid question would arise in the context of those cases where although notices may have been issued between 01 April 2021 to 30 June 2021, reassessment proceedings may themselves have come to an end with final orders being framed. Undoubtedly, in the facts of the present case, a final order of assessment came to be passed prior to judgment being rendered by the Constitution Bench in Ashish Agarwal. We are thus called upon to answer whether the judgment in Ashish Agarwal mandated or even envisaged the reopening of this particular class of cases.

& 194/Chny/2025 Mohit Chandak :- 16 -: 17. It appears from a reading of the judgment in Ashish Agarwal that despite the substituted Sections 147 to 151 having been brought into force with effect from 01 April 2021, the respondents had issued as many as 90,000 reassessment notices under the unamended set of provisions. The aforesaid action was based upon the explanations contained in the notifications dated 31 March 2021 and 27 April 2021. It was these reassessment notices which came to be assailed before various High Courts. The High Courts in unison held that the reassessment notices issued under the unamended Sections 148 to 151 would not sustain once the substituted provisions had come to be placed in the statute by virtue of Finance Act, 2021. On the basis of the aforesaid, the respective High Courts proceeded to set aside those reassessment notices. While the High Court of Allahabad quashed the reassessment notices, our Court in its judgment rendered in Mon Mohan Kohli, while quashing the individual reassessment had pertinently observed that notwithstanding the challenge to the reassessment notices having been accepted, the same would not detract from the right of the respondents to draw proceedings afresh, if so permissible in law.

19. However, by way of Section 148-A, the procedure has now been streamlined and simplified. It provides that before issuing any notice under Section 148, the assessing officer shall:

(i) conduct any enquiry, if required, with the approval of specified authority, with respect to the information which & 194/Chny/2025 Mohit Chandak :- 17 -: suggests that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment;

(ii) provide an opportunity of being heard to the assessee, with the prior approval of specified authority;

(iii) consider the reply of the assessee furnished, if any, in response to the show-cause notice referred to in clause (b); and (iv) decide, on the basis of material available on record including reply of the assessee, as to whether or not it is a fit case to issue a notice under Section 148 of the IT Act; and (v) the AO is required to pass a specific order within the time stipulated.

20. Therefore, all safeguards are provided before notice under Section 148 of the IT Act is issued. At every stage, the prior approval of the specified authority is required, even for conducting the enquiry as per Section 148-A(a). Only in a case where, the assessing officer is of the opinion that before any notice is issued under Section 148-A(b) and an opportunity is to be given to the assessee, there is a requirement of conducting any enquiry, the assessing officer may do so and conduct any enquiry. Thus if the assessing officer is of the opinion that any enquiry is required, the assessing officer can do so, however, with the prior approval of the specified authority, with respect to the information which suggests that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment.

"22. Thus, the new provisions substituted by the Finance Act, 2021 being remedial and benevolent in nature and substituted & 194/Chny/2025 Mohit Chandak :- 18 -: with a specific aim and object to protect the rights and interest of the assessee as well as and the same being in public interest, the respective High Courts have rightly held that the benefit of new provisions shall be made available even in respect of the proceedings relating to past assessment years, provided Section 148 notice has been issued on or after 1-4- 2021. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the various High Courts in holding so.

23. However, at the same time, the judgments of the several High Courts would result in no reassessment proceedings at all, even if the same are permissible under the Finance Act, 2021 and as per substituted Sections 147 to 151 of the IT Act. The Revenue cannot be made remediless and the object and purpose of reassessment proceedings cannot be frustrated. It is true that due to a bona fide mistake and in view of subsequent extension of time vide various notifications, the Revenue issued the impugned notices under Section 148 after the amendment was enforced w.e.f. 1-4-2021, under the unamended Section 148. In our view the same ought not to have been issued under the unamended Act and ought to have been issued under the substituted provisions of Sections 147 to 151 of the IT Act as per the Finance Act, 2021.

24. There appears to be genuine non-application of the amendments as the officers of the Revenue may have been under a bona fide belief that the amendments may not yet have been enforced. Therefore, we are of the opinion that some leeway must be shown in that regard which the High Courts could have done so. Therefore, instead of quashing and setting aside the reassessment notices issued under the unamended provision of the IT Act, the High Courts ought to have passed an order construing the notices issued under the unamended Act/unamended provision of the IT Act as those deemed to have been issued under Section 148-A of the IT Act as per the new provision Section 148-A and the Revenue ought to have been permitted to proceed further with the reassessment proceedings as per the substituted provisions of Sections 147 to 151 of the IT Act as per the Finance Act, 2021, subject to compliance of all the procedural requirements and the defences, which may be available to the assessee under the substituted provisions of Sections 147 to 151 of the IT Act and which may be available under the Finance Act, 2021 and in law.

25. Therefore, we propose to modify the judgments and orders passed by the respective High Courts as under:

25.1. The respective impugned Section 148 notices issued to the respective assessees shall be deemed to have been issued under Section 148-A of the IT Act as & 194/Chny/2025 Mohit Chandak :- 19 -: substituted by the Finance Act, 2021 and treated to be show-cause notices in terms of Section 148-A(b). The respective assessing officers shall within thirty days from today provide to the assessees the information and material relied upon by the Revenue so that the assessees can reply to the notices within two weeks thereafter. 25.2. The requirement of conducting any enquiry with the prior approval of the specified authority under Section 148-A(a) be dispensed with as a one-time measure vis-a-vis those notices which have been issued under Section 148 of the unamended Act from 1-4-2021 till date, including those which have been quashed by the High Courts. 25.3. The assessing officers shall thereafter pass an order in terms of Section 148-A(d) after following the due procedure as required under Section 148-A(b) in respect of each of the assessees concerned. 25.4. All the defences which may be available to the assessee under Section 149 and/or which may be available under the Finance Act, 2021 and in law and whatever rights are available to the Assessing Officer under the Finance Act, 2021 are kept open and/or shall continue to be available. 25.5. The present order shall substitute/modify respective judgments and orders passed by the respective High Courts quashing the similar notices issued under unamended Section 148 of the IT Act irrespective of whether they have been assailed before this Court or not."

21. It was in the aforesaid backdrop that the Supreme Court proceeded to frame the following operative directions: -

"28. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeals are allowed in part. The impugned common judgments and orders [Ashok Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine All 799] passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in WT No. 524 of 2021 and other allied tax appeals/petitions, is/are hereby modified and substituted as under: 28.1. The impugned Section 148 notices issued to the respective assessees which were issued under unamended Section 148 of the IT Act, which were the subject-matter of writ petitions before the various respective High Courts shall be deemed to have been issued under Section 148-A of the IT Act as substituted by the Finance Act, 2021 and construed or treated to be show-cause notices in terms of Section 148-A(b). The assessing officer shall, within thirty days from today provide to the respective assessees information and material relied upon by the Revenue, so that the assessees can reply to the show-cause notices within two weeks thereafter. 28.2. The requirement of conducting any enquiry, if required, with the prior approval of specified authority under Section 148-A(a) is hereby dispensed with as a one-time measure vis-a-vis those notices which have been issued under Section 148 of the unamended Act from 1-4-2021 till date, including those which have been quashed by the High Courts. 28.3. Even otherwise as observed hereinabove holding any enquiry with the prior approval of specified authority is not mandatory but it is for the assessing officers concerned to hold any enquiry, if required.

& 194/Chny/2025 Mohit Chandak :- 21 -: 28.4. The assessing officers shall thereafter pass orders in terms of Section 148-A(d) in respect of each of the assessees concerned; Thereafter after following the procedure as required under Section 148-A may issue notice under Section 148 (as substituted). 28.5. All defences which may be available to the assessees including those available under Section 149 of the IT Act and all rights and contentions which may be available to the assessees concerned and Revenue under the Finance Act, 2021 and in law shall continue to be available.

29. The present order shall be applicable PAN INDIA and all judgments and orders passed by the different High Courts on the issue and under which similar notices which were issued after 14-2021 issued under Section 148 of the Act are set aside and shall be governed by the present order and shall stand modified to the aforesaid extent. The present order is passed in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India so as to avoid any further appeals by the Revenue on the very issue by challenging similar judgments and orders, with a view not to burden this Court with approximately 9000 appeals. We also observe that the present order shall also govern the pending writ petitions, pending before various the High Courts in which similar notices under Section 148 of the Act issued after 1-4-2021 are under challenge."

25. However, we are of the firm opinion that Ashish Agarwal neither intended nor mandated concluded assessments being reopened. The respondent clearly appears to have erred in proceedings along lines contrary to the above as would be evident from the reasons which follow. Firstly, Ashish Agarwal was principally concerned with judgments rendered by various High Courts' striking down Section 148 notices holding that the respondents had erred in proceeding on the basis of the unamended family of provisions relating to reassessment. They had essentially held that it was the procedure constructed in terms of the amendments introduced by Finance Act, 2021 which would apply. None of those judgements were primarily concerned with concluded assessments. It is this indubitable position which constrained the Supreme Court to frame directions requiring those notices to be treated as being under Section 148A(b) and for the AO proceeding thereafter to frame an order as contemplated by Section 148A(d) of the Act. The Supreme Court significantly observed that the High Courts' instead of quashing the impugned notices should have framed directions for those notices being construed and deemed to have been issued under Section 148A. Ashish Agarwal proceeded further to observe that the Revenue should have been "permitted to proceed further with the reassessment proceedings as per the substituted provisions. . . . . .". Our view of the judgement being confined to proceedings at the stage of notice is further fortified from the Supreme Court providing in para 8 of the report that "The respective impugned Section 148 notices issued to the respective assessees shall be deemed to have been issued under section 148A of the Income Tax Act as substituted by Finance Act, 2021 and treated to be show cause notices in terms of Section 148A(b)." As would be manifest from the aforesaid extract, the emphasis clearly was on the notices which formed the subject matter of challenge before various High Courts' and the aim of the Supreme Court being to salvage the process of reassessment. This is further evident from the Supreme Court observing that the AO would thereafter proceed to pass orders referable to Section 148A(d). We consequently find ourselves unable to construe Ashish Agarwal as an edict which required completed assessments to be invalidated and reopened. Ashish Agarwal cannot possibly be read as mandating the hands of the & 194/Chny/2025 Mohit Chandak :- 24 -: clock being rewound and reversing final decisions which may have come to be rendered in the interregnum.

27. We are also of the firm opinion that even para 25.5 of Ashish Agarwal would not sustain the stand taken by the respondent since the same clearly confines itself to decisions or judgments rendered by a High Court invalidating a notice under Section 148 and the manifest intent of the Supreme Court being that its judgment would apply and govern irrespective of whether an appeal had been laid before it.

29. Accordingly, and for all the aforesaid reasons, we allow the present writ petition and quash the impugned SCN dated 30 May 2022 issued under Section 148A(b), the order dated 19 July 2022 issued under Section 148A(d) as well as the notice referable to Section 148 of the Act dated 20 July 2022.”

& 194/Chny/2025 Mohit Chandak :- 25 -: 9. The Jurisdictional High Court in the case of Merton v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax [2025] 171 taxmann.com 544 (Madras)/[2025] 475 ITR 734 (Madras) held as under:

9. It is submitted that the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal's case (cited supra) has been precluded the Department from issuing fresh notice under the new regime and that the earlier proceedings ought to have been construed as nullity in the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal's case (cited supra). 10. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Senior Standing Counsel for the respondents. 11. The reasons for issuance of notice on 28.06.2021 under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 as communicated to the petitioner vide notice dated 23.02.2022 issued under Section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the reasons stated in the notice issued under Section 148A(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 on 1.06.2022 read almost identically. 12. The issue was examined by the Assessing Officer which has culminated in an Assessment Order dated 30.03.2022. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal's case (cited supra), has summarized the position as under:- "28. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeals are allowed in part. The impugned common judgments and orders [Ashok Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine All 799] passed by the High & 194/Chny/2025 Mohit Chandak :- 26 -: Court of Judicature at Allahabad in WT No. 524 of 2021 and other allied tax appeals/petitions, is/are hereby modified and substituted as under: 28.1. The impugned Section 148 notices issued to the respective assessees which were issued under unamended Section 148 of the IT Act, which were the subject-matter of writ petitions before the various respective High Courts shall be deemed to have been issued under Section 148-A of the IT Act as substituted by the Finance Act, 2021 and construed or treated to be show-cause notices in terms of Section 148-A(b). The assessing officer shall, within thirty days from today provide to the respective assessees information and material relied upon by the Revenue, so that the assessees can reply to the show-cause notices within two weeks thereafter. 28.2. The requirement of conducting any enquiry, if required, with the prior approval of specified authority under Section 148-A(a) is hereby dispensed with as a one-time measure vis- a-vis those notices which have been issued under Section 148 of the unamended Act from 1-4-2021 till date, including those which have been quashed by the High Courts. 28.3. Even otherwise as observed hereinabove holding any enquiry with the prior approval of specified authority is not mandatory but it is for the assessing officers concerned to hold any enquiry, if required. 28.4. The assessing officers shall thereafter pass orders in terms of Section 148-A(d) in respect of each of the assessees concerned; Thereafter after following the procedure as required under Section 148-A may issue notice under Section 148 (as substituted). 28.5. All defences which may be available to the assessees including those available under Section 149 of the IT Act and all rights and contentions which may be available to the assessees concerned and Revenue under the Finance Act, 2021 and in law shall continue to be available.

13. In my view, the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal's case (cited supra) has been passed under Article 142 of the Constitution of India in view of the peculiar circumstances arising out of the amendment to the Income Tax Act, 1961 vide Finance Act, 2021. In order to put the issue at rest, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had given the above direction.

& 194/Chny/2025 Mohit Chandak :- 28 -: 10. Admittedly, in this case, assessment proceedings had already concluded on 31.03.2022 and the reassessment action was reinitiated on the same set of reasons vide Show Cause Notice dated 01.06.2022 under Section 148-A(b) [treated the notice u/s 148 dated 20.04.2021 as deemed u/s 148A(b)], leading to the passing of an order under Section 148-A(d) and issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act, both dated 31.07.2022.

11. In view of the position of law as enunciated in Anindita Sengupta and Merton v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax (supra), we find ourselves unable to sustain the impugned action of reassessment.

12. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned order dated 29.11.2024 and assessment order dated 27.03.2023 under Section 147 as well as consequential notice dated 31.07.2022 under Section 148 of the Act shall stand set aside.

14. In result, both the appeals of the assessee are allowed.

Order pronounced on 09th day of July, 2025 at Chennai.