DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, JHANDEWALAN EXTENSION vs. VIKAS WAHI, NOIDA

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ITA 6895/DEL/2026Status: DisposedITAT Delhi18 November 2026AY 2015-1614 pages

In favour of the assessee: the Revenue's appeal was dismissed. From the AI summary of this appeal.

AI SummaryDismissed

What did the Tribunal hold?

The Tribunal held that the assessment proceedings initiated under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AY 2014-15 and AY 2015-16 were beyond the limitation prescribed. The Tribunal followed the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in CIT vs. Jasjit Singh and the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in PCIT vs. Ojjus Medicare (P.) Ltd. and CIT vs. RRJ Securities Ltd. The Tribunal noted that the date of recording the satisfaction note by the AO of the searched person was 24.06.2022, and the seized documents were handed over to the AO of the 'other person' (assessee) subsequently, with the notice under Section 153C being issued on 10.11.2022, all pertaining to FY 2022-23 (AY 2023-24). Therefore, the six-year period under Section 153C would be from AY 2017-18 to 2022-23 (and 2023-24). AY 2014-15 was not covered within these six AYs, and the conditions for assessing it as part of the relevant assessment years were not met. Consequently, the assessment order for AY 2014-15 was annulled. The same reasoning was applied to AY 2015-16. The other grounds raised by the Revenue were not adjudicated as the issue was decided on legal grounds.

What were the facts?

The Revenue filed appeals against the orders of the CIT(A)/NFAC for Assessment Years (AY) 2014-15 and 2015-16. The appeals were filed 55 days late, which the Tribunal condoned due to reasonable cause. The core issue concerns the validity of assessments made under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Revenue contended that the CIT(A) erred in relying on the Delhi High Court's decision in PCIT vs. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. while the Revenue had filed an SLP against it. The assessee argued that the assessment years in question fell outside the permissible block period for Section 153C proceedings, rendering the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction invalid.

What were the issues?

1. Whether the assessment proceedings initiated under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AY 2014-15 and AY 2015-16 are barred by limitation, considering the date of search/handover of seized material. Assessee's contentions: The assessee argued that the date of handing over of seized material is the relevant date for reckoning the block period under Section 153C. This date was 10.11.2022, falling in AY 2023-24, which is the search year. The six assessment years (excluding the search year) and four relevant assessment years beyond that are to be reckoned from this date. The impugned assessment years fall outside this ten-year block period, making the Section 153C assessment without jurisdiction. The assessee relied on the decision in PCIT vs. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. Revenue's contentions: The Revenue submitted that the CIT(A) was not justified in relying on the judgment in PCIT vs. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. when an SLP was filed against it. The Revenue also relied on the findings of the Assessing Officer.

Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?

Section 153C,Section 153A

AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below

Before: SHRI S. RIFAUR RAHMAN & MS. MADHUMITA ROY

For Appellant: Shri Shivam Yadav, CA
For Respondent: Shri Zafarul Haque Tanweer, CIT DR
Hearing: 28.09.2026Pronounced: 18.11.2026

IN THE INCOME TAXAPPELLATE TRIBUNAL DELHI BENCH “A”, NEW DELHI BEFORE SHRI S. RIFAUR RAHMAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER and MS. MADHUMITA ROY, JUDICIAL MEMBER ITA No.6894/DEL/2026 (Assessment Year : 2014-15) ITA No.6895/DEL/2026 (Assessment Year : 2015-16) DCIT, Central Circle 26, vs. Vikas Wahi, New Delhi. C-3/1203, Cleo County, Sector 121, Noida - 201 301 (Uttar Pradesh). (PAN: AAMPW4901C) (APPELLANT) (RESPONDENT) ASSESSEE BY : Shri Shivam Yadav, CA REVENUE BY : Shri Zafarul Haque Tanweer, CIT DR Date of Hearing : 28.09.2026 Date of Pronouncement : 18.11.2026 O R D E R PER S. RIFAUR RAHMAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER : 1. These appeals are filed by the Revenue against the order of ld. Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)/National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC), New Delhi [“Ld. CIT (A)”, for short] dated 21.01.2026 for the Assessment Years 2014-15 and 2015-16.

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2.

At the time of filing of appeal, the Registry has pointed out a defect that both the appeals are time barred by 55 days. In response thereof, the ld. counsel for the assessee submitted that there was a reasonable cause for the delay in filing the appeal. Accordingly, he prayed that the delay in filing the appeals be condoned. We have heard both the counsels on the issue of condonation of delay. In our considered opinion, there was a reasonable cause for the delay in filing the appeals. Therefore, we condone the delay in filing the appeals before the Tribunal. 3. Since the issues are common and the appeals are connected, hence the same are heard together and being disposed off by this common order. We take up the Revenue’s appeal being ITA No.6894/Del/2026 for Assessment Year 2014-15 as lead case to adjudicate the issues under consideration. 4. At the time of hearing, ld. DR of the Revenue brought to our notice the grounds raised by the Revenue and submitted that the ld. CIT (A) was not justified in relying upon the judgment of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of PCIT, Central 1, Delhi vs. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No.52 of 2024) even when the Revenue has filed SLP against this decision of Hon’ble Delhi High Court. He further relied on the findings of the Assessing Officer. 5. On the other hand, ld. AR of the assessee submitted brief facts of the issue

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raised by the Revenue in the grounds of appeal no.(b) & (c) and submitted the following chart : Relevant Assessment year for initiation No. of No of Years years proceedings under section 153C of the Act 2023-24 1 2022-23 2 2021-22 3 2020-21 4 2019-20 5 2018-19 6 2017-18 7 2016-17 8 2015-16 9 2014-15 10 2013-14 11 6. It is submitted that it is a settled proposition of law that, in the case of an 'other person', the date of handing over of the seized material is to be treated as the date of search. In the present case, the said date is 10.11.2022, which falls in AY 2023-24. Consequently, AY 2023-24 constitutes the search year, with reference to which the block period comprising six assessment years (excluding the search year) and four relevant assessment years beyond the said six years (including the search year) is to be reckoned for the purpose of assumption of jurisdiction under Section 153C read with the fourth proviso to Section 153A, as held in Ojjus Medicare (supra). Accordingly, the impugned assessment year fall within the block period of ten years for the

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purpose of assessment under Section 153C, as detailed in the above chart. In view of the above, it is submitted that the impugned assessment year falls beyond the permissible block period and, therefore, the assessment under Section 153C was without jurisdiction, as rightly held by the Ld. CIT(A). 7. Ld. AR further submitted that ld. CIT (A), after going through the detailed submissions of the assessee and relying on the aforesaid decisions, held that the assessment years, under consideration, clearly falls outside the scope of application of section 153C of the Act, therefore, the contention of the assessee is found to be correct on this count. Further the assessee has stated before ld. CIT (A) that in cases where the escaped income is less than Rs. 50 Lakhs, the notice under section 153C of the Act can be issued for upto 6 assessment years from the end of the AY relevant to the previous year in which the books of accounts or documents or assets seized are received by the AO, and hence in the instant case under consideration (AY 2014-15), the proceedings were barred by limitation. He further submitted that ld. CIT (A) observed that the position of the statute has been clear insofar as the amount of income that has escaped assessment for which the reopening can be done for the 'relevant assessment years', i.e. beyond six years and up to ten years, is concerned. He submitted that accordingly, following the aforesaid

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decision and in view of principles of judicial discipline, ld. CIT(A) held that the impugned assessment order is beyond the limitation prescribed under section 153C of the Act, and therefore, the jurisdiction assumed by the Assessing Officer is not tenable in the light of aforesaid legal positions. Accordingly, he allowed the appeal on the legal grounds. In view of the above, ld. AR prayed that the order of the Ld. CIT (A) may be upheld and the appeal filed by the Revenue be dismissed. 8. Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record. We observed that the impugned assessment order is beyond the limitation prescribed under section 153C of the Act, and therefore, the jurisdiction assumed by the Assessing Officer is not tenable in the light of aforesaid legal positions in view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Jasjit Singh (supra) and Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of PCIT vs. Ojjus Medicare (P.) Ltd. and CIT vs. RRJ Securities Ltd. (2016) 380 ITR 612 (Delhi). For the sake of brevity, we reproduce the ratio of the aforesaid decisions :- “CIT vs Jasjit Singh-[2023| 155 taxmann.com 155 (SC)

“9. It is evident on a plain interpretation of Section 153C(1) that the Parliamentary intent to enact the proviso was to cater not merely to the question of abatement but also with regard to the date from which the six year period was to be reckoned, in respect of which the returns were to be filed by the third party (whose premises are not searched and in respect of whom the specific provision

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under Section 153-C was enacted. The revenue argued that the proviso [to Section 153(c)(1)] is confined in its application to the question of abatement.

10.

This Court is of the opinion that the revenue’s argument is insubstantial and without merit. It is quite plausible that without the kind of interpretation which SSP Aviation adopted, the A.O. seized of the materials – of the search party, under Section 132 – would take his own time to forward the papers and materials belonging to the third party, to the concerned A.O. In that event if the date would virtually “relate back” as is sought to be contended by the revenue, (to the date of the seizure), the prejudice caused to the third party, who would be drawn into proceedings as it were unwittingly (and in many cases have no concern with it at all), is dis-proportionate. For instance, if the papers are in fact assigned under Section 153-C after a period of four years, the third party assessee’s prejudice is writ large as it would have to virtually preserve the records for at latest 10 years which is not the requirement in law. Such disastrous and harsh consequences cannot be attributed to Parliament. On the other hand, a plain reading of Section 153-C supports the interpretation which this Court adopts.”

PCIT Vs Ojjus Medicare (P.) Ltd- [2024] 161 taxmann.com 160 (Delhi) F. IDENTIFICATION OF THE COMMENCEMENT POINT FOR THE PURPOSES OFCOMPUTATION OF THE SIX AND TEN YEAR BLOCK ………. G. COMPUTATION OF THE SIX AND TEN YEAR BLOCK IN THE PRESENT BATCH OF WRIT PETITIONS 86. In the present batch, List I pertains to writ petitions which have Satisfaction Notes recorded or Section 153C notices issued between the period 01 April 2021 to 31 March 2022. Undisputedly, the First Proviso to Section 153C, and which has been consistently recognized to also embody the commencement point for reckoning the six or the ten AYs', shifts the relevant date from the date of initiation of search or a requisition made to the date of receipt of books of account or documents and assets seized by the jurisdictional AO of the nonsearched person. Consequently, the block of six or ten AYs' would have to be reckoned bearing the aforesaid date in mind. Although in the present batch of writ petitions, the date of actual handing over has not been explicitly mentioned in a majority of the writ petitions, learned counsels for respective sides had addressed submissions based on the assumption that it would be the date of issuance of the Satisfaction Note by the AO of the non-searched person and in the case of nonavailability of such a note, the date of issuance of the Section 153C notices which would be pertinent for the purposes of the First Proviso to Section 153C.

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87.

Assuming, therefore, that the handover of material gathered in the course of the search and pertaining to the non-searched person occurred between 01 April 2021 to 31 March 2022, the same would essentially constitute FY 2021-22 as being the previous year of search for the purposes of the non-searched entity. As a necessary corollary, the relevant AY would become AY 2022-23. AY 2022- 23 would thus constitute the starting point for the purposes of identifying the six years which are spoken of in Section 153C. The six AYs' are envisaged to be those which immediately precede the AY so identified with reference to the previous year of search. It would thus lead us to conclude that it would be the six AYs' immediately preceding AY 2022-23 which could have formed the basis for initiation of action under Section 153C. Consequently, and reckoned backward, the six relevant AYs' would be:- Computation of the six-year block No. of years period as provided under Section 153C of the Act Consequently, AY 2021-22 would become the first of the six preceding AYs' and would as per the table set out hereinabove terminate at AY 2016-17. 88. Section 153A replicates the basis on which the six AYs' are to be identified and computed with the solitary distinction being that in the case of the searched person, the six AYs' are liable to be computed from the AY pertaining to the FY in which the search was conducted. The starting point for the purposes of identifying the six AYs' in the case of Section 153A would thus turn upon the year of search as opposed to the handover of material which is spoken of in the First Proviso to Section 153C. If one were to therefore assume that a search took place on a person between 01 April 2021 to 31 March 2022, the pertinent AY would become AY 2022-23 and the corresponding six AYs' would be as follows:- Computation of the six-year block No. of years period as provided under Section 153C of the Act 89. That takes us then to the issue of identifying the "relevant assessment year" for the purposes of computing the ten year block. Explanation 1 to Section 153A specifies the manner in which the entire ten AY period is to be computed. While the computation of six AYs' follows the position as enunciated and identified above, Explanation 1 prescribes that the ten AYs' would have to be computed from the end of the AY relevant to the FY in which the search was conducted or requisition made. The ten AY period consequently is to be reckoned from the end of the AY pertaining to the previous year in which the search was conducted as distinct from the preceding year which is spoken of in the case of the six relevant AYs'. 90. Viewed in that light, and while keeping the period of 01 April 2021 to 31 March 2022 as the constant, the relevant AY would be AY 2022-23. The ten AYs' would have to be computed from March 2023 with the said date indubitably constituting the end of the AY relevant to the previous year of search. Viewed in light of the above, the block period of 10 AYs' would be as follows:-

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Computation of the ten-year block No. of years period as provided under Section 153C read with Section 153A of the Act 91. Tested on the aforesaid precepts, it would be manifest that AY 2022-23 would form the first year of the block of ten AYs' and with the maximum period of ten AYs' terminating in AY 2013-14. We, in this regard also bear in consideration the following instructive passages as appearing in the decision handed down by a learned Judge of the Madras High Court in A.R. Safiullah. We deem it appropriate to extract the following paragraphs from that decision:- "9. Explanation-I is clear as to the manner of computation of the ten assessment years. It clearly and firmly fixes the starting point. It is the end of the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is conducted or requisition is made. There cannot be any doubt that since search was made in this case on 10.04.2018, the assessment year is 2019-20. The end of the assessment year 2019-20 is 31.03.2020. The computation of ten years has to run backwards from the said date i.e., 31.03.2020. The first year will of course be the search assessment year itself. In that event, the ten assessment years will be as follows : 1st Year 2019-20 2nd Year 2018-19 3rd Year 2017-18 4th Year 2016-17 5th Year 2015-16 6th Year 2014-15 7th Year 2013-14 8th Year 2012-13 9th Year 2011-12 10th Year 2010-11 The case on hand pertains to AY 2009-10. It is obviously beyond the ten year outer ceiling limit prescribed by the statute. The terminal point is the tenth year calculated from the end of the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is conducted. The long arm of the law can go up to this terminal point and not one day beyond. When the statute is clear and admits of no ambiguity, it has to be strictly construed and there is no scope for looking to the explanatory notes appended to statute or circular issued by the department. 10. In the case on hand, the statute has prescribed one mode of computing the six years and another mode for computing the ten years. Section 153A(1)(b) states that the assessing officer shall assess or reassess the total income of six years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is conducted. Applying this yardstick, the six years would go up to 2013- 14. The search assessment year, namely, 2019-20 has to be excluded. This is because, the statute talks of the six years preceding the search assessment year. But, while computing the ten assessment years, the starting point has to be the end

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of the search assessment year. In other words, search assessment year has to be including in the latter case. It is not for me to fathom the wisdom of the parliament. I cannot assume that the amendment introduced by the Finance Act, 2017 intended to bring in four more years over and above the six years already provided within the scope of the provision. When the law has prescribed a particular length, it is not for the court to stretch it. Plasticity is the new mantra in neuroscience, thanks to the teachings of Norman Doidge. It implies that contrary to settled wisdom, even brain structure can be changed. But not so when it comes to a provision in a taxing statute that is free of ambiguity. Such a provision cannot be elastically construed. 11. One other contention urged by the standing counsel has to be dealt with. It is pointed out that the petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction at the notice stage. Since the petitioner has demonstrated that the subject assessment year lies beyond the ambit of the provision, the respondent has no jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice. Once lack of jurisdiction has been established, the maintainability of the writ petition cannot be in doubt." In our considered opinion, the decision in A.R. Safiullah correctly expounds the legal position and the interpretation liable to be accorded to the identification of the ten AYs' which are spoken of in Sections 153A and 153C. 92. List II, forming part of this batch pertains to cases where Satisfaction Notes of the AO of the non-searched person were drawn between the period 01 April 2022 to 31 March 2023 and 01 April 2023 to 31 March 2024. Tested on the principles enunciated by us in the preceding passages of this judgment, we come to the conclusion that the relevant six AYs' would comprise the following years, when computed for the period 01 April 2022 to 31 March 2023:- Computation of the six-year block No. of years period as provided under Section 153C of the Act 93. The relevant block of six AYs' when computed for the period of 01 April 2023 to 31 March 2024 would be the following: Computation of the six-year block No. of years period as provided under Section 153C of the Act 94. Similarly, and in light of what has been held by us hereinabove, the relevant block of ten AYs' when computed for the period 01 April 2022 - 31 March 2023, and where the Satisfaction Note was drawn by the AO of the non- searched person between those two dates, would be as under:- Computation of the ten-year block No. of years period as provided under Section 153C read with Section 153A of the Act 95. The relevant block of ten AYs' when computed for the period 01 April 2023 – 31 March 2024, with the date of the Satisfaction Note drawn by the AO of

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the non-searched person falling within that period, would come to be identified as under: Computation of the ten-year block No. of years period as provided under Section 153C read with Section 153A of the Act. 96. To recall, the petitions forming part of List I pertain to AYs' 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13. So far as the aforenoted writ petitions are concerned, undisputedly AY 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 fall beyond the maximum period of ten AYs'. Since the ten AYs', when computed from the end of AY 2022-23 would terminate upon AY 2013-14, AYs' 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 would clearly fall outside the block period of ten AYs' and cannot legally or justifiably be reopened under Section 153C read with Section 153A of the Act. 97. Proceeding then to List II, we find that the petitions placed in that list pertain to cases where the hand over occurred in FYs 2022-23 and 2023-24. Consequently, the relevant AYs' would be AY 2023-24 and AY 2024-25 respectively. In light of the principles enunciated by us and which explain how the period of six and ten AYs' is liable to be computed, the reopening of assessments pertaining to AYs' 2010-11, 2011-12, 2012-13 and 2013-14 would clearly fall beyond the ambit of ten AYs' as provided under Section 153C read with Section 153A. We note in this behalf that all of the writ petitions forming part of List II pertain to the aforenoted AYs' 2010-11, 2011-12, 2012-13 and 2013-14. 98. We are therefore of the opinion that the Section 153C notices issued against the writ petitioners placed in List I and insofar as they pertain to AYs' 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 would not sustain being beyond the "relevant assessment year" which could have possibly formed the basis for initiation of action under that provision. Similarly, the Section 153C notices impugned by the writ petitioners placed in List II and insofar as they pertain to AYs' 2010-11, 2011-12, 2012-13 and 2013-14 and which have been found to fall outside the net of "relevant assessment year", being the ten year block, would be liable to be set aside on this score alone.” In RRJ Securities (Supra), the Hon'ble Delhi High Court held as under: “24. As discussed hereinbefore, in terms of proviso to Section 153C of the Act, a reference to the date of the search under the second proviso to Section 153A of the Act has to be construed as the date of handing over of assets/documents belonging to the Assessee (being the person other than the one searched) to the AO having jurisdiction to assess the said Assessee. Further proceedings, by virtue of Section 153C(1) of the Act, would have to be in accordance with Section 153A of the Act and the reference to the date of search would have to be construed as the reference to the date of recording of satisfaction. It would follow that the six assessment years for which assessments/reassessments could be made under Section 153C of the Act would also have to be construed with reference to the date of handing over of assets/documents to the AO of the Assessee. In this case,

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it would be the date of the recording of satisfaction under Section 153C of the Act, i.e .. 8th September, 2010. In this view, the assessments made in respect of assessment years 2003-04 and 2004-05 would be beyond the period of six assessment years as reckoned with reference to the date of recording of satisfaction by the AO of the searched person. It is contended by the Revenue that the relevant six assessment years would be the assessment years prior to the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted. If this interpretation as canvassed by the Revenue is accepted, it would mean that whereas in case of a person searched, assessments in relation to six previous years preceding the year in which the search takes place can be reopened but in case of any other person, who is not searched but his assets are seized from the searched person, the period for which the assessments could be reopened would be much beyond the period of six years. This is so because the date of handing over of assets/documents of a person, other than the searched person, to the AO would be subsequent to the date of the search. This, in our view, would be contrary to the scheme of Section 153C(1) of the Act, which construes the date of receipt of assets and documents by the AO of the Assessee (other than one searched) as the date of the search on the Assessee. The rationale appears to be that whereas in the case of a searched person the AO of the searched person assumes possession of seized assets/documents on search of the Assessee; the seized assets/documents belonging to a person other than a searched person come into possession of the AO of that person only after the AO of the searched person is satisfied that the assets/documents do not belong to the searched person. Thus, the date on which the AO of the person other than the one searched assumes the possession of the seized assets would be the relevant date for applying the provisions of Section 153A of the Act. We, therefore, accept the contention that in any view of the matter, assessment for A Y 2003-04 and AY 2004-05 were outside the scope of Section 153C of the Act and the AO had no jurisdiction to make an assessment of the Assessee's income for that year.” 9. We observed that as per the decision of the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court of Delhi, the period of six assessment years means six years prior to the assessment year in which the seized material was handed over to the AO of the 'other' (non-searched) person / satisfaction note u/s 153C was recorded by the concerned AO. as seen, the Satisfaction note in the instant case was recorded by the AO of the searched person on 24.06.2022, recording also that the seized documents were being handed over to the AO of the 'other person' (assessee) for necessary action. Thereafter, satisfaction note was recorded by the AO of the 'other person' (assessee) and subsequently the notice u/s 153C of the Act was

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issued by the AO on 10.11.2022, all dates pertaining to the F.Y. 2022-23 relevant to AY 2023-24. Therefore, by this yardstick, six years period as referred to in section 153C(1) of the Act would be from AY 2017-18 to 2022-23 (and 2023-24). 10. Further, we observed that ld. CIT (A) at pages 17 to 19 observed that to ascertain whether the income escaping assessment in the relevant assessment year or the aggregate of the assessment years amounted to or was likely to amount to Rs.50 Lakhs or more, the relevant portion of the satisfaction note as submitted by the assessee was perused. Ld. CIT (A) observed that the aggregate of the income having escaped assessment for the 'relevant assessment years', i.e. impugned AY 2014-15 (FY 2013-14), AY 2015-16 (FY 2014-15) and AY 2016-17 (FY 2015-16) as per the satisfaction note recorded falls short of RS.50 lakhs. 11. As discussed above, it is thus seen that A.Y. 2014-15 is not covered within six AYs as per section 153C of the Act and the conditions for assessing it as part of the relevant assessment years was not existent. Accordingly, based on the aforesaid facts in the instant case of the assessee, respectfully following the binding judgement of the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court as per judicial discipline in the case of Ojjus Medicare (P.) Ltd (supra), it is held that the notice u/s 153C issued on 10.11.2022 for the AY 2014-15 would fall beyond the ambit of six AYs' as provided under section 153C read with section 153A, and hence the impugned assessment order dated 04.03.2024

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passed u/s 153C of the Act for the instant AY 2014-15 in pursuance of such notice would not survive, having no legs to stand, and is thus annulled. 12. Respectfully following the aforesaid decisions, we are inclined to uphold the order of the ld. CIT (A) who has passed a well-reasoned and speaking order relying on the aforesaid decisions. Accordingly, the grounds raised by the Revenue are dismissed. 13. Since we have decided the issue on legal ground, the other grounds raised by the Revenue are not adjudicated and the same are kept open. 14. Since the facts in AY 2015-16 are exactly similar to AY 2014-15, our above findings in AY 2014-15 are applicable mutatis mutandis in Assessment Year 2015-16. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the Revenue for AY 2015-16 is dismissed. 15. In the result, the appeals filed by the Revenue are dismissed. Order pronounced in the open court on this 18th day of November, 2026

Sd/- sd/- (MADHUMITA ROY) (S. RIFAUR RAHMAN) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER Dated : 18.11.2026 TS

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