PRIEMARY AGRI CREDIT CO OPERATIVE BANK ,TUMKUR vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER, WARD-1, TIPTUR

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ITA 2666/BANG/2025Status: DisposedITAT Bangalore03 November 2026AY 2019-202052 pages

In favour of the assessee: the assessee's appeal was allowed. From the AI summary of this appeal.

AI SummaryAllowed

What did the Tribunal hold?

The Tribunal held that the assessment orders in both cases are bad in law and liable to be quashed because the notices issued were unsigned. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decision of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in Yeshoda Electricals (reported as 2025:KHC:38487-DB HC-KAR ITA 261/2021). The High Court, in that judgment, had clearly stated that any notice issued without the requisite signature of the issuing authority cannot constitute a valid notice under law, and that Section 282A(2) does not dispense with the requirement of signing the notice. The Tribunal noted that while Section 282A was amended and Rule 127A was introduced, the High Court's decision, which dealt with a digitally sent notice, still held that unsigned notices are invalid. Consequently, as the assessment proceedings themselves were quashed due to the invalid notices, the merits of the additions made in both cases were not considered. The appeals of both assessees were allowed.

What were the facts?

The appeals concern two assessees: Susheela Janardhan for AY 2017-18 and Priemary Agri Credit Co-Operative Bank Limited for AY 2019-20. The core issue in both cases is the validity of assessment orders stemming from unsigned notices. For the Bank, notices under sections 142(1) and 148 were allegedly unsigned. For Susheela Janardhan, the notice under section 143(2) was claimed to be unsigned. The assessees contend that unsigned notices render the subsequent assessment proceedings illegal and void. The procedural history involves the issuance of notices, the assessees' objections regarding their unsigned nature, and the subsequent assessment orders which are now under challenge before the Tribunal.

What were the issues?

1. Whether the assessment orders are bad in law and liable to be quashed on the ground that the notices issued under the relevant sections of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (specifically Section 148/142(1) for the Bank and Section 143(2) for Susheela Janardhan) were unsigned. Assessee's contentions: The assessees argue that unsigned notices are invalid and jurisdictional defects, rendering the entire assessment proceedings void ab initio, citing decisions from the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in Yeshoda Electricals and the Allahabad High Court in Vikas Gupta v/s. Union of India. They contend that the assessment orders are consequently non est and passed in violation of principles of natural justice. Revenue's contentions: The revenue's primary contention, as understood from the Tribunal's discussion, appears to be that Section 282A(2) of the Act, read with Rule 127A of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, allows for authentication of notices where the name and office of the Income Tax Authority are printed, even if not manually signed. They also relied on other High Court decisions like ZF Steering Gear (India) Ltd. and Sky Light Hospitality LLP, which the Tribunal found not applicable.

Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?

Section 148,Section 142(1),Section 148A,Section 143(2),Section 143(3),Section 282A,Section 69C,Section 54,Section 69A,Section 144,Section 250

AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, BANGALORE BENCHES, BANGALORE

Before: SHRI PRASHANT MAHARISHI & SHRI SOUNDARARAJAN K.

Heard together (2 matters)

ITA 1827/Bang/2025
ITA 2666/Bang/2025

Read from the judgment's own cause title. This page is filed under one of them.

आयकर अपीलीय अधिकरण, बेंगलुरू पीठें, बेंगलुरू INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, BANGALORE BENCHES, BANGALORE BENCH: B BEFORE SHRI PRASHANT MAHARISHI, VICE PRESIDENT AND SHRI SOUNDARARAJAN K., JUDICIAL MEMBER ITA 1827/Bang/2025 (निर्धारण वर्ा/Assessment Year : 2017-18) SUSHEELA JANARDHAN INCOME TAX OFFICER, 71, D 103, ADARSH RHYTHM, WARD - 5(3)(2), PANDURANGA NAGAR, 59, HMT BUILDING, BENGALURU-560076, BELLARY ROAD, Vs. KARNATAKA GANGANAGAR BENGALURU-560032, KARNATAKA अपीलधर्थी Appellant प्रत्यर्थी Respondent

Permanent Account Number of Assessee: ABPPJ6665G

अपीलधर्थी द्वारा/Appellant represented by: Sri. Hemant Pai Advocate & Shri Ravishankar SV Advocate प्रत्यर्थी द्वारा/Respondent represented by: Sri. Pradeep S - Addl. CIT & ITA 2666/Bang/2025 (निर्धारण वर्ा/Assessment Year : 2019-20) PRIEMARY AGRI CREDIT CO- INCOME TAX OFFICER, OPERATIVE BANK LIMITED WARD-1, SUGUR, NONAVINAKERE JAYADEVA COMPLEX, Vs. TIPTUR TALUK, TIPTUR TUMKUR-572224, KARNATAKA TIPTUR-572201, KARNATAKA अपीलधर्थी Appellant प्रत्यर्थी Respondent

Permanent Account Number of Assessee: AABAP4344A

अपीलधर्थी द्वारा/Appellant represented by: Shri Hemanth Pai Advocate & Shri Ravishankar SV Advocate प्रत्यर्थी द्वारा/Respondent represented by: Sri. Pradeep S - Addl. CIT

सुनवाई की तारीख / Date of conclusion of hearing: 07-Aug-2026 घोषणा की तारीख / Date of pronouncement: 03-Nov-2026 आदेश / ORDER PER SHRI PRASHANT MAHARISHI, VICE PRESIDENT 1. Ms Shusheela Janaradhan and Priemary Agri Credit Co-Operative Bank Limited [the Assessee/Appellant] filed ITA 1827/Bang/2025 for Assessment Year 2017- 18 and ITA 2626/Bang/2025 for Assessment Year 2019-20, respectively. The identical issue in both cases is the unsigned notice issued, rendering the assessment orders illegal and requiring them to be quashed. 2. In the case of Priemary Agri Credit Co-Operative Bank Limited u/s. 148 of the Act dated 31.03.2023 by the Ld. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1, the notices issued u/s. 142(1) dated 03.08.2023, 05.09.2023 and 26.10.2023 are unsigned. The facts in that case show that the Assessment was reopened by issuing a show cause notice u/s. 148A(b) dated 08.03.2023, culminating in an order u/s. 148A(d) dated 21.03.2023, which resulted in the issuance of a notice u/s. 148A of the Act on 31.03.2023. The claim is that the notice issued on 31.03.2023 u/s. 148 of the Act is unsigned. The claim is that the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Yeshoda Electricals has held that such a notice is invalid. The Assessee claims that the Assessment Order pursuant to that is also bad. It is stated before us that the issue is also covered in favour of the Assessee by the Allahabad High Court decision in Vikas Gupta v/s. Union of India 448 ITR 1. It is also claimed that, as the issue is already decided by the jurisdictional High Court, it is a complete nullity and futility.

3.

ITA No. 1827/Bang/2025 in the case of Susheela Janardhan, the facts show that the Assessee, an individual, filed the return of income for Assessment Year

2017-18 on 25.07.2017, with a total income of Rs. 15,55,490/-, which was picked up for limited scrutiny to verify the cash deposit. The Assessee's claim is that the notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act dated 09.08.2018, sent by the Ld. Assessing Officer, is unsigned and therefore invalid. The Ld. Authorized Representative, challenging the same, has cited several judicial precedents, including those cited in the case of Priemary Agri Credit Co-operative Bank Limited, to argue that the unsigned notice has resulted in an unsustainable and null order and deserves to be quashed.

4.

Assessee’s have raised the following grounds of appeal: ITA 1827/Bang/2025: 1. The order of the Learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) ("CIT(A)"), in so far as it is against the Appellant, is opposed to law, equity, weight of evidence, preponderance of probabilities on facts and circumstances of the case.

2.

The impugned assessment proceedings are bad in law, non est and passed in violation of principles of natural justice on the facts and circumstances of the case.

3.

The mandatory procedures applicable for assessment proceedings are not followed and consequently, the impugned proceedings are void ab initio on the facts and circumstances of the case.

4.

The notice issued under section 143(2) of the Act is non est and bad in law on the facts and circumstances of the case.

5.

The impugned order passed under section 143(3) of the Act is non est, bad in law and passed in violation of principles of natural justice on the facts and circumstances of the case.

6. The Appellant denies herself liable to be assessed at a total income of Rs. 2,10,46,528/- as against the returned income of Rs. 15,55,490/- on the facts and circumstances of the case.

7.

The learned CIT(A) failed to appreciate the fact that the impugned order was passed without issuing a show cause notice proposing the additions and consequently, the Appellant did not have an opportunity to object against the additions made on the facts and circumstances of the case.

8.

The learned CIT(A) erred in law and on facts in upholding the disallowance of deduction claimed under section 54 amounting to Rs. 1,90,05,000/- made by the learned Assessing Officer on the facts and circumstances of the case.

9.

The authorities below failed to appreciate the fact that the Appellant has complied with all the conditions to claim deduction under section 54 of the Act and consequently, the Appellant is entitled to claim deduction under section 54 of the Act on the facts and circumstances of the case.

10.

The learned CIT(A) erred in law and on facts in upholding the addition made by the learned Assessing Officer amounting to Rs. 4,90,000/-being cash payment made for purchase of jewellery as unexplained expenditure under section 69C of the Act on the facts and circumstances of the case.

11.

The authorities below failed to appreciate that the rigours of section 69C of the Act are not applicable to the facts of the case.

The Appellant craves to add, alter, delete or substitute any of the grounds urged above.

In view of the above and other grounds that may be urged at the time of hearing, the Appellant prays that the appeal may be allowed may be allowed in the interest of justice and equity.

ITA 2666/Bang/2025: 1. The order passed by the learned Commissioner of Income Tax, NFAC, under section 250 of the Act is so far as it is against the Appellant is opposed to law, weight of evidence, probabilities, facts and circumstances of the Appellant’s case.

2.

The appellant denies itself to be assessed at Rs. 6,14,69,453/- as against the returned loss of Rs. (-)-7,68,128/- for the assessment year 2019-20 under the facts and circumstances of the case.

3.

The order passed u/s 144 of the Act is bad in law on the facts and circumstances of the case.

4.

The authorities below erred in treating loan sanction of Rs. 6,14,57,963/-, being a liability as income of the society u/s 69A of the Act on the facts and circumstances of the case.

5.

The appellant craves leave to add, alter, delete or substitute any of the grounds urged above.

In view of the above and other grounds that may be urged at the time of the hearing of the appeal, the appellant prays that the appeal may be allowed and appropriate relief be granted in the interest of justice and equity.

5.

During the course of the hearing, the Ld. Authorized Representatives were requested to explain the provisions of section 282A of the Act, which provide that sub-section 1 sets out 2 modes of communication. In the first mode, where the notice is in paper form, it needs to be signed. In the second mode, communication in electronic form, the prescribed form of authentication is stated to be rule 127A of the Income Tax Rules, 1962. According to rule 127A, communication in electronic form is properly authenticated if the name and office of the Income Tax Authority are printed in the e-mail body. It was further

questioned whether sub-section 2 of section 282A also speaks identically, and therefore, in both notices in the case of both the AO ’s, the name and designation are printed in the notice. This was not denied by either of the Ld. Authorized Representatives. However, both relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Yeshoda Electricals and submitted that the Hon’ble Court, in para no. 7.1 and para no. 8, has dealt with this issue. The Hon’ble Court also specifically referred to section 282A sub-section 2 in para no. 8. Therefore, the question of the applicability of sub-section 2 is now irrelevant. It was also pointed out by them that judicial discipline demands that subordinate authorities have to follow those orders.

6.

In this regard, several questions were raised, and on 22.06.2026 a detailed order sheet raising these issues was submitted to the Ld. Authorised Representatives. The order sheet entry is as under:-

Issue of Unsigned notice The issue concerns the allegedly unsigned notice issued by the learned AO under section 148 of the Act. The learned AR submitted that the issue is covered by the decision of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Yashoda Electricals NC: 2025:KHC:38487-DB HC-KAR. The facts in that case, as recorded by the ITAT in Yashoda Electricals v. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax [20231 154 taxmann.com 677 (Bangalore Trib.) [03-02-20211, were as follows. "24. In this connection, the assessee submitted that the notice u/s. 148 of the Act dated 22-03- 2012 was not complied since it was found to be an illegal notice as it did not bear the signature of the AO. Further, the assessee has not complied with the hearing notice said to have been issued on 10-07-2012 for production of details on 27-07-2012 since the Reassessment Proceedings were not initiated in accordance with the law. The AO in the Assessment Order has stated that the Assessee has filed a letter on 26-07-2012 requesting for an Adjournment which is incorrect. The Assessee has not filed any such adjournment letters." Honourable high court held so for notice issued prior to 1-4-2016. "8. The Revenue has sought to rely on Section 282A of the Act to validate the unsigned notice. On its plain reading, Section 282A requires that a notice issued under the Act by the Income Tax Authority must be signed. Reliance is placed on sub-section (2) of Section 282A, which provides that every notice issued, served, or given for the purposes of the Act by any Income Tax Authority shall be deemed to be authenticated if the name and office of a designated Income Tax Authority is printed or otherwise written thereon. A reading of this sub- section, however,

clearly shows that it does not dispense with the requirement of signing the notice by the Income Tax Authority. Therefore, reliance on Section 282A offers no assistance to the Revenue."

Thus, the decision refers to the pre-amended section 282A and not to the provision as amended with effect from 1-4-2016.

Further section 282A provides that.

[Authentication of notices and other documents.

94 282A. (1) Where this Act requires a notice or other document to be issued by any income- tax authority, such notice or other document shall be 95 (signed96 and issued in paper form or communicated in electronic form by that authority in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed97). (2) Every notice or other document to be issued, served or given for the purposes of this Act by any income-tax authority, shall be deemed to be authenticated if the name and office of a designated income-tax authority is printed, stamped or otherwise written thereon.

Sec.282A(1) of the Act prior to its substitution by the Finance Act, 2016 w.e.f. 1-6-2016 also required the notice or document issued to be signed. The pre-amended provision of sec.282A(1) of the Act read as under: "282A. (1) Where this Act requires a notice or other document to be issued by any income-tax authority, such notice or other document shall be signed in manuscript by that authority." The above sub-section has been amended as follows: Authentication of notices and other documents. 282A. (1) Where this Act requires a notice or other document to be issued by any income-tax authority, such notice or other document shall be signed and issued in paper form or communicated in electronic form by that authority in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed. (2) Every notice or other document to be issued, served or given for the purposes of this Act by any income-tax authority, shall be deemed to be authenticated if the name and office of a designated income-tax authority is printed, stamped or otherwise written thereon.

(3) For the purposes of this section, a designated Income-tax authority shall mean any income- tax authority ty authorised by the Board to issue, serve or give such notice or other document after authentication in the manner as provided in sub-section (2).

After the amendment in the year 2016, the section dispensed with the manual signature and also the section prescribes that the notice or order if it is issued in paper form or communicated in electronic mode, it should be signed by that authority in accordance with the procedure as prescribed. The amendment only speaks about the manual signing and when the sub-section (2) and (3) are read along with sub-section (1), the mere mentioning of the name and designation of the officer in the notice or order is enough for authentication.

The Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Ambernath City Hospital (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India (2026) 182 taxmann.com 268 (Bombay)/(2026) 309 Taxman Ba (Bombay) [06-01-2026), following Prakash Krishnavtar Bhardwaj v. Income-tax Officer (2023) 150 taxmann.com 60 (Bombay)/(2023) 293 Taxman 132 (Bombay)/(2023) 451 ITR 27 (Bombay) [09-01-2023), appears to have proceeded without referring to section 282A(2) of the Act. The decision also did not consider the judgment of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in [1984] 17 Taxman 120 (Karnataka)/(1984) 145 ITR 246 (Karnataka)/(1984) 43 CTR 253 (Karnataka) (20-10-1983), where an unsigned sheet accompanying the order was considered, and it was held, relying on section 292B, that such documents could not be treated as invalid. The Hon'ble Karnataka High Court held that: Regard being had to these facts, it seems to us that the defect or omission pointed out by the Tribunal cannot invalidate the assessment order in view of the provisions of section 292B. The said section, which has been introduced by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, of Income, with effect from 1-10-1975, reads: "No return of income, assessment, notice, summons or other proceeding furnished or made or issued or taken or purported to have been furnished or made or issued or taken in pursuance of any of the provisions of this Act shall be invalid or shall be deemed to be invalid merely by reason of any mistake, defect or omission in such return of income, assessment, notice, summons or other proceeding if such return of income, assessment, notice, summons or other proceeding is in substance and effect in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of this Act." The assessment order in question was made on 30-3-1976, i.e., subsequent to the above section was brought into force. The impugned assessment order, in our opinion, in substance and effect, is in conformity with and according to the intent and purpose of the Act. Having regard to the facts found, the question referred needs to be reframed as follows: "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessment order is invalid under section 143 (3) and has to be annulled ?" We answer the question in the negative and in favour of the revenue. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs." There is also another decision of Honourable Karnataka High court in Toyota Taush India (P.) Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax [2024] 164 taxmann.com 85 (Karnataka)/[2024] 468 ITR 29 (Karnataka) [13-02- 2024] wherein it was held that, where TPO's order was not signed digitally or physically even on last date of limitation, i.e. 31-07-2021 and was subsequently physically signed and furnished to assessee, TPO's order was clearly illegal and non-est and same deserved to be quashed. But this decision did not refer to any of the provision of the act. Further Doddagarudanahalli Vyavasaya Seva Bank Niyamitha vs. Income-tax Officer [2025] 174 taxmann.com 864 (Karnataka) [03-04-2025) also did not refer to any provisions of the Act. The expression 'shall be signed’ used in section 282A(1) makes signing of notice or other document by authority a mandatory requirement and notice or document would take legal effect only after it is signed by prescribed authority (Vikas Gupta v. UOI [2022] 142 taxmann.com 253/289 Taxman 443 (All.)). Where in the approval u/s 151, name, designation and office is printed, submission of assessee that approval is not digitally signed would not be sustainable, more so when it bears DIN & Document Number (Bharat Krishi Kendra v. UOI [2022] 136 taxmann.com 245 (Chhattisgarh)].

Meaning of signed

1.

Includes initials, Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. P.S. Malvenkar, (1978) 3 SCC 78: 1978 SCC (L&S) 430.

2.

Means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorized in this behalf, [Section 18, Explanation (b), Limitation Act, 1963 (India)]. 3. Save in the case of a judgment or decree, includes stamped, [Section 2(20), Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (India)).

Signed and signature - Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, at pp. 2431 and 2432, Vol. 5 of the Fifth Edn.. the word "signed" is defined as follows:

“signed; Signature. (1) Speaking generally, a signature is the writing or otherwise affixing, a person's name or a mark to represent his name, by himself or by his authority R. V. Justices of Kent), (1873) 8 QB 305: 42 LJMC 112 with the intention of authenticating a document as being that of or as binding on, the person whose name or mark is so written or affixed. In Morton v. Copeland, (1855) 16 CB 517: 139 ER 861 Maule, J., said, ‘Signature does not, necessarily, mean writing a person's Christian and surname, but any mark which identifies it as the act of the party', but the reporter adds in a note, 'provided it be proved or admitted to be genuine and be the accustomed mode of signature of the party'. Without more 'to sign’ is not the same as 'to subscribe'.

(2) The minute requisite of a signature will vary according to the nature of the documents to which it is affixed, e.g. (a) Deeds; (b) Wills; (c) Contracts; (d) Bills of exchange and promissory notes; (e) Solicitors ‘bills; (f) Electioneering paper; (g) Judge's orders and legal proceedings: (h) Office copies Nagulapati Lakshmamma v. Mupparaju Subbaiah, (1998) 5 SCC 285. Meaning of Sign 1. In relation to a person who is unable to write his name means authenticate in such manner as may be prescribed, Uttamrao Shivdas Jankar v. Ranjitsinh Vijaysinh Mohite Patil, (2009) 13 SCC 131.

2.

Includes mark, when the person making the mark is unable to write his name, [Section 3, Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act, 1886 (India)].

3.

Sign with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, shall, with reference to a person who is unable to write his name, include "mark", with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, (Section 3(56), General Clauses Act, 1897).

4.

To create a digital signature for a message or to affix a signature to a document, depending upon the context, (Schedule 5, Information Technology (Certifying Authorities) Rules, 2000 (India)).

5.

In relation to a person who is unable to write his name, means authenticate in such manner as may be prescribed, [Section 2(i), Representation of the People Act, 1951 (India)). 6. In Webster's New World Dictionary, the word "sign" means "to write one's name on, as in acknowledging authorship, authorising action etc." To write one's name is signature. Signing means writing one's name on some document or paper. The document must be signed in such

a way as to make it appear that the person signing it is the author of it and if that appears it does not matter what the form of the instrument is or in what part of it the signature occurs, Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 526, 527 : (1967) 1 SCR 843 : (1967) 69 Punj LR (D) 49. 7. A sign or mark impressed upon anything; a stamp, a mark; the name of a person written by himself either in full or by initials as regards his Christian name or names and in full as regards his surname or by initials only (see Blewitt, In the goods of, (1880) 5 P.D. 116) or by mark only, though he can write (see Baker v. Dening, (1838) 8 Ad & E 94). (Whart.) The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Jindal Exports and Imports (2.) Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax [2023] 152 taxmann.com 609 (Delhi)/(2023) 294 Taxman 711 (Delhi)/[2024] 469 ITR 601 (Delhi) [26-07-2023] held that notices dated 2-6-2022 issued under section 148A(b) for assessment years 2013-14 and 2014-15, though emailed after 3-6-2022, not only breached CBDT Instruction No. 1/2022 dated 11-5-2022 but also violated section 282A, as they did not mention the name and designation of the officer issuing them. Accordingly, the notices under section 148A (b) and the order under section 148A(d) were set aside.

In Asro Arcade v. Income-tax Officer (2026) 186 taxmann.com 313 (Delhi) (16-04-2026), it was held that a notice issued under section 148 for initiating reassessment, though not digitally or manually signed, satisfied the authentication requirement under section 282A(2) because it bore the name and designation of the issuing officer. The notice was therefore held valid, and the reassessment order was sustained. These decisions considered the provisions of section 282A of the Act. This is the only decision which has considered provision of section 282A (2) of the Act as under:-

10.

A simple look at the above notice reveals that it bears the name and designation of the issuing authority. According to us, the same falls within the ambit of sub-Section (2) of Section 282A of the Act 1961, which provision reads thus:

(2) Every notice or other document to be issued, served or given for the purposes of this Act by any income tax authority, shall be deemed to be authenticated if the name and office of a designated income-tax authority is printed, stamped or otherwise written thereon."

11.

Since the name and the designation of the issuing officer has been mentioned, according to us, no signature is necessary. In the present era, when computer generated notice(s) and order (s) are being issued, the inscription of name (s) and the designation(s) is enough, as no digital document can bear the signature.

12.

May be a digital signature is a proper course, but since sub section (2) of Section 282A of the Act of 1961 does not enjoin upon the issuing authority to affix digital signature, we are of view that there is no irregularity worth the name in the notice under consideration. Because, in any case name and designation as required under Section 282A (2) of the Act of 1961 has been mentioned.

In Mytheenkunju Muhammed Kunju Kandathil Jewellers v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax [2024] 160 taxmann.com 630 (Cochin-Trib.)/[2024] 113 ITR (T) 40 (Cochin Trib.)/[2024] 206 ITD 226 (Cochin Trib.) (21-02-2024), the Cochin Tribunal held that section 282A of the Income-tax

Act, 1961, read with rule 127A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, deems notices and other documents to be authenticated where the name and office of the income-tax authority are printed on them, whether they are transmitted electronically or displayed on designated websites. In that case, the assessee objected that the assessment order for assessment year 2016-17 was neither physically nor digitally signed by the Assessing Officer. The Department clarified that technical issues may sometimes prevent digital signing, requiring manual signing, and that system-generated fields such as the date, PAN and DIN prevented manipulation or ante-dating. It also produced digitally signed penalty notices under sections 274 read with sections 271A and 271B, along with successful delivery reports, and stated that the assessment orders for assessment years 2016-17 and 2019-20 were uploaded and sent to the assessee's registered email ID. Since the officer's name and designation were printed on the assessment order, the order was physically signed, uploaded and emailed to the assessee, the Tribunal held that it was deemed to be authenticated and was therefore valid. Mere signing by putting hands is not the only way of authentication law also prescribed other methods of authentication.

The definition of "digital signature" in section 2 (p) of the Information Technology Act, 2000- authentication of an electronic record by a subscriber through an electronic method or procedure in accordance with section 3-does not correspond to the requirements of section 282A (2) and (3) of the Act.

Rue 127 of the IT Rules also needs to be considered. No provision comparable to section 282A of the Income-tax Act has been shown to us under the GST Act. Even otherwise, why it should not be treated as mere irregularity and not an illegality. Assessee did not object before the dl AO/ CIT (A) but participated in assessment proceedings. Thus, what is the prejudice caused to assessee also. In view of above facts, decisions, this issue needs deliberation, and further arguments and also the notice whether the issue should be referred to the special bench or not. Fixed for hearing on 29/06/2026 at 2.30 p.m.

8.

The Ld. Departmental Representative submitted that although the unsigned notice u/s. 148 is challenged by the Ld. Authorized Representative, if it is so and if it does not comply with the manner of authentication, despite there being sub- section 2, a fresh Assessee-specified notice u/s. 148, duly authenticated by a valid digital signature, was sent to the registered e-mail address of the Assessee, and therefore the claim of the Ld. Authorized Representative fails.

9.

In response, the Ld. Authorised Representative submitted that when a 148 notice is issued that is invalid and unsigned, the revenue cannot take recourse

to the second 148 notice, which is duly signed. He further referred to the decision of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court.

10.

In the case of Susheela Janardhan, Shri Hemant Pai, Advocate, the Ld. Authorised Representative submitted a 30-page written submission in response to the order sheet entry. This is as under:

A. Preamble : 1. It is respectfully submitted that the notice dated 30.06.2026 issued by this Hon’ble Tribunal (Refer Annexure – A) concerning the validity of an unsigned notice issued under section 143(2) (“the impugned issue”) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”) records, inter alia, the following : a. At Page 1 Para 1 - In ITA No. 2666/Bang/2025, the assessee submitted that the impugned issue is covered by the decision of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of M/s Yeshoda Electricals in ITA No. 261/2021 dated 24.09.2025 reported as NC:2025:KHC:38487-DB (Refer Annexure – G), wherein it was held that an unsigned notice is invalid. b. At Page 1 Para 3 – Decision rendered in the case of M/s Yeshoda Electricals (Refer Annexure – G) applies to notices issued prior to 01.04.2016. c. At Page 2 Para 1 - Decision rendered in the case of M/s Yeshoda Electricals (Refer Annexure – G) refers to pre-amended section 282A and not the amended one w.e.f. 01.04.2016.

d. At Page 3 Para 3 – w.e.f. 01.04.2016, section 282A of the Act dispensed with manual signature and mere mentioning of the name and designation of the officer in the notice or order is enough for authentication. e. At Page 3 Para 4 - The Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the cases of Ambernath City Hospital reported in [2026] 182 taxmann.com 268 (Bombay) (Refer Annexure – H) and Prakash Krishnavtar Bhardwaj reported in [2023] 150 taxmann.com 60 (Bombay) appears to have proceeded without referring to section 282A(2) of the Act and without considering the judgement of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of R. Giridhar reported in (1984) 145 ITR 246 (Kar) (Refer Annexure – I) which had held that an unsigned sheet accompanying the assessment order was valid by virtue of section 292B of the Act. f. At Page 4 Para 1 - Another decision of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in Toyota Tsusho India (P.) Ltd. reported in [2024] 164 taxmann.com 85 (Karnataka) (Refer Annexure – J) which held that the unsigned was illegal and non est did not refer to any provisions of the Act.

g. At Page 4 Para 1 - Another decision of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Doddagarudanahalli Vyavasaya Seva Bank Niyamitha reported in [2025] 174 taxmann.com 864 (Karnataka) (Refer Annexure – K) also did not refer to any provisions of the Act. h. At Page 4 Para 2 - The decision of the of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of Vikas Gupta* reported in [2022] 142 taxmann.com 253 (All) held that in terms of section 282A(1) of the Act, the document would take legal effect only after it is signed by the prescribed authority.

*SLP (Civil) Diary No. 21742/2023 filed by the Revenue dismissed on 26.08.2025

i. At Page 4 Para 2 - The decision of the of the Hon’ble Chhattisgarh High Court in the case of Bharat Krishi Kendra reported in [2022] 136 taxmann.com 245 (Chhattisgarh) held that an unsigned approval under section 151 of the Act would not be sustainable. j. At Page 7 Para 8 - The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Jindal Exports and Imports (P.) Ltd. reported in [2023] 152 taxmann.com 609 (Delhi) in which notices not mentioning the name and designation of the officer were set aside. k. At Page 7 Para 9 - The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Asro Arcade reported in [2026] 186 taxmann.com 313 (Delhi) (Refer Annexure – L) upheld the validity of an unsigned notice issued under section 148 of the Act on the basis of section 282A(2) of the Act and further records that that this is the only decision which has considered the provision of section 282A(2) of the Act. l. At Page 8 Para 11 - In terms of section 282A(2) of the Act, if the name and designation of the issuing officer has been mentioned, according to this Hon’ble Tribunal, no signature is necessary and further records that in the present era, when computer generated notices and orders are being issued, the inscription of name and designation of the officer is enough as no digital document can bear the signature. m. At Page 8 Para 12 - Although affixation of a digital signature may be the preferable course, section 282A(2) of the Act does not mandate the use of a digital signature and further expresses a view that no legal infirmity attaches to the unsigned notice so long as the name and designation of the issuing authority have been mentioned as required under section 282A(2) of the Act. n. At Page 8 Para 4 - The Hon’ble Cochin Tribunal in the case of Mytheenkunju Muhammed Kunku Kandathil Jewellers reported in [2024] 160 taxmann.com 630 (Cochin-Trib.) (Refer Annexure – M) held that an unsigned notice is valid by virtue of section 282A of the Act read with Rule 127A, which deems notices and other documents to be duly authenticated where the name and office of the issuing authority are printed thereon. o. Page 9 Para 2 & 3 - Mere signing by putting hands is not the only way of authentication as law prescribes other methods such as “digital signature” as defined under section 2(p) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which however does not correspond to the requirements of section 282A(2) and 282A(3) of the Act.

p. Page 9 Para 4 - Rule 127 of the Income Tax Rules, 1961, also requires consideration and that no provision pari materia to section 282A of the Act has been shown to exist under the GST Act. q. Page 9 Para 5 & 6 - Even otherwise, whether an unsigned notice should merely be regarded as an irregularity rather than an illegality, particularly when the assessee participated in the assessment proceedings without raising any objection before either the Assessing Officer or the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), and whether any prejudice has been caused to the assessee. r. Page 9 Para 7 - In view of the above facts, decisions, the impugned issue needs deliberation and further arguments, including the question whether the matter ought to be referred to a Special Bench

2.

Thereafter, during the course of the personal hearing held on 23.07.2026, the Appellant raised preliminary objections to the proposed reference of the impugned issue to a Special Bench under section 255(3) of the Act and simultaneously advanced detailed submissions on the merits of the controversy. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the matter was adjourned to 07.08.2026, with a direction to the Appellant to file objections and written submissions, inter alia, addressing the proposed reference to the Special Bench under section 255(3) of the Act.

3.

It is in the aforesaid background that the present objections and written submissions are being filed, confined to the limited issue of demonstrating why a reference to a Special Bench is wholly unwarranted and why the present appeal deserves to be decided by this Hon'ble Bench itself in accordance with the binding law governing the issue. B. Written Submissions :

4.

It is submitted that the issuance of a valid notice under section 143(2) of the Act is a jurisdictional prerequisite for conducting assessment proceedings and without a valid notice, the Assessing Officer lacks jurisdiction to proceed with scrutiny assessment and consequently, the assessment order passed without issuing a valid notice under section 143(2) of the Act is liable to be annulled. 5. It is submitted that such a jurisdictional notice, issued in exercise of statutory power and intended to create legal consequences for the assessee, must necessarily bear the signature of the issuing authority, either by way of a manual signature or a valid digital signature, signifying the conscious exercise of statutory power. In the absence of such signature, the notice lacks legal character, is non est in the eyes of law and incapable of conferring jurisdiction upon the Assessing Officer to proceed with the assessment. 6. It is submitted that in the present case, admittedly the jurisdictional notice dated 09.08.2018 issued under section 143(2) of the Act (Refer Annexure – B) is neither signed digitally or manually by the Assessing Officer and consequently, is invalid in the eyes of law. 7. It is submitted that section 282A(1) of the Act unequivocally mandates that every notice required to be issued under the Act 'shall be signed'. The relevant portion of the section

282A of the Act prior to its amendment vide Finance Act, 2016 and postamendment along with Rule 127 is reproduced below for ready reference: Pre-Amendment Authentication of notices and other documents. 282A. (1) Where this Act requires a notice or other document to be issued by any income- tax authority, such notice or other document shall be signed in manuscript by that authority. (2) Every notice or other document to be issued, served or given for the purposes of this Act by any income-tax authority, shall be deemed to be authenticated if the name and office of a designated income-tax authority is printed, stamped or otherwise written thereon. (3) For the purposes of this section, a designated income-tax authority shall mean any income-tax authority authorised by the Board to issue, serve or give such notice or other document after authentication in the manner as provided in sub-section (2). Post-Amendment Authentication of notices and other documents. 282A. (1) Where this Act requires a notice or other document to be issued by any income- tax authority, such notice or other document shall be [signed and issued in paper form or communicated in electronic form by that authority in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed]. (2) Every notice or other document to be issued, served or given for the purposes of this Act by any income-tax authority, shall be deemed to be authenticated if the name and office of a designated income-tax authority is printed, stamped or otherwise written thereon. (3) For the purposes of this section, a designated income-tax authority shall mean any income-tax authority authorised by the Board to issue, serve or give such notice or other document after authentication in the manner as provided in sub-section (2). Rule Authentication of notices and other documents. 127A. (1) Every notice or other document communicated in electronic form by an income- tax authority under the Act shall be deemed to be authenticated,— (a) in case of electronic mail or electronic mail message (hereinafter referred to as the e- mail), if the name and office of such income-tax authority— (i) is printed on the e-mail body, if the notice or other document is in the e- mail body itself; or (ii) is printed on the attachment to the e-mail, if the notice or other document is in the attachment, and the e-mail is issued from the designated e-mail address of such income-tax authority;

(b) in case of an electronic record, if the name and office of the income-tax authority— (i) is displayed as a part of the electronic record, if the notice or other document is contained as text or remark in the electronic record itself; or (ii) is printed on the attachment in the electronic record, if the notice or other document is in the attachment, and such electronic record is displayed on the designated website. (2) The Principal Director General of Income-tax (Systems) or the Director General of Income-tax (Systems) shall specify the designated e-mail address of the income-tax authority, the designated website and the procedure, formats and standards for ensuring authenticity of the communication. Explanation.—For the purposes of this rule, the expressions— (i) "electronic mail" and "electronic mail message" shall have the same meanings respectively assigned to them in Explanation to section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000); (ii) "electronic record" shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in clause (t) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000).] Authentication of notices and other documents. 8. A plain and grammatical reading of section 282A of the Act, both before and after its amendment by the Finance Act, 2016, leaves no manner of doubt that every notice or other document required to be issued under the Act must necessarily bear the signature of the issuing authority. Parliament has consciously retained the mandatory expression "shall be signed" even after the 2016 amendment, thereby unequivocally demonstrating its legislative intent that affixation of a signature continues to be an indispensable statutory requirement for every notice or document issued under the Act. Significantly, while sub-section (1) alone was amended to facilitate electronic communication, sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 282A of the Act have remained completely unaltered. This legislative continuity reinforces, rather than dilutes, the mandatory requirement of authentication through signature. 9. It is submitted that the Revenue’s contention that, by virtue of the amendment introduced through the Finance Act, 2016, the requirement of affixing a signature stands dispensed with in the case of electronically communicated notices is wholly untenable and contrary to the plain language of section 282A(1) of the Act. 10. In this regard, it is respectfully submitted that had the Parliament intended to dispense with the requirement of signature altogether, it could easily have omitted the words "shall be signed" from the statutory provision. Instead, Parliament consciously retained the mandatory requirement of signature while merely expanding the permissible modes by which a duly signed notice may be issued, namely, issuance in paper form or communication in electronic form. The amendment, therefore, alters only the mode of transmission of a notice and not the substantive requirement that every notice must first be duly signed by the competent authority before it can acquire legal validity.

11.

The amended provision therefore contemplates only two alternative modes by which a signed notice may be served on the assessee, namely: i. a signed notice issued in paper form; or ii. a signed notice communicated in electronic form. The emphasis of the amendment is on the mode of transmission and not on the requirement of signature. 12. The phraseology employed in section 282A(1) of the Act, namely, "signed and issued in paper form or communicated in electronic form", admits of only one reasonable interpretation. The words "signed and" precede both alternatives and applying settled principles of English grammar as well as statutory interpretation, qualify each of the coordinated expressions that follow unless the legislative context clearly indicates otherwise. Consequently, the provision must necessarily be read as requiring that every notice be signed and thereafter either issued in paper form or communicated in electronic form. 13. Any construction suggesting that the expression "signed" applies only to notices issued in paper form would render the statutory requirement of signature wholly redundant in the case of electronically communicated notices. Such an interpretation is impermissible. It is a settled canon of statutory construction that Parliament does not employ words unnecessarily and that every word used in a statute must be given due meaning and effect. A construction that renders any part of the statutory text otiose must therefore be eschewed. 14. The aforesaid interpretation is further reinforced by ordinary principles governing the English language. Where a qualifying expression precedes a coordinated phrase, the qualifier ordinarily extends to each of the alternatives unless the context indicates a contrary intention. By way of illustration: i. The application shall be signed and submitted by post or uploaded electronically; or ii. Every return shall be verified and furnished physically or electronically. No reasonable reader would construe either of the above expressions as dispensing with the requirement that the application be signed or the return be verified merely because it is transmitted electronically. The requirement of signature or verification necessarily attaches to both modes of transmission. Section 282A(1) of the Act must therefore receive the same construction, namely, that every statutory notice, whether issued physically or communicated electronically, must bear the signature of the competent authority. 15. Such an interpretation alone gives effect to the legislative purpose underlying the amendment. There exists no rational basis to infer that Parliament intended to insist upon authentication of notices issued in paper form while simultaneously permitting electronically communicated notices, which produce identical legal consequences, to be issued without any authentication whatsoever. Electronic communication has now become the principal mode of administration under the faceless assessment regime. If the interpretation

canvassed by the Revenue were accepted, the statutory safeguard of authentication would stand substantially diluted in respect of the overwhelming majority of notices issued under the Act, thereby eroding the principles of certainty, authenticity, transparency and accountability that govern the exercise of statutory power. 16. The Act recognises and facilitates electronic governance without compromising the mandatory requirement of statutory authentication. The amendment introduced by the Finance Act, 2016, merely substituted electronic communication as an additional mode of issuance in place of exclusive physical delivery. It did not dispense with the substantive requirement that the notice itself must bear the signature of the competent authority before it acquires legal efficacy. The requirement of signature is neither ornamental nor procedural, it serves vital legal functions by evidencing the conscious exercise of statutory power, authenticating the document, identifying the issuing authority and ensuring accountability. These considerations apply with equal, if not greater, force to notices communicated electronically. 17. The expression "communicated in electronic form" also lends no support to the interpretation canvassed by the Revenue. At best, it merely recognises an alternative mode by which a notice may be transmitted to the assessee. It does not, either expressly or by necessary implication, dispense with the antecedent statutory requirement that the notice must first be validly issued by the competent authority after being duly signed. The act of communication is distinct from the act of issuance. A notice which lacks legal validity at the stage of issuance cannot derive legitimacy merely because it is communicated electronically. 18. The aforesaid interpretation is further reinforced by the concluding words of section 282A(1) of the Act, namely, "in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed." Rule 127A prescribes the procedure governing the authentication of notices and other documents communicated electronically. The subordinate legislation thus proceeds on the clear premise that electronic notices are also required to be duly authenticated before being communicated to the assessee. A harmonious construction of section 282A(1) of the Act together with Rule 127A leaves no scope whatsoever for the contention that notices communicated electronically stand exempted from the mandatory requirement of signature. 19. Acceptance of the Revenue's interpretation would lead to manifestly anomalous and unintended consequences. It would imply that while notices issued in paper form must necessarily bear the signature of the issuing authority, electronically communicated notices, which today constitute the predominant mode of statutory communication, may validly be issued without any signature whatsoever. Parliament cannot be presumed to have intended such an irrational distinction between two modes of communication that produce identical legal consequences. It is, therefore, incumbent upon this Hon'ble Tribunal to adopt an interpretation that preserves the statutory requirement of authentication uniformly across both physical and electronic modes of issuance, thereby advancing the legislative intent and avoiding absurd results. 20. It is further submitted that the consistent administrative practice adopted by the Revenue itself unequivocally demonstrates that both physical and electronically communicated notices are required to be authenticated by affixing either a manual signature or a valid Digital Signature Certificate ("DSC"), as the case may be. The statutory Rules, CBDT

Instructions and the architecture of the electronic assessment system have uniformly proceeded on the footing that authentication through signature is mandatory. The Revenue cannot now be permitted to contend, contrary to its own longstanding and consistent administrative practice, that signatures are optional in the case of electronically communicated notices. Such a contention is not only contrary to the plain language of section 282A(1) of the Act but is also inconsistent with the statutory scheme governing electronic assessments and destructive of the safeguards consciously retained by Parliament to ensure authenticity, accountability and legality in the exercise of statutory powers. 21. It is further submitted that the Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 2016, (Refer Annexure – C) lends considerable support to the interpretation that the amendment to section 282A(1) of the Act was intended only to facilitate paperless administration and did not dispense with the mandatory requirement of affixing a signature. The relevant extract is reproduced below for ready reference: Providing legal framework for automation of various processes and paperless assessment It is proposed to amend the relevant provisions of the Act so as to provide adequate legal framework for paperless assessment in order to enhance efficiency and reduce the burden of compliance. A series of changes are proposed to achieve this end. Sub-section (1) of section 282A provides that where a notice or other document is required to be issued by any income-tax authority under the Act, such notice or document should be signed by that authority in manuscript. It is proposed to amend sub-section (1) of section 282A so as to provide that notices and documents required to be issued by income-tax authority under the Act shall be issued by such authority either in paper form or in electronic form in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed. 22. A plain reading of the aforesaid Memorandum makes the legislative intent abundantly clear. The amendment introduced by the Finance Act, 2016 was intended solely to facilitate paperless administration and electronic assessments by recognising electronic communication as an additional mode for issuing notices and other statutory documents. Significantly, the Memorandum nowhere suggests, either expressly or by necessary implication, that Parliament intended to dispense with the mandatory requirement that every notice or document "shall be signed." 23. Au contraire, while enabling notices and other statutory documents to be issued electronically, Parliament consciously retained the mandatory expression "shall be signed" in section 282A(1) of the Act. The retention of these words unmistakably demonstrates that the amendment was confined only to the mode of issuance and communication, without in any manner diluting or dispensing with the substantive statutory requirement that every notice or document must bear the signature of the competent authority, whether manually or by a legally recognised mode of electronic authentication. 24. It is respectfully submitted that, in the absence of a valid signature, a notice, order or other statutory document cannot be attributed to the conscious exercise of statutory authority by

the officer purportedly issuing it. The act of signing constitutes the formal manifestation of the authority's approval and assumption of responsibility for the contents of the document. An unsigned notice is, therefore, nothing more than an unauthenticated piece of paper or electronic record devoid of legal character. Consequently, such a document is incapable of producing any legal consequences, and its issuance strikes at the very validity of the statutory proceedings sought to be founded upon it. 25. An unsigned notice is not merely defective; it is not a decision of the statutory authority at all. A signature is the external manifestation of the authority's decision-making process. Until the authority authenticates the notice by signing it, there is no legally cognizable exercise of statutory power. Consequently, what is transmitted electronically is merely an unsigned computer-generated draft and not a "notice" in the eyes of law and the necessity of signature also flows from the broader principles of administrative law that every statutory act affecting civil rights must be attributable to the conscious satisfaction of the statutory authority. 26. To further reinforce the submission that affixation of a signature is mandatory even in the case of electronically communicated notices, reliance is placed upon the CBDT Instruction dated 15.03.2017 (Refer Annexure – D), whereby the Department introduced the mandatory use of DSC for notices, orders, communications and other statutory documents. The relevant extracts are reproduced below for ready reference:

1.

As a part of the day to day functioning of the Department, Officers and other employees are/will be required to issue letters, notices, orders to Income Tax assessees or other addressees within the Department or outside or upload documents, reports, forms or to perform several ITBA/Human Resource Management System related activities on the ITBA system. In order to enable digital authentication of such communications within and outside the Department, it is envisaged that the officers and other select employees shall use the Digital Signature Certificate issued to them by the Department to digitally sign such letters, notices, orders to Income Tax assesses or other addressees within the Department or outside or upload documents, reports, forms or to perform several ITBA/Human Resource Management System related activities on the ITBA system. 2. In view of the above, Department has introduced DSC integration with the ITBA/HRMS application. Digital Signature Certificate would enable officers/officials to make the signature process electronic so that all notices /letters/orders can be digitally signed at the time of finalization of the document. This will enable the digitally signed PDF copy to be stored in the database as well as sent to the tax payer by e-mail or to be placed on the tax payer's My Account in the e-filing portal. It would also be possible to print the digitally signed copy of the notices/letters/orders, in which case, an image of the Digital Signature can be printed in place of the actual physical signature in the same manner it is done for Intimation issued by CPC-ITR. Use of Digital Signature Certificate for Signing is also supported by the Information Technology Act and has also been enabled under the Income Tax Act. ……. 27. Further reliance is placed on the ITBA – Assessment Instruction No. 6, dated 03.10.2017 (Refer Annexure – E), the relevant extract of which is reproduced below for ready reference:

(E) Order Generation: (i).....Once the verification is done, AO can then select the various documents to be generated with the Assessment order, viz Demand Notice; Computation sheet; penalty notice if any. Option to select such documents is available on the order screen. AO can also select the option to digitally sign the order and related documents. (ii).....In order to digitally sign the assessment order AO will navigate go to View/ Enter Dispatch details Screen to sign the documents digitally. The work item pendency will be closed in ITBA and assessment proceedings will conclude” 28. Further reliance is placed on the CBDT Instruction No. 01/2018 dated 12.02.2018 (Refer Annexure – F) which expressly mandates that all departmental notices, orders and communications issued through the e-Proceedings facility shall be digitally signed by the Assessing Officer. The relevant extract is reproduced below for ready reference : 4.2 Use of digital signature by Assessing Officer : All departmental orders/communications /notices being issued to the assessee through the 'eproceedings' facility are to be signed digitally by the Assessing Officer. 29. It is respectfully submitted that the aforesaid CBDT Instructions unequivocally mandate that all notices, orders and other statutory communications issued electronically to an assessee must be authenticated by affixing a valid DSC. These Instructions have remained continuously in force since their issuance and are binding upon all subordinate income-tax authorities. Consequently, it is not open to the Revenue to contend that notices communicated electronically need not bear a digital signature, as such a contention is directly contrary to the binding departmental instructions, the statutory scheme governing electronic authentication and the Revenue's own consistent administrative practice. 30. It is a well-settled principle of law that where a statute, or an authority acting under a statute, prescribes a particular manner for performing an act, such act must be performed in that manner alone or not at all. Any departure from the prescribed procedure renders the action legally unsustainable. Non-compliance with a mandatory statutory or administrative requirement is not a mere procedural irregularity but constitutes a substantive violation of law, rendering the resultant action void ab initio and liable to be declared invalid. 31. It is respectfully submitted that section 282A(2) of the Act cannot be read in isolation so as to nullify or dilute the substantive mandate contained in section 282A(1) of the Act. The provisions of section 282A must receive a harmonious construction so that each sub-section is given its full effect. Accordingly, a notice must first satisfy the mandatory requirement under section 282A(1) of the Act of being duly signed before the deeming provision contained in section 282A(2) of the Act can operate. Section 282A(2) of the Act merely creates a legal fiction regarding the manner in which a notice is deemed to be authenticated by the printing, stamping or mentioning of the name and office of the designated income- tax authority. It does not dispense with the foundational statutory requirement that the notice itself must bear the signature of the issuing authority as mandated under section 282A(1) of the Act.

32. It is further submitted that although the Act does not define the expressions "sign" or "signed", it is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that where a Central enactment does not define a particular expression, recourse may legitimately be had to the definitions contained in the General Clauses Act, 1897, unless the context otherwise requires. In this regard, section 3(56) of the General Clauses Act defines the expression "sign" as follows: 3(56) 'sign', with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, shall, with reference to a person who is unable to write his name, include 'mark', with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions. 33. The above definition is of considerable significance, as it demonstrates that the Legislature has treated the requirement of signing as mandatory while merely recognising different permissible modes through which such authentication may be effected. The statutory emphasis, therefore, is not upon the form of the signature but upon the act of affixing it. 34. The aforesaid definition makes it abundantly clear that the expression "sign" is of wide import and is not confined merely to the act of writing one's name. On the contrary, the Legislature has consciously expanded its ambit by providing that, even where a person is incapable of writing his or her name, the statutory requirement of signing is not dispensed with but may instead be fulfilled by affixing a mark. The legislative emphasis, therefore, is not upon the particular form that the signature takes, but upon the act of authentication by the person lawfully authorised to issue the document. Thus, the essence of a signature lies in its function of evidencing conscious approval and authentication rather than in the medium through which it is affixed. 35. The legislative recognition of a mark as a valid substitute for a handwritten signature further reinforces the mandatory character of the requirement of authentication. Had Parliament intended that notices communicated electronically could be issued without any form of signature or authentication whatsoever, it would have expressly so provided. Instead, the statutory framework consistently proceeds on the footing that every statutory notice must bear an act of authentication attributable to the issuing authority, whether by way of a manual signature, a mark where legally permissible, or, in the case of electronic communications, a valid DSC or any other statutorily recognised mode of electronic authentication. 36. The interpretation canvassed by the Revenue that notices communicated electronically need not bear any signature whatsoever is therefore wholly inconsistent not only with the language of section 282A of the Act but also with the meaning assigned to the expression "sign" under the General Clauses Act, 1897. Acceptance of such an interpretation would render the mandatory requirement embodied in the words "shall be signed" nugatory in relation to an entire class of statutory notices, a consequence that Parliament could never have intended. The expression "shall be signed" must therefore receive a purposive, harmonious and contextual interpretation so as to require every statutory notice, irrespective of the medium through which it is issued, to bear a legally recognised mode of authentication attributable to the competent authority. 37. Without prejudice, it is respectfully submitted that any contention that the absence of a manual or digital signature on a notice issued under section 143(2) of the Act constitutes a mere procedural defect curable under section 292B of the Act is wholly misconceived and

untenable in law. Such a contention overlooks the fundamental distinction between an irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction and the complete absence of a jurisdictional precondition. As demonstrated hereinabove, a validly signed notice under section 143(2) of the Act is the very foundation upon which the Assessing Officer derives jurisdiction to undertake scrutiny assessment. Where the notice itself is legally non-existent, section 292B of the Act has no application and cannot be invoked to breathe life into a notice that is void ab initio. 38. It is respectfully submitted that section 292B of the Act is a curative provision intended to protect proceedings from being invalidated on account of technical mistakes, defects or omissions in a notice or proceeding that is otherwise valid in substance and effect. The provision is designed to cure procedural irregularities and not jurisdictional defects. It does not, and cannot, validate proceedings initiated in breach of mandatory statutory preconditions or cure a foundational defect that goes to the very assumption of jurisdiction. 39. In the present case, the defect strikes at the very root of the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction. A notice issued under section 143(2) of the Act is a jurisdictional notice and must necessarily be issued in strict compliance with the mandatory requirements of section 282A of the Act, which unequivocally provides that every notice "shall be signed." The admitted absence of both a manual signature and a valid Digital Signature Certificate renders the impugned notice legally non-existent and non est in the eyes of law. Such a foundational jurisdictional defect cannot be cured by invoking section 292B of the Act, as the statutory scheme mandates strict compliance with the requirements governing the issuance of jurisdictional notices before the Assessing Officer can validly assume jurisdiction. 40. It is further submitted that the issuance of a valid notice under section 143(2) of the Act is a condition precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the Assessing Officer for undertaking scrutiny assessment. Where this mandatory statutory precondition is not fulfilled, the entire assessment proceedings stand vitiated and are void ab initio. A jurisdictional infirmity of this nature cannot subsequently be validated or legitimised by resort to the curative provisions contained in section 292B of the Act. 41. It is respectfully submitted that section 292B of the Act is intended to ensure that inconsequential technical or procedural defects do not frustrate the object of the Act. However, the complete absence of the signature of the issuing authority on a jurisdictional notice is not a mere procedural irregularity but a substantive legal defect affecting the very validity and existence of the notice itself. As demonstrated hereinabove, affixation of the signature of the competent authority, whether manually in the case of a paper notice or by way of a valid Digital Signature Certificate in the case of an electronically communicated notice, is a mandatory statutory requirement under section 282A of the Act. Consequently, the omission to sign a notice issued under section 143(2) of the Act is incapable of being cured by taking recourse to section 292B of the Act. 42. The aforesaid principle stands authoritatively affirmed by the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in M/s Yeshoda Electricals (Refer Annexure – G, Page 4 Para 3, Page 10 Para 12), wherein it has been categorically held that section 292B of the Act does not come to the aid of the Revenue in curing the defect arising from an unsigned jurisdictional notice and cannot be invoked to confer jurisdiction upon the Assessing Officer where none existed in law. Being

the law declared by the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court, the said decision is binding upon this Hon'ble Tribunal. 43. Without further prejudice, it is further submitted that the Revenue's contention that the Appellant participated in the assessment proceedings without raising any objection, or that no prejudice has been caused to the Appellant, is wholly misconceived and legally unsustainable. Such considerations are wholly irrelevant where the defect complained of pertains to the very assumption of jurisdiction. Once the jurisdictional notice itself is invalid in the eyes of law, questions relating to acquiescence, waiver, participation or prejudice become entirely immaterial. 44. It is respectfully submitted that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, acquiescence or waiver. Where the statute mandates that jurisdiction can be assumed only upon the issuance of a valid statutory notice, participation in the proceedings or failure to raise an objection at an earlier stage cannot validate an inherently void notice. A defect which goes to the very root of jurisdiction is incurable and cannot be remedied by the conduct of the parties or by principles of estoppel. 45. In view of the foregoing statutory provisions, the Memorandum explaining the Finance Bill, 2016, the prescribed Rules and the binding CBDT Instructions along with judicial precedents, it is respectfully submitted that the legal position admits of no ambiguity. A notice issued in paper form must bear the manual signature of the issuing authority, whereas a notice communicated electronically must be authenticated by affixing a valid DSC or such other legally recognised mode of electronic authentication. Affixation of the appropriate signature is therefore sine qua non for the notice to acquire legal validity. Any notice issued without such authentication is devoid of legal character is non est in the eyes of law and is incapable of conferring jurisdiction upon the Assessing Officer to initiate or continue proceedings under the Act.

C. Objections : 46. It is respectfully submitted that any attempt to confine the ratio of the judgment of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in M/s Yeshoda Electricals (Refer Annexure - G) to the unamended provisions of section 282A of the Act is wholly misconceived. The ratio of the said judgment is founded upon the mandatory statutory requirement that every notice issued under the Act must bear the signature of the issuing authority and not upon any feature peculiar to the pre-amended provision. Since the amended provision also consciously retains the mandatory expression "shall be signed," the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court continues to apply with full force even after the amendment introduced by the Finance Act, 2016. 47. It is further submitted that the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court, being the jurisdictional High Court, has authoritatively declared the law governing the issue. Consequently, the decision in M/s Yeshoda Electricals (Refer Annexure - G) is binding upon this Hon'ble Tribunal. Any contrary view expressed by another High Court, including the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Asro Arcade (Refer Annexure - L), cannot override, dilute or whittle down the binding force of the law declared by the jurisdictional High Court. Judicial discipline demands that this Hon'ble Tribunal faithfully apply the law declared by the jurisdictional High Court until it is stayed, reversed or overruled by a superior court.

48.

It is further submitted that even after the amendment to section 282A of the Act vide Finance Act, 2016, the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court has consistently reiterated that the absence of a manual or digital signature renders statutory notices and orders invalid in the following decisions:

a. Toyota Tsusho India (P.) Ltd. reported in [2024] 164 taxmann.com 85 (Karnataka) (Refer Annexure - J) b. Doddagarudanahalli Vyavasaya Seva Bank Niyamitha reported in [2025] 174 taxmann.com 864 (Karnataka) (Refer Annexure - K) c. Panjos Builders (P.) Ltd. reported in [2024] 161 taxmann.com 573 (Karnataka) (Refer Annexure - N) d. Begur Sinappa Venkatesh in WP No. 20807 of 2023 dated 16.11.2023 (Karnataka) (Refer Annexure - O) e. Begur Sinappa Venkatesh in WA No. 568 of 2024 dated 20.01.2026 (Karnataka) (Refer Annexure - P) f. Harish Sanghvi (HUF) in WP No. 10017 of 2025 dated 03.11.2025 (Karnataka) (Refer Annexure - Q) 49. The aforesaid decisions unequivocally demonstrate that, notwithstanding the amendment introduced by the Finance Act, 2016, the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court has consistently regarded the requirement of affixing a manual or digital signature as a mandatory statutory requirement. The legal position, therefore, stands settled within the territorial jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court and leaves no room for any contrary interpretation. 50. It is further submitted that, to the best of the Appellant's knowledge and based on the information presently available, none of the aforesaid decisions has been stayed, reversed or overruled by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Accordingly, they continue to constitute binding precedent and are liable to be followed by this Hon'ble Tribunal. 51. Insofar as the reliance placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in R. Giridhar reported in (1984) 145 ITR 246 (Kar) (Refer Annexure - I) is concerned, it is respectfully submitted that the said decision is clearly distinguishable on facts and has no application whatsoever to the controversy arising in the present appeal. The issue before the Hon'ble High Court in that case pertained merely to an unsigned computation sheet accompanying an assessment order and not to the validity of an unsigned jurisdictional notice issued under the provisions of the Act. The decision, therefore, neither considers nor decides the issue presently arising for adjudication. Any reliance placed thereon to justify the validity of an unsigned notice issued under section 143(2) of the Act is therefore wholly misconceived and legally untenable. 52. It is respectfully submitted that the other decisions referred to in the notice dated 30.06.2026 issued by this Hon'ble Tribunal are distinguishable on facts and, in any event, cannot prevail over the binding decisions of the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court. It is a settled principle of

judicial discipline that this Hon'ble Tribunal is bound to faithfully follow the law declared by the jurisdictional High Court and cannot sit in appeal over, re-examine or question the correctness of such binding precedents. 53. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in East India Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs reported in AIR 1962 SC 1893 (1963) (Refer Annexure - R), wherein it was held as follows: 31.….. This raises the question whether an administrative tribunal can ignore the law declared by the highest court in the State and initiate proceedings in direct violation of the law so declared. Under Art. 215, every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Under Art. 226, it has a plenary power to issue orders or writs for the enforcement of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within its territorial jurisdiction. Under Art. 227 it has jurisdiction over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction. It would be anomalous to suggest that a tribunal over which the High Court has superintendence can ignore the law declared by that court and start proceedings in direct violation of it. If a tribunal can do so, all the sub-ordinate courts can equally do so, for there is no specific provision, just like in the case of Supreme Court, making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate courts. It is implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a superior tribunal that all the tribunals subject to its supervision should conform to the law laid down by it. Such obedience would also be conducive to their smooth working : otherwise there would be confusion in the administration of law and respect for law would irretrievably suffer. We, therefore, hold that the law declared by the highest court in the State is binding on authorities or tribunals under its superintendence, and that they cannot ignore it either in initiating a proceeding or deciding on the rights involved in such a proceeding. If that be so, the notice issued by the authority signifying the launching of proceedings contrary to the law laid down by the High Court would be invalid and the proceedings themselves would be without jurisdiction. 54. The aforesaid principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court leaves no manner of doubt that this Hon'ble Tribunal is constitutionally and judicially bound to apply the law declared by the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court and cannot disregard or dilute the same on the ground that another High Court has taken a different view. 55. Without prejudice, it is respectfully submitted that if the Revenue is aggrieved by the law declared by the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court, its remedy lies in challenging the said judgments before the appropriate superior forum and not in inviting this Hon'ble Tribunal to disregard binding precedent. Until such time as the judgments of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court are stayed, reversed or overruled by a superior court, they continue to bind every authority and Tribunal functioning within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. 56. Furthermore, it is respectfully submitted that the notice dated 30.06.2026 issued by this Hon'ble Tribunal proceeds on certain factual assumptions which are demonstrably contrary to the judicial records. 57. The said notice records at Page 3 Para 4 that the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Ambernath City Hospital (P.) Ltd. (Refer Annexure – H) appears to have rendered its decision without

referring to section 282A(2) of the Act. This observation is contrary to the judicial record. A plain reading of the judgment reveals that at Page 4 Paras 7 & 8, the Hon'ble Bombay High Court has expressly considered section 282A of the Act while adjudicating the issue. 58. Likewise, the said notice records at Page 4 Para 1, that the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in Toyota Tsusho India (P.) Ltd. (Refer Annexure – J) did not refer to any provision of the Act. This observation is equally contrary to the judicial record. A plain reading of the judgment reveals that at Page 3 Para 7, the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court has expressly considered section 282A of the Act as well as CBDT Instruction No. 01/2018 dated 12.02.2018 (Refer Annexure – F) before holding that the unsigned notice was invalid. 59. The aforesaid instances clearly demonstrate that the concerned Hon'ble High Courts have, in fact, expressly considered and interpreted the provisions of section 282A of the Act before holding that an unsigned statutory notice is non est and invalid in law. Consequently, the very factual premise underlying the notice dated 30.06.2026 issued by this Hon’ble Tribunal viz., that the aforesaid High Courts failed to consider section 282A(2) of the Act while rendering their decisions, is factually incorrect and contrary to the judicial record. The presumption that the said judgments were rendered without noticing the relevant statutory provision is therefore wholly unsustainable. 60. In any event, it is respectfully submitted that this Hon'ble Tribunal cannot enter into an enquiry as to what the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court did or did not consider while rendering its judgments. The Tribunal is duty-bound to apply the ratio decidendi of the binding precedents as they stand and cannot sit in appeal over the reasoning adopted by the Hon'ble High Court. Whether a particular statutory provision was considered or not is wholly irrelevant once the legal principle has been authoritatively declared by the jurisdictional High Court. Any attempt to examine the correctness or adequacy of the reasoning would amount to an impermissible exercise by this Hon’ble Tribunal. 61. It is further submitted that this Hon'ble Tribunal has itself held that an unsigned statutory notice is void ab initio and non est in the eyes of law and incapable of conferring jurisdiction upon the Assessing Officer in the following decisions : i. Yeshoda Electricals reported in [2023] 154 taxmann.com 677 (Bangalore - Trib.) (Refer Annexure - S) ii. Dhiren Gopal in ITA No. 2571/Bang/2025 dated 27.04.2026 (Refer Annexure - T) iii. Konda Devasenamma in ITA No. 1239/Bang/2024 dated 09.10.2025 (Refer Annexure - U) 62. It is a settled principle of judicial discipline that a co-ordinate Bench is ordinarily bound to follow the decision of an earlier Bench of equal strength, particularly where the Benches have common members and the issue involved is identical. The doctrine of precedent mandates consistency, certainty and institutional discipline in judicial decision-making and departure from an earlier co-ordinate Bench decision is permissible only in accordance with settled principles governing judicial precedents. 63. In this regard, reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Summit Securities Ltd. reported in [2011] 12 taxmann.com 372 (Mumbai) (SB) (Refer Annexure – V), wherein it was held as follows :

A survey of the above judgments divulges that there should be consistency in the approach of various Benches of the Tribunal. Once a case has been decided by an earlier Bench, the subsequent Bench should respect such decision and should not endeavour to make departure there from unless the facts are different or the legal position appreciated by the earlier Bench has undergone change because of some statutory amendment or enunciation of law by the Hon'ble Supreme Court or the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court. Consistency in the judicial approach removes the sword of uncertainty hanging over the heads of litigants. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is an all India Body working through its Benches across the country. The judicial discipline requires that the view taken by one Bench should be respected and ordinarily followed by the others. This type of approach results into consistency in the administration of justice as the parties can reasonably predict the decision of a subsequent Bench when the same issue has been decided by an earlier Bench. 64. To further fortify the submission that a subsequent co-ordinate Bench is bound to follow the ratio laid down by an earlier co-ordinate Bench on an identical question of law, in the interests of consistency, certainty and judicial discipline, reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija reported in (1989) 3 SCC 396 (Refer Annexure – W) and Sant Lal Gupta reported in (2010) 13 SCC 336 (Refer Annexure – X), wherein it was emphatically held that judicial discipline requires Benches of co-equal strength to follow earlier binding decisions and that departure therefrom is permissible only in accordance with the settled procedure recognised in law. 65. In any case, it is respectfully submitted that a reference to a Special Bench under section 255(3) of the Act constitutes an exception to the ordinary rule that an appeal is to be decided by the Bench before which it is listed. Such an extraordinary course is ordinarily warranted only where conflicting decisions of co-ordinate Benches of the Tribunal create uncertainty in the law or where an important question of law remains unresolved in the absence of a binding pronouncement by the jurisdictional High Court or the Hon'ble Apex Court. 66. The scope and purpose of the provision itself demonstrate that constitution of a Special Bench is intended to resolve genuine conflicts or uncertainties in the law, and not to revisit issues already authoritatively settled by binding judicial precedent. The relevant extract of section 255(3) of the Act is extracted below for ready reference : Procedure of Appellate Tribunal. 255… (3) The President or any other member of the Appellate Tribunal authorised in this behalf by the Central Government may, sitting singly, dispose of any case which has been allotted to the Bench of which he is a member and which pertains to an assessee whose total income as computed by the Assessing Officer in the case does not exceed fifty lakh rupees, and the President may, for the disposal of any particular case, constitute a Special Bench consisting of three or more members, one of whom shall necessarily be a judicial member and one an accountant member.

67. It is respectfully submitted that the issue arising in the present appeal viz., the validity of an unsigned notice issued under section 143(2) of the Act, does not involve any exceptional factual or legal circumstance warranting a reference to a Special Bench under section 255(3) of the Act. The controversy stands squarely and conclusively governed by the binding judgments of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court referred to hereinabove. Consequently, no unresolved conflict or substantial question survives for consideration by a Special Bench. 68. It is respectfully submitted that the power conferred under section 255(3) of the Act is not designed to enable the Tribunal, directly or indirectly, to reconsider, dilute or circumvent a question of law that already stands conclusively settled by a binding judgment of the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court. The existence of such binding precedent eliminates the very uncertainty or conflict that alone could justify the constitution of a Special Bench. 69. It is further submitted that the said provision is not intended to enable the Tribunal to reconsider or revisit a question of law which already stands settled by a binding judgment of the jurisdictional High Court. The existence of a binding precedent completely removes the element of uncertainty or conflict which alone could justify a reference to a Special Bench. 70. It is further submitted that the Tribunal is bound to faithfully apply the law declared by the jurisdictional High Court and cannot adopt an interpretation inconsistent with or contrary to such declaration. The Tribunal cannot, directly or indirectly, sit in appeal over the judgment of the jurisdictional High Court by referring the impugned issue to a Special Bench. Any such course would be contrary to settled principles governing judicial hierarchy and institutional discipline. 71. The doctrine of precedent and the principle of judicial discipline require every subordinate judicial forum to faithfully follow the law declared by the superior courts. It is submitted that within the territorial jurisdiction of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka, the decision of the said Court is binding and prevails over all contrary decisions rendered by any other Tribunal or High Court. Accordingly, no conflict of law survives so far as this Hon'ble Tribunal is concerned. 72. It is further submitted that the constitution of a Special Bench in the present case would serve no useful or meaningful purpose. Even if a Special Bench were to be constituted, it would remain equally bound by the judgments of the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court. Consequently, any opinion rendered by the Special Bench contrary to the law declared by the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court would be of no legal consequence within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Tribunal. 73. In this regard, reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Mumbai Tribunal in the case of M/s Reliance Communication Ltd dated 03.01.2018 in ITA No. 4672/Mum/2009 (Refer Annexure - Y), wherein it was held as follows : 11. We have considered rival contentions and carefully gone through the orders passed by the Tribunal as well as High Court. In this case, Tribunal have passed orders in respect of the appeals filed by the Revenue, which was subsequently recalled in a M.A. vide order dated 18/11/2016.

12.

Against the M.A. order, Department has filed writ petition challenging the same and the Hon’ble High Court vide order dated 08/08/2017 dismissed it. After the dismissal of the writ petition, Revenue has filed an application before the Hon’ble President for making a reference to the Special Bench. The Hon’ble President vide its order dated 12/12/2017 directed the Registry to put up the matter before Division Bench for making recommendation as the whether or not Special Bench needs to be constituted in these appeals. So far as Constitution of special Bench is concerned, a reference to constitute a Special Bench flows from the members and not from the parties to the case. Furthermore, such a reference can be made by the members when they do not agree with the view taken by the earlier order of the Tribunal. However, in the instant cases before us, it is not a situation, only after hearing, the matter afresh by the division bench in terms of direction of Hon’ble High Court dated 08.08.2017, the bench may decide the issue to agree or disagree with the view already taken by the earlier bench. Furthermore, merely on the conflict view of the decision of the High Court, a reference cannot be made to constitute Special Bench. If the present application of the Revenue is accepted, the process of reference to a Special Bench / larger Bench would never reach an end. Reference to Special Bench would continue to be moved by the parties upon every subsequent non-jurisdictional High Court decision, thus, leading to a number of cases being referred to constitute Special Bench. However, correct decision is to follow the judicial hierarchy and maintain judicial discipline 74. Further reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Ahmedabad Tribunal in the case of Chandulal Venichand reported in [1991] 38 ITD 138 (AHD) (Refer Annexure - Z), wherein it was held as follows : 10. Since conflicting views on this point had been expressed in the decisions of the Benches at Delhi, Special Bench was constituted at Delhi by the President of the Tribunal under Section 254(3) of the Act. The decision of the Special Bench at Delhi has been reported in Rishiroop Chemical (P.) Ltd. v. ITO [1991] 36 ITD 35. At the time when the Special Bench was constituted there was no decision of any High Court on the point on controversy viz. whether first proviso to Section 43B would be applicable for assessment years 1984-85 to 1987-88. However, when the Special Bench commenced hearing of the appeal, a copy of the decision of Delhi High Court dated 22-8-1990 in Civil Writ Petition No. 2692/90 in the case of Sanghi Motors was filed before it on behalf of the Department. The said decision of Delhi High Court is now reported in Sanghi Motors v. Union of India. The Delhi High Court had held that the first proviso would be applicable for assessment year 1988-89 and subsequent assessment years and would not be applicable to earlier four assessment years. In that case, the assessee's accounting year was calendar year and with regard to sales made for the quarter ending 31st December, 1984 the assessee had paid sales-tax on 31st January, 1985 which was the date on or before which the sale-tax was statutorily payable and the assessee had claimed deduction in respect of sales-tax liability. The Delhi High Court held that the said proviso was not applicable for assessment year 1985-86 and as such the assessee was not entitled to benefit under said proviso. The Special Bench observed that since it was sitting at Delhi it was bound by the said decision of Delhi High Court and was not free to decide the point in controversy by taking a contrary view. The Special Bench followed said decision as it was of binding nature and decided the point in controversy against the assessee and in favour of the Department….

18. In the present case, we are not concerned with this aspect of the matter. As already stated when the Special Bench was constituted, there was difference of opinion amongst Benches and there was no High Court decision. When the Special Bench heard the matter at Delhi, they had before it a decision of Delhi High Court which was jurisdictional High Court and as such binding on the Special Bench. The Special Bench had no jurisdiction to consider independently various aspects and come to the conclusion which was contrary to the conclusion reached by the jurisdictional High Court. ........ 75. The proposed reference would therefore amount to an entirely unnecessary exercise, resulting only in avoidable expenditure of valuable judicial time, public resources and prolonged litigation for the Appellant, notwithstanding that the controversy already stands concluded by binding precedent. In these circumstances, the present appeal deserves to be decided forthwith by this Hon'ble Bench by faithfully applying the law declared by the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court and thereby preventing any abuse of the process of law. 76. In view of the aforesaid facts, statutory provisions and binding judicial precedents, it is respectfully submitted that the controversy regarding the validity of an unsigned notice issued under section 143(2) of the Act stands conclusively settled by the judgments of the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court. Consequently, the jurisdictional prerequisites for invoking the exceptional power contained in section 255(3) of the Act are conspicuously absent. The proposed reference to a Special Bench is therefore wholly unwarranted and liable to be dropped.

11.

In response, the Ld. Departmental Representative, at the first instance on 23.07.2026, and further, on 07.08.2026, placed before us a 2-page written submission, and also placed before us a 21-page written submission, which is as under:-

23.07.2026: 1. At the outset, it is respectfully submitted that the controversy in the present appeal turns upon the interpretation of Section 282A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as applicable to Assessment Year 2017-18. It is the contention of the assessee that the impugned notice is invalid as it does not bear signature of the Assessing Officer. It is respectfully submitted that such contention is contrary to the statutory framework contained in Section 282A when the provision is read as a whole.

2.

Prior to its amendment by the Finance Act, 2016, Section 282A(1) provided that every notice or other document issued under the Act "shall be signed in manuscript" by the income-tax authority. The ordinary meaning of the word "manuscript" is something written by hand or in handwriting. Thus, under the unamended provision, Parliament had expressly mandated that notices issued under the Act should bear a handwritten signature of the issuing authority, without being prejudice to provisions of sec.282A(2), which clarifies that every

such notice shall be deemed to be authenticated if the name and office of a designated IT Authority is printed, stamped or otherwise written thereon.

3.

However, vide the Finance Act, 2016, legislation has omitted the words "signed in manuscript" and substituted the provision with the present language, which reads as "signed and issued in paper form or communicated in electronic form by that authority in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed". This procedure is prescribed vide Rule 127A of the Income tax Rules, 1962. Accordingly, it is submitted that amended provisions of Section 282A(1) read with Rule 127A is applicable to the assessment year under consideration in the case of appellant assessee.

4.

The amendment is significant. Parliament consciously removed the expression "signed in manuscript" and introduced a provision recognising two distinct modes by which notices may thereafter be issued. The first mode is "signed and issued in paper form", while the second mode is "communicated in electronic form".

5.

The legislature has employed the conjunction "or" between these two expressions. Ordinarily, the word "or" is disjunctive and denotes alternatives. Therefore, Section 282A(1) contemplates two separate and independent situations, namely:

(i) a notice signed and issued in paper form; or (ii) a notice communicated in electronic form. Both limbs of the provision must be given independent meaning. If the requirement of signature were intended to apply equally to notices communicated electronically, the second limb of the provision would become redundant. Such an interpretation would defeat the amendment brought about by Parliament and render the words "or communicated in electronic form" redundant. It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that every word employed by the legislature must be given its due meaning and no part of the provision should be rendered redundant.

6.

This interpretation is further reinforced by the provisions of Rule 127A, which has been framed in exercise of the power conferred by Section 282A(1) to prescribe the procedure for notices and other documents communicated in electronic form. The Rule supplements the statutory scheme contained in Section 282A(1) by prescribing the manner in which electronically communicated notices are to be authenticated. It is, therefore, evident that the legislature has separately provided for notices communicated in electronic form, distinct from notices issued in paper form.

7. Further, section 282A(2), which provides that every notice or other document shall be deemed to be authenticated if the name and office of the designated Income-tax Authority is printed, stamped or otherwise written thereon reinforces the intentions of provisions of Sec.282A(1). Thus, while sub-section (1) recognises communication in electronic form as an independent mode of issuance, sub-section (2) separately prescribes the manner in which such notice stands authenticated.

8.

The distinction between manual notices and digital notices has also been recognised in Yeshoda Electricals v. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax [2023] 154 taxmann.com 677 (Bangalore Trib.)[03-02-2021]. In paragraph 38 of its order, while examining the notice under Section 148, the Hon'ble Tribunal specifically recorded that the notice before it was a manual notice and not a digital document, and observed as under: "This notice issued u/s. 148 is a manual notice and not a digital document. The digital document only does not require signature. A manual notice u/s. 148 is required to be dated and duly signed by the Officer who is issuing the same."

9.

The aforesaid decision of the Tribunal has been upheld by the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in ITA No. 261 of 2021. Thus, the judicial position emerging from Yeshoda Electricals (supra) is that where the notice is issued manually in paper form, the requirement of signature is mandatory. At the same time, the Tribunal itself recognised that a digital document stands on a different footing.

10.

In the present case, the impugned assessment year is AY 2017-18, which is subsequent to the aforementioned amendment. It is the assessee's own contention that the impugned notice is an electronically generated notice. Consequently, the first limb of Section 282A(1), relating to notices issued in paper form, has no application. The present case falls within the second limb of Section 282A(1), namely, communication in electronic form, thereby the procedure prescribed in Rule 127A needs to be referred to, as per which if the notice is issued in electronic form, then as long as the name and office of such income tax authority is printed/displayed, such notice is deemed authenticated. It may be mentioned that the assessment year involved in the case of Yashoda Electricals is 2007-08 and thus, the reliance placed on by the assessee in the case of AY 2017-18 is not correct and is not applicable considering the factual matrix as well as the applicability of amended provisions of law.

11.

Whereas, this position has thereafter been reiterated by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Asro Arcade v. Income-tax Officer [2026] 186 taxmann.com 313 (Delhi) [16-04-2026], wherein the Hon'ble Court, while dealing with the identical issue regarding the absence of

a handwritten or digital signature on an electronically generated notice, interpreted Section 282A(2) and held that where the notice bears the name and designation of the issuing authority, the statutory requirement of authentication stands satisfied. The Hon'ble Court categorically held that Section 282A(2) does not require a handwritten or digital signature and that, in the case of computer-generated notices, mention of the name and designation of the issuing authority is sufficient compliance with the statutory requirement.

12.

Accordingly, a cumulative reading of Section 282A(1) & (2) and Rule 127A clearly demonstrates that the Act contemplates two distinct modes of issuance of notices. While notices issued manually in paper form may be required to be signed, notices communicated electronically are governed by the separate statutory mechanism of electronic communication as per the prescribed procedure in Rule 127A and authentication under Section 282A(2). Since the impugned notice is an electronically generated notice bearing the name and designation of the Assessing Officer, the statutory requirements stand fully satisfied. Consequently, the objection raised by the assessee regarding the absence of a handwritten or digital signature is devoid of merit and deserves to be rejected.

07.08.2026: 1. At the outset, it is respectfully submitted that on 23.07.2026, the Revenue has already placed its detailed Written Submissions on record for the kind consideration of this Hon'ble Tribunal, wherein the issues arising in the present appeal have been comprehensively addressed in accordance with the statutory provisions and the applicable judicial precedents. Subsequent thereto, the assessee has putforth her Written Submissions raising various contentions in support of her case. In view thereof, the Revenue is filing the present rebuttal to the submissions advanced by the assessee, together with such further written submissions as may be necessary, without prejudice to and in continuation of the earlier Written Submissions already placed on record. It is respectfully submitted that the contentions advanced by the assessee are legally untenable and liable to be rejected for the reasons set out hereinbelow.

2.

The principal contention advanced by the assessee in paragraphs 1 to 21 of her Written Submissions pertains to the interpretation of Section 282A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It is the assessee's contention that the amendment brought about by the Finance Act, 2016 has not dispensed with the mandatory requirement of signature for notices communicated electronically and that the expression "signed" governs both notices issued in paper form as well as those communicated electronically. In support of the said contention, the assessee has, in paragraph 9 of the Written Submissions, specifically contended that "signed and issued in paper form or communicated in electronic form" is properly read as

"signed and (issued in paper form or communicated in electronic form)". Proceeding on the aforesaid interpretation, the assessee contends that every notice, irrespective of the mode of communication, must necessarily bear the signature of the Assessing Officer.

2.1 It is respectfully submitted that the said interpretation of the assessee is contrary to the language of the amended provision, overlooks the legislative intent underlying the Finance Act, 2016, ignores the statutory scheme contained in Rule 127A of the Income- tax Rules, 1962 and fails to give due effect to the deeming provisions contained in Section 282A(2). The aforesaid contention is therefore liable to be rejected for the reasons set out hereinbelow.

3.

It is respectfully submitted that the aforesaid contention raised by the assessee has already been dealt with in detail in the Written Submissions filed by the Revenue on 23.07.2026 before this Hon'ble Tribunal. The Revenue reiterates the submissions already advanced therein and seeks leave to rely upon the same. Without prejudice to the aforesaid, it is submitted that the interpretation sought to be placed by the assessee on Section 282A(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is erroneous, contrary to the language of the amended provision and proceeds on an incorrect understanding of the legislative amendment brought about by the Finance Act, 2016.

4.

It is respectfully submitted that the cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is that the intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the language employed in the statute itself. Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the adjudicating authority is required to give effect to the words used by the legislature and cannot substitute or introduce words which are not present in the enactment. The power to enact, amend or modify a statutory provision lies exclusively within the domain and prerogative of the legislature. Therefore, once Parliament has consciously altered the statutory language, the amended provision must be interpreted in accordance with the legislative intent reflected therein and not by importing requirements which existed under the unamended provision.

5.

In the present case, prior to the amendment brought about by the Finance Act, 2016, Section 282A(1) specifically provided that every notice or other document issued under the Act "shall be signed in manuscript" by the income-tax authority. However, Parliament consciously omitted the expression "signed in manuscript" and substituted the provision with the present statutory framework, wherein a notice or other document may either be "signed and issued in paper form" or "communicated in electronic form by that authority in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed". The amendment, therefore, was not merely a change in the mode of delivery but was a conscious legislative recognition of

electronic communication as a distinct mode of issuance governed by a separate statutory procedure.

6.

The assessee's interpretation that the expression "signed" continues to govern both paper- based notices as well as electronically communicated notices is contrary to the legislative scheme and seeks to defeat the very purpose of the amendment. If the interpretation advanced by the assessee is accepted, the expression "communicated in electronic form by that authority in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed" would lose its independent significance if every electronically communicated notice would continue to be governed by the same requirement applicable to manually issued paper notices. Such a construction would render the amendment introduced by Parliament redundant and contrary to the settled principle that every word employed by the legislature must be given meaningful effect.

7.

It is respectfully submitted that the interpretation advanced by the assessee amounts to rewriting the statutory provision rather than interpreting it. The assessee seeks to retain the requirement of the pre-amendment regime despite the fact that Parliament consciously substituted the same with a new statutory mechanism recognising electronic communication. The adjudicating authority cannot restore a requirement which the legislature has deliberately modified or omitted. The interpretation of a statutory provision cannot be guided by what may be considered desirable or appropriate but must necessarily be confined to the legislative intent expressed through the words enacted by Parliament.

8.

Without prejudice to the aforesaid submissions, it is respectfully submitted that the assessee's interpretation proceeds on an erroneous premise by reading Section 282A(1) in isolation, without appreciating the complete statutory scheme governing authentication of notices under the Act. It is a settled principle of interpretation that statutory provisions forming part of the same enactment must be read together so as to give harmonious effect to each provision. The provisions of Section 282A(1) and Section 282A(2) are not independent provisions operating in separate spheres but constitute a composite mechanism dealing with issuance and authentication of notices and other documents under the Act.

9.

Section 282A(1) specifies the permissible modes through which a notice or document may be issued, whereas Section 282A(2) provides the manner in which such notice or document shall be deemed to be authenticated. Thus, the requirement of issuance and the requirement of authentication are equally addressed by the legislature. The assessee's attempt to read the requirement of signature contained in Section 282A(1) as the sole test

of validity disregards the specific deeming mechanism provided under Section 282A(2), whereby authentication is achieved upon the name and office of the designated income-tax authority being printed, stamped or otherwise written on the notice or document. Section 282A(2) is not an independent provision divorced from Section 282A(1), but forms an integral part of the statutory scheme governing authentication of notices and other documents issued under the Act. While Section 282A(1) recognises the manner in which notices may be issued, including communication in electronic form in accordance with the prescribed procedure, Section 282A(2) prescribes when such notice shall be deemed to be authenticated. Therefore, once an electronically generated notice contains the name and office of the designated income-tax authority, the statutory requirement of authentication stands satisfied. Any interpretation which requires a further signature despite fulfilment of the express deeming provision under Section 282A(2) would render the said provision redundant and defeat the legislative intent behind introducing electronic communication under the amended Section 282A.

10.

It is respectfully submitted that an interpretation which renders Section 282A(2) redundant cannot be accepted. If the assessee's contention is accepted that every electronically communicated notice must necessarily bear a signature, Section 282A(2) would have no meaningful application in respect of such notices, despite the legislature expressly retaining the said provision even after the amendment brought about by the Finance Act, 2016. Such an interpretation would amount to ignoring a part of the statutory scheme, which is impermissible.

11.

The aforesaid interpretation is further fortified by Rule 127A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, which has been framed pursuant to the authority conferred under Section 282A(1). The reference to "such procedure as may be prescribed" in Section 282A(1) is a clear legislative indication that electronically communicated notices are to be governed by the procedure prescribed under the Rules. Therefore, the validity of an electronic notice cannot be examined by applying the requirements applicable to a paper notice but must be determined with reference to the procedure specifically prescribed for electronic communication.

12.

A cumulative reading of Section 282A(1), Section 282A(2) and Rule 127A demonstrates that the legislature has created a complete framework for issuance and authentication of notices in different modes. While a notice issued in paper form is governed by the requirement applicable to such mode, an electronically communicated notice is governed by the prescribed electronic procedure, read with the authentication mechanism contained in Section 282A(2). The impugned notice, having been electronically generated and bearing

the name and office of the designated income-tax authority, satisfies the statutory requirements contemplated under the Act.

13.

It is therefore respectfully submitted that the assessee's interpretation, which seeks to examine Section 282A(1) independently and disregard the operation of Section 282A(2) and Rule 127A, is contrary to the principle of harmonious construction. The provisions must be construed in a manner that gives effect to the entire statutory framework rather than adopting an interpretation which creates an artificial conflict between the provisions. The interpretation advanced by the Revenue alone gives complete and meaningful effect to the scheme enacted by Parliament.

14.

The assessee, in paragraph 22 of her Written Submissions, has placed reliance upon the Instruction dated 15.03.2017 to contend that electronically communicated notices are mandatorily required to bear a Digital Signature Certificate (DSC). The said reliance is wholly misplaced. It must be emphasized that the instruction referred to is ITBA Instruction, as the title of the instruction refers to. This is an administrative instruction and a plain reading of the aforesaid Instruction, in its first para emphasizes that Officers/users shall use Digital Signature issued by the department, thereby it emphasizes the users of ITBA not to use any other Digital Signature Certificates(DSCs). Thus the intent of this circular is to bring uniformity across the system and it further says that this would enable the officers to make signature process electronic. The Instruction was issued in the context of implementation of digital infrastructure and providing a mechanism whereby officers could use DSC issued by the Department for authentication of communications, notices, orders and other documents generated through the system. It must also be mentioned that this is a circular issued by the Directorate of Systems for administrative purpose and does not emanate from the provisions of statute. Further, the said Instruction does not provide that every electronically communicated notice, in the absence of a DSC, would be rendered invalid or non-est in law.

15.

It is respectfully submitted that an administrative instruction issued by the Board cannot be interpreted in a manner contrary to the statutory scheme contained in Section 282A of the Act read with Rule 127A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. The said Instruction provides for a mode of digital authentication available to the departmental officers and facilitates the functioning of the electronic assessment mechanism. It does not seek to prescribe an additional statutory condition for validity of a notice, nor does it override the authentication mechanism expressly provided under Section 282A(2). The assessee's attempt to elevate the said Instruction into a mandatory statutory requirement is therefore misconceived.

16. The distinction between a statutory requirement and an administrative mechanism has been recognised by the Hon'ble Bengaluru Special Bench of the Tribunal in M.D. Sons v. Income Tax Officer, ITA No. 1413/Bang/2025 (AY 2017-18). The Hon'ble Special Bench recognised that instructions issued for facilitating functioning of the Department cannot be construed as creating additional legal requirements beyond the provisions enacted by the legislature. The object of such instructions is to streamline departmental processes and ensure efficient implementation of the statutory framework and not to determine the validity of statutory notices contrary to the Act.

17.

In the present case also, the Instructions relied upon by the assessee have to be understood in their proper context. The reference to DSC therein is to ensure smooth functioning of the ITBA/electronic assessment architecture and to provide officers with a facility for digital authentication. The same cannot be read as prescribing that the absence of a DSC, despite compliance with the statutory requirements under Section 282A(1), Section 282A(2) and Rule 127A, would render the notice invalid. Such an interpretation would amount to introducing a condition which neither finds place in the statutory provision nor flows from the said Instruction.

18.

The assessee has also relied upon ITBA Assessment Instruction No. 6 dated 03.10.2017 and CBDT Instruction No. 01/2018 dated 12.02.2018 to contend that digital signature is mandatory for all electronically issued notices and communications. In this regard, it is respectfully submitted that these instructions are administrative directions issued for regulating the internal functioning of the Department and facilitating the use of the ITBA and e-proceedings platforms. The purpose of such instructions is to enable Assessing Officers to generate, authenticate and transmit documents through the electronic system. They cannot be construed as creating a jurisdictional requirement beyond what has been provided by Parliament under Section 282A of the Act.

19.

It is further submitted that the assessee's reliance on departmental instructions overlooks the settled principle that executive instructions cannot supplement or expand the scope of statutory provisions. Where the legislature has consciously provided a specific statutory mechanism for authentication of electronically communicated notices under Section 282A(2) read with Rule 127A, an administrative instruction issued for operational convenience cannot be interpreted to impose an additional condition for validity of such notices. The instructions relied upon by the assessee merely facilitate the electronic functioning of the Department and do not alter the legal position emerging from the statutory provisions. Consequently, the reliance placed by the assessee upon the aforesaid CBDT Instructions is misplaced and liable to be rejected.

20.

The assessee, in paragraphs 28 to 31 of its Written Submissions, has sought to place reliance upon the definition of the expression "sign" under Section 3(56) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and has contended that the requirement of signature is intended to ensure authentication attributable to the issuing authority. The said contention, with respect, proceeds on an incorrect understanding of the statutory scheme governing electronically communicated notices under the Income-tax Act.

21.

It is respectfully submitted that the purpose of authentication is to establish the identity of the authority issuing the communication and to ensure that the notice emanates from the competent statutory authority. In the present case, there is no dispute regarding the identity of the issuing authority. The electronically generated notice contains the name and designation of the Assessing Officer and identifies the authority responsible for issuance of the communication in compliance with Section 282 A read with Rule 127 A.

22.

Further, the officer is identifiable through the prescribed departmental identification mechanism, including the DIN generated in accordance with the applicable procedure. Therefore, the object sought to be achieved through authentication, namely, attribution of the notice to the competent authority, stands fully satisfied.

23.

It is respectfully submitted that the assessee's contention proceeds on the assumption that absence of a visible manual or digital signature necessarily creates doubt regarding the genuineness or origin of the notice. Such an assumption is misplaced in the context of electronically generated communications issued through the statutory electronic framework. Unlike a manually issued paper notice, where a physical signature serves as a means of identification of the issuing authority, an electronic communication generated through the prescribed system carries inherent identifiers which establish its origin and authenticity.

24.

The reliance placed upon the General Clauses Act is also of no assistance to the assessee. The definition contained in Section 3(56) of the General Clauses Act is a general definition and cannot be applied divorced from the specific statutory scheme governing electronic communication under the Income-tax Act. The expression "sign" has to be understood in the context in which it is used. Where the legislature has specifically provided a separate mechanism for authentication of electronically communicated notices under Section 282A(2) read with Rule 127A, the general understanding of signature applicable to conventional documents cannot be imported to defeat the specific statutory framework.

25.

The contention advanced by the assessee that the decision of the jurisdictional High Court is binding on subordinate authorities from Para 39 onwards proceeds on an incorrect

assumption that the decision in the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Yeshoda Electricals in ITANo.261/2021 applies squarely to the facts and statutory framework involved in the present case. The doctrine of binding precedent applies only to the ratio decidendi of a decision and cannot be extended mechanically without examining the statutory context and the factual circumstances in which the same was rendered. A decision cannot be applied in isolation without considering the relevant statutory amendments and the legal position applicable to the case under consideration. It is also a settled principle that the rule of Res judicata does not apply to income-tax proceedings. Therefore, the applicability of a judicial precedent must necessarily be determined with reference to the statutory provisions, factual matrix and legal position prevailing in the case under consideration.

26.

The decision in Yeshoda Electricals(supra) is clearly distinguishable on facts as well as on the statutory scheme applicable therein. The said decision was rendered with respect to AY 2007-08, which is prior to the amendment to Sec. 282A(1). As recorded by the Hon'ble Tribunal in the said case, the notice under consideration was a manual notice issued in physical form and not a digitally generated electronic communication. The controversy before the Tribunal and thereafter before the Hon'ble High Court arose in the context of a paper notice which did not bear the signature of the issuing authority. The observations made therein were, therefore, in the context of a notice governed by the requirements applicable to manual issuance. The Hon'ble Tribunal itself recognised the distinction between a manual notice and a digital document by observing that a digital document does not require a signature in the same manner as a manual notice.

27.

In the present case, the factual position is entirely different. The assessee's own case is that the impugned notice issued under Section 143(2) was an electronically generated notice. The issue before this Hon'ble Tribunal, therefore, is not whether a manually issued paper notice requires a signature, but whether an electronically communicated notice issued after the amendment brought about by the Finance Act, 2016 is invalid in the absence of a visible manual or digital signature. The statutory provision applicable to the present case is the amended Section 282A(1), read with Section 282A(2) and Rule 127A, which specifically recognise electronic communication as an independent mode of issuance. Thus, the ratio of Yeshoda Electricals cannot be extended to a factual situation which was neither considered nor decided therein.

28.

In contrast, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Asro Arcade v. Income-tax Officer [2026] 186 taxmann.com 313 (Delhi) has directly examined the issue arising in the context of an electronically generated notice under the amended provisions of Section 282A. The Hon'ble

Court considered the statutory scheme post amendment and held that in the case of computer-generated notices, where the name and designation of the issuing authority are reflected, the requirement of authentication stands satisfied. The Hon'ble Court specifically recognised that Section 282A(2) does not prescribe a requirement of a separate handwritten or digital signature where the notice is generated and communicated electronically in accordance with the prescribed procedure.

29.

The decision in Asro Arcade therefore directly addresses the controversy arising in the present appeal, namely, the validity of an electronically generated notice in the absence of a signature, whereas Yeshoda Electricals dealt with a manual notice under a different factual setting. Consequently, the reliance placed by the assessee on Yeshoda Electricals is misplaced and cannot override the interpretation emerging from the amended statutory framework applicable to the present case.

30.

It is respectfully submitted that the present issue requires consideration of the amended provisions introduced by the Finance Act, 2016, which were enacted specifically to provide a legal framework for electronic communication. A decision rendered in the context of the earlier statutory framework governing manual notices cannot be applied to defeat the subsequent legislative scheme. The interpretation adopted by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Asro Arcade, which gives effect to the amended provisions of Section 282A(1), Section 282A(2) and Rule 127A, is consistent with the legislative intent and ought to be preferred while deciding the controversy arising in the present appeal.

31.

The assessee has also placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in Toyota Tsusho India (P.) Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax [2024] 164 taxmann.com 85 (Karnataka)/[2024] 468 ITR 29 (Karnataka) in Para 41, wherein the Hon'ble Court held that an order of the Transfer Pricing Officer, which was neither digitally nor physically signed even on the last date of limitation and was subsequently signed and furnished to the assessee, was illegal and non-est in law. It is respectfully submitted that the said decision was rendered in the context of the validity of a Transfer Pricing Officer's order and did not examine or interpret the specific statutory framework governing authentication of notices under Section 282A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, particularly the effect of the amendment introduced by the Finance Act, 2016, Section 282A(2) and Rule 127A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962.

32.

Similarly, the decision of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in Doddagarudanahalli Vyavasaya Seva Bank Niyamitha v. Income-tax Officer [2025] 174 taxmann.com 864 (Karnataka) was rendered without examining the scope and interplay of the aforesaid

statutory provisions. Therefore, the said decisions, though rendered in the context of authentication of statutory communications, cannot be applied mechanically to the present case, which involves an electronically generated notice governed by the specific statutory mechanism introduced for electronic communication under the amended Section 282A. The issue in the present case requires determination on the basis of the statutory scheme specifically applicable to electronically communicated notices and not merely on the general requirement of signature applicable in the context of physical documents.

33.

Without prejudice to the aforesaid submissions, even assuming, without admitting, that there exists any procedural irregularity in the mode of authentication, the same would not invalidate the proceedings in view of Section 292B of the Act. It is respectfully submitted that the scope and object of Section 292B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 assumes considerable significance. Section 292B provides that no return of income, assessment, notice, summons or other proceeding shall be invalid merely by reason of any mistake, defect or omission, provided that such return, assessment, notice, summons or proceeding is, in substance and effect, in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of the Act. The provision is a statutory recognition of the principle that procedural or technical defects in a proceedings cannot invalidate actions otherwise lawfully undertaken under the Act.

34.

The scope and object of Section 292B has been explained in CBDT Circular No. 179 dated 30.09.1975, wherein it was clarified that the provision was enacted to ensure that proceedings validly initiated under the Income-tax Act are not frustrated on account of technical mistakes, defects or omissions. The provision embodies the salutary principle that substance should prevail over form and the procedural irregularities which do not prejudice the assessee or defeat the object of the Act should not result in invalidation of otherwise valid proceedings.

35.

The aforesaid principle has been explained by the Hon'ble Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Bengaluru Special Bench in M.D. Sons v. Income Tax Officer, ITA No. 1413/Bang/2025 (AY 2017-18), wherein, at paragraph 10.7 of the order, the Hon'ble Special Bench observed that Section 292B is intended to ensure that proceedings are not rendered invalid merely because of technical mistakes, defects or omissions, so long as they are, in substance and effect, in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of the Act. The Hon'ble Special Bench further recognised that the legislative object behind the provision, as reflected in CBDT Circular No. 179 dated 30.09.1975, is to prevent valid proceedings from being defeated on hyper-technical grounds and to ensure that procedural lapses which do

not affect the substance of the proceedings do not invalidate actions otherwise lawfully undertaken addressing the contention raised by the assessee in Para 33 to 38.

36.

Accordingly, where the proceedings substantially conform to the statutory scheme and fulfil the object sought to be achieved under the Act, minor procedural defects or omissions cannot be permitted to defeat the proceedings. Such an interpretation gives full effect to the legislative intent underlying Section 292B and furthers the object of effective tax administration without compromising the rights of the assessee.

37.

Therefore, a cumulative reading of Sections 282A(1) and 282A(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Rule 127A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 clearly demonstrates that the Act contemplates two distinct modes of issuance of notices. While notices issued manually in paper form may be required to bear a signature, notices communicated electronically are governed by a separate statutory mechanism of electronic communication and authentication under Rule 127A and Section 282A(2). Since the impugned notice is an electronically generated notice bearing the name and designation of the Assessing Officer, the statutory requirements stand fully satisfied. In any event, even assuming without admitting that there exists any procedural defect in the mode of authentication, the same would stand cured by Section 292B of the Act, as the notice is, in substance and effect, in conformity with the intent and purpose of the Act and no prejudice whatsoever has been caused to the assessee. Consequently, the objection raised by the assessee regarding the absence of a handwritten or digital signature is wholly devoid of merit and deserves to be rejected.

12.

In the case of the notice issued u/s. 143(2) of the Act for Assessment Year 2017- 18, regarding Susheela Janardhan, the notice shown to us was signed by Mr. Subbarao Gururaj, ITO, Ward-4(3)(1), Bangalore. However, the original notice did not show a signature, merely listing the name, designation and address of the issuing authority.

13.

The provisions of section 282A of the Act as well as rule 127 of the Income Tax Rules, are as under:-

Section 282A:

282A. (1) Where this Act requires a notice or other document to be issued by any income-tax authority, such notice or other document shall be signed and issued in paper form or

communicated in electronic form by that authority in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed.

(2) Every notice or other document to be issued, served or given for the purposes of this Act by any income-tax authority, shall be deemed to be authenticated if the name and office of a designated income-tax authority is printed, stamped or otherwise written thereon. (3) For the purposes of this section, a designated income-tax authority shall mean any income- tax authority authorised by the Board to issue, serve or give such notice or other document after authentication in the manner as provided in sub-section (2).

Rule 127: (1) For the purposes of sub-section (1) of section 282, the addresses (including the address for electronic mail or electronic mail message) to which a notice or summons or requisition or order or any other communication under the Act (hereafter in this rule referred to as "communication") may be delivered or transmitted shall be as per sub-rule (2).

(2) The addresses referred to in sub-rule (1) shall be—

(a) for communications delivered or transmitted in the manner provided in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 282—

(i) the address available in the PAN database of the addressee; or (ii) the address available in the income-tax return to which the communication relates; or (iii) the address available in the last income-tax return furnished by the addressee; or (iv) in the case of addressee being a company, address of registered office as available on the website of Ministry of Corporate Affairs: Provided that the communication shall not be delivered or transmitted to the address mentioned in items (i) to (iv) where the addressee furnishes in writing any other address for the purposes of communication to the income-tax authority or any person authorised by such authority issuing the communication: [Provided further that where the communication cannot be delivered or transmitted to the address mentioned in items (i) to (iv) or any other address furnished by the addressee as referred to in first proviso, the communication shall be delivered or transmitted to the following address:—

(i) the address of the assessee as available with a banking company or a co-operative bank to which the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949) applies (including any bank or banking institution referred to in section 51 of the said Act); or (ii) the address of the assessee as available with the Post Master General as referred to in clause (j) of section 2 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (6 of 1898); or (iii) the address of the assessee as available with the insurer as defined in clause (9) of section 2 of the Insurance Act, 1938 (4 of 1938); or (iv) the address of the assessee as furnished in Form No. 61 to the Director of Income-tax (Intelligence and Criminal Investigation) or to the Joint Director of Income-tax (Intelligence and Criminal Investigation) under sub-rule (1) of rule 114D; or (v) the address of the assessee as furnished in Form No. 61A under sub-rule (1) of rule 114E to the Director of Income-tax (Intelligence and Criminal Investigation) or to the Joint Director of Income-tax (Intelligence and Criminal Investigation); or (vi) the address of the assessee as available in the records of the Government; or (vii) the address of the assessee as available in the records of a local authority as referred to in the Explanation below clause (20) of section 10 of the Act;]

(b) for communications delivered or transmitted electronically—

(i) email address available in the income-tax return furnished by the addressee to which the communication relates; or (ii) the email address available in the last income-tax return furnished by the addressee; or (iii) in the case of addressee being a company, email address of the company as available on the website of Ministry of Corporate Affairs; or (iv) any email address made available by the addressee to the income-tax authority or any person authorised by such income-tax authority.

(3) The Principal Director General of Income-tax (Systems) or the Director General of Income- tax (Systems) shall specify the procedure, formats and standards for ensuring secure transmission of electronic communication and shall also be responsible for formulating and implementing appropriate security, archival and retrieval policies in relation to such communication.]

14.

In the decision of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court, which upheld the order of the Coordinate Bench in 2023 154 taxmann.com 677, the Coordinate Bench relied on the decision of another Coordinate Bench in the case of Taureg Properties & Security Services Ltd., in ITA No. 733/DEL/2016, dated

04.03.2020. In para no. 33 of that judgment, the notice was issued u/s. 148 on 22.03.2012, and in para 34, the Coordinate Bench considered the provisions of section 282 of the Act and held that the sub-provisions are applicable only to the Central Processing Unit, which was nominated as the designated authority. In para no. 38, the Coordinate Bench concluded that a notice issued u/s. 148 is a manual notice and not a digital document. The Coordinate Bench also held that if it is a digital document, it does not need a signature. According to it, a manual notice is required to be dated and duly signed by the Assessing Officer who is issuing the same. The Coordinate Benchin Yeshoda Electricals vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax [2023] 154 taxmann.com 677 (Bangalore - Trib.)[03-02-2021] held as under :- 38. A perusal of the above notice in all the cases show that the said notice issued u/s. 148 of the Act was typed on a plain paper, it was not signed by the Assessing Officer who issued the same and remained unsigned which is not in dispute before us. The contention of the Id. DR is that the office copy of the said notice was duly signed by the AO. This notice issued u/s. 148 is a manual notice and not a digital document. The digital document only does not require signature. A manual notice u/s. 148 is required to be dated and duly signed by the Officer who is issuing the same. A notice or an order without having signature of the person who issued such notice loses its relevance and importance and is to be treated as invalid. An order or notice without signature is not an order for execution or implementation. In all these cases, there was no signature of the AO who issued notice u/s. 148 of the Act. Therefore, it has to be construed that no notice was issued by the AO to the assessee and the assessee was continuously objecting for the same. It is also a fact that from the assessment order it is found that it is an ex parte order u/s. 144 r.w.s 147 of the Act without participation of the assessee and the provisions of section 292BB of the Act is of no help to the assessee, which suggests that if the assessee cooperated in the proceedings of assessment, the assessee cannot raise objections in further proceedings. Further, in our opinion, service of valid notice is a pre-condition to assume jurisdiction by the AO. Non-signing of a notice is not a clerical mistake and there cannot be any waiver by the assessee of an irregularity of an unsigned notice. In our view, section 282 of the Act provides that a notice under the Act may be served on the person name therein as if it were a summons issued by a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order 5, CPC, provides that every summons shall be signed by the judge or

such officer, as he appoints. In view of this provision, the notice issued u/s. 148 should have been signed by the AO and omission to do so invalidated the notice. Further, the provisions of section 292B of the Act intended to ensure that an inconsequential technicality does not defeat justice. But, the signing of a notice under section 148 of the Act is not merely an inconsequential technicality. It is a requirement of the provisions of Order 5, Rule 1(3) of CPC, which are applicable by virtue of Section 282 of the Act. Under the circumstances, the provisions of section 292B of the Act would not be attracted so as to make it as a valid notice in the eye of law. Therefore, the requirement of the signature of the AO is a legal requirement. The omission to sign the notice u/s. 148 cannot be cured by relying on the provisions of section 292B of the Act. The notice issued by the AO without affixing signature, in our view, cannot be said to be an omission, which was sought to be covered by the provisions of section 292B of the Act. If such a course is permitted to be followed, then that would amount to miscarriage of justice. An unsigned notice of reopening of assessment cannot be said to be in substance and effect in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of the Act. Further, as rightly pointed out by the ld. AR, in the case of M/s. Taureg Properties & Security Services Ltd. (supra) in similar circumstances the assessment was framed on the basis of unsigned notice issued u/s. 148. In that case, the Tribunal quashed the assessment order by observing as follows:- "6. After considering the rival submissions, we do not find any merit in the Departmental Appeal. Copy of the notice under section 148 Dated 26.03.2007 is available at page-1 of the paper book. It is unsigned as well as did not mention any assessment year. Since unsigned notice have been sent to the assessee, therefore, it vitiate the entire re-assessment proceedings because it was the jurisdictional notice to initiate proceedings under section 147 of the I.T. Act, 1961. Since the notice itself was illegal and bad in Law, therefore, entire re- assessment proceedings have been vitiated and as such A.O. could not have assume the jurisdiction under section 148 of the I.T. Act, 1961 to frame the assessment against the assessee. The Ld. CIT(A) was justified in holding the assessment order to be null and void. The Departmental Appeal has no merit and the same is accordingly dismissed." 39. Further, as already observed, the provisions of section 282A of the Act is of no assistance to the department and it would be applicable only to a CPU which was nominated as designated authority by CBDT as required u/s. 282A of the Act. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the assessment framed on the basis of unsigned notice u/s. 148 is bad in law and cannot be sustained in the

eyes of law. Accordingly, we quash all the assessment orders in these cases and allow the primary legal ground raised by the assesses in all these appeals.

15.

It can be seen that the provisions of section 282A have undergone subsequent change in the Finance Act, 2008, w.e.f. 01.06.2008, and thereafter “signed in manuscript of that Authority” has been substituted by the clause “signed and issued in paper form or communicated in electronic form by that Authority in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed”. This led to the introduction of rule 127A w.e.f. 01.06.2016 by the Finance Act, 2016.

16.

Thus, as the Coordinate Bench in case of Yeshoda Electricals was dealing with a manual notice and categorically stated that had it been a digital notice it would have been a different issue.

17.

When the matter reached the Hon’ble High Court in 2025:KHC:38487-DB HC- KAR ITA 261/2021, the Hon’ble High Court, in paras 7.1 to 12, stated that an unsigned notice is correctly held to be a nullity by the Coordinate Bench as under :- “7. On consideration of the submissions of the respective counsels for the parties, the record indicates the undisputed fact that a notice under Section 148 of the Act was issued on 22.03.2012 for the Assessment Year 2007-08, and the said notice was not signed by the Assessing Officer. 7.1 It is well settled that any notice issued without the requisite signature of the issuing authority cannot constitute a valid notice under law. The mere fact that the Assessee did not raise an objection cannot, by itself, validate a notice that is otherwise invalid. The notice under Section 148 of the Act is a jurisdictional notice, and any defect therein cannot be ignored. Non-signing of a jurisdictional notice is a serious defect, which renders the notice invalid. Section 148 of the Act mandates the issuance of the notice, and

such issuance is complete only when the notice bears the signature of the issuing authority.

8.

The Revenue has sought to rely on Section 282A of the Act to validate the unsigned notice. On its plain reading, Section 282A requires that a notice issued under the Act by the Income Tax Authority must be signed. Reliance is placed on sub-section (2) of Section 282A, which provides that every notice issued, served, or given for the purposes of the Act by any Income Tax Authority shall be deemed to be authenticated if the name and office of a designated Income Tax Authority is printed or otherwise written thereon. A reading of this sub- section, however, clearly shows that it does not dispense with the requirement of signing the notice by the Income Tax Authority. Therefore, reliance on Section 282A offers no assistance to the Revenue.

9.

Reliance on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in ZF Steering Gear (India) Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, [2024] 167 Taxmann.com 663 (Bombay), is not applicable to the present case. In that case, an unsigned notice was issued, and the Bombay High Court held that the Assessee ought to have filed objections to the notice under Section 148 of the Act and directed the Assessing Officer to dispose of such objections. The Court did not hold that the unsigned notice was valid. Therefore, the said judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case.

10.

The Revenue has placed reliance on the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Sky Light Hospitality LLP v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, [(2018) 254

Taxman 0109] (Delhi), to contend that defects in a notice arising from human errors or mistakes cannot invalidate proceedings which are otherwise valid. However, the factual position before the Delhi High Court is not identical to the facts of the present case. Accordingly, the said judgment offers no assistance to the Revenue.

11.

The Tribunal, after noticing the undisputed fact that the notice under Section 148 of the Act was issued and served without the signature of the Assessing Officer, observed that the Assessee raised objections at the earliest opportunity, which was the very next date. The Assessing Officer, however, proceeded to complete the assessment without considering the Assessee's objections. As rightly held by the Tribunal, a notice under Section 148 of the Act being a jurisdictional notice, any foundational defect cannot be ignored. In view of the above, the Tribunal was justified in invalidating the assessment order. 12. In view of the foregoing reasons, the following: Order (i) The appeals are dismissed.”

18.

Before us, these are digital notices. 19. However, respectfully, following the decision of the Hon’ble High Court in the case of Yeshoda Electricals in ITA 261/2021, dated 24.09.2025, relied upon by the Ld. Authorized Representative, which holds that the impugned notices, though digitally sent, are unsigned and, despite the provisions of section 282A(2) and rule 127, are held to be invalid.

20.

In view of this, as the Assessment Proceedings themselves are quashed, the merits of both cases need not be considered.

21.

Hence, the appeals of both the assessee’s are allowed. Order pronounced in the open court on 03rd November, 2026.

Sd/- Sd/- SOUNDARARAJAN K. PRASHANT MAHARISHI JUDICIAL MEMBER VICE PRESIDENT Bangalore Dated: 03.11.2026 *TNTS* Copy to: SUSHEELA JANARDHAN 1 71, D 103, ADARSH RHYTHM, PANDURANGA NAGAR, BENGALURU-560076, KARNATAKA PRIEMARY AGRI CREDIT CO OPERATIVE BANK SUGUR NONAVINAKERE 2 TIPTUR TALUK, TUMKUR-572224, KARNATAKA INCOME TAX OFFICER, WARD - 5(3)(2), 59, HMT BUILDING, 3 BELLARY ROAD, GANGANAGAR BENGALURU-560032, KARNATAKA INCOME TAX OFFICER, WARD-1, JAYADEVA COMPLEX, 4 TIPTUR TIPTUR-572201, KARNATAKA 5 THE PCIT / CIT, 6 THE CIT(APPEALS) 7 THE D.R., ITAT, BANGALORE BENCH

BY ORDER P G Digitally signed by P G RAJANI RAJANI Date: 2026.11.13 16:01:58 +05'30' ASSISTANT REGISTRAR I.T.A.T., BANGALORE

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