SKANRAY TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED,MYSURU vs. DCIT, CENTRAL CIRCLE-2(3), BANGALORE

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ITA 1245/BANG/2025Status: DisposedITAT Bangalore06 November 2026AY 2017-1848 pages
AI SummaryPartly Allowed

What did the Tribunal hold?

The Tribunal dismissed the grounds challenging the validity of the search proceedings under Section 132 and the assessments under Section 153A, stating that these challenges were identical to those addressed in the assessee's appeal for AY 2015-16, where the validity of the search could not be challenged before them and disallowances were based on incriminating material found during the search. Consequently, Grounds Nos. 1 and 2 were dismissed. The ground concerning the additional loss claimed in the return filed under Section 153A (Ground No. 4) was also dismissed. On merits, following an earlier decision regarding Section 35(2AB), the Tribunal allowed the deduction claim of ₹18,33,583 for assessment year 2017-18. However, it confirmed the disallowance of ₹4,20,000 for assessment year 2018-19. Accordingly, Ground No. 3 was allowed for AY 2017-18 and dismissed for other assessment years. The ratio is that challenges to search and Section 153A assessments are often bound by previous decisions, and specific deductions are allowed or disallowed based on merits and prior precedents. The appeal for AY 2017-18 was partly allowed, while appeals for AYs 2018-19 and 2019-20 were dismissed.

What were the facts?

The assessee, Skanray Technologies Limited, filed six appeals before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), Bangalore Bench, for assessment years 2014-15 to 2019-20. The appeals challenged the appellate order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-15, Bengaluru. The core issues involved the validity of search proceedings under Section 132 and assessments under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. For AY 2014-15, the dispute also concerned share premium assessed under Section 56(2)(viib) and a claim for additional loss. For AYs 2015-16 to 2018-19, the appeals related to deduction under Section 35(2AB) regarding salary paid to employees on probation. Additional loss claims were also raised for AYs 2016-17, 2018-19, and 2019-20. A search under Section 132 was conducted on November 6, 2019. The original return for AY 2014-15 was filed on November 30, 2014. The assessment under Section 143(3) was completed on December 30, 2016. A notice under Section 153A was issued on November 19, 2020.

What were the issues?

The Tribunal had to decide the following questions: 1. Whether the search proceedings under Section 132 of the Act were valid, considering grounds related to the assessee not failing to produce documents, the tax officer lacking reason to believe so, the absence of evidence of possession of undisclosed income/property, lack of bonafide reason for search, no undisclosed income/property found, and prior submission of share issue details. 2. Whether the assessment under Section 153A of the Act was valid, particularly regarding the assumption of jurisdiction without evidence of possession of specified assets representing escaped income. 3. Whether the share premium received in respect of shares allotted to Mr. Alva, amounting to Rs. 1,65,30,400, was correctly treated as income from other sources under Section 56(2)(viib), considering arguments about its applicability to genuine commercial transactions and the fair market value of shares. 4. Whether the claim for additional loss while filing the return of income under Section 153A of the Act was admissible, with arguments focusing on the abatement of assessment and the treatment of the Section 153A return as the return for the year. Assessee's Contentions: The assessee argued that the search proceedings were bad in law on multiple grounds, including lack of proper reason to believe, absence of incriminating material, and prior compliance. They contended that Section 153A jurisdiction was wrongly assumed. Regarding share premium, the assessee argued that Section 56(2)(viib) was not applicable to genuine transactions and that the share allotment was at or below fair market value. For additional loss claims, the assessee argued that such claims are permissible after assessment abatement under Section 153A. Revenue's Contentions: The judgment does not explicitly record the revenue's contentions for each ground.

Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?

Section 132,Section 153A,Section 56(2)(viib),Section 35(2AB),Section 143(3),Section 142(1),Section 143(2)

AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, BANGALORE BENCHES, BANGALORE

Before: SHRI PRASHANT MAHARISHI & SHRI SOUNDARARAJAN K.

आयकर अपीलीय अधिकरण, बेंगलुरू पीठें, बेंगलुरू INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, BANGALORE BENCHES, BANGALORE BENCH: B BEFORE SHRI PRASHANT MAHARISHI, VICE PRESIDENT AND SHRI SOUNDARARAJAN K., JUDICIAL MEMBER ITA 1242-1247/Bang/2025 (निर्धारण वर्ा/Assessment Years : 2014-15, 2015-16, 2016-17, 2017-18, 2018-19 & 2019-20) SKANRAY TECHNOLOGIES DCIT, LIMITED CENTRAL CIRCLE-2(3), PLOT NO. 15-17, C R BUILDING, HEBBAL INDUSTRIAL AREA, QUEENS ROAD, Vs. MYSORE-570016, KARNATAKA BANGALORE-560001, KARNATAKA अपीलधर्थी Appellant प्रत्यर्थी Respondent

Permanent Account Number of Assessee: AALCS1086Q

अपीलधर्थी द्वारा/Appellant represented by: Shri. T. Suryanarayana - SR Advocate प्रत्यर्थी द्वारा/Respondent represented by: Shri. N. S. Shashidhara – CIT DR सुनवाई की तारीख / Date of conclusion of hearing: 18-Aug-2026 घोषणा की तारीख / Date of pronouncement: 06-Nov-2026 आदेश / ORDER PER BENCH:

1.

These six appeals have been filed by Skanray Technologies Private Limited (the Assessee/Appellant/Company) for assessment years 2014-15 to 2019- 20 against the appellate order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-15, Bengaluru (the learned CIT(A)).

2.

The six appeals raise common challenges to the validity of the search under section 132 and the assessments under section 153A. The appeal for assessment year 2014-15 also concerns share premium assessed under section 56(2)(viib) and a claim for additional loss. The appeals for assessment years 2015-16 to 2018-19 concern deduction under section 35(2AB) in respect of salary paid to employees on probation. Additional- loss claims also arise in the appeals for assessment years 2016-17, 2018-19 and 2019-20. 03. The grounds and discussion relating to ITA 1242/Bang/2025 are set out first, followed by the grounds relating to the remaining appeals. ITA 1242/Bang/2025 [ AY 2014-15]

1.

Validity of the search proceedings under section 132 of the Income- tax Act, 1961 ('the Act')

1.1. The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act at the premises of the Appellant are bad in law since the Appellant has not failed to produce books of account or other documents as required by summons or notice issued on the Appellant.

1.2. The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act at the premises of the Appellant are bad in law as the tax officer had no reason to believe that the Appellant would not produce books of account or other documents.

1.3. The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act at the premises of the Appellant are bad in law as the tax officer failed to bring on record any document to demonstrate that the Appellant was in possession of any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing represented by undisclosed income.

1.4. The learned tax officer erred in conducting a search without any bonafide reason to believe that the Appellant was in possession of undisclosed property or would not cooperate in any proceedings.

1.5. The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act are erroneous and bad in law since there were no undisclosed income or property found during the course of the search proceedings as evident from the Panchama drawn post search or addition made during the corresponding proceedings.

1.6. The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act are erroneous and bad in law since the Appellant had duly submitted the details about share issue to the Income Tax Officer, (Intelligence and Criminal Investigation), Mysore and before the learned AO and there was no reason to believe that the Appellant would not produce the requisite documents.

2.

Validity of assessment under section 153A of the Act

2.1. The learned AO/CIT(A) erred in law and on facts in assuming jurisdiction under section 153A of the Act in the case of the Appellant without bringing on record any documents to demonstrate that the Appellant was in possession of specified assets representing income escaped assessment.

2.2. The learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have observed that the proceedings under section 153A of the Act can be initiated only when assets being land or building, shares and securities, loans and advances, deposits in the bank account that have escaped assessment are in the possession of the learned AO

3.

Share premium received in respect of shares allotted to Mr. Alva treated as income from other sources Rs. 1,65,30,400

3.1. The learned AO/CIT(A) has erred in invoking provisions of section 56(2)(viib) of the Act in the case of the Appellant in respect of shares allotted to Mr. Alva.

3.2. The learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that section 56(2)(viib) of the Act was introduced as an anti-abuse provision i.e, not applicable to genuine commercial transactions carried out through normal banking channels, as in the case of the Appellant.

3.3. Without prejudice to grounds 3.1 and 3.2 above, the learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have observed that the Appellant has allotted shares to Mr. Alva at an average price of Rs 57.82 per share during the captioned AY viz-a-viz the fair market value ('FMV') of shares of Rs. 89 per share and hence, there is no income assessable to tax under section 56(2)(viib) of the Act.

3.4. Without prejudice to the above, the learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have observed that during AY 2014-15 the Appellant has allotted shares to UTI Investment Advisory Services Limited (A/c Ascent India Fund III) at Rs. 157 per share and hence, the fair market value of the shares works-out to be Rs. 157 per share.

4.

Claim of additional loss while filing the return of income ('ROI') under section 153A of the Act

4.1. The learned AO/CIT(A) has erred in not allowing the loss claimed by the Appellant while filing its ROI under section 153A of the Act.

4.2. The learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that once the assessment gets abated by virtue of the proceedings under section 153A of the Act, it is open for the Appellant to make additional claims.

4.3. The learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that once the ROI is filed under section 153A of the Act, such ROI would be treated as the ROI filed for the year under consideration.

Each of the above grounds is independent and without prejudice to the other grounds of appeal preferred by the Appellant.

The Appellant craves leave to add, alter, rescind, and modify the grounds herein above or produce further documents, facts, and evidence before or at the time of hearing of this appeal.

For the above and any other grounds which may be raised at the time of hearing, it is prayed that necessary relief may be provided.

4.

The assessee company is engaged in the design, development, manufacture, marketing and servicing medical equipment for the healthcare sector. 05. On 6 November 2019, a search under section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was conducted in respect of the assessee company. The assessee had filed its original return of income on 30 November 2014, declaring a total loss of ₹14,38,48,032. The assessment under section 143(3) was completed on 30 December 2016, accepting the returned income. Subsequently, a notice under section 153A was issued on 19 November 2020. In response, the assessee filed a return on 19 December 2020, declaring a loss of ₹14,55,96,174. Notices under sections 143(2) and 142(1) were issued on 10 March 2021 and 6 August 2021, respectively, to examine the return. 06. During the assessment proceedings, the learned Assessing Officer noted that the assessee’s equity allotment details, appearing at pages 155–157 of Annexure A/STPL/03, had been found and seized during the search of its office on 6 November 2019. Based on this material, a statement by Mr.

Vishva Prasad Alwa, the company’s Managing Director, was recorded under section 132(4) of the Act, and he furnished the complete equity allotment details. The assessee subsequently submitted the final details, with modifications, during the proceedings relating to the prohibitory order at its corporate office on 6 January 2020. 07. The learned Assessing Officer noted that shares were allotted to Mr. Shiva Prasad Alwa on 28 January and 6 March 2014. On 28 January 2014, he received 2,30,000 shares and a further 269 shares, each at a face value of ₹10. On 6 March 2014, he was allotted 80,000 shares at a premium of ₹285.63 per share, resulting in a total premium of ₹2,28,50,400 received by the assessee. During the search, the assessee was found to have a valuation report prepared by Gargesh and Company, Chartered Accountants, dated 5 February 2015, which was seized on 8 November 2019 at pages 87–100 of Annexure A/STPL/03. Using the discounted free cash flow method, the report valued the shares at ₹155.03 each. Further valuation reports were found and seized on 6 January 2020 during the proceedings relating to the prohibitory orders and recorded in Annexures A/STPL/PO/02 and 03. These reports stated values of ₹61.61 per share on 28 September 2011, ₹70.84 on 1 July 2013, ₹89 and ₹123 on 4 December 2013, and ₹155 on 5 February 2015. The company also allotted shares on these dates to employees, outsiders, and directors. The learned authorised representative submitted that the company issued shares to employees and outsiders at discounted prices, while investors received shares at a premium during the same financial year. When examined under section 132(4) of the Act about the differences between the valuations and allotment prices, the Managing Director, Mr. Vishva Prasad Alwar, stated in response to question 24 that he had not handled these matters and was unaware of the details. He explained that professionals, including Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers, had been consulted for investments, with strict instructions to comply with the law. The Assessing Officer concluded that shares had been allotted above their fair market value during financial year 2013-14. Relying on the discounted cash flow valuations of ₹70.84 and ₹89 in the reports dated 1 July and 4 December 2013, respectively, he questioned the allotment of 80,000 shares to Mr. Alwa on 6 March 2014 at an issue price of ₹295.63 per share against a fair market value of ₹89. He treated the difference of ₹206.63 per share, amounting to ₹1,65,30,400, as excess consideration and issued a show-cause notice proposing an addition under section 56(2) (viib) of the Act. The assessee submitted that 3,97,874 shares had already been issued to Mr. Alwa at ₹10 each during financial year 2013-14 and that the subsequent allotment of 80,000 shares at ₹295.63 each brought the average issue price to ₹57.82 per share. The Assessing Officer rejected this explanation as unsatisfactory, holding that the shares had not been issued at fair market value as required by law, and added ₹1,65,30,400. By the assessment order under section 153A dated 30 September 2021, he determined a total loss of ₹12,73,17,631 against the returned loss of ₹14,55,96,174. An additional adjustment of ₹17,48,142 was made in respect of the excess loss claimed. 08. The assessee appealed to the learned CIT(A), challenging the validity of the search under section 132, the assessment under section 153A, and the additions on merits. The CIT(A) rejected the challenge to the search, relying on the Karnataka High Court’s decision in Pratibha Jewellery House v. Commissioner of Income Tax [2017] 88 taxmann.com 94 (Karnataka). On the validity of the assessment under section 153A, the assessee contended that the additions were not based on incriminating material found during the search. The CIT(A) noted that five valuation reports had been found and rejected this ground, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Abhishek Buildwell Private Limited [2023] 454 ITR 212 (SC), dated 24 April 2023. On merits, after considering the assessment order and the assessee’s submissions, the CIT(A) held that the assessee’s explanation was untenable in law and on facts. He observed that section 56(2) (viib) treats consideration received for the issue of shares more than their fair market value as income. In view of the valuation reports found during the search and the absence of justification for the premium difference, he confirmed the addition. He also rejected the claim for additional loss of ₹17,48,142, representing the difference between the returns filed under sections 139(1) and 153A, holding that a fresh claim could not be made in the return filed under section 153A. The appeal was recorded as partly allowed. 09. Aggrieved by the appellate order, the assessee is in appeal before us. On ground No. 1, the learned senior counsel challenged the validity of the search under section 132 of the Act. He submitted that the specified Income-tax Authority must, on the basis of information in its possession, have reason to believe that the assessee (i) has omitted or failed to produce books of account or documents; (ii) would not produce them; or (iii) possesses money, bullion, jewellery or another valuable article or thing representing undisclosed income. According to counsel, no such information or reason to believe existed in this case. The appellant had neither failed to produce books or documents nor been unresponsive to notices or summons, and there was no basis to believe that it would withhold its books. The scrutiny assessments for assessment years 2014-15 and 2016-17 demonstrated its cooperation. Counsel further submitted that the Panchanamas and the seized documents—valuation reports and offer letters relating to some employees—showed that the Income-tax Authorities were not in possession of any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing that the appellant had not disclosed. He therefore contended that none of the conditions under section 132 was satisfied, rendering the search invalid and the consequential assessments for assessment years 2014-15 to 2019-20 illegal and unsustainable. Counsel nevertheless acknowledged that the Explanation to section 132(1), inserted by the Finance Act, 2017 with retrospective effect from 1 April 1962, bars disclosure of the recorded reasons to believe to any person, authority or Appellate Tribunal. He referred to N.K. Jewellers v. CIT [2017] 85 taxmann.com 361 (SC), a copy of which was handed over at the hearing on 18 August 2026, in which the Supreme Court held that, in view of the amendment, the validity of the search could not be examined.

10.

On ground No. 2, he submitted that the assessment under section 153A of the Income-tax Act was invalid because the addition was not based on any incriminating material found during the search. He pointed out that, for assessment year 2014-15, the notice under section 143(2) was issued on 30 September 2016 and the assessment under section 143(3) was completed on 30 December 2016, before the search on 6 November 2019. He therefore contended that the assessment was concluded and could be disturbed only based on incriminating material found during the search. As no such material had been found, he sought deletion of the addition of ₹1,65,00,000 on this ground.

11.

Addressing the remaining assessment years, counsel submitted that all assessments under consideration, except for assessment year 2019-20, were unabated. He maintained that, for unabated years, no assessment could be made under section 153A in the absence of incriminating material unearthed during the search. He relied on PCIT v. Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd. (2023) 149 taxmann.com 399 (SC), paragraphs 7.1–12 and 14, affirming CIT v. Kabul Chawla [2015] 61 taxmann.com 412 (Delhi), paragraph 37. Counsel disputed the Assessing Officer’s characterization of the equity allotment details, valuation reports and appointment letters of certain employees as incriminating material. He submitted that the share- allotment details relating to Mr. Alva and the deduction particulars under section 35(2AB) were already available to the Income-tax authorities, and that Forms 3CL/3CLA had been filed well before the search. The assessments for assessment years 2014-15 and 2016-17 had also been completed under section 143(3) before the search, accepting the returned income. For assessment year 2014-15, counsel referred to the appellant’s submissions dated 19 December 2016 in response to a notice under section 142(1). In answering the query concerning “large premium received during the year”, the appellant furnished share-premium details, including shares allotted to Mr. Alva at a premium. These particulars also appeared in the audited financial statement. In response to a notice under section 133(6), the appellant’s submissions dated 7 July 2017 supplied the share-allotment details and the valuation report dated 5 February 2015 that was subsequently seized during the search. Counsel therefore contended that the search unearthed no incriminating material to justify initiating section 153A proceedings, and that the orders for assessment years 2014-15 to 2018-19 were without jurisdiction.

12.

On the merits, the learned senior counsel argued that section 56(2) (viib) could be invoked only in a money laundering case. He submitted that no such allegation arose here, as the shares were allotted to the company’s Managing Director. He also maintained that the documents relied upon were already available to the Assessing Officer or the Department before the search and could not constitute incriminating material supporting an addition in a concluded assessment. He referred to the assessee’s reply to the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax during the original assessment proceedings, at page 774 of the paper book, which addressed the substantial share premium received during the year. Paragraph 4 identified an allotment to a venture capital fund as the source of the funds. On page 626, he referred to information sought under section 133(6) by the Income Tax Officer (Intelligence and Criminal Investigation). In its letter dated 22 June 2017, the assessee stated that share-premium details for financial years 2012-13 and 2013-14 had been furnished and examined during scrutiny. Share premium was a reason for selecting those years for scrutiny, and the relevant information and documents had been submitted to the Department. For financial year 2014-15, the assessee sought 15 days to respond and subsequently furnished details by letter dated 7 July 2017. Paragraph 3 enclosed the valuation report dated 5 February 2015 and particulars of the board resolution. Relying on Abhishar Buildwell and Kabul Chawla, counsel contended that no addition could be made without incriminating material found during the search, placing reliance on paragraph 7 of the judgment referred to. 13. Ld. Counsel further submitted that section 56(2) (viib), being an anti-abuse provision, did not apply to normal transactions. He relied on the memorandum explaining the Finance Bill, 2010 and paragraph 17 of the Mumbai Tribunal’s decision in CIT v. Subodh Menon, 103 taxmann.com 15. He also argued that the allotments must be considered in aggregate, since the average issue price of the shares allotted to Mr. Alwa was below their fair market value of ₹89 per share. 14. Ld. Counsel further submitted that section 56(2) (viib) did not apply to the present transaction. He argued that the provision was introduced to prevent closely held companies from receiving related persons’ unaccounted money as share premium. He relied on the Finance Minister’s Budget speech and a subsequent statement that no action of any kind had been taken against honest taxpayers who brought genuine money at a premium. He noted that sections 56(2)(vii) and 56(2) (viia), introduced earlier, were likewise anti-abuse provisions intended to counter the laundering of unaccounted money. Referring to Circular No. 1/2011 explaining the introduction of section 56(2) (viia), he maintained that the legislature did not intend these provisions to apply to genuine commercial transactions. Mr. Alva, the appellant’s Managing Director and promoter, brought in new strategic institutional investors during financial year 2013-14, namely UTI Investment Advisory Services Ltd. (“UTI”), to support the business. Under the investors’ commercial understanding, a precondition was that shares be allotted to Mr. Alva to align the pre- and post-investment capitalization tables with that understanding. He therefore subscribed initially at face value and subsequently at a premium, so that the differing issue prices reflected the agreement with the new investors. Counsel characterized the arrangement as a genuine commercial transaction outside section 56(2) (viib). Alternatively, he submitted that the provision required consideration of whether the aggregate consideration received for shares issued in the previous year exceeded their fair market value. The aggregate consideration received from Mr. Alva was ₹2,76,29,140, representing an average issue price of ₹57.82 per share, below the ₹89 fair market value adopted by the Assessing Officer. He accordingly contended that section 56(2) (viib) did not apply because the aggregate consideration did not exceed the shares’ fair market value. 15. Ld. Counsel accordingly submitted that the impugned addition was unsustainable, as no incriminating material had been found to support it in the concluded assessment. On the merits, he contended that the addition was also unjustified because the shares were allotted only to the company’s promoter and Managing Director at an average issue price below their fair market value. He therefore urged that the addition for the assessment year under consideration be deleted. 16. The learned Departmental Representative, Shri NS Sasidhara, Commissioner of Income Tax, also submitted detailed written submissions in a paper book dated 24 August 2016. He contended that the addition was based on incriminating material found during the search and that the Assessing Officer had explained the relevant documents and reasons in detail in the assessment order. He therefore submitted that the assessee’s argument was untenable and that the Supreme Court’s decision in Abhishek Buildwell Private Limited squarely applied to the assessee. He also relied on CIT(A)’s order, which had decided this issue against the assessee. 17. Regarding the shares allotted to Mr. Alwa, the learned Departmental Representative strongly contended that the assessee had received a premium exceeding the shares’ fair market value, so section 56(2) (viib) applied. He submitted that the anti-abuse provisions of section 56(2) applied irrespective of any allegation of money laundering, and that the Act contained no restriction excluding their application to an otherwise ordinary transaction. According to him, the Revenue was required to establish only the conditions specified in the provision. He further argued that the average issue price of the shares allotted to Mr. Siva Prasad Alwa being below fair market value was immaterial: valuation and the resulting taxable income had to be determined separately for each allotment. He therefore submitted that the assessee’s argument could not be accepted. 18. We address the respective issues considering the rival submissions, the orders of the lower authorities, the paper books filed by both parties, and the judicial precedents relied upon. We have carefully considered the submissions and examined these materials. The relevant precedents will be discussed, where necessary, in relation to each issue. 19. We first address ground No. 1, in which the assessee challenges the validity of the search under section 132 of the Income-tax Act. Following the amendment to section 132 by the Finance Act, 2017, the reasons to believe or suspect underlying a search cannot be disclosed to any person, authority or Appellate Tribunal. The Hon Supreme Court also affirmed this position in N.K. Jewellers v. Commissioner of Income Tax [2017] 85 taxmann.com 361 (SC). Following that decision, we dismiss ground No. 1. 20. Ground No. 2 challenges the validity of the assessment under section 153A of the Income-tax Act. The learned authorised representative contended that the addition was made without any incriminating material found during the search. The assessment for assessment year 2014-15 was completed under section 143(3) on 30 December 2016, before the search on 6 November 2019. The assessee therefore maintained that this was a concluded assessment, which could be disturbed only based on incriminating material found during the search. As no such material had been found, it contended that neither the returned income nor the income assessed under section 143(3) could be altered. 21. It is undisputed that the assessment was concluded and could be disturbed only based on incriminating material found during the search. The sole issue, therefore, is whether the search yielded incriminating documents justifying an upward revision of the assessee’s assessed income. 22. The learned Assessing Officer found that the allotment of 80,000 shares to Mr. Vishwaprasad Alwa on 6 March 2014, at a premium of ₹285.63 per share, was not at fair market value. Paragraph 7.2 of the assessment order records that the assessee’s equity allotment details were found and seized at pages 155–157 of Annexure A/STPL/03 during the search at its office on 6 November 2019. The Managing Director was questioned about these details and furnished complete equity allotment information on 7 November 2019. The assessee subsequently submitted modified final details during the continuation of the search, while the prohibitory order was in operation. Paragraph 7.3 records that a valuation report prepared by Ghargesh and Company, Chartered Accountants, on 5 February 2015, was also found during the search. Using the discounted free cash flow method, it determined the fair market value at ₹155.03 per share. Further valuation reports were found and seized on 6 January 2020 during the continuation of the search. The five valuations were ₹67.61 per share on 28 September 2011, ₹70.84 on 1 July 2013, ₹89 and ₹123 on 4 December 2013, and ₹155 on 5 February 2015. The assessment order reproduces the Managing Director’s statement concerning these documents and records that the assessee could not explain the variations in valuation. These facts show that the addition of ₹1,65,30,400 was based on material found during the search, namely the valuation reports, which did not justify the allotment of 80,000 shares on 6 March 2014 at a premium of ₹285.63 per share against a discounted cash flow valuation of ₹89 per share. We therefore find that the Assessing Officer was justified in disturbing the concluded assessment based on this incriminating material. Merely furnishing the documents to another authority within the same Department did not deprive them of their incriminating character, as they disclosed a difference between the allotment price and the valuations found during the search. The letter produced before us by the learned authorised representative did not address these differing valuations. Nor could he explain before us why the reports valued the company’s shares at different prices at different times. 23. The learned authorised representative relied on the Hon. Karnataka High Court’s decision in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax v. Atria Wind Private Limited [2025] 178 taxmann.com 556 (Karnataka). Following the Supreme Court’s decision, the High Court held that, in the absence of incriminating material found during the search, an addition could not be made under section 153A of the Act. That case concerned the conversion of a partnership firm into a private limited company, with all its assets and liabilities vesting in the company, and whether the transaction constituted a transfer under section 2(47) and attracted section 47(xii). The documents found during the search, listed in paragraph 7 of that decision, comprised a board resolution, a note prepared by advocates King and Partridge, a fixed- asset valuation report, deeds of retirement, an indenture for reconstitution of the firm, and a retirement-cum-release deed. The High Court held that these documents were not incriminating and that the addition under section 153A was therefore unsustainable. The present case is materially different. Here, the search yielded several share valuation reports showing different values at different points in time. The Managing Director, who was also the allottee of the shares and was examined under section 132(4), could not explain these variations. Even before us, no explanation was offered for the differing share valuations at different points in time. The material found during the search showing that the assessee company had presented these differing valuations, therefore constitutes incriminating material. In Atria Wind, the seized material consisted of documents concerning the firm’s conversion into a company and the applicability of section 47(xii), rather than conflicting fixed-asset valuations. That decision is therefore distinguishable on its facts. 24. This conclusion is consistent with the principles laid down in the Hon. Supreme Court’s decision in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Central-3 v. Avishar Buildwell (P) Limited [2023] 454 ITR 212 (SC), dated 24 April 2023. Accordingly, ground No. 2 is dismissed. 25. Ground No. 3 concerns the addition of ₹1,65,30,400 for share premium received on shares allotted to Mr. Alwa under section 56(2)(viib) of the Act. Section 56(1) taxes income of every kind that is not excluded from total income and is not chargeable under any other head. Without prejudice to this general provision, section 56(2) specifies categories of income chargeable under this head. Among them, section 56(2)(viib) applies where a company in which the public are not substantially interested receives, in any previous year, consideration for issuing shares that exceeds their face value. The aggregate consideration exceeding the shares’ fair market value is treated as the company’s income. The Explanation to this provision sets out two alternative bases for determining fair market value, with the higher value available to the assessee. 26. Applying these provisions to the present facts, Mr. Vishva Prasad Alwa was allotted 80,000 shares on 6 March 2014 at a face value of ₹10 and a premium of ₹285.63 per share. Their fair market value, determined under the Explanation to section 56(2)(viib) using the discounted cash flow method, was ₹89 per share. The consideration received by the assessee company exceeded this fair market value by ₹1,65,30,400. The company therefore correctly brought this excess to tax under section 56(2)(viib) of the Act. 27. The learned authorised representative strongly contended that section 56(2) contains anti-abuse provisions designed to prevent tax evasion through the laundering of unaccounted income. He argued that, because the shares were issued to the company’s Managing Director and there was no allegation of tax evasion or money laundering, no addition could be made under this provision. He relied on Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v. Subodh Menon [2019] 103 taxmann.com 15 (Mumbai). In that case, shares were issued to a director and promoter to comply with a covenant in a bank loan agreement funding the acquisition of a business in the United States by the company’s subsidiary. The coordinate Bench held that such a bona fide business transaction could not be taxed under section 56(2)(vii), particularly when the assessment order contained no allegation of money laundering. 28. We have carefully considered the decision relied upon by the learned authorised representative but find no merit in his contention. Anti-evasion provisions address arrangements involving complex tax avoidance, transfer-pricing manipulation or aggressive corporate restructuring. Their application depends on the satisfaction of the statutory conditions, not on a separate finding or proof of money laundering or tax evasion. Tax evasion, statutory avoidance and money laundering are distinct concepts, governed by different legislative frameworks, objectives and evidentiary standards.

Section 56(2)(viib), which addresses excessive share premium, contains no requirement that the Assessing Officer allege money laundering or tax evasion before invoking it or sustaining an addition. As a fiscal anti-evasion and anti-abuse mechanism, it operates independently of those separate enquiries. Where the statutory language is clear and its application to the economic realities apparent, strict interpretation requires giving effect to that language without importing additional conditions. Courts, like other authorities, must refrain from adding requirements that the legislature has not prescribed. The anti-evasion provision places the onus on the assessee to establish that its case falls outside its scope. To rely on Subodh Menon, the assessee must demonstrate that the allotment to its Managing Director was bona fide and made at fair market value. In that case, the coordinate bench held as under :- “17. We further observe that provisions of section 56(2)(vii) does not apply to bona fide business transaction. As explained hereinabove, shares were issued by the company to comply with a covenant in the loan agreement with State Bank of India which required the promoters to increase the total net worth of the company to Rs. 150 crores by 31 March, 2010. Therefore, the shares were issued by the company for a bona fide reason and as a matter of business exigency. Circular No.1/2011 dated 6 April, 2011 issued by the CBDT explaining the provision of section 56(2)(vii) specifically states that the section was inserted as a counter evasion mechanism to prevent money laundering of unaccounted income. In paragraph 13.4 thereof where it is stated that "the intention was not to tax transactions carried out in the normal course of business or trade, the profit of which are taxable under the specific head of income". 29. Section 56(2) expressly provides safeguards and specifies the circumstances in which it does not apply. The assessee has not demonstrated comparable circumstances; the decision relied upon is therefore distinguishable. In that decision, the Bench held that transfer- pricing provisions, being anti-abuse provisions, must be interpreted strictly. We also apply them strictly. Thus, ground No. 3 is dismissed. 30. Ground No. 4 concerns a fresh claim for loss made in the return filed under section 153A of the Act. The facts show that this loss was neither available nor claimed in the original return, and the claim was not raised during the original assessment proceedings completed under section 143(3). On the assessee’s own case, the assessment for assessment year 2014-15 was concluded and had not abated. In an unabated assessment, fresh claims are generally impermissible unless directly connected with incriminating material unearthed during the search. In this regard, we rely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Sun Engineering. Where an assessment has attained finality and no assessment proceedings are pending on the date of search, the scope of section 153A is confined to incriminating material found during the search, as mandated by the Supreme Court in Abhisar Buildwell Private Limited. A search assessment does not permit reconsideration of the entire past assessment or settled claims unless specific incriminating material requires recomputation. The assessee therefore cannot use a return under section 153A for an unabated year to introduce independent, previously unclaimed allowances or deductions without a direct nexus to incriminating material and undisclosed income. Accordingly, ground No. 4 is dismissed.

31.

In the result, the assessee’s appeal for assessment year 2014-15 is dismissed. ITA 1243/Bang/2025 for assessment year 2015-16 32. The assessee has filed ITA 1243/Bang/2025 for assessment year 2015-16 against the consolidated appellate order dated 21 March 2025 passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-15, Bengaluru, for assessment years 2015-16 to 2019-20. The appeal arises from the assessment order dated 28 October 2021 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle-2(3), Bengaluru. 33. The assessee has raised the following grounds of appeal: ITA 1243/Bang/2025:

1.

Validity of the search proceedings under section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ('the Act')

1.1. The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act at the premises of the Appellant are bad in law since the Appellant has not failed to produce books of account or other documents as required by summons or notice issued on the Appellant.

1.2. The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act at the premises of the Appellant are bad in law as the tax officer had no reason to believe that the Appellant would not produce books of account or other documents.

1.3. The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act at the premises of the Appellant are bad in law as the tax officer failed to bring on record any document to demonstrate that the Appellant was in possession of any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing represented by undisclosed income.

1.4. The learned tax officer erred in conducting a search without any bonafide reason to believe that the Appellant was in possession of undisclosed property or would not cooperate in any proceedings.

1.5. The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act are erroneous and bad in law since there were no undisclosed income or property found during the course of the search proceedings as evident from the Panchama drawn post search or addition made during the corresponding proceedings.

1.6. The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act are erroneous and bad in law since the Appellant had duly submitted the details about share issue to the Income Tax Officer, (Intelligence and Criminal Investigation), Mysore and before the learned AO and there was no reason to believe that the Appellant would not produce the requisite documents.

2.

Validity of assessment under section 153A of the Act

2.1. The learned AO/CIT(A) erred in law and on facts in assuming jurisdiction under section 153A of the Act in the case of the Appellant without bringing on record any documents to demonstrate that the Appellant was in possession of specified assets representing income escaped assessment.

2.2. The learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have observed that the proceedings under section 153A of the Act can be initiated only when assets being land or building, shares and securities, loans and advances, deposits in the bank account that have escaped assessment are in the possession of the learned AO.

3.

Disallowance in respect of salary paid to employees on probation under section 35(2AB) of the Act-Rs. 3,39,000

3.1. The learned AO/CIT(A) erred in law and on facts in denying deduction under section 35(2AB) in respect of salary paid to employees under probation as salary paid to trainees.

3.2. The learned AO/CIT(A) erred in concluding that the employees were trainees based on their designation without considering that they were employed of the appellant and also participated in the provident fund and gratuity scheme of the Appellant.

3.3. Without prejudice to ground 3.1 and 3.2 above, the learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that the salary paid to trainees was not eligible for weighted average deduction as per DSIR guidelines issued in July 2017, which is not applicable for the year under consideration.

3.4. Without prejudice to ground 3.1 to 3.3 above, the learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that the weighted average deduction cannot be denied in respect of salary paid to employees after their probation period.

3.5. The learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have observed that the employee on probation have the requisite technical qualification and hence, otherwise covered under the DSIR guidelines for deductions under section 35(2AB) of the Act.

3.6. Without prejudice to the above, the learned AO/ CIT(A) ought to have granted deduction with respect to salary paid to the employees under section 35(1)(i) of the Act.

Each of the above grounds is independent and without prejudice to the other grounds of appeal preferred by the Appellant.

The Appellant craves leave to add, alter, rescind, and modify the grounds herein above or produce further documents, facts, and evidence before or at the time of hearing of this appeal.

For the above and any other grounds which may be raised at the time of hearing, it is prayed that necessary relief may be provided.

34.

In its return filed under section 139 on 30 November 2015, the assessee declared a total loss of ₹770 1,17,727. Following a notice under section 153A dated 19 November 2020, it filed a return on 19 December 2020 declaring the same loss of ₹770 1,17,727. A notice under section 143(2) of the Act was subsequently issued on 10 March 2021. 35. The assessee disputes the validity of the search and maintains that no incriminating material was found. The sole issue on merits, however, is the deduction of ₹3,39,000 claimed under section 35(2AB) of the Act. 36. The assessee' s in- house research and development unit develops new products, modifies, and improves existing products to meet customer requirements. In its return, the assessee claimed a deduction under section 35(2 AB) of the Income- tax Act. The learned Assessing Officer found that the claim included remuneration or stipends paid to trainees, which he considered ineligible. During the search, the research activities and personnel involved were examined, and offer and confirmation letters for trainees and contract employees were found and seized. A folder referred to in the order was also found during post- search operations. The General Manager' s statement was recorded, and a compact disc furnished on 19 December 2019 contained information sought by summons issued on various dates. According to the submission, the disc included expenditure details for various financial years relating to the research and development facility approved by the Secretary, Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, under section 35(2 AB). The Assessing Officer identified salaries or stipends paid to graduate engineer trainees, postgraduate engineer trainees, apprentice trainees and fixed- tenure agreement trainees, which he considered inadmissible under the Department' s guidelines. He tabulated payments to 15 such employees for whom deduction had been claimed. During proceedings relating to the prohibitory order, the Managing Director, Mr. Vishwas Prasad Alwar, was examined under section 132(4) and asked to explain the deduction claimed for payments to graduate trainees, postgraduate trainees and other trainees. The appointment letters described the remuneration as salary but specified stipends payable during stated training periods. After examining some of these letters, the Assessing Officer issued a show- cause notice proposing disallowance of the excess deduction. He rejected the assessee's explanation and determined that excess weighted deduction under section 35(2 AB) had been claimed at ₹ 3, 39, 000 for assessment year 2015-16, ₹ 3,53,000 for assessment year 2016-17, ₹ 18,33,583 for assessment year 2017-18 and ₹ 4,20,000 for assessment year 2018-19. Accordingly, he disallowed ₹ 3,39,000 for the year under consideration. 37. The assessee appealed to the learned CIT(A), contending that the assessment year was unabated and that, even otherwise, expenditure on trainees could not be disallowed for purposes of section 35(2AB). In paragraph 9.4 of his order, the CIT(A) referred to paragraph (xiii) of the DSIR guidelines for 2014 and 2017. He observed that the 2014 guidelines excluded manpower engaged on retainership, consultancy or contract from weighted tax deduction, and that the 2017 guidelines similarly excluded retainers, trainees, consultants and contract manpower. He therefore upheld the Assessing Officer’s disallowance and dismissed the assessee’s grounds on this issue for the year under consideration.

38.

The learned senior counsel challenged the disallowance on the ground that no incriminating material had been found during the search. Referring to paragraphs 8.4 and 8.5 of the assessment order, he submitted that the former described the material purportedly found by the Assessing Officer, whereas the latter recorded only Kavita’s statement, on which the disallowance was based. He maintained that the Assessing Officer had merely relied on Form No. 3CL, filed with the original return. Citing pages 817 and 832 of the paper book, he argued that the disallowance for the impugned assessment year was unsustainable without incriminating material found during the search. For assessment year 2016-17, counsel cited the appellant’s submissions dated 27 October 2018, made in response to a notice under section 142(1), setting out the particulars of its section 35(2AB) claim. The appellant had produced the prescribed authority’s approval in Form 3CL, quantifying expenditure on salaries paid to employees on probation. During the original proceedings under section 143(3), the Assessing Officer’s show-cause notice dated 5 September 2018 specifically sought details of the expenditure underlying that deduction. In response, the appellant’s submissions dated 30 November 2018 provided an expenditure breakdown and an employee-wise list with designations. That list included the two employees whose payments were identified for disallowance in the section 153A assessment order, and disclosed their designations. Counsel therefore contended that the search had yielded no incriminating material warranting initiation of section 153A proceedings and that the orders for assessment years 2014-15 to 2018-19 were without jurisdiction. 39. On merits, counsel submitted that the amendment concerning the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research took effect from 2018. He relied on the guidelines at page 847 of the paper book, which, in his submission, permitted the expenditure and rendered the disallowance unsustainable. The Assessing Officer had treated the salary paid to employees designated as “trainees” as stipends ineligible for deduction under section 35(2AB) under the DSIR guidelines. Counsel disputed this characterization, maintaining that they were employees on probation and that an employer-employee relationship existed. They also participated in the appellant’s provident fund and gratuity schemes. He referred to the pay slip at page 914 of the paper book for assessment year 2015-16, which recorded a provident fund contribution, and contended that the deduction claim was correct. He further submitted that DSIR’s approval of the appellant’s claim for assessment year 2016-17 demonstrated that employees designated as “trainees” were not excluded from eligibility. Without prejudice, and in any event, he argued that the DSIR guidelines were amended only in July 2017, with effect from assessment year 2018- 19, to exclude expenditure on trainees from admissible deduction. The appellant’s claim should therefore remain undisturbed at least through assessment year 2017-18. In support, he cited the revised guidelines at pages 876–882 of the paper book for assessment year 2015-16. 40. The learned Departmental Representative strongly disputed the contention that no incriminating material had been found. He relied on Form No. 3CL, the material identified in paragraph 8.4 of the assessment order and the Managing Director’s statement recorded under section 132(4). He further submitted that, following the statement of Ms. Kavita, the Finance Manager, the Assessing Officer identified incriminating material, including appointment letters. In his submission, this material justified disturbing the concluded assessment.

41.

On merits, the Departmental Representative relied on the orders of the learned Assessing Officer and the CIT(A). He submitted that expenditure on manpower recruitment and consultancy charges was ineligible for deduction under the DSIR guidelines for 2014 and 2017. He therefore maintained that the Assessing Officer had correctly disallowed the assessee’s claim for weighted deduction under section 35(2AB) of the Income-tax Act for the relevant assessment years. 42. We have carefully considered the rival contentions and examined the assessment and appellate orders of the lower authorities, together with the documents presented by both parties. 43. Ground No. 1 challenges the validity of the search. This ground is identical to ground No. 1 in the assessee’s appeal for assessment year 2014-15, which we have already addressed. For the same reasons, we find no merit in this challenge and dismiss ground No. 1. 44. Ground No. 2 challenges the assessment under section 153A on the basis that the disallowance was not supported by incriminating material found during the search. The Assessing Officer disallowed ₹3,39,000 as excess weighted deduction under section 35(2AB), treating the training expenditure as ineligible. The total deduction claimed is recorded as ₹253,14,000. The search took place on 6 November 2019, by which time the assessment for assessment year 2015-16 was concluded. It could therefore be disturbed only based on incriminating material found during the search. The Assessing Officer recorded that the assessee’s research activities and the personnel involved were examined during the search. Offer and confirmation letters relating to trainees and contract employees were found and seized in a folder during post-search operations at the corporate office on 6 January 2020. The Managing Director was examined under section 132(4) but could not explain the deduction claimed for trainee payments. Complete details were also obtained on 19 December 2019 during the search, revealing that expenditure on certain categories of trainees had been included in the weighted-deduction claim. Read together, paragraphs 8.4 to 8.8 of the assessment order identify the evidence found and seized during the search on which the proposed addition was based. The material before the Assessing Officer was thus not confined to Form No. 3CL, which the learned representative stated was already available with the return. We find that the disallowance under section 35(2AB), and the resulting increase in total income, were supported by incriminating material found during the search. Accordingly, ground No. 2 is dismissed. 45. On ground No. 3, the Assessing Officer denied deduction under section 35(2AB), treating salaries paid to employees designated as “trainees” as stipends ineligible under the guidelines issued by the Department of Scientific Research. We find, however, that these were probationary employees of the assessee, with an employer-employee relationship, who participated in its provident fund and gratuity schemes. Examination of their pay slips confirms their provident fund contributions. The deduction claim was thus justified. DSIR’s approval of the assessee’s claim for assessment year 2016-17 further demonstrates that employees designated as “trainees” were not excluded from eligibility. The guidelines were amended only in July 2017, applicable from assessment year 2018-19, to exclude expenditure on trainees. This exclusion therefore cannot support disallowance of the assessee’s claim up to assessment year 2017-18. Accordingly, we allow ground No. 3 on merits and direct the learned Assessing Officer to allow the weighted deduction of ₹3,39,000 under section 35(2AB) of the Income-tax Act.

46.

In the result, the assessee’s appeal for assessment year 2015-16 is partly allowed. ITA 1244/Bangalore/2025 AY 2016-17 47. The assessee has filed ITA 1244/Bang/2025 for assessment year 2016-17 against the consolidated appellate order dated 21 March 2025 passed by the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), Bangalore. The grounds raised in this appeal are substantially identical and are reproduced below: 1. Validity of the search proceedings under section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ('the Act')

1.1. The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act at the premises of the Appellant are bad in law since the Appellant has not failed to produce books of account or other documents as required by summons or notice issued on the Appellant.

1.2. The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act at the premises of the Appellant are bad in law as the tax officer had no reason to believe that the Appellant would not produce books of account or other documents.

1.3. The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act at the premises of the Appellant are bad in law as the tax officer failed to bring on record any document to demonstrate that the Appellant was in possession of any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing represented by undisclosed income.

1.4. The learned tax officer erred in conducting a search without any bonafide reason to believe that the Appellant was in possession of undisclosed property or would not cooperate in any proceedings.

1.5. The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act are erroneous and bad in law since there were no undisclosed income or property found during the course of the search proceedings as evident from the Panchama drawn post search or addition made during the corresponding proceedings.

1.6. The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act are erroneous and bad in law since the Appellant had duly submitted the details about share issue to the Income Tax Officer, (Intelligence and Criminal Investigation), Mysore and before the learned AO and there was no reason to believe that the Appellant would not produce the requisite documents.

2.

Validity of assessment under section 153A of the Act

2.1. The learned AO/CIT(A) erred in law and on facts in assuming jurisdiction under section 153A of the Act in the case of the Appellant without bringing on record any documents to demonstrate that the Appellant was in possession of specified assets representing income escaped assessment.

2.2. The learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have observed that the proceedings under section 153A of the Act can be initiated only when assets being land or building, shares and securities, loans and advances, deposits in the bank account that have escaped assessment are in the possession of the learned AO.

3.

Disallowance in respect of salary paid to employees on probation under section 35(2AB) of the Act - Rs. 3,53,300

3.1. The learned AO/CIT(A) erred in law and on facts in denying deduction under section 35(2AB) in respect of salary paid to employees under probation as salary paid to trainees.

3.2. The learned AO/CIT(A) erred in concluding that the employees were trainees based on their designation without considering that they were employees of the Appellant and also participated in the provident fund and gratuity scheme of the Appellant.

3.3. Without prejudice to ground 3.1 and 3.2 above, the learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that the salary paid to trainees was not eligible for weighted average deduction as per DSIR guidelines issued in July 2017, which is not applicable for the year under consideration.

3.4. Without prejudice to ground 3.1 to 3.3 above, the learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that the weighted average deduction cannot be denied in respect of salary paid to employees after their probation period.

3.5. The learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have observed that the employee on probation have the requisite technical qualification and hence, otherwise covered under the DSIR guidelines for deductions under section 35(2AB) of the Act.

3.6. Without prejudice to the above, the learned AO/ CIT(A) ought to have granted deduction with respect to salary paid to the employees under section 35(1)(i) of the Act.

4.

Claim of additional loss while filing the return of income ('ROI') under section 153A of the Act - Rs. 4,97,350

4.1. The learned AO/CIT(A) has erred in not allowing the loss claimed by the Appellant while filing its ROI under section 153A of the Act.

4.2. The learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that once the assessment gets abated by virtue of the proceedings under section 153A of the Act, it is open for the Appellant to make additional claims.

4.3. The learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that once the ROI is filed under section 153A of the Act, such ROI would be treated as the ROI filed for the year under consideration.

Each of the above grounds is independent and without prejudice to the other grounds of appeal preferred by the Appellant.

The Appellant craves leave to add, alter, rescind, and modify the grounds herein above or produce further documents, facts, and evidence before or at the time of hearing of this appeal.

For the above and any other grounds which may be raised at the time of hearing, it is prayed that necessary relief may be provided. 48. After considering the rival submissions, we find that the challenges to the search and the assessment under section 153A are identical to those addressed in the assessee’s appeal for assessment year 2015-16. For the reasons given in that decision, the validity of the search cannot be challenged before us, and the disallowance of ₹353100 under section 35(2AB) was based on incriminating material found during the search. We therefore dismiss Grounds Nos. 1 and 2. We also dismiss ground No. 4, relating to the additional loss of ₹497 1350 claimed in the return filed under section 153A. On merits, however, applying our earlier decision on deduction under section 35(2AB), we allow the assessee’s claim of ₹353100. Accordingly, we allow ground No. 3, while dismissing all other grounds. 49. Thus, ground Nos. 1, 2 and 4 stand dismissed, and ground No. 3 stands allowed. 50. In the result, the appeal for assessment year 2016-17 is partly allowed. 51. The assessee has filed ITA 1245/Bang/2025 for assessment year 2017-18, ITA 1246/Bang/2025 for assessment year 2018-19 and ITA 1247/Bang/2025 for assessment year 2019-20. These appeals raise grounds identical to those raised in the assessee’s appeal for assessment year 2015- 16. The grounds are reproduced below:

ITA 1245/Bang/2025 A Y 2017-18

1.

Validity of the search proceedings under section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961(‘the Act’) 1.1 The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act at the premises of the Appellant are bad in law since the Appellant has not failed to produce books of account or other documents as required by summons or notice issued on the Appellant.

1.2 The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act at the premises of the Appellant are bad in law as the tax officer had no reason to believe that the Appellant would not produce books of account or other documents.

1.3 The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act at the premises of the Appellant are bad in law as the tax officer failed to bring on record any document to demonstrate that the Appellant was in possession of any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing represented by undisclosed income.

1.4 The learned tax officer erred in conducting a search without any bonafide reason to believe that the Appellant was in possession of undisclosed property or would not cooperate in any proceedings.

1.5 The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act are erroneous and bad in law since there was no undisclosed income or property found during the course of the search proceedings, as evident from the Panchama drawn post-search or addition made during the corresponding proceedings.

1.6 The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the act are erroneous and bad in law since the Appellant had duly submitted the details about share issue to the Income Tax Officer, (Intelligence and Criminal Investigation), Mysore and before the learned AO and there was no reason to believe that the Appellant would not produce the requisite documents.

2.

Validity of assessment under section 153A of the Act

2.1 The learned AO/CIT(A) erred in law and on facts in assuming jurisdiction under section 153A of the Act in the case of the Appellant without brining on record any documents to demonstrate that the Appellant was in possession of specified assets representing income escaped assessment.

2.2 The learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have observed that the proceedings under section 153A of the Act can be initiated only when assets being land or building, shares and securities, loans and advances, deposits in the bank account that have escaped assessment are in the possession

3.

Disallowance in respect of salary paid to employees on probation under section 35(2AB) of the Act – Rs. 18,33,583

3.1 The learned AO/CIT(A) erred in law and on facts in denying deduction under section 35(2AB) in respect of salary paid to employees under probation as salary paid to trainees

3.2 The learned AO/CIT(A) erred in concluding that the employees were trainees based on their designation without considering that they were employees of the Appellant and also participated in the provident fund and gratuity scheme of the Appellant.

3.3 Without prejudice to the ground 3.1 and 3.2 above, the learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that the salary paid to trainees was not eligible for weighted average deduction as per DSIR guidelines issued in July, 2017 which is not applicable for the year under consideration.

3.4 Without prejudice to ground 3.1 to 3.3 above, the learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that the weighted average deduction cannot be denied in respect of salary paid to employees after their probation period.

3.5 The learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have observed that the employee on probation have the requisite technical qualification and hence, otherwise covered under the DSIR guidelines for deductions under section 35(2AB) of the Act.

3.6 Without prejudice to the above, the learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have granted deduction with respect to salary paid to the employees under section 35(1)(i) of the Act.

Each of the above grounds is independent and without prejudice to the other grounds of appeal preferred by the Appellant.

The Appellant craves leave to add, alter, rescind, and modify the grounds herein above or produce further documents, facts, and evidence before or at the time of hearing of this appeal.

For the above and any other grounds which may ne raised at the time of hearing, it is prayed that necessary relief may be provided.

ITA 1246/Bang/2025 AY 2018-19

1.

Validity of the search proceedings under section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ('the Act')

1.1. The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act at the premises of the Appellant are bad in law since the Appellant has not failed to produce books of account or other documents as required by summons or notice issued on the Appellant.

1.2. The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act at the premises of the Appellant are bad in law as the tax officer had no reason to believe that the Appellant would not produce books of account or other documents.

1.3. The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act at the premises of the Appellant are bad in law as the tax officer failed to bring on record any document to demonstrate that the Appellant was in possession of any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing represented by undisclosed income.

1.4. The learned tax officer erred in conducting a search without any bonafide reason to believe that the Appellant was in possession of undisclosed property or would not cooperate in any proceedings.

1.5. The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act are erroneous and bad in law since there were no undisclosed income or property found during the course of the search proceedings as evident from the Panchama drawn post search or addition made during the corresponding proceedings.

1.6. The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act are erroneous and bad in law since the Appellant had duly submitted the details about share issue to the Income Tax Officer, (Intelligence and Criminal Investigation), Mysore and before the learned AO and there was no reason to believe that the Appellant would not produce the requisite documents.

2.

Validity of assessment under section 153A of the Act

2.1. The learned AO/CIT(A) erred in law and on facts in assuming jurisdiction under section 153A of the Act in the case of the Appellant without bringing on record any documents to demonstrate that the Appellant was in possession of specified assets representing income escaped assessment.

2.2. The learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have observed that the proceedings under section 153A of the Act can be initiated only when assets being land or building, shares and securities, loans and advances, deposits in the bank account that have escaped assessment are in the possession of the learned AO.

3.

Disallowance in respect of salary paid to employees on probation under section 35(2AB) of the Act - Rs. 2,10,000

3.1. The learned AO/CIT(A) erred in law and on facts in denying deduction under section 35(2AB) in respect of salary paid to employees under probation as salary paid to trainees.

3.2. The learned AO/CIT(A) erred in concluding that the employees were trainees based on their designation without considering that they were employees of the Appellant and also participated in the provident fund and gratuity scheme of the Appellant.

3.3. Without prejudice to ground 3.1 to 3.2 above, the learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that the weighted average deduction cannot be denied in respect of salary paid to employees after their probation period.

3.4. The learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have observed that the employee on probation have the requisite technical qualification and hence, otherwise covered under the DSIR guidelines for deductions under section 35(2AB) of the Act.

3.5. Without prejudice to the above, the learned AO/ CIT(A) ought to have granted deduction with respect to salary paid to the employees under section 35(1)(i) of the Act.

4.

Claim of additional loss while filing the return of income ('ROI') under section 153A of the Act – Rs. 7,45,584

4.1. The learned AO/CIT(A) has erred in not allowing the loss claimed by the Appellant while filing its ROI under section 153A of the Act.

4.2. The learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that once the assessment gets abated by virtue of the proceedings under section 153A of the Act, it is open for the Appellant to make additional claims.

4.3. The learned AO/CIT(A)s ought to have appreciated that once the ROI is filed under section 153A of the Act, such ROI would be treated as the ROI filed for the year under consideration.

Each of the above grounds is independent and without prejudice to the other grounds of appeal preferred by the Appellant.

The Appellant craves leave to add, alter, rescind, and modify the grounds herein above or produce further documents, facts, and evidence before or at the time of hearing of this appeal.

For the above and any other grounds which may be raised at the time of hearing, it is prayed that necessary relief may be provided.

ITA 1247/Bang/2025 AY 2019-20

1.

Validity of the search proceedings under section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’)

1.1 The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act at the premises of the Appellant are bad in law since the Appellant has not failed to produce books of account or other documents as required by summons or notice issued on the Appellant.

1.2 The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act at the premises of the Appellant are bad in law as the tax officer had no reason to believe that the Appellant would not produce books of account or other documents.

1.3 The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act at the premises of the Appellant are bad in law as the tax officer failed to bring on record any document to demonstrate that the Appellant was in possession of any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing represented by undisclosed income.

1.4 The learned tax officer erred in conducting a search without any bonafide reason to believe that the Appellant was in possession of undisclosed property or would not cooperate in any proceedings.

1.5 The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act are erroneous and bad in law since there were no undisclosed income or property found during the course of the search proceedings as evident from the Panchama drawn post search or addition made during the corresponding proceedings.

1.6 The search proceedings initiated under section 132 of the Act are erroneous and bad in law since the Appellant had duly submitted the details about share issue to the Income Tax Officer, (Intelligence and Criminal Investigation), Mysore and before the learned AO and there was no reason to believe that the Appellant would not produce the requisite documents.

2.

Validity of assessment under section 153A of the Act 2.1 The learned AO/CIT(A) erred in law and on facts in assuming jurisdiction under section 153A of the Act in the case of the Appellant without brining on record any documents to demonstrate that the Appellant was in possession of specified assets representing income escaped assessment.

2.2 The learned AO/CIT(A) ought to have observed that the proceedings under section 153A of the Act can be initiated only when assets being land or building, shares and securities, loans and advances, deposits in the bank account that have escaped assessment are in the possession of the learned AO.

3.

Claim of additional loss while filing the return of income (‘ROI’) under section 153A of the Act – Rs. 78,35,941

3.1 The learned AO has erred in not allowing the loss claimed by the Appellant while filing its ROI under section 153A of the Act.

3.2 The learned AO ought to have appreciated that once the assessment gets abated by virtue of the proceedings under section153A of the Act, it is open for the Appellant to make additional claims.

3.3 The learned AO ought to have appreciated that once the ROI is filed under section153A of the Act, such ROI would be treated as the ROI filed for the year under consideration.

Each of the above grounds is independent and without prejudice to the other grounds of appeal preferred by the Appellant.

The Appellant craves leave to add, alter, rescind, and modify the grounds herein above or produce further documents, facts, and evidence before or at the time of hearing of this appeal.

For the above and any other grounds which may be raised at the time of hearing, it is prayed that necessary relief may be provided.

52.

Having considered the rival submissions, we find that the challenges to the search and the assessments under section 153A are identical to those addressed in the assessee’s appeal for assessment year 2015-16. For the reasons stated in that decision, the validity of the search cannot be challenged before us, and the disallowance under section 35(2AB) was based on incriminating material found during the search. Grounds Nos. 1 and 2 are therefore dismissed. The ground concerning additional loss claimed in the return filed under section 153A, referred to as ground No. 4, is also dismissed. On merits, following our earlier decision on section 35(2AB), we allow the deduction claim of ₹18,33,583 for assessment year 2017-18. We confirm the disallowance of ₹4,20,000 for assessment year 2018-19. Accordingly, ground No. 3 is allowed for assessment year 2017- 18, while all other grounds are dismissed. 53. Thus, grounds Nos. 1, 2 and 4 are dismissed. Ground No. 3 is allowed for assessment year 2017-18 and dismissed for the other assessment years.

54.

In the result, the appeal for assessment year 2017-18 is partly allowed, and the appeals for assessment years 2018-19 and 2019-20 are dismissed.

Order pronounced in the open court on 06th November, 2026.

Sd/- Sd/- SOUNDARARAJAN K. PRASHANT MAHARISHI JUDICIAL MEMBER VICE PRESIDENT Bangalore Dated: 06.11.2026 *TNTS* Copy to:

SKANRAY TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED PLOT NO. 15-17, 1 HEBBAL INDUSTRIAL AREA, MYSORE-570016, KARNATAKA DCIT, CENTRAL CIRCLE-2(3), C R BUILDING, 2 QUEENS ROAD, BANGALORE-560001, KARNATAKA 3 THE PCIT / CIT, 4 THE CIT(APPEALS) 5 THE D.R., ITAT, BANGALORE BENCH

BY ORDER

P G Digitally signed by P G RAJANI RAJANI Date: 2026.11.13 16:23:14 +05'30' ASSISTANT REGISTRAR I.T.A.T., BANGALORE

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