NMDC Limited, vs. The Chief Commissioner of Income Tax-I

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WP/4701/2013HC TelanganaHBHC01062022201325 February 2013Author: GODA RAGHURAM,M.S.RAMACHANDRA RAO5 pages
AI SummaryDismissed

What did the High Court hold?

The High Court held that the errors alleged by the petitioner, such as the finding of suppressed income based on a fundamentally misconceived inference from the record, were errors within jurisdiction and not errors going to the root of jurisdiction. The Court cited the principles laid down in Addanki Tiruvenkata Thata Desika Charyulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh and The Queen v. The Commissioner for Special Purposes of the Income Tax, distinguishing between errors going to the root of jurisdiction and errors within jurisdiction. The Tribunal, as the final authority on facts, is entrusted with the jurisdiction to determine jurisdictional facts and correct erroneous findings. The Court noted that the petitioner had chosen to subject itself to the assessment order and had pursued the appellate remedy before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). As an effective alternative statutory remedy by way of appeal under Section 253 of the Act was available before the Tribunal, the Court declined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. The writ petition was dismissed at the admission stage, with the Court not going into the merits of the competing contentions, deeming them more appropriately pursued before the Tribunal. Liberty was granted to the petitioner to urge all contentions of fact and law before the Tribunal.

What were the facts?

The National Mineral Development Corporation Limited (NMDC), an instrumentality of the Union, filed a writ petition challenging an order of reassessment under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, a notice proposing a fresh assessment, the consequent assessment order dated February 17, 2012, and the appellate order dated December 3, 2012, which confirmed the assessment. The reassessment was initiated based on a perceived huge variation between the prices of iron ore exported by NMDC to Japan and South Korea and similar exports by a private exporter to China, inferring suppressed income. The petitioner argued that the reassessment was initiated without recording reasons and was contrary to established legal principles. The petitioner also contended that the availability of an alternative remedy did not preclude the High Court from exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226, especially given the significant tax liability and potential for affirmation of lower appellate orders.

What were the issues?

1. Whether the High Court should exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with the reassessment proceedings and subsequent orders, despite the availability of an alternative statutory remedy of appeal to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal under Section 253 of the Income Tax Act, 1961? Assessee's Contentions: - No reasons were recorded or existed for exercising powers under Sections 147 and 148 of the Act for reopening the assessment. - The reopening transgressed established legal principles, citing Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi vi. Kelvinator of India Limited. - The availability of an alternative remedy is not per se a ground to decline jurisdiction under Article 226. - The orders of the primary and appellate authorities were vitiated by errors going to the root of their jurisdiction, as the reassessment was based on no relevant facts and proceeded on an assumption of non-existent, presumptive income. Revenue's Contentions: - The judgment records no specific contentions from the revenue regarding the issues raised by the assessee, beyond filing a counter.

Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?

Section 148,Section 147,Section 253

AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE GODA RAGHURAM AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.S.RAMACHANDRA RAO

WRIT PETITION No.4701 of 2013 ORDER (Per the Hon’ble Sri Justice Goda Raghuram): The petitioner is an instrumentality of the Union – the National Mineral Development Corporation Limited. The order of the second respondent reopening the Assessment in purported exercise of powers under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short ‘the Act’) vide the order dated 16.12.2011; the notice dated 29.12.2011 proposing to pass a fresh Order of Assessment; the consequent Order of Assessment dated 17.02.2012 by the second respondent and the appellate order of the first respondent dated 03.12.2012 confirming the Order of Assessment and rejecting the petitioner’s appeal, are assailed in this writ petition.

The Assessment Order by the second respondent dated 17.02.2012 brought to tax specified income allegedly earned by the petitioner on the ground that these were suppressed, on an inference drawn from the fact that there was a huge variation between the comparative prices of iron ore exported by the petitioner to Japan and South Korea and similar exports by a private exporter in relation to exports to China. The Order of Assessment was passed after reopening the assessment, in exercise of the powers under Section 148 of the Act preceded by a due process under Section 147. Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the first respondent which was rejected by the order dated 16.12.2011 confirming the finding that there was a suppression of income. The petitioner has a further right of appeal to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal under Section 253 of the Act and thereafter on any substantial error of law, to this Court under Section 260-A of the Act.

Sri K. Raghavacharyulu, the learned counsel for the petitioner

would however strenuously contend that no reasons were either recorded or existed for exercise of powers under Sections 147 and 148 of the Act in reopening the Assessment; that the reopening of the Assessment was in transgression of established principles of law delineated in several binding precedents including Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi vi. Kelvinator of India Limited[1]; that availability of an alternative remedy (by way of an appeal to the Tribunal under Section 253 of the Act) is per se not a ground for relegating the petitioner to the alternative statutory appellate remedy and declining exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution; and that having regard to the onerous tax liability imposed on the petitioner and the possibility of affirmation of the primary and appellate orders by the further Appellate Forum of the Tribunal, this Court should intervene exercising jurisdiction under Article 226. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the orders of the primary and appellate authorities are vitiated by errors going to the root of jurisdiction of these authorities since the Assessment was reopened on the basis of no relevant facts legitimizing exercise of jurisdiction; that the Assessment proceeded on an assumption regarding a non- existent and presumptive income, not borne out by the record; an assumption that potential income was a factual income; and similar illegalities vitiate the order of the appellate authority – the first respondent, as well.

In a classic judgment on jurisdiction in Addanki Tiruvenkata Thata Desika Charyulu (since deceased) and after him his legal representatives v. State of Andhra Pradesh[2], the Supreme Court approved the classic statement of principle set out in the judgment of Lord Esher in The Queen v. The Commissioner for Special purposes of the Income Tax ((1888) 21 QBD 313), as to when an error going to the root of jurisdiction must be distinguished from error within jurisdiction. The principle, to the extent relevant and material for

the purposes of this case reads: “But there is another state of things which may exist. The legislature may intrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. When the legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases I have mentioned it is an erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends, and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction."

The Assessing Authority; the first appellate forum, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the further appellate forum, the Tribunal which is the final authority on fact are all entrusted with jurisdiction to determine the jurisdictional fact in the first instance and determining the same in appeals therefrom. If the Assessing Authority and the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) had recorded a finding that the petitioner had suppressed income, a finding which is erroneous, even if on the basis of a fundamentally misconceived inference from the record, such errors in our view are errors within jurisdiction and eminently amenable to further appellate scrutiny and correction. These cannot be said to be errors that go to the root of jurisdiction. A finding as to suppression of income is not finding regarding a jurisdictional fact.

It is an axiomatic principle that an authority invested with the power to decide is accommodated the authority to come to an erroneous conclusion. It is in recognition of the fallibility of primary and appellate authorities that a further appellate jurisdiction is created

under the Act. Every error within jurisdiction is not to be subjected to judicial review, as that would cripple the hierarchical principle on which our system of adjudication is normatively founded. The extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution must be preserved to oversight serious errors which are not properly amenable to the hierarchic statutory remedies available.

In the case before us, the petitioner has not chosen to challenge initiation of proceedings for reopening of the Assessment by way of prophylactic remedy, at that stage. It has chosen to subject itself to an order of Assessment. What is more, the petitioner has also chosen to pursue the further appellate remedy before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and at this stage seeks to cavil that exercise of the original and appellate jurisdictions is faulty. The alleged errors of the primary and appellate authorities are eminently reviewable in appeal by the Tribunal. As the petitioner has an effective alternative statutory remedy by way of an appeal under Section 253 of the Act before the Tribunal, we are disinclined to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The learned counsel for the petitioner seeks liberty to urge all contentions of fact and law before the Tribunal. No such liberty is required. The petitioner is always at liberty to urge all positions of fact and law and interpretations of the material on record before the Tribunal, which is a body invested with the jurisdiction to go into factual and legal aspects. The petitioner is also at liberty to file a memorandum of written submissions, if it so desires, to sensitize the Tribunal of the controversy in issue.

On the aforesaid analysis, we find no merit in this writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed at the stage of admission, after hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner – Sri K. Raghavacharyulu and the learned Standing Counsel

for Income Tax – Sri J.V. Prasad. We note that the respondent Revenue has filed its counter but in the view we are taking, we are not going into the merits of the competing contentions with regard to the alleged error and justification of the validity and vitality of orders of the primary and appellate authorities as these are more appropriately pursued before the Tribunal. No costs.

JUSTICE GODA RAGHURAM

Date: 25.02.2013

JUSTICE M.S.RAMACHANDRA RAO va

[1] (2010) 2 Supreme Court Cases 723 [2] AIR 1964 Supreme Court 807

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