COMNR.OF I.TAX vs. LAND LOOSERS WELFARE
What did the High Court hold?
The High Court held that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform her part of the agreement. It noted that possession had been delivered to the purchaser, and a vendor cannot unilaterally dispossess a purchaser without lawful termination of the agreement. The court found the defendant's cancellation of the agreement to be invalid. Regarding limitation, the court found the suit was filed within three years from the agreement's execution date (January 23, 2003), making the contention untenable. The court also dismissed the defendant's argument that specific performance cannot be sought by a party at default, in light of its findings on the validity of the cancellation. The High Court upheld the trial court's reasoned judgment and decree for specific performance, finding no case made out to interfere. The appeal was dismissed.
What were the facts?
The appellant, M/s Yogasai Health Resorts Limited, is the defendant in a suit filed by the respondent, Smt. S. Padmavathi, for specific performance of an Agreement of Sale dated January 23, 2003. The agreement pertained to agricultural land in Chitkul Village, Medak District, for a total sale consideration of Rs. 37,55,000/-. The plaintiff paid Rs. 2,00,000/- as advance and claimed possession was delivered. The plaintiff alleged the defendant cancelled the agreement on March 21, 2003, citing non-payment of the first installment, and later attempted to alienate the property. The defendant admitted the sale agreement and receipt of advance but contended the plaintiff failed to pay the first installment of Rs. 7,40,000/- by February 28, 2003, and that time was of the essence. The defendant rescinded the agreement and forfeited the advance. The suit was decreed by the Principal District Judge, Medak, leading to the present appeal.
What were the issues?
1. Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform her part of the agreement of sale dated January 23, 2003, and whether the defendant wrongfully cancelled the agreement (mixed question of law and fact, concerning Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963). The plaintiff argued that she was always ready and willing, and the defendant's cancellation was malafide due to issues with revenue record mutation. The defendant contended that time was the essence of the contract and the plaintiff's failure to pay the first installment by the stipulated date constituted a default, justifying the cancellation and forfeiture of the advance. 2. Whether the suit for specific performance was barred by limitation (question of law). The plaintiff argued the suit was filed within three years of the agreement's execution. The defendant contended the suit was filed beyond the limitation period.
Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?
AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below
rN rHE HIGH couRr Fo$rttr^:JiJE oF TELANGANA WEDNESDAYi,s,lJ^ii,B',x.ir'iiuRilJ'IFAPRTL PRESENT Appear under section *'ol^t;t'[::1"f :'&3&t3; $:i#,#ti'I;#f;l3fi'J"tx'-Ti'':niIn"oov ifl3'fiii $:#t'fii1'11: Between: Yo g as ai H 3:rth Res o rts Li T 1tx i.: rP,I,tA: jr,lt::1: "#iil': ffis'''t"J:: ;f;r# nis",In. no ": ffi :LtJ,::ffi ,t'$l* Sastry Represented by ltS ulreutut !'' v " r' ---- ..A''ELLANTTDEFENDANT t34e21 ...RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF AND Smt. S.Padmavathi' Wo S'S' 3al1 aged 42y"1's''Qcc:Household R/o H'No' 7-1- 621,535 and sJb"ihi -o-a,' sr,';,rdil-R""io"n.y sanjeevareddy Nagar' Hyderabad ASMP. NO: 2996 OF 2013 Petition under order 1 Rule 1q(?) Read with Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstan"", statelii'tn" atrroavii tifi=fi"#;J?ttr" petition, the High court mav be preaseo to impieal ihe petitio.#il'rlfinscriueJ Is Apperrants 2 to 5 in the AS.No.60 of 2008' that in the Court maY Petitionunderorder4lRule5(1)ReadwithSectionl5lCPCpraying circumstan.", "t"tJa-ii'tn. "mJ"rit'n[i i" "rpp",t of the petition' the High
siti{'iltl::ilt:i,:,[:,'ll:f:"it':]a:[r?,il:?ilr'F,,#:n:]r#ffi:;:?ir Counsel for the Appellant: Sri. Kuber Kaushik Counset for the Respondent: Sri. pramod fifaligi The Court made the following: ORDER
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA A'I': I{YDERABAD HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN AND HON'BLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO APPEAL SUIT No. 60 OF 2008 Date 026 Between: M/S Yogasai Health Resorts [.imited. And Smt. S. Padmavathi This Court passed the following:- ....Appellant Respondent JTJDGF]MI]N't Heard Mr. Vikram Poosarla, learned senior counsel representing Mr. A. Venkatesh, leamed senior counsel representing Mr. Pramod Malgi, leamed counsel for the plaintiff. 2. The present Appeal Suit is filed assailing the judgment and decree passed in o.S. No.l4 oi 2005 b,r,rhe learned principal District Mr. Kuber Kaushik, learned counsel flor the Defendant and
2 and Sessio.s Judge, Medak at Sanga Reddy. The suit was instituted for specific per{brmance of an Agreenre.t of Sale dated 23.01.2003 in respect of agricultural land admeasuring Ac.lg-3.1 guntas situated in Survey Nos. 478lAA, 47BlA, 47BlE, 47g[,E. and 47gl| at chitkul Village, Patancheru Mandal, Medak District, (for short, .suit schedule property'). (fbr sake of convenience, the parties hereinal-ter arc referred to as defendant and plainrilf) 3. Plaintiff has I'iled a suit in o.S.No.14 of 2005 againsr the defendant for specific performance ol' agrcernent ol. sale da-tc.J 23.0 1 .2003 contending as follows:- t. [-and in Sy.No.478 of chitkur vilrage belongs to plaintiff and land in Sy.No.479 of the very sanle viilage belongs to Smt. I{amsaveni, w/o Reddapa Reddy and three others. M/s. Yoga Sai Flealth Resorts Limitcd (previously known as RR Heterocyclics Limited, purchased the suit schcdule property under registered sale deeds bearing documcnt lt
3 Nos.1l73 of 1996 dated 04.03.1996 and 1281 of 1996 dated 08.03.1996. iii. Thereafter, the name iWs RR Heterocyclics Limited, is changed as ItI/s Yoga Sai Health Resorts Limited. iv. The said change of name was approved by Registrar of Companies on I 1.06.2002. v. The defendant approached the plaintiff and offered to sell the suit schedule property. Ptaintiff agreed to purchase the same for a total sale consideration of Rs-37,55,000/- and Defendant agreed for the same. vi. The Board of Directors of the defendant company has passed a resolution dated 15.01.2003 authorizing its Director to sell the suit schedule property, receive sale consideration etc. vii. Both the defendant and the plaintiff have entered into an agreement of sale dated 23.01.2003 on the specific terms and conditions agreed thereon as per which the total sale consideration agreed was Rs.3 7,55,000/-.
'.\, 4 viii' Plaintiff has paid an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- to the defendant towards part sare consideration and defendant having received the said advance sare-consideration, issued receipt. ix. Possession of the suit schedule property was arso delivered in favour of the plaintiff. x. Plaintiff is in possession of the suit schedule property. xi' Plaintiff agreed to pay balance sale consideration of Rs.35,55,000/- in three installments on the dates and on receipt of the same, defendant shail execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintifl xii' Plaintiff requested the defendant to receive first installment ol'amount on 29.02.2009. Defendant requested the praintiff to wait for some time as the name of the M/s yoga Sai Health Resorts Limited is not entered into revenue records. Mutation was not effected. -4
5 xlll. xlv. xv. xvt xvll. Defendant has issued a notice dated 21.03.2003 stating that first installment was not paid and therefore, agreement of sale dated 23.01.2003 is cancelled. On receipt of the said notice, plaintiff approached the defendant to receive first installment amount of Rs.7,40,000/- on 02.04.2003, but the defendant informed her that he will receive the said amount along with second installment. On 31.05.2003 and on 31.08.2003, plaintiffapproached the defendant with a request to receive the balance sale consideration and execute a registered sale deed in her favour as agreed in the agreement of sale dated 23.01-2001. Thus, plaintiff was always ready with balance sale consideration to pay to the defendant. Defendant informed the plaintiff that the name of the lWs Yoga Sai Health Resorts is not entered in the revenue records, mutation was not effected, pattadar passbooks and title deeds are not issued, therefore, it is not in a position to
6 xviii. xix. xx. xxi. xxii. xxiii. receive balance sale consideration and execute registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. Plaintiff believed the said version. Defendant cancelled the agreement of sale vide notice dated 2t.03.2003. Plaintiff came to know that defendant is trying to alienate the property to third parties keeping the ptaintiff in dark. Plaintiff got information on 20.05.2005 that defendant entered into an agreement of sale to sell the suit schedure property to Sri V.Sudhakar, Paladugu Venkat Rao, and Khaja Rajasekhar and got issued a telegraphic notice to the proposed purchasers on 24.05.2005. Plaintiff also issued a publication in Eenadu Telugu Daily newspaper in Ameerpet, Edition of Hyderabad on 25.05.2005. Thus, plaintiff expressed its readiness and witlingness to perform her part of contract. It is the defendant which
7 . postponed the same with a malafide intention for wrongful garns. 4. With the said contentions, plaintiff filed the aforesaid suit seeking specific performance of agreement of sale, dated 23.01.2003. 5. On the other hand, defendant filed written statement contending as follows:- i. Purchase of suit schedule property from the plaintiff and others has been admitted and that it has been in possession of the suit schedule property since the date of purchase. ii. The defendant company was originally incorporated under the name of 'oRR HetroCyclics Limited" and subsequently changed its name to M/s YogaSai Health Resorts Limited with the approval of Registrar of Companies, dated 11.06.2002. iii. Defendant company purchased portions of the suit schedule property in its former name IWs RR
8 lv. Hetrocyclics Limited. portion of the suit land was purchased under registered sale deed bearing document No.4952 of 2002, dated 0g.0g-2002 in the name of M/s Yoga Sai l{ealth Resorts Limited. It is the absorute owner and possessor of the suit schedule propefty. For buying artemative site, which would be used for rnore beneficiar for its colporate objectives, defendant offered to seil the suit schedure property for a totar sale consideration ol. Rs. 37,55,000 /_ to plaintiff and the Plaintilf agreed to purchase the same. An agreement of sare dated 23.,r.zoozwas entered and plaintiff had paid an amount of Rs.2,00,000/_ towards advance sale consideration on 23-0r.2003. plaintiff agreed to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs. 35.55,000/- in three installments. Time is essence of contract as per clause 2 of the agreement of sale. VI vii
9 vlll. lx. x. xl. Defendant has fumished the Photostat copies of sale deeds, link documents etc., to enable the plaintiff for verification of the documents and" title of the suit schedule property. Plaintiff faited to pay first installment of Rs.7,40,000/- on 28.02.2003 as agreed. Defendant has cautioned the plaintiff before the stipulated time of first installment to pay the first installment as the time is the essence of contract. In spite of number of personal and telephonic conversations, plaintiff failed to perform her part of agreement and willfully defaulted. Defendant has rescinded the agreement dated 23012003 by sending a registered notice with acknowledgement due dated 21.03.2003 as null and void and forfeited the advance sale consideration. . Reasons for rescission were mentioned in the said notice in detail. xlt. xll1.
L0 xiv. xv. xvi. xvii. xviii. xix. Despite receipt of the said notice on z3.o2.zoo3, plaintiff did not care the same and did not issue any reply. Plaintiff never came to the suit schedule property. Plaintiff failed to adhere to the schedule mentioned in the agreement of sare for payment of balance sale considcration. Plaintiff failed to perform her part of contract at material time and was never ready and willing to carry out her part of agreement on materiar time. praintiff did not have requisite money at her disposal for completing the transaction. Plaintiff ahs no financial capacity to pay even first installment. There are laches on the part of the plaintiff and therefore, she is not entitled for discretionary relief of specific performance. Def'endant has been in exclusive possession and enjoyrnent of the suit schedule property and it has got J ,.*oliErl...*
11 survey of the suit land. There is increase of land value within the viciniry of the suit schedule property. Therefore, plaintiff filed the present suit for specific performance of agreement of sale. xx. The agreement of sale dated 23.01.2003 is insuffrciently stamped and it cannot be received as evidence for any purpose as per Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, r899. xxl. Agreement of sale dated 23.01.2003 is not registered as required under Section l7(G) of the A.P.Amendment of Registration Act, and as such it cannot be received as evidence. xxu. With the said contentions defendant sought to dismiss the said suit. 6. Basing on the said pleadings, leamed trial court framed and restructured the following issues:- Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to carry out her part of the contract within the stipulated time?
L2 ii. Whether time rvas the essence of the contract? iii. whether the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit property in pursuance of the Agreement of Sale? iv. To what reliel? Subsequently, during the course of the trial, the learned Trial Court observed that Issue No.3 relating to possession was more relevant in a suit for injunction and was not germane to the principal relief of specific performance sought in the present suit. The Court therefore considered it appropriate to restructure the issues for proper adjudication of the dispute. Accordingly, the issues were restructured and the following issues were framed for determination: i. Whether the plaintif{'is errtitled to the relief prayed for? ii. whether time rvas the essence of the contract and whether the cancellation of the agreement is valid and binding? iii. whether the plainriff was ready and willing to perform her part of the contract within the stipulated time? iv. To what reliefl 7. These issues forrned the basis for consideration of the evidence and determination of the rights of the parties by the Triat court.
13 8. Plaintiff examined herself as P.W.l and her husband as P.W.2 and exhibited A.l to A.8 documents in support of her claim 9. Whereas, defendant examined its Direbtor as D.W.l and exhibited Ex.B.l ro B.l I 10. On consideration of the aforesaid evidence both oral and documentary, leamed trial court decreed the suit with costs directing the defendant to execute and register sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit land after receiving balance sale consideration of Rs.35,55,000/- lying in the deposit, within a period of three months from the date of the decree. Learned trial Court further held that in the event of the defendant failing to execute and register sale deed, plaintiff is entitled to get the registration of the sale deed through the Court and the plaintiff is liable to pay the stamp duty and registration fee for registration either by the defendant or through Court. 11. Challenging the said judgment and decree, defendant preferred the present appeal.
14 t2. co ll lll. lv ONS OF DEFEND The Trial Court erred in granting the relief of specific performance without properly appreciating the terms and conditions contained in the Agreement of Sale dated 23.0t.2003, particularly the clause stipulating payment of the balance sale consideration in instalhnents within specified dates. The Trial court failed to appreciate that the plaintiff had admittedly not paid the hrst installment amount on the stipulated date, which constituted breach of the essential terms of the contract. The Trial Courl ought to have held that time is essence of the contract. in view of the clear stipulation in the agreement prescribing specific dates for payment of installments. The Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence on record which, according to the defendant, demonstrated that the plaintiff had not established readiness and willingness to perform her part of the contract within the time stipulated under the agreement. )
15 v. The Trial Court did not properly consider the admissions elicited in the cross-examination of the plaintiff (P.W.l) and P.W.2, particularly with regard to thb absence of documentary proof showing availability of funds or financial capacity of the plaintiff to complete the transaction. vi. The Trial Court failed to give due weight to the fact that the defendant had issued a notice dated 21.03.2003 rescinding the agreement upon the plaintifls failure to comply with the agreed payment schedule. vii. The Trial Court did not conectly appreciate the legal objections raised regarding the admissibility of the agreement of sale, including the objections relating to stamp duty and registration. viii. The Trial Court erred in drawing adverse conclusions against the defendant in granting an equitable relief of specifrc performance without properly considering the conduct of the plaintiff and the surrounding circumstances. ix. Defendant has already cancelled the agreement of sale dated 23.01.2003 by way of issuing notice dated 21.03.2003. Plaintiff
16 received the said notice on22.03.2003.Even then, plaintiff did not seek declaration to declare the said notice dated 21.03.2003 as null and void. Plaintiff sought for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 23.01.2003. Learned trial court did not consider the said aspect while decreeing the suit. x. The plaintiff did not deposit the balance sale consideration in the Court within the time granted by the Trial Court. Therefore, plaintiff is not entitled for equitable relief of specific performance of agreernent of sale. Time is the essence of contract and plaintiff failed to adhere to the xl. xll same Without considering the said aspects, learned trial Court decreed the suit erroneously. Therefore, impugned judgment and decree is liable to be set aside 13. CONTENTIONS OF PLAINTIFF:- It is the defendant which failed to perform its obligations casted upon it as per on the agreement of sale dated 23.01.2003. I
t7 ll It has not effected mutation and change of its name in the revenue record. lll. There is no clause for cancellation in the agreement of sale dated 23.0t.2003. lv. Plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform her part of contract in terms of agreement of sale dated 23.01.2003 and it is the defendant which requested the plaintiff to wait for mutation and change of its name in the revenue records. v. Defendant issued notice dated 23.01.2003 cancelling the agreement of sale illegally though there is no clause in the agreement of sale to cancel the same on the ground that plaintiff failed to pay first installment on 28.02.2003. Thus, intention of the defendant is clear and therefore, there is no need of seeking declaration to declare the said cancellation notice dated 2t.03.2003. vl. Both the plaintiff and defendant are known to each other. vii. Suit is filed well within the limitation.
vlll 18 Plaintiff and her husband approached Director of defendant with a request to receive the balance sale consideration and execute a registered sale deed in her favour. lx It is the delbndant which failed to receive the balance sale consideration and execute registered sale deed on the ground that in the revenue records its name was not changed, mutation was not effected. Tl-rerefore, defendant cannot throw blame on the plaintiff. x There is no clause in the agreement of sale for forfeiture of advance sale consideration xl Plaintiff has deposited the balance sale consideration in the trial court as per the orders passed by the trial court within the timelines lines. 'lhere isno default on the part of the plaintiff. xll Under the agreernent of sale dated 23.01.2003 defendant has delivered possession of the suit schedule property and therefore the plaintilf is in possession of the same. Defendant cannot contend that it is in possession of the suit schedule property.
19 xlll. On consideration of the said aspects only, learned trial Court decreed the suit. 14. With the said submissions, plaintiff 3ought to dismiss the present appeal. 15. We have heard both the learned Senior Counsel appearing for parties extensively. We gave our thoughtful consideration of the same. 16. Sri Vikram Poosarla, leamed senior counsel for defendant and Sri A.Venkatesh, leamed Senior Counsel for the plaintiff placed reliance on the principle laid down in catena of decisions and the same would be discussed in the following paragraphs contextually 17. In the light of the said submissions, the points that arise for determination of this Court are as follows:- l. Point No.l: Whether time was the essence of the contract under the Agreement of Sale dated 23.01.2003 and whether the alleged failure to adhere to the installment schedule justified the defendant in refusing performance of the contract?
20 2. Point No.2: Whether Ex.A.l agreement of sale, dated 23.01.2003. is inadmissible on the ground that it is unregistercd'? 3. Point No.3: Whether the plaintiff has established continuous readiness ancl witlingness to perform her part of the contract as required undcr Section l6(c) of the Specific ReliefAct,19631 4. Point No.4: Whether the Agreement of Sale dated 23.01.2003 was valiclly' oancelled by the defendant and whether the dcfendant rvas entitled to forfeit the advance amount? 5. Point No.5: Whether the mutation of the property in the name of the dcf'enclant alfected the enforceability of the Agreement of Sale datcd 23.01.2003 or the rights of the plaintiff to seek specifrc performance? 6. Point No.6: Whether the application filed by the plaintiffbefore the 'l'rial Court seekilg permission to deposit the balance sale consideration supports the plea of readiness and willingness to perform the contract? 7. Point No.7: Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the equitable and discretionary relie f of specific performance of theAgreement of Sale datcd 23.01.2003? 8. Point No.8: Whether the plaintiff has to seek declaration to declare the notice dated 23.03.2003 cancelling the Agreement of sale dated 23.01.2003, as illegal? g. Point No.9: Whether, after delivering possession of the suit properry to tl"rc plaintiff pursuant to the Agreement of Sale, the
2L defendant coutd lawfully reclaim possession without first cancelling the agreement of sale in accordance with [aw? Point No.8 Whether the plaintiff has to seek declaration to d'eclare the notice dated 23.03.2003 cancelling the Agreement of sale dated 23.01.2003, as iltegal? 18. In the light of the aforesaid facts of the case, we are of the opinion that it is apt to first deal with point No.8. tt is the specific contention of the leamed senior counsel for the defendant that the defendant has cancelled the agreement of sale dated 23.01.2003 by way of issuing notice dated 23.03.2003 on the ground that the plaintiff failed to pay an amount of Rs.7,40,000/- towards first installment on 28.02.2003 as agreed under agreement of sale dated 23.01.2003. The suit for specific perflormance is not maintainable when there is no challenge to the cancellation notice. Thus, the claim of the plaintiff for specific performance is not maintainable unless as condition precedent, plaintiff first seeks and obtains declaration to declare the cancellation notice dated 23.03.2003 cancelling agreement of sale dated 23.01.2003 as illegal. So long as the cancellation remains unchallenged, the agreemeAt is not in subsistence. He has placed reliance on the principle \ \
22 laid down by the Apex court in l.s.sikandar (Dead) by L.Rs. vs. K.Subramanir, Sangita Sinha vs. Bha\ilana Bhardwaj2, Annamalai vs. vasanthi and othersr, K.S. Manjunath vs. vs" Moorasavirappa @ Muttanna Chennappar, A. Kanthamani vs. Nazreen Ahmeds, to contend that once the agreement of sale is terminated, the plaintiff has to necessarily seek declaration to declare the same as illegal. [n the absence of the said relief, suit for specific performance is not maintainable. 19. [n the light of the said submissions, it is apt to note that considering the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments, in Sangita sinha (supra), the Apex court held that where the seller had issued a communication cancelling the agreement prior to the institution of the suit, such cancellation constitutes a jurisdictional fact directly affecting the rlaintainability of a suit for specific performance. The court observed that unless the plaintiff seeks and obtains a '(zors) 1s scc 27 'ArR 2025 sc 1806 t 2ozs scc onLine sc 2300 o 2o2s tNSc 1298 5 AIR 20t7 SC 1236 ,t
23 declaratory reliefchallenging such cancellation as being illegal or non- binding, the agreement cannot be treated as subsisting for the purpose of enforcing specific performance. It was therefore held that in the absence ofa prayer seeking declaration that the termination or cancellation of the agreement is invalid in law a suit for specific performance of that agreement is not maintainable, as the existence of a valid and subsisting contract is a sine qua non for the grant ofsuch equitable relief. 20. In Annamalai (supra), the Apex Court held that a declaratory relief seeks to clear what is doubtful, and which is necessary to make it clear. If there is a doubt on the right of a plaintiff, and without doubt being cleared, no further relief can be granted, a decl*ufo.y relief becomes essential because without such declaration, the consequential relief may not be available to the plaintiff. A declaratory relief would be required where a doubt or a cloud is there on the right of the plaintiff and grant of relief to the plaintiff is dependant on removal of that doubt or cloud. However, whether there is a doubt or cloud on the right of the plaintiffto seek consequential relief, the same is to be determined on the facts of each case.
24 21. Apex Court lurther hetd that for example a contract may give right to the parties, or anyonc ofthe parties, to terminate the contract on existence of ccrtain conditions, in terms thereof, the contract is terminated, a doubt over subsistence of the contract is created and, therefore, without seeking a declaration that termination is bad in law, a decree for specific perfomance may not be available. However, where there is no such right confen'cd on any party to terminate the contract, or the right so conf'crred, is waived, yet the contract is terminated unilaterally, such tcrtnination may be taken as a breach of contract by repudiation and the party aggricved rnay, by treating the contract as a^ subsistingl sue lol specific performance without seeking declaratory relief, qua validity of such termination. 22. ln the said case, as pcr the contents of the agreement of sale, the purchaser has to pay an amount of Rs.10,000/- within six months. The said amount was not paid within the aforesaid time. Even then, leamed owners/sellers accepted an additional sum of Rs.1,95,000/- after expiry of the aforesaid stipulated period of six months. They have already made endorsement receiving and acknowledging the said (
25 amount of Rs.1,95,000/-. On examination of the said facts and also considering the scope of Section 55 of the Contract Act, the Apex Court hetd that the original land owners accepted performance of agreement of sale after the stipulated time enabling the delayed performance treating sale deed as subsisted, they waived their right to terminate on the ground of delay. Therefore, subsequent termination notice dated 20.08.2010 was hetd to be invalid. In such circumstances, there is no need of seeking declaration to declare the termination notice as invalid. 23. ln K.S. Manjunath (supra) considering the principle laid down in Annamalai (supra), the Apex Court laid down certain principtes of law that are discernible in paragraph No.43 and the same is relevant and it is extracted below:- 43. Thus, in view of the above discussion, the following principles of law are discernible: (i). Unilateral termination of the agreement to sell by one party is impermissible in law except in cases where the agreement itself is determinable in nature in terms of Section l4 of the Act of 1963; (ii). lf such unilateral termination of a non-determinable agreement to sell is permitted as a defence, then virtually every suit for specific performance can be frustrated by the defendant by placing an unfair burden on the plaintiff, who despite performing his part of the obligations and having showcased readiness and willingness, would require to also seek a separate declaration that the termination was bad in
26 law. ln such cascs, the burden cannot be casted upon the plaintiff to challenge the allcged tcrmination of agreement: (iii). Where a party clairns to have valid reasons to terminate or rescind a non-determinable agreement to sell, with a view to err on the side of cautiorr, it should be such terminating party, if at all, who ideally should approach the court and obtain a declaration as to the validity of such termination or rcscission. and not the non-terminating party. However, this must not ntean that the defendant (the terminating party) in such cases would rnandatorily be required to seek a declaration because Sections 27 and 3l of the Act of 1963 respectively, while using the phrase "may sue" merely give an option to any person to have the contract rescinded or adjudged as void or voidable; (iv). Once the alleged terrnination of a non-determinable agreement in question is found to be not f,or bona fide reasons and being done in a unilateral manncr on part of the defendant, it cannot be said that any declaration challcnging thc alleged tennination rvas required on part of plaintif f; (v). If a contract itself gives no right to unilaterally terminate the contract, or such right has been waived, and a party still terminates the contract unilatcrally then that termination would amount to a breach by repudiation, and tlre non- terminating party can directly seek specific performance without first seeking a declaration; and (vi). In the event it is found that the termination of agreement to sell by the defendant was not valid, then such an agreement to sell will remain subsisting and exccutablc. 24. On examination of the facts of the case and also considering the principle laid down by the various High Courts, the Apex Court held that unilateral termination of the agreement is impermissible in law except in cases where the agreement itself is determinable in nature in terms of Section l4 of the Acr of I963.
27 25.\n the light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court, coming to the facts of the case on hand, it is apt to extract relevant clauses of Ex.A. I agreement of sale dated 23.0L 2003:- 2 WHEREAS the purchaser has paid the part payment of sale consideration i.e. Rs.2,00,000/- (RupeesTwo Lakhs Only) to the Vendor and the Vendor has hereby received and acknowledges the receipt of the same. WHEREAS the entire balance of sale consideration i.e., Rs-35,55,000/- (Rupees Thirty Five Lakhs and Fifty Five Thousand Only) shall be paid to the Vendor in installments as follows from the date of the execution of this Agreement of sale i.e., as on or before 3l August 2003. Time is the essence of this Agreement. a. First installment of Rs.7,40,000/- (Rupees Seven Lakhs Forty Thousand Only) on 28th February 2003. b. Second installment of Rs.13,25,000/- (Rupees Thirteen Lakhs Twenty Five Thousand Only) on 31" May 2003. c. Third installment of Rs.14,90,000/- (Rupees Fourteen Lakhs Ninety Thousand Only) on 3l't August 2003. 8. The Vendor hereby assure the vendee that the vendor shall deliver the original documents of title together with link documents, pahanis, mutation, nil encumbrance certificates. The vendor has already furnished photostat copies of the above mentioned sale deeds, link documents, pahanis, encumbrance certificates to the vendee to enable the vendee to go into the title by verification of the documents.
28 26. Thus, as per clause No.8 of the agreernent of sale, the defendant being the vendor, agreed to deliver originat documents of title together with link documents, pahanis, mutationn nil encumbrance certificates. It has already furnished Photostat copies of the same to enable the plaintiff to go into the title by verification of the documents. It is the specific contention of the defendant that it has already furnished photostat copies of the aforesaid documents and plaintiff also admitted the said fact. 27. lt is not in dispute that there is change of name of the defendant i.e. frorn R.R. I{eterocyclics Limited to M/s Yogasai Health Resorts Limited w.e.f. 11.06.2002 Zg.lt is also not in dispute that the defendant purchased the suit land under registered sale deeds bearing document Nos'1173 dated 04.03.1996 and 1281 0f 1996 dated 08.03.1996 in its former name R.R.Heterocyclics Limited from the plaintiff. It is also not in dispute that further portion of the suit land was purchased by defendant vide sale deed bearing document No.4952 of 2002, dated 08'08'2002 in the name of Yogasai l{ealth Resorts Limited. Therefore, there is specific .,.i.,,.F-ji _i.v/';ir4tffi
29 Clause in the agreement of sale that the defendant has to get mutation of the land in its favour by changing name in the revenue records. Admittedly, the same was not effected. The said fact was also admitted by D.W.l in his cross-examination. Therefore, the defendant cannot blame the plaintiff that the plaintiff has not paid the balance sale consideration as agreed in the agreement of sale dated 23.10.2003, more particularly, an amount of Rs.7,40,000/- towards first installment on 28.02.2003. 29.\t is also apt to note that as per clause No.2 of the agreement of sale, the plaintiff agreed to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs.33,55,000/- in three installments. The plaintiff has to pay entire balance sale consideration on or before 31.08.2003. In clause No.2 of the agreement of sale, it is also mentioned that time is essence of the agreement. In the said agreement of sale, there is no clause for cancellation of the agreement of sale for non-payment of either first installment or other installments within the timelines. There is no clause to forfeit the advance sale consideration paid by the plaintiff. Even then, the defendant had cancelled the agreement of sale dated 23.01.2003 by
30 way of issuing notice dated 21.03.2003. Thus, there is no cloud over the right of the plaintiff to seek declaration to declare the notice dated 23.03.2003 as illegat. The said principle was also laid-down by the Apex Court in Annamalai and K.S.Manjunath (supra). 30. In the light of the aforesaid discussiorr, the contention ol the leamed counsel for the delendant in the absence of the relief of declaration, the plaintiff cannot seek specific perlormance of agreement of sale is untenable. We are of the considered view that there is no need of seeking declaration. Therefore, this issue is answered in favour of the plaintiff. Point No.l : Whether time rvas the essence of the contract under the Agreement of Sale dated 23.01.2003 and whether the alleged failure to adhere to the installmenl schedule justified the defendant in refusing performance of the contract? 31. It is the specific contention of the leamed senior counsel for the defendant that the Court has to consider express terms of contract, nature of property and surrounding circumstances including object of
31 the contract. The relief of specific performance is an equitable and discretionary relief. Therefore, when a contract prescribes specific time/period for performance, such stipulation mus! have significance and cannot be ignored. He has placed reliance on the principle laid down by the Apex Court in Chand Rani vs. Kamal Rani6, Saradamani Kandappan vs. S.Rajalakshmii- 32. As discussed supra, in the present case, there is no clause for cancellation of agreement of sale on the ground of non-payment of installments, more particularly, first installment of Rs.7,40,000/-on 28.02.2003. There is also no clause to forfeit the advance sale consideration paid by the plaintiff. tt is apt to note that in Ctause No.2 of the agreement of sale, it is specifically mentioned that plaintiff shall pay batance sale consideration of Rs.35,55,000/- in installment basis from the date of agreement of sale i.e. on or beforc 3 1.08.2003. Time is essence of the agreement. Thus, the plaintiff has to pay entire balance sale consideration of Rs.35,55,000/- on or before 31.08.2003. Therefore, the defendant cannot contend that the plaintiff failed to pay first t(rggr) 1 scc s19 '(zorr) 12 scc 18
32 installment and thercfore, it has cancelled the agreement of sale by way of issuing notice, dared 2r.03.2003. The defendant cannot craim that time is esscncc of contract. The Court has to consider express terms of contract, nature ol.thc propcrty and surrounding circumstances. The said principle rvas also held by the Apex Court in Chand Rani (supra). 33. In the present case, nature of property is an agricultural property, the dcfendant agreed to get its name mutated in the revenue records as per clauseNo.g of the agreement of sale, dated 23'01'2003.Admittedry, the defendant failed to mutate its name in the revenue records. l'herefore, the defendant cannot contend that the plaintiff failed to pay thc balance sare consideration and that time is essence of the contract. 34. It is apt to note that there was no unexplained delay on the paft of the plaintiff. 35. The Apex Court in Chand Rani (supra) held that in contracts relating to sale of irnmovable property, time is ordinarily not regarded as the essence of the contract unless such intention is expressry stated or
33 caq be clearly inferred from the terms of the agreenrent and surrounding circumstances. 36. In Saradamani Kandappan (supra), the'supreme Court held that the determination of whether time is the essence of the contract must still depend upon the intention of the panies as reflected in the terms of the agreement and the conduct ol the parties. 37. tn ICR Suresh vs. R.Poornimas, the Apex court held that "whether time is of the essence in a contract", has to be culled out from the reading of the entire contract as well as the surrounding circumstances. Merely having an explicit clause may not be suflicient to make time the essence of the contract. 38. In Indira Kaur vs. Sheo Lal Kapoore, the Apex Court held that in transactions of sale of immovable propefties' time is not the essence of the contract. In the case of immovable property, there is no presumption as to time being the essence of the contract. 8 2025 SCC Online sc l0l4 " (1988) 2 scc 488
34 39' In the present case, this Court has to consider the evidence on record and also conduct of the parties. As discussed supra, the defendant agreed to get mutation of its name in the revenue- record as per clause No.8 of the agreeme,r of sale, dated 23.or.2oo3.Admiuedly, defendant did not get mutation of its name in the revenue record. without performing the said obligation casted upon the defendant, it cannot contend that thc plaintiff'failed to pay the balance sale consideration, more particularly, first installment within the agreed time. perusar of the evidence would also rcveal the said fact. 40. It is also apt to note that the plaintiff has paid an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- to the defbndant towards advance sale consideration. The installment schedule appears to be indicative of intended timeframe for completion of the lransaction rather than a condition precedent shows breach or automatic te,nination of the agreement. The Apex court consistently held that the intention to seek time is essence of contract must be clear and cannot from the circumstances of time schedule in the agreement.
35 41. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the view that time cannot be said to have been essence of contract in the present case. Accordingly, this point is held in favour of, the plaintiff. Point No.2 Whether Ex.A.l agreement of sale, dated 23.01.2003, is inadmissible on the ground that it is unregistered? 42. It is apt to note that Ex.A.l is an unregistered agreement of sale. During pendency of the said suit, plaintiff got it impounded as per the procedure laid down under the Indian Stamp Act, [899, by paying stamp duty and an amount of Rs.2,25,000/- towards penalty vide endorsement under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 vide File No.Gl/[3 43105, dated 15.11.2005 issued by District Registrar and collector under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, Medak at Sanga Reddy. Therefore, Ex.A.1 is admissible in evidence. On consideration of the said aspects only, learned trial court marked the said agreement of sale as Ex.A.t. There was no objection ftom the defendant while marking the said Ex.A.1.
36 43.\t is also apt to note that plaintiff has paid deficit court fee of Rs.4000/- on 05.0t1.2005 itself. 44. This point is accordingly answered in favour of the plaintiff. Point No.3: whether the plaintiff has established continuous readiness and willingness to perform her part of the contract as required undcr section l6(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963? 45. Section l6 (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963., is relevant and the same is extracted below:- 16. Personal bars to relief.- Specific perlormance of a contract cannot be enlbrced irr f'avour of a person- 1a) who would not be entitled to recover compensation for its breach; or (b) who has become incapable of performing, or violatcs any cssential term ofl, the contract that on his part remains to be performed, or acts in fraud ofthe contract, or willfully acts at variance with, or in subversion of, the relation intended to be established b.v the contract; or
37 (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation.-For the purposes ol' clause (c),- (i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintitI to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the court: (ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction. 46. It is the specific contention ofthe plaintiff in the plaint that she has requested the defendant to receive first installment amount of Rs.7,40,000/- on 28.02.2008 as agreed, but the defendant requested her to wait for some time as the name of M/s. Yogasai Health Resorts Limited is not entered in the revenue records and it has to obtain pattadar passbooks in its favour. Contrary to the same, defendant has issued notice dated 21.03.2003 terminating the agreement of sale on the ground of non-payment of first installment. On receipt ol the said \
38 notice, imrnediatcly. shc approached the defendant to receive the first installment amount on 02.04.2003, but defendant informed her that it will receive the first installment along with second installment. Again plaintiff approached the defendant on 31.05.2003 and again on 31.08.2003 along with entire consideration as agreed with a request to receive the same and execute and register sale deed in her favour. Thus, plaintiff was always ready and willing to pay the balance sale consideration to the dcfendanr and it is the defendant which postponed the same on the ground that its name was not mutated in the revenue record. According to the plaintiff, there was steep hike in the lands within the vicinity ol'rhe suit schedule property, therefore, the defendant cancelled the agreement of sale with a mala fide intention. 47. To prove thc same plaintiff examined herself as p.w.1 and her husband as P.W.2. l'heir examination in chief is in the aforesaid lines. However, during cross-examination plaintiff (p.w. I ) categorically admitted about the contents of Ex.A.l, payment of an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- towards advance sale consideration and also the timelines. According to her, her husband and one Mallikarjun Reddy were present
39 at the time of execution of Ex.A.l agreement of sale and they are the attesting wihresses. In Ex.A.1, it is not mentioned that the sale deed has to be executed and registered only after mutation of the name of the defendant in the revenue records, she did not file any document in support of her plea that she has Rs.;7,40,000/- on 28.02.2003. She did not issue any reply to Ex.A.3 and any notice informing to the defendant that she was willing and ready to pay the entire sale consideration and requesting him to execute registered sale deed. llowever, she orally informed the defendant personally by going to the house of Director of defendant at S.R.Nagar along with her husband. She further admitted that Sri Shastry, Director of Defendant company and herself were staying at S.R.Nagar, at that point of time and therefore, she went to the house of the said Sri Shastry and informed him personally prior to issuance of Ex.A.3. She further admitted that aft€r issuance of Ex.A.3 also she personally informed Mr.Shastry who used to reside in a portion of house, but not an apartment. She has also taken an amount of Rs.7,40,000/-, first installment with her to the house of said Mr.Shastry to pay it to him. However, she has not mentioned the said fact in the
40 plaint- She again went to his house after receipt of Ex.A.3 notice and her husband went to his house severar times. week days after receipt of Ex.A.3, she personally approached Mr.Shastry by going to his house. 48. P.w.2 husband of p.w.l, during cross-examination, admitted that they did not file any passbook and bank intimation to show that his wife is ready with the ["ralance amount to make payment towards the suit land. He is having 20 acres of rand by the side of the suit land and the price of the land abutting to the suit land increased many folds. 49. It is also apt to note that D.w.l director of defendant company Mr. S.V.R.shastry, during cross-examination categorically admitted that there are l'our directors in the defendant company and also passing of resolution by the said Directors on 15.01.2003 authorizing him to sign Ex.A.l agreement of sale. He has also admitted about the aforesaid installments and dates of payment of the same. He did not inform to the plaintilf prior to the filing of the suit that the mutation in respect of suit land was effected in the name of the defendant. Th.y have not obtained title deed and pattadar passbook from MRo office in respect of suit schedule land. l'he authorities have informed them that ,
41 they will not issue pattadar passbook and title deeds to the companies, but they would issue the same to the individuals. Nothing is given in writing to that effect. There is no clause in the agreement for forfeiture of the amount. 50. As per the provisions of the Telangana Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 and also Rules framed thereunder, it is permissible for the companies to obtain mutation proceedings, pattadar passbooks and title deeds For the said reaSons only, the defendant agreed to get its name mutated in the revenue record and obtain pattadar passbooks and title deeds. 51. The afore-stated facts would reveal that the defendant agreed for getting mutation of its name in revenue records at clause No.8 of Ex.A.1 agreement of sale. Admittedly, mutation was not effected in the name of the defendant. Though the D.W.1 contended that mutation was effected by the time of filing of the suit, but during cross-examination, he has admitted that he did not inform the plaintiff with regard to mutation ofdefendant's name in the revenue record in respect of the suit schedule property. He has further admitted that there is no clause in
42 Ex.A.l for cancellation of agreement of sale on the ground of non- payment of installments within the agreed timelines and also forfeiture of advance sale consideration. 52. lt is the specific conrention of the plaintiff that after issuing Ex'A.3 notice, the dcfendant entered into agreement of sare to sell the suit schedule property to Sri V.Sudhakar and others. Thereafter, she has issued telegraphic notice to them and arso a caution notice in Eanadu News Daily. 53. It is relevant to note that basing on Ex.A.r agreement of sale, the plaintifPs name was mentioned in the revenue record and therefore the defendant had filed an appeal and revision etc. as per the provisions of ROR Act, l97I 54. Defendant c.rnpany having entered Ex.A.l agreement of sale, receiving an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- towards advance sale consideration on 21.03.2003, agrced to effect mutation of its name in revenue record, failed to inform the praintiff about mutation with a request to pay the balance sale consideration and obtain registered sale (
43 deed in respect of the suit schedule property. Thus, defendant unilaterally cancelled Ex.A.l agreement of sale by way of issuing Ex.A.3 notice. 55. It is apt to note that in Mankour (dead) by L.Rs. vs. Hartar Singh Sangharo, the Apex Court clarified that breach of contract by the defendant and ready and willingness of the plaintiff are two distinct issues in a suit for specific performance. even if, a defendant is proved to have committed breach, the plaintiff cannot obtain a decree unless he pleads and proves that he was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract as required under Section 16 (c) of the Act, 1963. Even il the vendor wrongfully refuses to execute the sale dee{ if the purchaser did not possess the financial capacity to pay the balance sale consideration at the time of the performance, he is not entitled to the specific performance. 56.In N.P.Thirugnanam (dead) by L.Rs. vs. Dr.Jaganmohan Raorl, the Apex Court hetd that the conduct of the plaintiff, pitor and 'o (2010) l0 scc 512 " 1995 5 SCC I 15 1 )
44 subsequent to filing of the suit, availability of funds, surrounding circumstances are the relevant factors in determining whether the plaintiff has genuinely ready and willing to perform his part of contract. If the plaintiff fails ro prove such readiness and willingness by producing relevant evidence, the relief of specific performance cannot be granted. 57. tn smt. chandrakanthamma vs. D.Ramakrishnaiahl2, the Karnataka High courr reiterated the aforesaid principle. 58. In R.Kandasrvamy vs. TRK saraswathil3, the Apex court held that relief of specific perfonnance is discretionary and equitable in nature. The plaintiff rnust plead and prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform tlte essential terms of the contract from the date of the agreement until the decree. The expression ,ready and willingness' signifies that the plaintiff rnust possess both the intention and financial capacity to perform the contractual obligations, particularly the obligation to pay the balance sale consideration. Mere " (2015) SCC Onlirre Kar. 6 t4 I '3 (2025) 2 SCC 5t3 ( /
45 assertions in pleadings are insufftcient, plaintiff must place material on record demonstrating availability of funds or capacity to arrange the same within the stipulated time. tn the absence of the same, plaintiff would not be entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance. 59. Learned senior counsel appearing for the defendant relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Chand Rani (supra) to contend that in suits for specific performance, readiness and willingness of the purchaser to perform his part of the contract is a fundamental requirement, and failure to comply with contractual timelines may disentitle the plaintiff from relief. In the said judgment, the Apex Court held that although time is ordinarily not the essence in contracts relating to immovable property, the Court must examine the following conditions:- i. Express terms of the contract, ii. Nature of property, and iii. Surrounding circumstances. To determine whether performance within the stipulated time was intended. The Court further held that where the conduct of the purchaser
46 demonstrates lack of readiness and willingness to perform contractual obligations, the decree lor specific performance cannot be granted. 60. Relevant paragr-aphs are extracted below:- 25. Frorn an analysis of the above case-law it is clear tlrat in the casc of sale of immovable property there is no presurnption as to timc being the essence of the contract. Even if it is not of the esscnce of the contract the court may infer that it is to be perforrned in a reasonable time if the concliiions are: I. Fronr the express terms of the contract; 2. fiorrr the nature of the property; and 3. fronr l.he surrounding circumstances, for example: the ob.iect ol'making the contract. 29. The analysis of evidence would also point out that thc plaintiff r.r'as not willing to pay this amount unless vacant delivcrl ol'posscssion of one room on the ground floor was given. ln cross-examination it was deposed that since income tax clcarance ccrti{lcate had not been obtained the sum of Rs 98.000 rv'as rrot paid. Unless the propefty was redeemed the payment would nor be made. If this was the attitude it is clear that the plaintiff was insisting upon delivery of possession as a condition prccedent for rnaking this payment. The income tax certificatc was .eccssary only for completion of sale. we are unable to see horv thcse obligations on the part of the defendant could be insisted uporr lor payment of Rs 98,000. Therefore, we conclude that though as a general proposition of taw time is not the essence of the contract in the case of a sare of immovable propert), yet thc parties intended to make time as the essence under clause ( I ) oi the suit agreement. From this point of view, we are unable ro see how the case in Nothulal t(1969) 3 SCC 120 : ( 1970) 2 sclt 8541 could have any application to the facts of th is casc.
47 61. In Saradamani Kandappan (supra), the Apex Court while examining the doctrine that time is generally not the essence in contracts relating to immovable property, clarified that such a principle cannot be applied mechanically in modern commercial realities. The Court observed that although earlier precedents treated time stipulations in properly contracts as merely indicative, thc significant escalation in property values and changing economic circumstances require courts to give due significance to the time stipulations agreed between the parties. Where the contract clearly prescribes specific dates for payment of consideration and provides consequences for deflault, such stipulations may demonstrate the intention of the parties to treat time as the essence of the contract. In such circumstances, failure to adhere to the agreed schedule of payment may justiff termination of the agreement and disentitle the purchaser from seeking the equitablc relief of specific performance 62.In Padmakumari and others v. Dasayyan and othersla, the Apex Court, emphasized that where the agreement ol'sale stipulates a "(2015) 8 SCC 695
48 specific period lor paymcnt of the balance consideration, failure on the part of thc purchaser to conrply with such stipulation assumes significant legal importance in dcterrnining entitlement to specific performance. The Court held that when the purchaser does not pay the balance consideration rvithin thc agreed period and no acceptable explanation is offered for such delault, the conduct of the purchascr clearly indicates lack of readiness and rvillingness to perform the essential terms of the contract. Thc (lourt furlhcr observed that courts must carefully examine the contractual terrns and surrounding circumstances and cannot ignore such material aspects r.vhile granting the equitable relief of specific performancc. Accordinglv, non-compliance with the stipulated time for payment ol- considcrarion may discntitle the purchaser from obtaining the relief sought. 63. Ttrc delcrrdant also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in I.S. Sikandar (Dcad) by LRs (supra), to emphasize that strict compliance with the contractual terms and timelines is essential where the agreement cxpressly stipulates a time period for completion of the transaction. -l-he Suprcrnc Court held that where the plaintiff fails to
49 perform his obligations within the stipulated period and the agreement stands terminated in accordance with its terms, the plaintiff cannot subsequently seek specific perforrnance of such terminated agreement. The Court further reiterated that the plaintifl'must establish continuous readiness and willingness to perform the contract as mandated under Section l6(c) of the Specific ReliefAct. 64. In A. Kanthamani (supra), the Apex Court held that the plea regarding the maintainability of suit is required to be raised in the first instance in the pleadings i.e. written statement and then only such plea can be adjudicated by the trial Court on its merits as a preliminary issue under Order XIV Rule 2 of CPC. Once a finding is rendered on the plea, the same can be examined by the first or/and second appellate Court. Unless an issue as to maintainability is framed by the trial Court, the suit cannot be held to be not maintainable at the appellatc stage only 65. As discussed supra, in the present case, the defendant did not plea with regard to maintainability of the suit either in the written statement or during trial.
50 66 In R.Shama Naik vs. G.Srinivasaiahrs, the Apex court held as follows:- 9. '['hcrc is a legion of precedents on the subject of readiness arrd rr illingness. 10. 'lhe law is rvell settled. The plaintiff is obliged not only to rrral<c spccific statement and averments in the plaint but is also obliged to adduce necessary oral and documcntary cvidence to show the availability of funds to makc payment in terms of the contract in timc. I l. 'l'hcre is a fine distinction between readiness and rvi llingrress to perl'oun the contract. Both the irrgredicrrts arc nccessarl lor the relief of specific perlbrmancc. 12. Whilc rcadincss means the capacity of the plaintiff to pcrfbrrn tlrc contract u,hich would include his financial position, willingness relates to the conduct of the plaintifl. 67. [n Sangeeta Sinha (supra) also, the Apex court hetd the aforesaid principlc 68. In Annamalai (supra), the Supreme court examined the scope of the relief of specific pcrformance under Sections t6(c) and 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, particularly in relation to the requirement of continuous readiness and willingness of the purchaser. The dispute arose from an agrecmcnt of salc, where the purchaser sought enforcement of '52024INSC 927
51 the agreement after disputes arose regarding performance and subsequent sale of the property to a third party. '[he trial court dismissed the suit holding that the agreement was not acted upon within the stipulated period and that the plaintiff had failed to establish readiness and willingness. The first appellate court reversed the finding and decreed the suit for specific performance; however, the High Court interfered and directed refund of the advance amount instead. 69. While examining the matter, the Supreme Court reiterated the settled principle that in a suit for specific perforrnance, the plaintiff must plead and prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract from the date of the agreement till the decree. The Court clarified that "readiness" relates to the financial capacity of the purchaser to pay the sale consideration, whereas "willingness" refers to the intention and conduct of the purchaser demonstrating his commitment to complete the transaction. The Court emphasized that these two elements must coexist and must be established through pleadings, evidence, and the conduct of the parties. lf the purchaser fails
52 to establish these statutory requirements, the equitable relief of specific performance cannot be granted 70. I'he decisior-r lurther reiterates that courts must carefully evaluate the conduct ol'the plaintiff, the surrounding circumstances, and compliance with tl-re contractual obligations before granting the discretionary remcc{y ol- speci fic performance 71. In the present case, the defendant rely upon the said judgment to contend that the plaintiff must demonstrate clear evidence of readiness and willinqncss throughout the contractual period, and any failure to cornply with the contractual terms or payment schedule would disentitle thc plaintiff'liom obtaining a decree for specific performance 72. In Zarina Siddiquc vs. A.Ramalingamr6, the Apex Court held that relief of specific performance is equitable and discretionary and therefore, courts have to consider the conduct of the parties and that parties must come beflorc the court ,,vith clean hands "(2015) I SCC 705
53 73. In Syed Dastagiri vs. 1'. R. Gopalakrishna ShettyrT, the Apex Court held that plaintiff can always tender the amount to the defendant or deposit in the court, towards performance o1'his obligation under the contract. Such tender rather exhibits the willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of obligation. What is not essential is only means need not do but does not mean he cannot do so. When the plaintiff has tendered the balance amount in Court even without the court order, it cannot be constitute adversely against the plaintiff under explanation - I of Section 16 (c) of the Act, 1963 74. ln R.C.Chandiok vs. Chunilal Subarwalrs, the Apex court held that readiness and willingness cannot be treated as straighdacket formula. This has to be determined from the entirety of the facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned. " (1999) 6 SCC 337 " 1970 (3) SCC 140
54 75. In Sugarsingh vs. [Iarisingh (dead through L.Rs.) and othersre, the Apex Court held that the Court while dealing with suit for specific perfonnance, morc particularly readiness and willingness to perform the contract has to consider overall circumstances, conduct on the part of the parties and prayer of the plaintiff in whose favour execution of agreerncnt shall has been held to be proved. They are the relevant factors to be considcred for the purpose of deciding readiness and willingness. 76.In Motilal Jain vs. Ramdasi Devi2o, the Apex Cqurt held that the readiness and willingncss need not be in specific phraseology and language. The sum and substance of the principle taid down in the aforesaid judgment is that rclief of specific performance is an equitable and discretionary rclief. 'fhe parties seeking the said relief have to approach the courl with clean hands. The court while dealing suit for specific performance has to consider the conduct of the parties and overall circumstances of the case. " (202Ut7 SCC 705 20 AdR 2000 scc 240ti
55 77. As discussed supra, in the present case, in Ex.A.1 agreement of sale, defendant has specifically agreed that it will get its name mutated in the revenue record, hand over the original documents of title, passbooks, Encumbrance Certificate, pahani etc. Admittedly, it has not got its name mutated in the revenue record in respect of the suit schedule property. D.W.l - Director of the defendant company categorically admitted the said fact. However, according to him, mutation was affected before filing of the suit. But defendant company did not inform the said fact to the plaintiff and I).W.1 admited the said fact, during cross-examination. 78. As discussed supra, parties are not strang€rs to each other. Earlier the plaintiff was the owner of the part of the suit schedule property and she sold the same to the defendant company under the aforesaid two registered sale deeds. Thus, parties are known to each other. Though there is no clause to cancel the agreement of sale and forfeiture of the advance sale consideration, defendant cancelled the agreement of sale unilaterally. Before issuing cancellation notice,
56 defendant did not dernand the plainriff to pay first installment of Rs.7,40,000/-. 79. lt is the specific conrention of the plaintiff that she and her husband approached Mr. Shastry, Director of the defendant company, with a request to receive balance sale consideration execute and register sale deed on getting mutation of defendant's name in the revenue record. He has infonr-red the plaintiff and her husband that he will receive the balance sale consideration once the defendant,s name is mutated in revenue rccord. 80. There was no unexplained delay on the part of the plaintiff. She has deposited the balance sale consideration in the court with permission of the courr vide I.A.No.l570 of 2005 dated 16.0g.2005. It is the defendant whiclr issued Ex.A.3 termination notice and put full stop to the further transaction. 81. It is apt to notc that in paragraph No. 6 (iii) of the written statement, defendant has contended that in spite of number of personal and telephonic conversations, plaintiff failed to perform her part of .,-..::r;,H
57 contract and willfully defaulted. Therefore, it has rescinded the agreement by issuing notice and forfeited the advance sale consideration. The said fact is also mentioned in Ex.A.3 (8.3) notice dated 21.03.2003. Thus, both the plaintiff and defendant admitted with regard to contacting each other with regard to Ex.A.l transaction and payment of balance sale consideration. They are in touch with each other. There is no explanation from the defendant as to the information furnished to the plaintiff with regard to effecting mutation in its name before issuing Ex.A.3 notice. There is no evidence to show that defendant has informed the plaintiff that it has got its name mutated in respect of suit schedule property and the same was informed to the plaintiff and even then, plaintiff did not pay the balance sale consideration within the agreed timelines including first installment. In the absence of the same, defendant cannot blame that the plaintiff did not pay the first installment on 28.02.2003. 82. It is apt to note that as per clause 8 of the Ex.A.l agreement of sale, the defendant agreed to get the mutation of its name in revenue record and hand over the original documents of title together with link
58 documents, pahanis. rnutation, nil Encumbrance Certificates etc, to the plaintiff but the dclendanr lailed to do so. DW.l has admitted the said fact during cross-examination. Thus, there is breach of contract on the part of the defendant. liven then, plaintiff and her husband went to the house of D.w.1 and expresscd her readiness and willingness to perform her part of contract. T'he continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance, this circutrrstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the Court while granting or refusing to grant the relief, the court has to consider the conduct <lf the parties prior and subsequent to filing of suit. In the present case, the plaintiff had deposited the balance consideration in the court on obtaining permission by frling IANo.1507 of 2005 itself It is a material and attendant circurnstance. 83. It is apt to note that in Beemaneni Maha Lakshmi vs Gangumalla Appa Rao (since Dead) By Lrs2r, the facts are that under the agreement of sale, it was agreed between the parties that the " 1zor9; 6 scc 233
59 vendor has to get the land measured and produce all the documents including litigation documents making out a complete chain of the title of the vendor before paying balance consideration. He has also agreed to deliver the original sale deed. The vendor did not carry out measurements of the suit property after execution of the agreement of sale. D.W.l admitted the said fact during the cross-examination. On consideration of the said aspects, the Apex Court held that the plaintiff was under no obligation to deposit/pay balance sale consideration and the plaintiff insisting of production of papers of Land Tribunal proceedings was natural conduct. The Apex Court further held that both the trial Court and the Appellate Court are justified in holding that the plaintiff insisted on the seller producing all the documents necessary for making out complete chain of his title. 84. Thus, defendant failed to perform its part of contract under Ex.A.l agreement of sale. On consideration of the said aspect only,
50 leamed trial court decreed the suit. Thus, this point is answered in favour oflthe plaintiff. Point No.4: Whethcr the Agrccmcnt ol Sale dated 23.01.2003 was validly cancelled by thc defendant and whether the defendant was entitlcd to forleit the advance amount? 85. As discussed supm, there is no clause in Ex.A.l agreement of sale either to canccl thc aereeurent of sale or to forfeit the advance sale consideration on the ground ol non-payment of balance sale consideration in three installments within the agreed timelines. [t is also agreed by the defendant tllat it will get its name mutated in the revenue record in clause No.8 of [:x.A.l. Admittedly, its name was not mutated. D.W.l admitted the said fact. Even record discloses the said fact. Even then, defendant cancelled the agreement of sale by way of issuing Ex.A.3 (B.2) notice and lbdcited the advance sale consideration. The same is contrary to the terms of the Ex.A.l agreement of sale. 86. It is apt to note that in the absence ofthe specific clause in the agreement of sale fbr cancellation, we have to consider the common law, right of a party in terms of Section 39 of the Indian Contract Act, l9g2 r
6L which deals with regard to effect of refusal of parry to perform promise wholly which is relevant and extracted below:- 39. Effect of refusal of party to perform promise wholly.- When a party to a contract has refused to perform, or disabled himself from performing, his promise in its entirety, the promisee may put an end to the contract, unless he has signified, by words or conduct, his acquiescence in its continuance 87. Learned counsel for the defendant contended that even in the absence of a clause, enablingaparty to terminate, the agreement can be terminated even without assigning any reason. He has also placed reliance on the principle laid down by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Rajasthan Breweries Ltd. v.'[he Stroh Brewery Company22. In the said judgment, it was an application filed under Section 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and on examination of the facts of the said case, Division Bench of Delhi l-tigh Court held that agreement in the said case is a technical know-how agreement and it was terminated by a pafi, Such contract is not in the nature of contract referred under Section 14 (1) (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Therefore, contract could be terminated by any party without assigning " (2020) SCC online Del. 481
62 any reason. But in thc pl'esent case, the facts are different. Therefore, the principle [aid down in thc said judgment is not applicable to the facts of the prescnt case. 88. 'fhus, defendant cancelled Ex.A.l agreement of sale vide Ex.A.3 notice and forlcited the advance sale consideration contrary to the terms of E.ex.A. I . 89. It is contended by the learned senior counsel for the defendant that the plaintifl did not issue any reply to ExA.3 notice. However, it is not fatal to the case of the ptaintiff. Ptaintiff specifically contended that she has approached D.W I on receipt of Ex.A.3 notice, which fact is not disputed b1, the defendant 90. Section 55 of thc Indian Contract Act deals with the effect of failure to perform at a fixcd tirne in contract in which time is essential, is relevant and cxtracted below:- 55. Effcct of failure to pcrform at a fixed time, in contract in which time is essential.- When a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing at or before a specificd time, or ccrtairr things at or befbre specified times, and fails to do any suclr thing at or bcl.ore the specified time, the contracq or so
63 much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee, if the intention of the parties was that time should be of the essence of the contract. Effect of such failure when time is not essential.-lf it was not the intention of the parties that time should be of the essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing at or before the specified tirne: but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor lbr any loss occasioned to him by such failure. Effect of acceptance ol'perl'ormance at time other than that agreed upon.-[f, in case of a contract voidable on account of the promisor's failure to perform his prornise at thc time agreed, the promisee accepts performance of such promisc at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim cotlpensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance of the protnise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so. 91. The above section deals with the effect of failure to perform at a fixed time, in contracts in which time is essential. The question whether time is the essence of the contract, with reference to the performance of a contract, what generally nray arise for consideration either with reference to the contract as a whole or with refbrence to a particular term or condition of the contract which is breached. [n a contract relating to sale of immovable property if time is specified for payment of the sale price but not in regard to the execution of the sale deed, time will become the essence only with refrrence to payment of
64 sale price but not in regard to execution of the sale deed. Normally in regard to contracts relating to sale of irnmovable properties, time is not considered to be the essencc of the contract unless such an intention can be gathered either flrom the express terms of the contract or impliedly from the intention ol' thc parties as expressed by the terms of the contract. 92. on consideratiorr of the said aspects only, more particularly Section 55 and Section 25 of the lndian Contract Act, learned trial Court decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff. Therefore, this point is answered in favour of the plaintiff. 93. The contentiott of the learned senior counsel appearing for the defendant that learned trial court misinterpreted Sections 55 and 25 of the Indian Contract Act, is untenable. whether the mutation of the property in the name of the defbndant affected llre enforceability of the Agreement of Sale dated 23.01.2003 or thc rights of the praintiff to seek specific performance? Point No.5:
65 94. It is contended by the leamed counsel for the defendant that mutation proceedings relating to suit property were not completed satisfactorily and that the same contiibuted to the delay in completion of the transaction, thereby affecting the plaintiff's readiness and willingness. It is the contention of the plaintiIf that mutation entries are only for physicat and administrative purposes and have no bearing on title or enforceability of the agreement of sale. It is settled principle of law that mutation in revenue record neither creates nor extinguishes title to immovable property and does not determine ownership. The rights of the parties over the suit schedule property arises from the agreement of sale dated 23.01.2003 and not from the revenue entries. Therefore, pendency or absence of mutation cannot affect the validity or enforceability of Ex.A.l agreement of sale. Thus, the mutation issue does not materially impact the plaintifPs clainr for specific performance. 95. It is settled law that an agreement to sell does not by itself create any interest of the proposed vendee in the immovabte property, but only creates an enforceable right in the parties. The said principle was also laid down by the Apex court in Rambhau Namdeo Gajre vs
66 Narayan Bapuji Dhotra (Dead) Through L.Rs23 and in Dharma Naika vs Rama Naika2a 96. As discussecl sLrpra, defendant contended that its name was mutated in the revenue record before filing of the suit. However, the said fact was not informed to the plaintiff. The said fact was also admitted by D.W.l. Defendanl has not filed any documents in proof of the same. Therefore, this point is ansu,ered in favour of the plaintiff. Point No.6 Whether the application flled by the plaintiff before the Trial Court seeking pcrnrission to tlcposit the balance sale consideration supports the plea of readiness and willingness to perform the contract? 97. It is apt to note that plaintiff has filed an application vide I.A.No.1570 of 2005 in O.S.No.14 of 2005 seeking permission to deposit the balance sale consideration. Learned trial Court allowed the said application on 16.08.2005. According to the plaintiff, she has deposited the said amount on27.12.2006 to the credit of the said suit on seeking extension of tinre to deposit. " eooql 8 scc 614 'o lzooay 14 scc 517
67 98. It is apt to note that learned senior counsel for the defendant conrended that ptaintiff did not deposit balance sale consideration in Court in comptiance with the said order. P.Ws.1 and 2 admitted the said fact, during cross-examination. tn the impugned judgment, learned trial coufl specifically mentioned about deposit of the balance sale consideration with the permission of the court. Thus, as on the date of cross-examination of P.Ws.l and 2, plaintiff has not deposited the said amount in the court and deposited the same seeking extension of time. Such conduct constitutes a relevant circumstance demonstrating the plaintiff bona fide intention and willingness to perform the contract. It is apt to note that without extension of time, leamed trial Court will not issue lodgment schedule for the purpose of deposit. 99. Thus, plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform her part of contract under Ex.A.l. She has pleaded and proved the same. [n fact, it is defendant which did not perform its part of contract by getting its name mutated in revenue record. Thus, this point is answered in favour of the plaintiff.
68 100. It is apt to note that in Chandrakanthamma (supra) and U.N. Krishnamurthy vs A.M.Krishnamurthy25, the Apex Court held that deposit of balance considcration in the court during the pendency of the suit has no relevancy. 101. I{oweveq in the present case, the said aspect is considered as one of the surrounding circumstances. Point No.7 whether the plaintifi'is e,titled to the equitable and discretionary relie{'ol- specilic perfbrmance of the Agreernent of Sale dated 23.0 1.100:l? 102. lt is well settled that the relief of specific performance under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 cannot granted as a matter of course. The remedy is essentially equitable and discretionary in nature, and the court must examine the conduct of the parties, the surrounding circumstances and the overall equities of the case before granting such relief. 103. In K. Prakash v. B.R. Sampath Kumar26, the Apex court held that where the agreernento{'sale is proved, the court is not bound to " 1zozz1 11 scc 77s " 120rs1 1 scc 587 )
69 grant specific performance automatically. The court must exercise judicial discretion and determine whether the plaintiff has approached thc court with clean hands and whether the circumstances of the case justify the grant of such relief. At the same time, it has also been consistently held that contracts relating to immovable property are ordinarily enforced through specific performance, since monetary compensation is often inadequate to compensate for the loss of a specific irnmovable property. 104. It is well settled law that where a valid agreement of sale is established and the plaintiff has demonstrated readiness and willingness to perform the contract, the nonnal rule is to grant specific performance unless equitable considerations justify refusal of such relief. 105. In the present case, execution of the Ex.A.l agreement of sale dated 23.0L 2003 is not in dispute. The plaintiff has paid advance consideration under the agreement and has taken steps to enforce the contract. 106. Further, as discussed while dealing with the earlier issues, time cannot be treated as the essence of the contract merely on the basis
70 of the instalhnent schedule. Possession of the property was delivered to the plaintiff pursuant to the agreement and the said agreement was not validly cancelled bi the defendant. The plaintiff has demonstrated readiness and willingness to perfonn the contract, including depositing the balance sale consideration before the Trial Court. The contention regarding mul.ation ol'the propert.v does not al'flect the enforceability of, the agreement. These circutnstances indicate that the plaintiff has acted in a bona fide manner and has consistently attempted to enforce the contract. On the other hand, the defendant has failed to establish that the agreement stood validl;, cancclled or that the plaintiff committed such breach as u,ould disenritle her {iorn seeking equitable relief. 107. The corrduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances, therefore, tilt the balance of equities in lavour of the plaintiff" [t is also relevant to note that the plaintiffhas already deposited the balance sale consideration befbre the Trial court. Thus, this point is answered in favour of the plaintiff.
7L Point No.9 Whether, after delivoring possession of the suit property to the plaintiff pursuant to the Agreement o[ Sale, the defendant could lawfutly reclaim possession without first - cancelling the agreement of sale in accordance with law? 108. Clause No.3 of the agreement of sale is relevant, it is extracted below:- "3.The Vendor has today given possession of the said property, and legal possession of the property shall bc dclivered t<r the purchaser at the time of payment of entirc balance ol' sale consideration as per the atbrementioned schedu le." Thus, the defendant has already delivered possession of the said property. [n the said agreement, there is no clause that on cancellation of agreement of sale, the possession of the schedule property witt be re- delivered to the defendant automatically. In the absence of the same, the def,endant cannot contend that it is in possession of the property. 109. tt is also apt to note that the doctrine in Section 53-A of the 'l'ransfer of Property Act, which protects a transferee who has taken possession of property in pursuance of a contract and has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract.
72 I 10. The essence of the doctrine ol' part performance is that once the transferee has been placed in possession pursuant to the agreement, the transferor cannot act in a manner inconsistent with the contract so as to disturb the possession of the transferee, unless the agreement itself is larvlu I ly tenni rrated. I ll. In the present case, the record indicates that possession ol.the propeffy was delivered to the plainti{F under I:x.A.l agreement of sale. '[he del'endant has nor. placed arry mater.ial on recor.d to show that thc agreement was formally rescinded or cancelled prior to the attempt to deny the plaintiff's rights under the agreement. In contractual relationships of this nature, the law requires that cancellation o[ the agreement must be clear, unequivocal and communicated to the other parly' Mere allegations of breach or failure to comply with contractual terms would not autornatically terminate the agreernent. l12. lt is also apt to note that once possession has becn delivered to the purchaser in pursuance of the agreement, the vendor cannot tunilaterally dispossess the purchaser unless the agreement has been lawfully terminated and appropriate legal sreps have been taken.
73 'l'herefore, in the absence of any valid cancellation of the agreement of sale, the act of reclaiming possession or acting in a manner inconsistent with the rights of the purchaser cannot be sustained. Therefore, this is answered in favour of the plaintiff 113. With regard to contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the defendant that the suit is barred by limitation, it is apt to note that Ex.A.l agreement of sale was executed on 23.01.2003, the same was cancelled on 21.03.2003, the plaintiff has frled the present suit on 30.05.2005. Thus, suit is filed within three years from the date of execution of Ex.A.1 agreement of sale, therefore, the said contention of learned senior counsel appearing for defendant is untenable 114. Further contention of learned senior counsel appearing for the defendant that the retiel of specifrc performance cannot be sought when the party is at default, is also untenable in view of the aforesaid discussion.
74 I I5. On considcration ol'the said aspects including evidence both oral and docunrentarr,. learned trial Court decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff for specific perlormance of agreentent of sa.le. ll6. It is apt to note that in Prakash chandra vs. Angadlal and others27, the Apex court held that the ordinary rule is that specific perfonnance should be granted. tt ought to be denied only when equitable considcrations ltoint to its refusal and the circumstances shor.r that dantages ri'ould constitute an adequate relief. I 17. In K.Prakash (supra), the Apex courr held that when the trial court cxcrcises its discretion in one way of the other alter appreciation ol'entire evidence and materials on record, the appellate couft should not interfere unless it is established that the discretion has been exerciscd perversell,', arbitrarily or against judicial principles, the appellate Court should also not exercise its discretion against the grant of specific performance on extraneous considerations or sympathetic considerations. " ltoToya scc -.r93
r-- 75 118. A pa(y is not entitled to get a decree for specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so as contemplated under Section 20 of the Act, 1963. Once an agreement to sell is legal and validly proved and further requirements for getting such a decree are established, the court has to exercise its discretion in favour of granting relief for specific performance. Subsequent rise in the price will not be treated as, a hardship entailing refusal of decree for specific performance. Rise in price is a normal change of circumstances and, therefore, on that ground a decree for specific perfbrmance cannot be reversed. The said principle was also laid down in K.Prakash Chandra (supra). 119. On consideration of the said aspects only, learned trial court decreed the suit frled by the plaintiff seeking specific performance of the agreement of sale. It is a reasoned judgment and well-founded. Defendant herein failed to make out any case to interfere with the said judgment and decree. 'I'here[ore, this appeal is liable to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed. \ \ \
a 76 Consequently, rniscellaneous petitions, if any pending, in this appeal. shall stand closed , SD/. A.V.S.PRASAD PUTY REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY/ o-ne F.air.copy to the Hon'bre Sri Justice K. Lakshrhan (For His Lordship's kind perusal) SECTION OFFICER The Principar District Judge, medak at Sanga Reddy.(with Records if any) 11 LFt Copies ! 'lvvs''\r r' I[::l:fl,?_.83,;,lrr, Union of lndia Ministry of Law, Justice and company To \ 1 2 3 4' The secretary, Telang.ana Advoc-ates Association Library, High Court for the state of rerangana, Fign court erirdi'r;r;i'iyreraoao. 5. one CC to Sri. Kuber Klushik, novocitElOi;U'Ci 6. One CC to Sri. pramod Maligi, nOvocate f'OpUCi 7 . Two rlD Copies -- 1-' - -J Pr/KA PnAC..
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I HIGH COURT DATED: 2210412026 JUDGMENT AS.No.60 of 2008 DISMISSING THE APPEAL r5\9 II ,t'^ ,!ol ) ,* , -.( ,} .J .J-. ts-. i ut,.i\iv (, (:,' c\; * trt {. crl t) cr = U I,J "i.. '!t \,+.
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD WEDNESDAY, THE TWENTY SECOND DAY OFAPRIL TWO THOUSAND AND TWENW SIX PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN ' AND THE I.IONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO APPEAL SUIT NO: 60 OF 2OO8 Between: Yogasai Health Resorts Limited, a Public limited Company Registered office at A/8' Anandasheet Enclave Nandinagar, Road No. 14 Banjara Hills, Hyderabad-34. Represented by its Director S.V.R. Sastry ...APPELLANT/DEFENDANT AND Smt. S.Padrnavathi, Wo S.S. Raju, aged 42 years, Occ: Household R/o H.No. 7-1-621, 535 and 536 3RT 6-8, Sai Sudha Residency Sanjeevareddy Nagar, Hyderabad' ...RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF Appeal under section 96 of Civil Procedure Code, against the judgment and decree dated: 26-12-2o(J7 passed in os No. 14 of 2005 on the file of the court of the Principal District Judge, medak at Sanga Reddy. This appeal coming on for hearing and upon perusing the grounds of appeal' the judgment and decree of the court below and the material papers in the MVOP and upon hearing the arguments of Sri. Kuber Kaushik, counsel for Appellants and Sri. Pramod Maligi, counsel for Respondent
This Court doth Order and Decree as follows: 1. That this Appeal Suit be and hereby is dismissed; 2. That there shall be no order as to costs in this appeal //TRUE COPY// To SD/. A.V.S.PRASAD DEPUTY REGISTRAR OFFICER 1. 2. Pr/KA The Principal District Judge, medak at Sanga Reddy Two CD Copies fu\t*
HIGH COURT DATE D: 2?1041202G .t ,Fl I DECREE ItS.[rlo.r50 of 2008 DISIUIISSING THE APPEAL tsltl)a, a l:;ilLil4ir r.i,&':Eli:fi+d
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