COMNR.OF I.TAX vs. HINDUSTAN SALES
What did the High Court hold?
The High Court held that the first substantial question of law regarding the voter list (Ext. 4) is answered in the negative. While a voter list is a public document, its mere production is insufficient to prove the facts stated therein without evidence of the basis for the entries. In this case, the registered deed of adoption, supported by other evidence like a passbook and land revenue receipts, and remaining unchallenged, was rightly given precedence over the voter list. The court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Babloo Pasi v. State of Jharkhand and Another. Regarding the second substantial question of law concerning DW6's admission, the court held it was not a serious error. The adoption deed (Ext. B) clearly stated Jaiprakash's age as 8 years at the time of adoption and remained unchallenged. The court reiterated the principle that a registered deed of adoption, signed by the parties, gives rise to a presumption of validity until discarded, citing Laxmibai (Dead) through LRS and Another v. Bhagwantbuva (Dead) through LRS and Others. The indirect evidence from DW6, if interpreted to suggest a different age, did not warrant interference with the concurrent findings of fact. Therefore, both substantial questions of law were answered in the negative.
What were the facts?
The appellants filed a partition suit concerning suit land recorded in the names of six recorded tenants, descendants of Khelu Mahato. The plaintiffs contended that one of the recorded tenants, Haru Mahato, was deceived into executing an adoption deed for Jaiprakash Mahato, which was later cancelled. They asserted that Jaiprakash was not the legally adopted son of Haru Mahato. The defendants, however, admitted the plaintiffs' pleadings in part, with some asserting the validity of the adoption deed and the cancellation deed being barred by limitation. They also claimed the property had been previously partitioned and that the plaintiffs' genealogical table was incomplete. The trial court framed issues, and the first appellate court upheld the trial court's judgment and decree, dismissing the appeal. The present Second Appeal was filed against this judgment.
What were the issues?
1. Whether the judgment and decree of the courts below are vitiated due to non-consideration of the voter list (Ext. 4) as a public document, under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act? - Assessee's Contention: The voter list, being a public document, should have been considered. - Revenue's Contention: The voter list alone is insufficient to prove facts without evidence of the basis for its entries, especially when pitted against a registered deed of adoption supported by other evidence and unchallenged. 2. Whether the courts below committed a serious error of law by not considering the admission of DW6 in his cross-examination regarding the age of Jaiprakash Mahato at the time of adoption? - Assessee's Contention: DW6's admission suggests Jaiprakash was 18 years old at adoption, contradicting the adoption deed. - Revenue's Contention: The adoption deed, stating Jaiprakash was 8 years old, is a valid, unchallenged documentary evidence. Indirect evidence from DW6, if interpreted to suggest an 18-year-old adopted son, does not warrant interference with the finding of facts, especially when the adoption deed is presumed genuine until discarded, as per Supreme Court pronouncements.
Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?
Section 100,Section 35
AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
S.A. No. 103 of 2008
(Against the judgment dated 22.04.2008 passed by learned first Additional District Judge, Deoghar in Title Appeal No. 22 of 2004) 1. Bengali Mahato, son of Late Etwari Mahato, resident of Village - Bhikhana, P.O. & P.S Mohanpur, Sub Division and District 2. Bhikhari Mahato, son of Late Gugali Mahato 3. Banwari Mahato, son of Late Subal Mahato, 4. Dubar Mahato, son of Late Bira Mahato 5. Ketkaha Mahato, son of late Bhola Mahato 6. (a) Pintu Yadav, aged about 24 years, S/o Late Anandi Mahato, R/o Vill- Donihari, Kunda, P.O. & P.S.- Kunda, Dist.- Deoghar ….. Plaintiff/Appellant/Appellant Versus
Versus 1. Nunulal Mahato, son of Late Chhotan Mahato, resident of Village Bhikhana, P.O. & P.S. Mohanpur, Sub Division and District - …….Defendant/Respondent 1st party / Respondent 1st party
Nakat Mahato 3. Bhachu Mahato 4. Jaidhar Mahato, Sl. No. 2 to 4 all sons of Late Bhatu @ Bhattan Mahato 5. Reshmi Debi, widow of late Jai Prakash Mahato 6. Kailu Mahato, son of late Jai Prakash Mahato (Minor being represented through his mother and natural guardian Reshmi Debi, Respondent No. 5) 7. Kumbhi Mahatwain, daughter of Late Bhatu @ Bhattan Mahato and wife of Baiju Mahato 8. Deoki Mahatwain, daughter of late Bhatu @ Bhattan Mahato All by faith - Hindu, by profession Cultivation, residents of Village -Bhikhana, P.O.- Mohanpur & P.S.- Kunda, Sub Division and District - Deoghar (Jharkhand). ….. Defendant/Respondent 2nd Party/ Respondent 2nd Party 9. Kamali Mahatwain @ Kunti Mahatwain, widow of Late Gugali Mahato 10. Transposed as appellant no. 2 11. Bijli Debi @ Abali Mahatwain, widow of late Subal Mahato 12. Transposed as appellant no. 3 13. Bhudeo @ Budho Mahato, son of Late Subal Mahato 14. Tuntun Mahato, son of Late Subal Mahato 15. Jaya Mahatwain, daughter of Late Subal Mahato and wife of Raj Kishore Yadab 16. Transposed as appellant no. 4 17. Transposed as appellant no. 5 18. Transposed as appellant no. 6 19. Babu Mahato, son of Late Kolha Mahato
All are residents of Village Bhikhana, P.O. & P.S. Mohanpur, Sub Division and District, Deoghar (Jharkhand) …….Defendant/Respondent 3rd Party/ Respondent 3rd Party 20. Ratan Mahto, son of Maru Mahato 21. Pano Debya, widow of Late Lalo Mahato 22. Lutan Mahato, son of Late Bachu Mahato Sl. No. 20 to 22 all are residents of Village Taran, P.O. & P.S. Taljhari, Sub Division and District – Dumka, (Jharkhand). 23. Sakali Mahatwain, widow of Late Naresh Mahato, resident of Village Arjuna, P.O. & P.S.Mohanpur, Sub Division and District - Deoghar (Jharkhand) 24. Bhuria Debi, wife of Sri Kripal Mahato, resident of Village Gulipather, PO. & P.S. -Satsanga, District- Deoghar, (Jharkhand). 25. Shakti Mahato, son of Late Bishar Mahato, resident of Village Chaparia, P.O. Mathurapur, P.S. Jasidih, Sub Division and District - Deoghar (Jharkhand) 26. Hargouri Mahato, son of Sri Munshi Mahato, resident of Village Dalhapurni, P.O. + P.S.+ Sub Division Madhupur, District - 27. Gendalal Yadab, son of Sri Arjun Yadab, resident of Village, Chaparia, P.O.- Mathurapur, P.S.- Jasidih, Sub Division and Dist. – Deoghar (Jharkhand). …… Defendants / Respondents 4th Party / Respondents 4th Party
For the Appellants : Mr. Pandey Neeraj Rai, Adv. For the Respondents : Mr. Amar Kr. Sinha, Adv. Mr. Kundan Kr. Ambastha, Adv. Mr. Bhaiya V. Kumar, Adv. Mr. Anurag Chandra, Adv.
Ms. Leena Mukherjee, Adv. For the State
: Mr. Praveen Akhauri, SC Mines I.
P R E S E N T HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY
By the Court:- Heard the parties. At the outset, learned counsel Mr. Praveen Akhauri, SC Mines I, submits that the Superintendent of Police, Deoghar has submitted the compliance report in terms of the order dated 25.11.2021 in I.A. No. 6501 of 2021. Let the same be kept in the record. At the time of hearing of this Second appeal, no one turns up on behalf of the appellant no. 1 of this appeal. 2. This Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 has been preferred against the judgment of concurrence dated 22.04.2008 passed by learned first Additional District Judge, Deoghar in Title Appeal No. 22 of 2004 whereby and where under, learned First Appellate Court has found that the judgment and decree passed by learned trial court being the Sub-Judge- II, Deoghar in Title (Partition) Suit no. 102 of 1985 / 302 of 1997 is proper and dismissed the appeal. 3. The brief facts of the case is that the plaintiff who are the original appellants of this Second Appeal, filed a partition suit in the court of Sub Judge, Deoghar with the prayer for partition of the suit land. 4. The case of the plaintiffs is that the suit land stood recorded in the name of six recorded tenants namely Madari Mahto, Puran Mahato, Bodhi Mahto, Chotan Mahato, Bishu Mahato and Haru Mahato, all sons of the Khelu Mahato. The parties to the suit are descendants of Khelu Mahato. As per the case of the plaintiffs, Puran Mahato died in jointness of the property in the year 1953 and his rights over the property was vested with his coparceners. Haru Mahato died issueless and his share has also vested with his brothers. Bhato @ Bhatan Mahato got an adoption deed executed by cheating Haru Mahato and his wife namely Dakhu Mahatain in a deceitful manner and the said forged adoption deed no. 274 of 1965 was executed even though there was no adoption. When Haru Mahato and Dakho Mahatain came to know about the deceit, they executed a registered document for cancellation of the adoption deed. The plaintiff pleaded that there was no adoption nor there was any giving and taking of child in the adoption. Therefore, Jaiprakash @ Jamuna Mahato was not the adopted son of Haru Mahato. The Sradh of Dakho Mahatain was done by Haru Mahato and the Sradh of Haru Mahato was done
by the plaintiffs. At the time of the settlement operation, Jaiprakash Mahato claimed to be the adopted son of Haru Mahato. The claim of Jaiprakash Mahato was disposed of by the settlement authorities, giving liberty to the Jaiprakash Mahato to approach the civil court. The plaintiffs told the defendants for partition of the suit land which was refused, hence, the plaintiff filed the suit for partition. 5. In their written statement, the second set of defendants admitted the pleadings of the plaintiffs. In the written statement, filed by Nakad Mahato, Yamuna Mahato and Jahri Mahatain, they pleaded that Yamuna Mahato has validly been adopted by Haru Mahato. The deed of cancellation of the adoption was barred by limitation. They further pleaded that the suit property has earlier been partitioned hence, the question of partition does not arise. They pleaded that Puran Mahato died in the year 1969 and not in the year 1953, as pleaded by the plaintiff. Therefore, the share of Puran Mahato has been inherited by his descendants, hence they pleaded that the claim of share by the plaintiffs is erroneous. These defendants further pleaded that the settlement operation is not final and adoption deed can only be cancelled by the civil court. The defendant no. 17 and 18, in their written statement, pleaded that the genealogical table furnished by the plaintiffs is incomplete. They pleaded that Puran Mahato died in the year 1969 and his wife- Kaila Devi, died in the year 1979, Karu Mahato died in the year 1974 and Dakho Mahatain died in the year 1980 leaving behind her only adopted son Jamuna Mahato, who was taken in adoption by Dakho Mahatain and Karu Mahato on 22.10.1965. 6. The defendant no. 19 and 20, in their written statement also pleaded that the genealogical table furnished in the
plaint, is incomplete and the plaintiff has deliberately not impleaded the daughters of Madhari Mahato in the said genealogical table and the adoption of Jamuna Mahato was valid one. The defendant no. 21 and 22, adopted the written statement filed by the defendant no. 19 and 20. 7. Learned trial court on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, framed the following issues:- i. Whether the suit is maintainable? ii. Whether there is any valid cause of action for the suit? iii. Whether the defendant no. 5 has legally been adopted on 22.10.1965 by Haro Mahato and Dakho Mahatain and the adoption deed no. 274 dated 25.10.1965 is legal and valid? iv. Whether the cancellation of adoption dated 02.07.1969 is legally tenable and valid? Whether the suit property has earlier been partitioned or it is the joint property? vi. Whether the plaintiffs and the original defendants as well as the defendants who have been impleaded during the pendency of the suit, are entitled to have any share in the suit property and if yes, to what extent and whether Madari Mahato died in the year 1954 or in the year 1957. vii. Whether the suit is barred by limitation or waiver, or acquiescence? viii. Whether the suit is barred by res-judicata? ix. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs as prayed for?
In support of their case, the plaintiff examined six witnesses, out of whom, the deposition of the PW3 was deleted. From the side of the original defendants, eleven witnesses were examined and the defendants who were impleaded later on, examined three witnesses. The plaintiffs besides oral testimony, proved the documents which have been examined as Ext. 1 to 5, whereas from the side of the defendants, the documents have been marked as Ext. A to E. 9. Learned trial court first took up issue nos. (iii), (iv) and
(viii) together and after considering the evidence in the record, came to the conclusion that the suit is not barred by res-judicata and there is no justification for cancelling the adoption deed dt. 25.10.1965. The adoption deed was
valid one and the same is not obtained by practising deceit. 10. Learned trial court next took up issue nos. (v) and (vi) together and after considering the evidence in the record, came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are entitled to 1/6th share of the suit property and the descendants of each of the six recorded tenants, will get 1/6th share each. 11. Learned trial court next took up issue nos. (vii) and held that the suit is not barred by limitation, waiver and acquiescence. 12. In respect of issue no. (i), learned trial court concluded that the suit is maintainable and then learned trial court took up issue no. (ii) and held that there is valid cause of action for the suit. 13. Learned trial court lastly took up issue no. (ix) and decreed the suit by holding that the descendants of each of the six recorded tenants will get 1/6th share of the property. 14. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 24.03.2004, passed by learned Sub-Judge, II, Deoghar, in Title (P) Suit no. 102 of 1985/ 302 of 1997, the plaintiff filed Title Appeal no. 22 of 2004 in the court of learned District Judge, Deoghar which was ultimately heard and disposed of by learned First Appellate Court by the impugned judgment dated 22.04.2008 as already indicated above. 15. Learned First Appellate Court considering the materials available in the record and submissions made before it, formulated the following points for determination;- “Whether learned trial court has answered each of the issues properly?” 16. Learned First Appellate Court first took up issue no. (viii) and considering that in Ext. 5, which is the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, in which leave was
granted to the defendant no. 5, to get his share on the basis of the his adoption deed, was not a final order, hence, the suit is not barred by res-judicata. 17. Learned First Appellate Court next took up issue no. (v) and considering the Ext. 3 and 3/V, which are the certified copy of the purcha and the land revenue receipt, marked Ext. 1 to 1/C as well as the Ext. A to A/5, it appeared to the learned First Appellate Court that the property appears to be joint property and there has not been any partition by metes and bounds rather the parties are cultivating their land as per their convenience and came to the conclusion that learned trial court has rightly held that there has not been partition of the suit property between the parties. 18. Learned First Appellate Court then took up issue no. (iii) and (iv) together and considering the evidence in the record and making independent appreciation of the same concluded that the wives of Haro Mahato and Bhatan Mahato were present at the time of the adoption and the adoption took place with their consent. 19. Learned First Appellate Court considered that the Ext. B is a registered adoption deed and the same is valid one and in fact, giving and taking ceremony of adoption was observed. Haro Mahato and Dakho Mahato have never approached the civil court for cancellation of the adoption deed, even though the civil court has jurisdiction for cancellation of such adoption deed though Haro Mahato died in the year 1974 and his wife died in 1980, hence, Ext. 2 which is cancellation of the adoption deed is valueless and finding of learned trial court in this respect is proper. 20. Learned First Appellate Court next took up issued no, (vi) and after making an independence appreciation of the evidence in the record, came to the conclusion that
the descendants of the six recorded tenants are entitled to 1/6th share each and found that learned trial court has rightly decided the said issue. 21. Learned First Appellate Court lastly took up issue no. (i), (ii), (vii) and (ix) and came to the conclusion that the finding of the learned trial court in respect of the same, to be proper. 22. In this Second Appeal, vide order dated 16.03.2010 the following substantial questions of law were formulated:- (a) whether the judgment and decree of the courts below are vitiated on account of non-consideration of Ext. 4, the voter list being the public document ? (b) whether the courts below have committed serious error of law in not considering the admission of DW6 particularly made in para 19 and 20 of his cross- examination? 23. It is pertinent to mention here that during pendency of the suit, a petition was filed by the respondent no. 10, 12, 16, 17 and 18 of this Second Appeal to transpose them as appellants because the original appellants of this Second Appeal, sought permission under Order XXIII Rule 1 to permit them to withdraw the Second Appeal. The predecessor Judge in the roster, vide order dated 17.09.2014 has allowed the prayer of respondent nos. 10, 12, 16, 17 and 18 to be transposed as appellant nos. 2 to 6. 24. Mr. Pandey Neeraj Rai, learned counsel for the appellant nos. 2 to 6 (a) submits that besides two substantial questions of law formulated in this appeal, three additional substantial question of law, is required to be formulated in this case and in this respect, it is further submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that in page 18 of learned appellate court judgment, which has erroneously been referred as para 18 in I.A. No. 12081 of 2024 filed in this respect, there has been reference to land
revenue receipt which shows that the suit land stands recorded in the name of Madari Mahato and his brothers, as joint family property and the document filed by the defendant inter alia land revenue receipt, adoption deed and pass-book, shows that Haru Mahato adopted Jayprakash Mahato. It is next submitted that the appellate court has committed perversity by considering the pass-book and Malguzari receipt, as evidence of adoption, hence, the same be formulated as substantial question of law. 25. So far as this contention of the appellants is concerned, learned counsel for the appellants relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme court of India in the case of the Vijay Kumar Talwar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi reported in MANU/SC/1027/2010 in Civil Appeal no. 3265 – 3266 of 2003 decided on 06.12.2010 , the para 21 of which reads as under:- “21. A finding of fact may give rise to a substantial question of law, inter alia, in the event the findings are based on no evidence and/or while arriving at the said finding, relevant admissible evidence has not been taken into consideration or inadmissible evidence has been taken into consideration or legal principles have not been applied in appreciating the evidence, or when the evidence has been misread. (See: Madan Lal v. Mst. Gopi and Anr. MANU/SC/0017/1980 : (1980) 4 SCC 255; Narendra Gopal Vidyarthi v. Rajat Vidyarthi MANU/SC/8433/2008 : (2009) 3 SCC 287; Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) v. Vijay Dasharath Patel MANU/SC/1314/2007 : (2007) 4 SCC 118; Metroark Ltd. Commissioner of Central Excise, Calcutta MANU/SC/0150/2004 : (2004) 12 SCC 505; West Bengal Electricity Regulatory Commission v. CESC Ltd. 8 SCC 715).”
wherein, it is submitted that the evidence of Malgujari and pass-book has been misread by learned First Appellate Court, hence, the same amounts to a finding of fact, which has given rise to the substantial question of law.
Now coming to the facts of the case after going through the page 18 of the judgment of learned First Appellate Court, this court do not find any force in this contention of learned counsel for the appellants of any evidence being mis-read by learned First Appellate Court when it is the contention of the defendants that the defendant no. 5 is the adopted son of Haru Mahato, which is denied by the plaintiff, certainly a pass-book where the defendant no. 5 has been described as the son of Haru Mahato, is certainly a relevant piece of evidence and the same cannot be construed as mis-reading of the evidence by learned First Appellate Court and the same is a case in respect of land revenue receipt, which also goes to show that defendant no. 5- Jaiprakash Mahato was described as the son of Haru Mahato, so the same cannot be termed as mis-reading of an evidence by learned First Appellate Court, hence this court do not find any force in this contention of learned counsel for the appellant nos. 2 to 6(a) for formulating any additional substantial question of law in this respect. 27. It is next submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that whether the fact of giving in adoption by the natural mother of the Jaiprakash Mahato, having not been proved and as the same is an essential condition for a valid adoption as set out in Section 11(vi) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, having not been complied with and the compliance of such an essential condition having not been proved, learned First Appellate Court committed perversity by holding the adoption of the defendant no. 5 by Haru Mahato to be valid one, hence, an additional substantial question of law is required to be formulated in this respect also. 28. So far as this contention of learned counsel for the appellant is concerned, it is appropriate to refer to
Section 11(vi) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, which reads as under:- “11. Other conditions for a valid adoption.—In every adoption, the following conditions must be complied with:
xxxxx (vi) the child to be adopted must be actually given and taken in adoption by the parents or guardian concerned or under their authority with intent to transfer the child from the family of its birth [or in the case of an abandoned child or a child whose parentage is not known, from the place or family where it has been brought up] to the family of its adoption: Provided that the performance of datta homan, shall not be essential to the validity of an adoption.”
The plain reading of Section 11(vi) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, makes it abundantly clear that one of essential conditions for every adoption is that the child to be adopted must be actually given and taken in adoption by the parents or guardian concerned or under their authority with intent to transfer the child from the family of its birth. 30. Now coming to the facts of the case, it is not the case of the plaintiffs or the appellant nos. 2 to 6(a) of this second appeal, who were defendants in the trial court that the natural mother of the Jaiprakash Mahato has not given Jaiprakash Mahato in adoption, so in the absence of any pleading as the adoption in this case, was proved by the registered deed of adoption which was executed undisputedly, by Haru Mahato, in evidence of adoption which took place about three days prior to the registration of adoption deed, this court do not find any force in this contention of learned counsel for the appellant no. 2 to 6(a) that learned First Appellate Court has committed any perversity by not considering that giving in adoption by the natural mother has not been proved as in the absence of any pleading of any of the
parties, that giving in adoption of Jaiprakash Mahato- the defendant no. 5, was not made by the natural mother of Jaiprakash Mahato, certainly there was neither any occasion nor any scope either for learned trial court or for learned First Appellate Court, to consider such a plea in support of which, there is no pleading. It is needless to mention that it is a settled principle of law that the court cannot go beyond pleadings of the parties, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal and Another reported in (2008) 17 SCC 491, para 10 of which reads as under:-
“10. The High Court, in this case, in its obvious zeal to cut delay and hardship that may ensue by relegating the plaintiffs to one more round of litigation, has rendered a judgment which violates several fundamental rules of civil procedure. The rules breached are: (i) No amount of evidence can be looked into, upon a plea which was never put forward in the pleadings. A question which did arise from the pleadings and which was not the subject-matter of an issue, cannot be decided by the court. (ii) A court cannot make out a case not pleaded. The court should confine its decision to the question raised in pleadings. Nor can it grant a relief which is not claimed and which does not flow from the facts and the cause of action alleged in the plaint. (iii) A factual issue cannot be raised or considered for the first time in a second appeal.”
As also in the case of Bondar Singh and Others v. Nihal Singh and Others reported in (2003) 4 SCC 161, para 7 of which reads as under :-
“7. As regards the plea of sub-tenancy (shikmi) argued on behalf of the defendants by their learned counsel, first we may note that this plea was never taken in the written statement the way it has been put forth now. The written statement is totally vague and lacking in material particulars on this aspect. There is nothing to support this plea except some alleged revenue entries. It is settled law that in the absence of a plea no amount of evidence led in relation thereto can be looked into. Therefore, in the absence of a clear plea regarding sub-tenancy (shikmi), the defendants cannot be allowed to build up a case of sub- tenancy (shikmi). Had the defendants taken such a plea it would have found place as an issue in the suit. We have perused the issues framed in the suit. There is no issue on the point.” (Emphasis supplied)
So in view of the discussions made above, this court do not find any merit in this contention of the learned counsel for the appellants to formulate any additional substantial question of law. 32. Lastly, it is submitted by learned counsel for the appellants, that the essential elements of an adoption ceremony which has been claimed to have been taken place in presence of a caste man and relatives cannot be said to have been proved by the sole testimony of DW4 and in the absence of any other evidence, learned First Appellate Court ought not have held the adoption to be a valid one. In this respect, learned counsel for the appellants, relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Orissa in the case of Md. Aftabuddin Khan and Ors. v. Chandan Bilasini and Ors. reported in MANU/OR/0025/1977 wherein the Hon’ble High Court of Orissa, considered that unless the adoption made is signed by the person giving and person taking the child in adoption, the court cannot presume that the adoption has been made in terms of section 16 of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. 33. In this respect, learned counsel for the appellants, also relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Kishori Lal v. Most. Chaltibai reported in MANU/SC/0145/1958 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has observed as under in para 7:-
“7. As an adoption results in changing the course of succession, depriving wives and daughters of their rights and transferring properties to comparative strangers or more remote relations it is necessary that the evidence to support it should be such that it is free from all suspicion of fraud and so consistent and probable as to leave no occasion for doubting its truth. Failure to produce accounts, in circumstances such as have been proved in the present case, would be a very suspicious circumstance.
The importance of accounts was emphasised by the Privy Council in Sootrugun v. Sabitra (1834) 2 Knapp. 287; in Diwakar Rao v. Chandanlal Rao ((1916) I.L.R. 44 Cal 201; in Kishorilal v. Chunilal (1908) 36 I.A. 9; in Lal Kunwar v. Charanji Lal ((1909) 37 I.A. 1 and in Padamlal v. Fakira Debya.”
Now coming to the facts of the case, unlike the case of Md. Aftabuddin Khan and Ors. v. Chandan Bilasini and Ors. (supra), in this case, the person giving in adoption and the person receiving in adoption have both signed the registered deed of adoption. It is a settled principle of law that if the adoption is challenged after a substantial period of time, it is difficult to find a witness of the ceremony of giving and taking. It is also a settled principle of law as has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that the fact of adoption can be proved by producing registered document of adoption or by examining the priest present at the ceremony or evidence of change of name of the alleged adopted son or the evidence of any neighbour that the son was living with the adopted mother as has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Rahasa Pandiani (Dead) through LRS and Others Gokulananda Panda and Others reported in AIR 1987 SC 962. 35. Now coming to the facts of the case, in this case the undisputed fact remains that there was valid adoption deed which was executed three days after the adoption and neither the plaintiff nor the appellant nos. 2 to 6 who were the defendants before the trial court, ever challenged the validity of the adoption deed which has been marked Ext. B before the trial court. 36. Under the facts and circumstances, this court is of the considered view that there is no force in this contention of the learned counsel for the appellants to frame any
additional substantial question of law in this respect and in view of this discussions made above, the interlocutory application no. 12081 of 2024 with the prayer to frame three additional substantial questions of law being without any merit is dismissed. 37. Now coming to the substantial question no. ‘a’ which is to the effect “whether the judgment and decree of the courts below are vitiated on account of non-consideration of Ext. 4, the voter list being the public document ?” so far as the Ext. 4, which is the voter list is concerned, it is a settled principle of law that in absence of evidence to show that on what material the entry in the voter list and the name of the person was made, a mere production of the copy of the voter list, though a public document in terms of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, was not sufficient to prove the fact mentioned therein as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Babloo Pasi v. State of Jharkhand and Another reported in (2008) 13 SCC 133. 38. Under such circumstances, when pitted against the voter list is the registered deed of adoption and deed of adoption is supported by other evidences such as pass book and the land revenue receipt beside the oral testimony and the deed of adoption has remained unchallenged, this Court is of the considered view that not giving weightage to Exhibit 4 over the registered deed of adoption, which draws a presumption of adoption and which deed has not been challenged, has not made the impugned judgment and decree vitiated, so the first substantial question of law is answered in the negative. 39. So far at the second substantial question of law which is to the effect that “whether the courts below have committed serious error of law in not considering the admission of DW6
particularly made in para 19 and 20 of his cross-examination?” is concerned, it is contented by the learned counsel for the appellant that the DW6 has categorically mentioned in paragraph 20 of his cross-examination that his age was 24 years at the time of adoption and Jai Prakash was 6 years younger to him so, his age was 18 years, is an indirect evidence. On the other hand, it was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant of this Second Appeal that in the adoption deed itself, marked as Exhibit B, the age of Jaiprakash has been mentioned as 8 years and the adoption deed was held to be valid one and the adoption deed was not challenged and the subsequent deed of cancellation of adoption, having been made beyond the period of limitation of three years, the same was having no force, more so, when such adoption could have been cancelled only by a decree of a competent civil court. 40. It is a settled principle of law that the registered deed of adoption signed by the person giving and taking the child in adoption has been made in accordance with law, so the same gives rise to presumption of adoption which is considered to be genuine until it is discarded as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Laxmibai (Dead) through LRS and Another v. Bhagwantbuva (Dead) through LRS and Others reported in (2013) 4 SCC 97. 41. Under such circumstances, when there is unchallenged documentary evidence in the shape of age of the Jaiprakash when adopted was 8 years, not giving precedence to indirect evidence of DW6, which if interpreted may give rise to the age of the defendant no. 5 at the time of the adoption to be 18 years, cannot be termed as serious error warranting interference of this Court in exercise of its power under Section 100 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, to the finding of facts by this court. Hence the second substantial question of law is also answered in the negative. 42. In view of the discussions made above, this appeal being without any merit is dismissed on contest but under the circumstances without any costs. 43. Let a copy of this Judgment along with the Lower Court Records be sent to the Court concerned forthwith and with the disposal of this Second Appeal, the interlocutory applications, if any, also stands disposed of being infructuous.
(Anil Kumar Choudhary, J.) High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi Dated, the 11th November, 2024 Smita /AFR
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