SURAT CITY GYMKHANA vs. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
What did the High Court hold?
The High Court allowed the petitions and quashed the impugned notices dated January 9, 2001, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for all the assessment years. The Court reasoned that the revenue had accepted the Tribunal's order for AY 1988-89 to 1990-91, and the High Court itself had dismissed the revenue's appeals for AY 1991-92 and 1992-93, thereby confirming the assessee's entitlement to exemption under Section 11. The issuance of fresh Section 148 notices was considered an attempt to bypass these judicial decisions and amounted to an abuse of the process of law. The Court relied on the principle that where an authority acts without jurisdiction, the High Court can intervene even if alternative remedies exist, citing the Supreme Court's judgment in Calcutta Discount Company Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer. The Court also expressed dissatisfaction with the manner in which the reassessment proceedings were conducted, emphasizing that taxing authorities must act fairly and not in a partisan manner. Consequently, all subsequent proceedings and assessment orders dated October 23, 2001, were also quashed, and the respondent was directed to refund taxes collected.
What were the facts?
The petitioner, Surat City Gymkhana, a charitable trust registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, and the Societies Registration Act, 1860, applied for and received registration under Section 12A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, on February 24, 1983. It also held a certificate under Section 80G of the Act. While exemption under Section 11 was granted for assessment years (AY) 1984-85 to 1990-91, it was denied for AY 1991-92 and 1992-93. Reassessment proceedings under Section 147 were initiated for AY 1988-89 to 1990-91, leading to rejection of exemption. Appeals to the CIT(Appeals) and the Tribunal were filed. The Tribunal, by order dated January 20, 2000, quashed reassessments for AY 1988-89 to 1990-91 and held the trust entitled to exemption under Section 11 for all five years. The revenue accepted the Tribunal's order for AY 1988-89 to 1990-91 but filed appeals for AY 1991-92 and 1992-93, which were dismissed by the High Court on September 25, 2000. Subsequently, the petitioner challenged notices dated January 9, 2001, issued under Section 148 for reassessment for AY 1990-91, among others.
What were the issues?
1. Whether the notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, dated January 9, 2001, for reassessment for the assessment years in question are valid, particularly in light of previous High Court and Tribunal orders concerning the assessee's entitlement to exemption under Section 11 of the Act. Assessee's contentions: - The revenue had accepted the Tribunal's order quashing reassessments for AY 1988-89 to 1990-91. - The High Court had dismissed the revenue's appeals for AY 1991-92 and 1992-93, upholding the assessee's claim for exemption. - The issuance of fresh notices under Section 148 was an attempt to circumvent the previous judicial pronouncements and amounted to an abuse of process. - The reassessment proceedings were initiated without valid reasons and were barred by limitation. - The principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata applied, preventing the revenue from re-agitating issues already decided. Revenue's contentions: - The revenue argued that the assessment framed had been challenged by way of appeal, and therefore, the High Court should not intervene. - The revenue contended that the High Court's power to issue writs should not be exercised when alternative remedies like appeals exist.
Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?
Section 11,Section 12A,Section 143(3),Section 147,Section 148,Section 80G
AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below
Cited by 4 judgments on BharatTax
See all citing judgments →Counted from the text of the judgments hosted here. Most recent first.
- Jeppiar Educational Trust, Chennai v. DCIT, Central Circle-1(3), ChennaiChennai · 2023-08-23
- Jeppiar Educational Trust, Chennai v. DCIT, Central Circle-1(3), ChennaiChennai · 2023-08-23
- Jeppiar Educational Trust, Chennai v. DCIT, Central Circle-1(3), ChennaiChennai · 2023-08-23
- Jeppiar Educational Trust, Chennai v. DCIT, Central Circle-1(3), ChennaiChennai · 2023-08-23
Cause title — parties, addresses and appearances
of the Tribunal's order.
[c] In so far as the 5th & 6th years are concerned, viz. assessment years 1994-95 and 1995-96, it was contended that the respondent originally accepted the claim of the petitioner, issued notice under Section 148 of the Act on 19/11/1998 for both the years, dropped that initiation under Section 147 of the Act on 23/11/2000 i.e. after the date of the Tribunal's order and after considering the assessee's submission in pursuance to because :
[i] The petitions were barred by delay and latches.
[ii] At least there was acquiescence on behalf of the petitioner : the petitioner having submitted returns of income on 20/7/2001 and responded to the notice issued under Section 142(1)/143(2) of the Act.
[iii] As could be seen from the various letters exchanged, the petitioner had been given adequate opportunities and there was no haste in framing assessment.
[iv] That the petitioner had already preferred appeals against fresh assessment framed on 23/10/2001 and hence should be relegated to the alternative statutory remedy.
[v] That the respondent had recorded reasons and from the said reasons it could be gauged that they were in accordance with requirement of Section 147 of the Act read with Proviso to the said Section as well as Explanation 1 and Explanation 2(c)(iii) of the Act.
[vi] That the Tribunal's order was relevant only for the first three assessment years and not for the later three years, and hence the notices issued under Section 148 of the Act were not to give effect to the Tribunal's order but were independent of the same.
[vii] That the assessment order could not be for the 4th, 5th, & 6th.years the petitioner's case was on a better footing as the respondent had already taken into consideration the Tribunal's order in the original proceedings.
16 It is well settled that any challenge to initiation of reassessment proceedings has to be tested primarily on the basis of the reasons recorded. The case of revenue must succeed or fail on the basis of reasons recorded. In the present case in para 4 of the reasons recorded, it is stated thus :
"
The founder members and also other members falling in the list of persons u/s.13(3) (a) [list placed on record] of the act have contributed to the institution by a sum exceeding Rs.25,000/- upto the relevant previous year. Section 13 as amended by the Finance Act 1970-71 w.e.f. 01-04-1971 has excluded the benefit of Section 11 in case adversely effected by the provisions of Section 13(1)(c) of the IT act, if the benefit directly enures to the prohibited persons u/s.13(3) as per sub-clause (1) of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 13, the provision of Section-11 or Section 12 would not operate to exclude such income of the previous year if it directly or indirectly enures for the benefits of prohibited persons listed in sub.sec.3 of Sec.13 in the following conditions prescribed in 13(1)(c) of the Act.
[i] if such trust or institution has been created or established after the commencement of this Act and under the terms of the trust of the rules governing the institution, any part of such income
enures, or [ii] if any part of such income or any property of the trust or the institution (Whenever created or established) is during the previous year used or applied". thus :
"5 Whereas the assessee - trust despite being charitable institution as per order of the ITAT at the instance of the assessee itself is not eligible to exemption by virtue of provisions of section 13(1)(c) of the I.T.Act so as to exclude its income from total income of the previous year with reference to provisions of section 11 or section 12 in view of the law having emerged from the order of the ITAT, the income liable to tax has escaped assessment. That apart there is also failure on the part of the trust in making full and true disclosure of such material facts relevant to such income eligible to tax with reference to section 11 read with section 13(1)(c) as evident from the return of income filed".
Therefore, the reasons recorded go to show that the respondent is of the view that exemption under Section 11 of the Act would not be available to the petitioner in view of provision of Section 13(1)(c)(i) read with Section 13(3) of the Act. But what is more pertinent is that in para 5, it is recorded by the respondent that the income liable to tax has escaped assessment in view of the law having emerged from the order of the ITAT. The respondent further goes on to state: that apart, there is also failure on the part of the trust in making full and true disclosure of such material facts relevant to such income eligible (exigible?) to tax with reference to Section 11 read with Section 13(1)(c) as evident from the returns of income filed. On a plain reading of the reasons recorded following facts emerge :
[a] List of prohibited category of persons was available on record with the Assessing Officer,
[b] Liability to tax with reference to Section 11 read with Section 13(1)(c) of the Act is evident from the return of income filed as per his own say,
[c] Income has escaped assessment in view of the law having emerged from the order of the Tribunal.
Having regard to the fact that the reasons recorded as extracted hereinbefore, themselves bring out contradiction in terms it cannot be stated that any failure or omission can be ascribed to the petitioner. Thus, it is not possible to state that there is any failure on part of the petitioner Trust in making full and true disclosure of all material facts necessary for the assessment of the assessment year in question.
19 Even otherwise, provisions of Section 13 open with a non obstante clause and hence by virtue of the said provisions exception to the exemption provided by Section 11 is carved out and an assessee is denied the exemption under Section 11 of the Act in case where the income or property of the Trust is used or applied or enures for the benefit of any person referred to in Section 13(3) of the Act. In the present case, it is the respondent who avers applicability of provision of Section 13(1)(c) and hence the onus is on him to establish the failure, if any. From the reasons recorded it is apparent that he is of the opinion that the Tribunal has specifically directed the respondent to initiate action as there is failure of the prescribed condition or that some portion of the property or income of the petitioner Trust enures for the benefit of the prohibited category of persons or some portion of the property or income is applied or used for the benefit of the prohibited category of persons specified in Section 13(3) of the Act. The law is well settled, a person who makes a positive averment is required to establish the same. It is not for the person against whom the averment is made to establish negatively that the state of affairs averred by the other person do not exist. Furthermore, the Tribunal nowhere states that provisions of Section 13 of the Act are applicable. All that is stated is to grant exemption u/s.11 of the Act subject to other conditions being fulfilled.
Even otherwise, as stated, provision of Section 13 carves out an exception to the applicability of provision of Section 11 of the Act, and hence, the exception has to be stated and established by the person who seeks to invoke and apply the exception. The petitioner in the present case has prima facie established as can be seen from the order of the Tribunal, apart from the fact that the petitioner has also been granted exemption for assessment years 1984-85 to 1987-88 (and the same is not disturbed), that it is entitled to exemption under Section 11 of the Act and hence it will be the respondent who will have to establish that the petitioner is not so entitled. The impugned notice having been issued after expiry of the period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, the respondent shall have to establish that there was any omission or violation on the part of the petitioner to place all material facts necessary for the assessment of the assessment year in question. An omission or failure presumes a statutory obligation. From the reasons recorded itself it is apparent that the list of persons falling within the prohibited category as stipulated in Section 13(3) of the Act was already available on record. Thereafter, what inference in facts or in law had to be drawn was the duty of the respondent and in case the respondent failed on the said count such failure or omission cannot be laid at the doorstep of the petitioner. In this context reliance placed by Mr.Joshi on the provision of Explanation 1 to the effect that even if the list was available it would not amount to disclosure within the meaning of Proviso merely because the Assessing Officer could have with due diligence discovered material evidence is to be stated to be rejected. This is not a case where a significant, material or relevant evidence was hidden in mass of papers submitted along with the return of income. The entire scheme of assessment of charitable institution is laid down in Sections 11, 12 and 13 and the provisions operate as an integrated code and the respondent cannot be heard to state that he had not applied his mind to the applicability or otherwise of provision of Section 13 of the Act especially when he had initially declined to grant exemption under Section 11 of the Act. At the same time, it is extremely significant that for the 4th. year i.e. assessment year 1993-94, the Assessing Officer granted exemption in light of the order of the Tribunal inspite of the fact that in para 31 of its order (reproduced hereinbefore) the Tribunal had very categorically referred to provision of Section 13 of the Act. Similarly for the 5th and 6th years i.e. assessment years 1994-95 and 1995-96 the respondent had "That though the writ of prohibition or certiorari would not issue against an executive authority, the High Courts had power to issue in a fit case an order prohibiting an executive authority from acting without jurisdiction. Where such action of an executive authority acting without jurisdiction subjected, or was likely to subject, a person to lengthy proceedings and unnecessary harassment, the High Courts would issue appropriate orders or directions to prevent such consequences. The existence of such alternative remedies as appeals and reference to the High Court was not, however, always a sufficient reason for refusing a party quick relief by a writ or order prohibiting an authority acting without jurisdiction from continuing such action. When the Constitution conferred on the High Courts the power to give
relief it became the duty of the Courts to give such relief in fit cases and the courts would be failing to perform their duty if relief were refused without adequate reasons."
25 Before parting we may observe that during course of hearing we had called for the original files of the respondent in view of the fact that submissions were made on behalf of the petitioner to the effect that the assessment had in fact not been framed on 23/10/2001 but subsequently and an attempt had been made by the respondent to over reach the process of the Court, that though the respondent had been served with process of the Court on 23/10/2001 in the later half of the day he had reproduced :
"The taxing authorities exercise quasi-judicial powers and in doing so they must act in a fair and not a partisan manner. Although it is part of their duty to ensure that no tax which is legitimately due from an assessee should remain unrecovered, they must also at the same time not act in a manner as might indicate that scales are weighted against the assessee. We are wholly unable to subscribe to the view that unless those
authorities exercise the power in a manner most beneficial to the revenue and consequently most adverse to the assessee, they should be deemed not to have exercised it in a proper and judicious manner".
26 We have considered various judicial authorities cited before us by both the sides, even if some of them might not have been specifically referred to and discussed in the judgment.
The petitions are allowed accordingly. The impugned notices dated 9/1/2001 issued under Section 148 of the Act in all the assessment years are quashed and set aside. As a consequence all the subsequent proceedings and the assessment orders dated 23/10/2001 passed by the respondent are quashed and set aside and the respondent is directed to refund the taxes collected by him in pursuance of such assessment orders. There shall be no order as to costs. (B.C.Patel,J) (D.A.Mehta,J)
m.m.bhatt
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