DR. SHEELA VIRGINIA RODRIGUES vs. THE PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

Petitioner alleges that, when her bank accounts were attached on 26.03.2019 by a notice issued under Section 226(3) of the Act. On enquiry, she realized that a demand of Rs.7,95,840/- was intimated under Section 143(1), allegedly issued on 19.02.2014. Petitioner contended that she had never received the intimation of 2014 and that on noticing the contents of the intimation, she realised that there was a mistake in the return filed. Thereafter a revision petition was filed under Section 264 of the Act on 24.09.2019. However, by the impugned order dated 08.03.2021, the revision petition was rejected on the ground that the application filed under Section 264 was highly belated and further that the intimation was sent to the petitioner on 19.02.2014 to the mail id of the assessee and hence there was no sufficient cause for not invoking

The learned Counsel for the Petitioner Sri.Arun Raj S. vehemently contended that petitioner was completely in the dark about the intimation dated 19.02.2014. According to the learned Counsel, apart from the absence of any material to show that such an intimation was sent to the mail id of the petitioner, the rules for electronic communications came into effect only in 2015 and hence the response of the department that the intimation was sent in 2014 through mail id cannot be accepted. Even otherwise, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, in 2014, sending communications through mail was not a practice in vogue and that, considering the nature of the claim raised in the revision, the same ought to have been considered on merits so that the assessee was not put to prejudice.

The learned Standing Counsel for the respondents Sri.Christopher Abraham, on the other hand justified the order impugned and stated that in the light of the clear delay of more than 5 years in preferring the revision petition under Section 264 of the Act, the first respondent had no other alternative, other than to dismiss the same.

On a consideration of the rival arguments, it is noticed that petitioner's specific contention was that the intimation issued under Section 143(1) came to the attention of the petitioner only on 26.03.2019. A perusal of Ext.P4 letter issued on 17.04.2019 shows that immediately on coming to know about the attachment of the bank account, petitioner had WP(C) NO. 29801 OF 2021 4 requested the first respondent to issue a copy of the intimation under Section 143(1). In response to the said request, the first respondent issued the intimation along with the covering letter dated 15.05.2019, pursuant to which Ext.P9 revision petition was filed under Section 264 of the Act.

It is true that the respondents have not referred to any specific mail nor have they produced the details of the mail sent to the petitioner as alleged to have been sent on 19.02.2014. It is also true that the practice of sending communications by mail was not a prevalent practice in the year 2014 and normally the assessee would have expected communications to be served by post rather than mail.

The tendency to check the emails with all its seriousness, that too, those from the income tax department was not a practice in vogue in those days. Though technologically, we have advanced leaps and bounds, still, while appreciating the circumstances of this case, this Court cannot ignore the realities of the communication system and the human conduct that existed 8 years ago. Thus even if it is assumed that petitioner had received the email communication, in the absence of the said communication being the only mode of service of notice prescribed by law, an assessee cannot be blamed if they assumed that the e-mail communication would be followed by a written communication. To deny the opportunity of the petitioner to contest her case due to an e-mail communication send in 2014, would be to say the least a violation of her

In view of the above appreciation, I find that the first respondent was too technical while rejecting the application of the petitioner filed under Section 264 of the Act. In this context, the provisions of Section 264(3) cannot be ignored. The wordings used in Section 264(3) conveys that the application must be made within one year from the date on which the order was communicated to the assessee or the date on which the assessee came to know of, whichever is earlier.

Since there is nothing to disbelieve the version of the assessee that the order was communicated only in 2019 and she came to know about the order only after March, 2019, I am of the view that Ext.P10 order is legally unacceptable and is liable to be set aside.