SARK CABLE PRIVATE LIMITED vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER TDS

By Ext.P1 to Ext.P6 intimations, petitioner was called upon to pay the late filing fee under section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short,'the Act'). As per the aforesaid intimations, amounts have been demanded as late

According to the petitioner, though section 234E of the Act was introduced by the Finance Act, 2012 with effect from 1st July, 2012, since petitioner is being demanded to pay, by Ext.P1 to Ext.P6, late fee for not filing the statement of tax deduction at source, it is necessary to refer to section 200A of the Act. It was further submitted that Section 200A(1) incorporated clause (c) only with effect from 01.06.2015. Sub-clause (c) to section 200A (1) refers to the fee if any to be computed in accordance with the provisions of section 200A(1)(e). It is the claim of the petitioner that till 01.06.2015 petitioner cannot be mulcted with any liability to pay late fee for non filing of any statement of tax deduction at source.

A statement has been filed by the respondents objecting to the claim of the petitioner. It is averred that the demands of late filing fee under section 234E of the Act were raised by orders issued from 2013 till 2016 and that the demands are still outstanding. The intimations issued by the department were all appealable orders under section 246A of the Act and the petitioner failed to challenge the levy of late fee. In such circumstances, the demands have become final and the petitioner has accepted the demands. Respondents also pleaded that the delay is a ground to refuse an appropriate relief so as to avoid unsettling the settled things. Relying upon the decisions in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar (AIR 1995 SC 1991), G.C.Gupta and Others v. N.K.Pandey and Others [(1988) 1 SCC 316] and State of M.P. And Another v. Bhailal Bhai (AIR 1964 SC 1006), it was asserted that the delay must defeat the claim raised by the petitioner.

I have heard Sri.P.J.Anilkumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri.Christopher Abraham, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents 1 to 3 as well as Sri.S.Manu,

I have considered the rival contentions.

In the decision in M/s.Sarala Memorial Hospital v. Union of India and Another (W.P.(C) No.37775 of 2018) an identical question arose for consideration. After considering the statutory provisions of section 234E and section 200A of the Act and the implications of the amendment brought in to the Act, it was held that the amendment would take effect only from 1st June, 2015 and is thus prospective in nature. The aforesaid judgment has become final and is binding upon the authorities. Thus the juri iction to levy late fee under section 234E arises only from 01-06.2015 and not earlier.

As regards the contention on the delay, though the said contention was impressive on first blush, it can be seen that the nature of challenge raised by the petitioner is based upon the lack of juri iction of the respondents to impose late fee. Since in matters where total lack of juri iction is WP(C) NO. 1312 OF 2022 6 alleged, delay cannot be relied upon as a ground to deny the relief, this Court is of the view that the objections of the respondents are without any basis.

Further, this Court had considered an identical issue in W.P.(C)No.1259/2022 and quashed the intimations. Petitioner is also similarly placed.

In view of the above, the demand in Ext.P1 to Ext.P6 intimations for the period from 2012-13 to 2013-14 are bereft of authority and cannot be legally sustainable.

Accordingly, I quash Ext.P1 to Ext.P6 intimations to the extent it demands late fee under section 234E for the period from 2012-13 till 01.06.2015. The writ petition is therefore allowed as above. BECHU KURIAN THOMAS JUDGE AJM