SANJAY KUMAR JAISINGHANI, RAIPUR,RAIPUR vs. ITO, WARD-3(1), RAIPUR, RAIPUR

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ITA 699/RPR/2026Status: DisposedITAT Panaji14 October 2026AY 2019-207 pages
AI SummaryRemanded

What did the Tribunal hold?

The Tribunal held that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC was not justified in dismissing the appeal in limine solely on the ground of delay without adjudicating on the merits. Following the principles laid down in CIT Vs. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF) and Prabal Aadhar Seva Sansthan Vs. ITO, the Tribunal stated that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC has no power to dismiss an appeal in limine on delay only, without referring to and discussing the contents of the assessment order and Form 35. The Tribunal found it appropriate to provide the assessee one final opportunity to represent its case before the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC regarding the condonation of delay under Section 249(3) of the Act. If the delay is condoned, the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC shall then adjudicate the issues on merits as per law, complying with principles of natural justice. The order of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC was set aside. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.

What were the facts?

The assessee, Sanjay Kumar Jaisinghani, proprietor of M/s. Manish Stores, filed an appeal before the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC for Assessment Year 2019-20. The CIT(Appeals)/NFAC dismissed the appeal in limine due to a delay of 47 days, finding that the assessee had not established sufficient cause for the delay as required by Section 249(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The CIT(Appeals)/NFAC noted that the assessee had not even acknowledged the delay, let alone explained it. The assessee's appeal to the ITAT challenges this dismissal. The Revenue, through its Sr. DR, conceded that the matter could be remanded for de novo adjudication.

What were the issues?

1. Whether the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC was justified in dismissing the assessee's appeal in limine on the ground of delay without adjudicating on the merits of the case, as per Section 249(3) and Section 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961? Assessee's Contention: The assessee relies on the judgment of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in CIT Vs. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF) and a co-ordinate bench of the ITAT, Raipur in Prabal Aadhar Seva Sansthan Vs. ITO, arguing that an appellate authority cannot dismiss an appeal in limine solely on grounds of delay or non-prosecution without considering the merits. Revenue's Contention: The Revenue's Sr. DR fairly conceded that the matter may be remanded back to the file of the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC for de novo adjudication as per law after considering the delay aspect in the interest of substantive justice.

Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?

Section 249(3),Section 250(4),Section 250(6),Section 251(1)(a),Section 251(1)(h),Section 251(2)

AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, RAIPUR BENCH “SMC”, RAIPUR

Before: SHRI PARTHA SARATHI CHAUDHURY

For Appellant: Shri Shubham Agrawal, CA
For Respondent: Shri Piyush Tripathi, Sr. DR
Hearing: 13.10.2026Pronounced: 14.10.2026

आदेश / ORDER PER PARTHA SARATHI CHAUDHURY, JM The present appeal preferred by the assessee emanates from the order of the Ld.CIT(Appeals)/NFAC, Delhi dated 31.07.2026 for the assessment year 2019-20 as per the grounds of appeal on record.

2.

At the very outset, it is noted that the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC had dismissed the appeal of the assessee in limine by not condoning the delay of 47 days. That as discernable from the order of the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC, sufficient cause in accordance with Section 249(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short ‘the Act’) has not been established in the case of the assessee and hence, the appeal of the assessee was dismissed as barred by limitation. The relevant observations of the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC are extracted as follows: “5. CONCLUSION 5.1 The position of law on condonation of delay in filing appeal is clear: the appellant must discharge the onus of proving that the appellant has been duly diligent and the delay caused was for sufficient cause. 5.2 In the instant case, however, the appellant has not even acknowledged the apparent delay in filing appeal, much less explaining the reasons behind such delay. Thus, delay of 47 days has not been explained at all. The appellant assessee has neglected/omitted to assert his right of appeal in a timely manner. In absence of any request for condonation of delay, the instant appeal has to be dismissed without adjudication as to the merits of the case.

3 Sanjay Kumar Jaisinghani Vs. ITO, Ward-3(1), Raipur (C.G.) ITA No.699/RPR/2026

6.

In result, the appeal is held to be barred by limitation, and is dismissed in limine on that ground, without going into the merits of the case.”

3.

The Ld. Sr. DR fairly conceded that the matter may be remanded back to the file of the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC for denovo adjudication as per law after considering the delay aspect in interest of substantive justice.

4.

That the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in the case of in the case of CIT Vs. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF) (2017) 297 CTR 614 (Bom) had categorically held that the appellate authority has to adjudicate all the grounds on merits and cannot dismiss the appeal in limine on the ground of delay or for non-prosecution. In the aforementioned case the Hon’ble High Court had observed as under:

"8. From the aforesaid provisions, it is very clear once an appeal is preferred before the CIT(A), then in disposing of the appeal, he is obliged to make such further inquiry that he thinks fit or direct the AO to make further inquiry and report the result of the same to him as found in Sec. 250 of the Act. Further, Sec. 250(6) of the Act obliges the CIT(A) to dispose of an appeal in writing after stating the points for determination and then render a decision on each of the points which arise for consideration with reasons in support. Sec. 251(1)(a) and (h) of the Act provide that while disposing of appeal the CIT(A) would have the power to confirm, reduce, enhance or annul an assessment and/or penalty. Besides Explanation to sub- s. (2) of s. 251 of the Act also makes it clear that while considering the appeal, the CIT(A) would be entitled to consider and decide any issue arising in the proceedings before him in appeal filed for its consideration, even if the issue is not raised by the appellant in its appeal before the CIT(A). Thus once an assessee files an appeal under s. 246A of the Act, it is not open to him as of right to withdraw or not press the appeal. In fact the CIT(A) is obliged to

4 Sanjay Kumar Jaisinghani Vs. ITO, Ward-3(1), Raipur (C.G.) ITA No.699/RPR/2026

dispose of the appeal on merits. In fact w.e.f. 1st June, 2001 the power of the CIT(A) to set aside the order of the AO and restore it to the AO for passing a fresh order stands withdrawn. Therefore, it would be noticed that the powers of the CIT(A) are co-terminus with that of the AO i.e. he can do all that A.O could do. Therefore, just as it is not open to the AO to not complete the assessment by allowing the assessee to withdraw its return of income, it is not open to the assessee in appeal to withdraw and/or the CIT(A) to dismiss the appeal on account of non-prosecution of the appeal by the assessee. This is amply clear from the s. 251(1)(a) and (b) and Explanation to Sec. 251(2) of the Act which requires the CIT(A) to apply his mind to all the issues which arise from the impugned order before him whether or not the same has been raised by the appellant before him. Accordingly, the law does not empower the CIT(A) to dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution as is evident from the provisions of the Act.”

The principle of law as enshrined in the judgment of the Hon’ble 5. High Court of Bombay in the case of CIT Vs. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF) (supra), transcends into the scenario that the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC has no power to dismiss appeal in limine on delay only without referring and discussing the contents available on record before him. Further, I find that similar pronouncement has been provided by ITAT, DB Bench, Raipur in the case of Prabal Aadhar Seva Sansthan Vs. ITO (Exemption), Ward-1, Raipur (C.G.), ITA No. 553/RPR/2025, A.Y.2023-24, dated 13.11.2025 wherein it was held and observed as follows:

“7. Considering the entire facts and circumstances, in the interest of substantive justice, we allow one final opportunity to the assessee to present relevant evidence/documents before the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC explaining the reasons for condonation of delay and after going through those evidences, the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC shall specifically decide whether such delay can be condoned as per Section

5 Sanjay Kumar Jaisinghani Vs. ITO, Ward-3(1), Raipur (C.G.) ITA No.699/RPR/2026

249(3) of the Act and then decide on merits of the case in terms with Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act. Further, as per the dictate of the decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in the case of CIT Vs. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF) (2017) 297 CTR 614 (Bom), the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC had no power to dismiss an appeal in limine on the ground of non-prosecution and the same jurisprudence transcends into the situation that the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC has no power to dismiss an appeal in limine on ground of delay only without referring and discussing the contents of the assessment order and Form 35 and its annexures. Needless to say, the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC shall afford reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee as per law. Accordingly, the order of the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC is set-aside. 8. As per the above terms, grounds of appeal raised by the assessee stands allowed for statistical purposes. 9. In the result, appeal of the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes.”

6.

The fact of the matter is that since the assessee has not provided sufficient reasons in terms with Section 249(3) of the Act the appeal was dismissed in limine on law of limitation itself, therefore, balancing the scales of justice, it would be appropriate to provide one final opportunity to the assessee to represent its case before the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC on the ground of condonation of delay specifically on terms with Section 249(3) of the Act.

7.

Having heard the submissions of the Ld. Sr. DR and upon examination of the facts on the ground of delay and following the aforesaid decisions (supra), even without going into the merits of the matter, I find that the purpose of natural justice shall be served if one opportunity is

6 Sanjay Kumar Jaisinghani Vs. ITO, Ward-3(1), Raipur (C.G.) ITA No.699/RPR/2026

given to the assessee to explain before the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC the reasons for delay and the said authority shall accordingly decide the issue of condonation of delay in terms with Section 249(3) r.w.s. 250(4) & (6) of the Act. That once delay condoned, the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC shall adjudicate issue on merits as per law while complying with the principles of natural justice. I order accordingly.

8.

As per the above terms grounds of appeal of the assessee are allowed for statistical purposes.

9.

In the result, appeal of the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes.

Order pronounced in open court on 14th day of October, 2026.

Sd/- (PARTHA SARATHI CHAUDHURY) �या�यक सद�य/JUDICIAL MEMBER रायपुर / Raipur; �दनांक / Dated : 14th October, 2026. SB, Sr. PS आदेश क� ��त�ल�प अ�े�षत / Copy of the Order forwarded to : अपीलाथ� / The Appellant. 1. ��यथ� / The Respondent. 2. 3. The Pr. CIT-1, Raipur (C.G.) 4. �वभागीय ��त�न�ध, आयकर अपील�य अ�धकरण, “एक-सद�य” ब�च, रायपुर / DR, ITAT, “SMC” Bench, Raipur. गाड� फ़ाइल / Guard File. 5.

7 Sanjay Kumar Jaisinghani Vs. ITO, Ward-3(1), Raipur (C.G.) ITA No.699/RPR/2026

आदेशानुसार / BY ORDER, SAMIRA Digitally signed by SAMIRAN BERA // True Copy // N BERA Date: 2026.10.14 15:09:16 +05'30' Senior Private Secretary आयकर अपील�य अ�धकरण, रायपुर / ITAT, Raipur

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