HUAWEI TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDIA COMPANY PRIVATE LIMITED vs. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CENTRAL CIRCLE 2
What did the High Court hold?
The Delhi High Court held that the assessment proceedings for AY 2013-14 are time-barred. The Court relied on the Full Bench decision in CIT vs. M/s. Anju Garg, which clarified the interpretation of Section 260A(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court held that the word 'received' in Section 260A(2)(a) means received by any of the named officers of the Department, including the CIT (Judicial), and there is no warrant to read the word 'concerned' as a prefix. Therefore, the limitation period for filing an appeal begins to run from the date the ITAT order is received by any designated officer, irrespective of whether they are the 'concerned' officer. Since no order has been passed by the TPO or AO pursuant to the remand by the ITAT within the time stipulated under Section 153 of the Act, the petitioner's return is required to be considered as accepted. The petition was allowed.
What were the facts?
The petitioner, Huawei Telecommunications India Company Private Limited, filed its return of income for Assessment Year (AY) 2013-14 on November 29, 2013, declaring a loss. A revised return was filed on March 30, 2015. The assessment proceedings led to an order dated October 3, 2017, with additions including transfer pricing adjustments, disallowance for employee PF contribution, advertisement expenses, customer claims, and advances written off. The petitioner appealed to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT). The ITAT, by order dated February 24, 2021, remanded the transfer pricing issue to the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) for fresh determination, deleted disallowances for advertisement expenses, and deleted disallowances for customer claims and advances written off, subject to verification. The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking a declaration that assessment proceedings for AY 2013-14 are time-barred.
What were the issues?
1. Whether the assessment proceedings for AY 2013-14 have become time-barred, and the petitioner's return is liable to be accepted? (Question of law and fact, turning on Section 153 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the interpretation of 'received' in Section 260A(2)(a)). Assessee's Contention: The petitioner argued that no order has been passed pursuant to the remand by the ITAT within the stipulated time under Section 153 of the Act, rendering the assessment proceedings time-barred. They relied on the Delhi High Court's decision in CIT vs. M/s. Anju Garg (2023 SCC OnLine Del 7058) and other High Court judgments regarding the interpretation of 'received' in Section 260A(2)(a) of the Act. Revenue's Contention: The revenue contended that the period of limitation for filing an appeal under Section 260A(2)(a) begins to run from the date the ITAT order is received by the 'concerned' Commissioner, not just any officer. They argued that the ITAT order dated February 24, 2021, was received by the CIT (Judicial) on March 1, 2021, and the appeal was filed within the extended period of 120 days from the date of receipt by the concerned CIT.
Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?
Section 153,Section 260A(2)(a),Section 36(1)(va),Section 37,Section 40(a)(ia),Section 143(2)
AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below
Heard together (2 matters)
Read from the judgment's own cause title. This page is filed under one of them.
Cause title — parties, addresses and appearances
months to give effect to the order: Provided further that where an order under section 250 or W.P.(C) 7814/2024 section 254 or section 260 or section 262 or section 263 or section 264 requires verification of any issue by way of submission of any document by the assessee or any other person or where an opportunity of being heard is to be provided to the assessee, the order giving effect to the said order under section 250 or section 254 or section 260 or section 262 or section 263 or section 264 shall be made within the time specified in sub-section (3).”
Undisputedly, the learned ITAT had pronounced the order in open court on 24.02.2021 as is expressly stated in the said order. The order also indicates that the Revenue was duly represented by the departmental representative (Sh. Surender Pal, CIT). Thus, the timeline for passing an order under Section 153(5) of the Act commenced from 24.02.2021. 14. There is no controversy regarding the date on which the said order was received.
In Commissioner of Income-tax-7 v. Odeon Builders (P.) Ltd.: Neutral Citation No. 2017:DHC:1720-DB, a Full Bench of this court considered the question as to when the period of limitation to file an appeal under Section 260A of the Act against an order passed by the learned ITAT would commence. This Court had also taken note of the decision in the case of CIT v. Sudhir Choudhrie: (2005) 278 ITR 490. In that case this court had directed the learned ITAT to pronounce judgment and orders “in open hearing and upon enlisting them for a given date”.
After the decision of this court in CIT v. Sudhir Choudhrie (supra), Rule 34 of the Income Tax Appellate Rules, 1963 were amended to read as under: “Order to be pronounced, signed and dated W.P.(C) 7814/2024 34. (1) The order of the Bench shall be in writing and shall be signed and dated by the Members constituting it. (2) The Members constituting the Bench or, in the event of their absence by retirement or otherwise, the Vice-President, Senior Vice-President or the President may mark an order as fit for publication. (3) Where a case is referred under sub-section (4) of section 255, the order of the Member or Members to whom it is referred shall be signed and dated by him or them, as the case may be. (4) The Bench shall pronounce its orders in the Court. (5) The pronouncement may be in any of the following manners :— (a) The Bench may pronounce the order immediately upon the conclusion of the hearing. (b) In case where the order is not pronounced immediately on the conclusion of the hearing, the Bench shall give a date for pronouncement. (c) In a case where no date of pronouncement is given by the Bench, every endeavour shall be made by the Bench to pronounce the order within 60 days from the date on which the hearing of the case was concluded but, where it is not practicable so to do on the ground of exceptional and extraordinary circumstances of the case, the Bench shall fix a future day for pronouncement of the order, and such date shall not ordinarily be a day beyond a further period of 30 days and due notice of the day so fixed shall be given on the notice board. (6) The order of the Bench shall ordinarily be pronounced by the Members who heard the appeal. However, if the said Members or any of them is or are not available for W.P.(C) 7814/2024 pronouncement for any reason, then the order will be pronounced by such Member or Members as may be nominated by the President, Senior Vice- President, Vice-President, or Senior Member, as the case may be. (7) In the case where the order is ready in every respect and can be made available to the parties, the Bench may advance the date of pronouncement and put this information on the notice board and the order shall be pronounced accordingly. (8) In a case where the order cannot be pronounced on the date given, the date of pronouncement may be deferred, subject to sub- rule (5)(c) above, to a further date and information thereof shall be given on the notice board.”
In Commissioner of Income-tax-7 v. Odeon Builders (P.) Ltd. (supra), a Full Bench of this court had noted the directions issued by the court in CIT v. Sudhir Choudhrie (supra) as well as the amendment to Rule 34 of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963 (hereafter the ITAT Rules) made following the said judgment and had observed as under:
“40. The context in which the interpretive exercise is to be undertaken is that of the statute of limitation. Usually, the commencement of limitation is that point when there is ‘knowledge’ of an order or judgment. In the context of Section 260A(2)(a), the question that should be asked is: “when was the Department/Revenue aware of the order” and not “when was that particular CIT or Pr CIT having jurisdiction have knowledge of the order”. Once a responsible officer or representative of the Department such as its DR or the CIT (Judicial) is aware of the order, then from that point it is a purely internal administrative arrangement as to how the said officer obtains and further communicates the order to the officer who has to take a decision on filing the appeal. Of course, the time taken to obtain a copy of the order by such DR W.P.(C) 7814/2024 or CIT (Judicial) would be excluded. However, the period of limitation will not cease to run only because the ‘concerned’ officer has not yet received the order.
The counsel for the Revenue point out that the requirement that the ITAT should pronounce orders was not a statutory one but was brought about by a decision of this Court. Whilst this is correct, Rule 34 of the ITAT Rules equally provides the statutory underpinning of this principle. The fact that the jurisdictional CIT was not present at the time of pronouncement of the order of the ITAT will make no difference. The first officer of the Department who receives the certified copy should be taken to have “received” it on behalf of all the officers of the Department. How such officer who first receives the copy ensures that it reaches the particular officer who has to take a decision on filing an appeal is for the Department to figure out. That internal issue of the Department cannot possibly extend the time for filing of the appeal beyond 120 days as provided under Section 260A (2) (a) of the Act.
***
***
***
Viewed differently, the contextual interpretation of the expression ‘receive’ would be when the parties notified of the pronouncement are represented at that time in the open court. When pronounced, both parties are said to receive it. The agency which they choose for transmission to the official or executive component to authorise an appeal is not the concern of the judicial system.
Another context would be the absence of arbitrariness and discrimination in the manner of treatment of the parties to the litigation. Section 260 A (2) (a) applies to both, the Assessee W.P.(C) 7814/2024 as well as the Revenue. When it is the Assessee who is aggrieved, limitation for filing the appeal will begin to run once the Assessee through its AR receives a copy of the order of the ITAT. Where the AR is present at the pronouncement, or even when such AR chooses not to remain present for pronouncement, the Assessee should be taken to be aware of the order from that moment. From then on, barring the time taken by such AR to obtain a copy of the order, the limitation for filing an appeal would begin to run. Assuming that the Assessee is a large company, and a decision as to filing an appeal can only be taken by, say, its Managing Director (MD), an argument that the limitation does not begin till the order has reached the desk of the MD of that company will not be countenanced. Therefore, what applies to an Assessee should equally apply to the Revenue particularly since the legislature has not couched the language in a manner that brings out any difference in the treatment of both the parties to the appeal.”
We also consider it relevant to set out the relevant extract of the said decision of the Full Bench of this Court in regard to the first two questions that were referred for consideration. The same are set out below: “Q: (i) What is the correct interpretation to be placed on the expression “received by the Assessee or the Principal Chief Commissioner or the Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner” in Section 260A (2) (a) of the Act? Does it mean 'received' by any of the named officers including the CIT (Judicial)?
Ans: The word ‘received’ occurring in Section 260A (2) (a) would mean received by any of the named officers of the Department, including CIT (Judicial). The provision at present names four particular officers i.e. the Principal Commissioner, Commissioner, Principal Chief Commissioner, and the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax. These are the only designations W.P.(C) 7814/2024 of the officers who could receive a copy of the order. In the absence of a qualifying prefix “concerned”, the receipt of a copy of the order of the ITAT by any of those officers in the Department including the CIT (Judicial) will trigger the period of limitation.
Q: (ii) Does limitation begin to run for the purposes of Section 260A (2) (a) only when a certified copy of the order of the ITAT is received by the ‘concerned’ CIT within whose jurisdiction the case of the Assessee falls notwithstanding that it may have been received by any other CIT, including the CIT (Judicial) prior thereto? Is it open to the Court to read the word ‘concerned’ into Section 260 A (2) (a) of the Act as a prefix to any of the officers of the Department named therein?
Ans: In Section 260A (2) of the Act, the words CIT, Pr CIT or Chief CIT are not prefixed or qualified by the word ‘concerned’. There is no warrant for the Court to read into the provision such a qualifying word. The Court rejects the contention of the Revenue that limitation for the purposes of Section 260A (2) (a) begins to run only when a certified copy of the order of the ITAT is received by the 'concerned' CIT within whose jurisdiction the case of the Assessee falls notwithstanding that it may have been received by any other CIT, including the CIT (Judicial) prior thereto.”
In view of the above settled position, there can be no dispute regarding the date of receipt of the order passed by the learned ITAT. Concededly, further proceedings by the TPO or by the AO pursuant to the remand by the learned ITAT are now barred as the time stipulated for passing an order under Section 153 of the Act has since expired. Consequently, the petitioner’s return is required to be considered as accepted. W.P.(C) 7814/2024 20. The petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms. The pending application is also disposed of.
VIBHU BAKHRU, J
SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J NOVEMBER 28, 2024 RK
Click here to check corrigendum, if any
More judgments on Section 153
- Cornerstone Ondemand International Limited… vs Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax…ITA 2128/MUM/2025[2022-23]Status: Disposed16 Oct 2026AY 2022-23
- Cornerstone Ondemand International Limited… vs Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax…ITA 4558/MUM/2023[2021-22]Status: Disposed16 Oct 2026AY 2021-22
- Cornerstone Ondemand International Limited… vs Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax…ITA 3228/MUM/2023[2020-21]Status: Disposed16 Oct 2026AY 2020-21
- Zabuben Mepabhai Bharvad, Ahmedabad vs The PCIT - 1, AhmedabadITA 1233/AHD/2026[2018-19]Status: Disposed8 Oct 2026AY 2018-19
- Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment… vs The Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax…ITA 3453/MUM/2026[2022-23]Status: Disposed8 Oct 2026AY 2022-23
Recent GST High Court judgments
Search GST case law →- M/S Utkal Suppliers,Ganjam vs. Assistant Commissioner Of CT And GST, Ganjam-I Circle,GanjamOrissa · 28 Oct 2026
- M/S Kotdwar Steel Limited vs. Office Of Hte Deputy CommissionerUttarakhand · 28 Oct 2026
- M/S Kotdwar Steel Limited vs. Office Of The Deputy CommissionerUttarakhand · 28 Oct 2026
- M/S Kotdwar Steel Limited vs. Office Of The Deputy CommissionerUttarakhand · 28 Oct 2026
- M/S Govindjee Dairy Milk Private Limited vs. Central Goods And Services TaxRajasthan · 27 Oct 2026
