DEEPA GOENKA vs. INCOME TAX OFFICE WARD -1, CHURU

Order 16/03/2022 Issue notice to the respondents. Shri G.S. Chouhan, appears for the respondent on behalf of Shri K.K. Bissa. It is stated that the controversy involved in this writ petition is squarely covered by the ratio of judgment rendered by a Coordinate Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sudesh Taneja vs. Income Tax Officer & Ors. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.969/2022) decided on 27.01.2022, wherein while quashing the impugned notices of re-assessment, this Court observed as under:- “37. In this context we have perused the provisions of reassessment contained in the Finance Act, 2021. We (Uploaded on 16/03/2022 at 03:57:29 PM) (Downloaded on 28/10/2026 at 12:05:52 AM) (2 of 6) [CW-3614/2022] have noticed earlier the major departure that the new scheme of reassessment has made under these provisions. The time limits for issuing notice for reassessment have been changed. The concept of income chargeable to tax escaping assessment on account of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly or fully all material facts is no longer relevant. Elaborate provisions are made under Section 148A of the Act enabling the Assessing Officer to make enquiry with respect to material suggesting that income has escaped assessment, issuance of notice to the assessee calling upon why notice under Section 148 should not be issued and passing an order considering the material available on record including response of the assessee if made while deciding whether the case is fit for issuing notice under Section 148. There is absolutely no indication in all these provisions which would suggest that the legislature intended that the new scheme of reopening of assessments would be applicable only to the period post 01.04.2021. In absence of any such indication all notices which were issued after 01.04.2021 had to be in accordance with such provisions. To reiterate, we find no indication whatsoever in the scheme of statutory provisions suggesting that the past provisions would continue to apply even after the substitution for the assessment periods prior to substitution. In fact there are strong indications to the contrary. We may recall, that time limits for issuing notice under Section 148 of the Act have been modified under substituted Section 149. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 149 reduces such period to three years instead of originally prevailing four years under normal circumstances. Clause (b) extends the upper limit of six years previously prevailing to ten years in cases where income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment amounts to or is likely to amount to 50 lacs or more. Sub-section (1) of Section 149 thus contracts as well as expands the time limit for issuing notice under Section 148 depending on the question whether the case falls under clause (a) or clause (b). In this context the first proviso to Section 149(1) provides that no notice under Section 148 shall be issued at any time in a case for the relevant assessment year beginning on or before 01.04.2021 if such notice could not have been issued at that time on account of being beyond the time limit specified under the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 149

as they

stood

immediately

before

the commencement of the Finance Act, 2021. As per this proviso thus no notice under Section 148 would be issued for the past assessment years by resorting to the larger period of limitation prescribed in newly substituted clause (b) of Section 149(1). This would indicate that the notice that would be issued after 01.04.2021 would be in terms of the substituted Section 149(1) but without breaching the upper time limit provided in the original (Uploaded on 16/03/2022 at 03:57:29 PM) (Downloaded on 28/10/2026 at 12:05:52 AM) (3 of 6) [CW-3614/2022] Section 149(1) which stood substituted. This aspect has also been highlighted in the memorandum explaining the proposed provisions in the Finance Bill. If according to the revenue for past period provisions of section 149 before amendment were applicable, this first proviso to section 149(1) was wholly unnecessary. Looked from both angles, namely, no indication of surviving the past provisions after the substitution and in fact an active indication to the contrary, inescapable conclusion that we must arrive at is that for any action of issuance of notice under Section 148 after 01.04.2021 the newly introduced provisions under the Finance Act, 2021 would apply. Mere extension of time limits for issuing notice under section 148 would not change this position that obtains in law. Under no circumstances the extended period available in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 149 which we may recall now stands at 10 years instead of 6 years previously available with the revenue, can be pressed in service for reopening assessments for the past period. This flows from the plain meaning of the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 149. In plain terms a notice which had become time barred prior to 01.04.2021 as per the then prevailing provisions, would not be revived by virtue of the application of Section 149(1)(b) effective from 01.04.2021. All the notices issued in the present cases are after 01.04.2021 and have been issued without following the procedure contained in Section 148A of the Act and are therefore invalid.

and socio-economic

problems (including income disparities in our economy) the power of Delegation has become a constituent element of legislative power as a whole. However, as held in the case of Indian Express Newspaper v. Union of India reported in (1985) 1 SCC 641 at page 689, subordinate legislation does not carry the same degree of immunity which is enjoyed by a statute passed by a competent

Legislature.

Subordinate legislation may be questioned on any of the grounds

on which plenary

legislation

is questioned. In addition, it may also be questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the statute under which it is made. It may further be questioned on the ground that it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act or that it is contrary to some other statute applicable

on the same

subject

matter. Therefore, it has to yield to plenary legislation. It can also be questioned on the ground that it is manifestly arbitrary and unjust. That, any inquiry into its vires must be confined to the grounds on which plenary legislation may be questioned, to the grounds that it is contrary to the statute under which it is made, to the grounds that it is contrary to other statutory provisions or on the ground that it is so patently arbitrary that it cannot be said to be inconformity with the statute. It can also be challenged on the ground that it violates Article 14 of the Constitution.”

of the statutory

provision

and its interpretation is clear, by adopting a position different in an explanation and describing it to be clarificatory, the subordinate legislature cannot be permitted to amend the provisions of the parent Act. Accordingly, these explanations are unconstitutional and declared as invalid.

and Amendment

of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 and time for issuance of notice under Section 148, the end date was initially extended uptill on 30th day of April 2021 and subsequently again by notification dated 27th April, 2021 the time limit of 30th day of April 2021 was further extended up till 30th day (Uploaded on 16/03/2022 at 03:57:29 PM) (Downloaded on 28/10/2026 at 12:05:52 AM) (6 of 6) [CW-3614/2022] of June, 2021. By effect of such notification, the individual identity of Section 148, which was prevailing prior to amendment and insertion of section 148A was insulated and saved uptill 30.06.2021.” With respect,

we

are unable

to persuade ourselves to accept this analysis of the situation. In our understanding by virtue of notifications dated 31.03.2021

and 01.04.2021

issued

by CBDT substitution of reassessment provisions framed under the Finance Act, 2021 were not deferred nor could they have been deferred. The date of such amendments coming into effect remained 01.04.2021. 42. In the result we find that the notices impugned in the respective petitions are invalid and bad in law. The same are quashed and set aside. The learned Single Judge committed no error in quashing these notices. All the writ petitions are allowed. Appeals of the revenue are dismissed. Pending applications if any stand disposed of.” In view of the Sudesh Taneja’s judgment (supra), the impugned notice/s are invalid and bad in law and hence, the same are quashed and set aside. The writ petition is allowed. Stay application is disposed of. (VINOD KUMAR BHARWANI),J (SANDEEP MEHTA),J 49-Sudhir Asopa/- Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org) (Uploaded on 16/03/2022 at 03:57:29 PM) (Downloaded on 28/10/2026 at 12:05:52 AM)