RAMA NAGAPPA SHETTY vs. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS

This Court (Coram : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Akil Kureshi and Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.N.Karia) passed the following order on 4th October, 2018 :

In   view   of   the   aforesaid   order,   this   appeal   was   heard finally. This appeal is filed by the original noticee of the show   cause   notice   challenging   the   judgment   and   order dated 31st October, 2016  passed by the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad (“CESTAT” for short) raising the following substantial questions  of law: “[a] Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Hon'ble Appellate CESTAT was correct in upholding the penalty imposed on appreciation of the incorrect facts that the Appellate was a Promoter­cum­whole time evidences on record   before   the   Appellate   CESTAT   proved   that   the Appellant was a non­executive Chairman of the Company even though the facts and evidences on record before the Appellate CESTAT proved that the Appellate was a non­ executive Chairman of the Company and used to rarely visit the Company and used to participate very rarely in the Board's meetings? [b] Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Hon'ble Appellate CESTAT is correct in upholding the penalty imposed on the Appellant under Section 112(a) of the customs Act, 1962 especially when the Appellant was the non­executive Chairman of the Company and used to visit   rarely   to   the   Company   as   well   as   to   the   Board's meetings? [c] Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Hon'ble Appellate CESTAT was right in rejecting the ROM application on the ground that consideration of facts and   evidences   on   record   would   result   in   review   of   the order? [d] Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the   Hon'ble   CESTAT   was   right   in   rejecting   the   ROM application without considering the various case laws cited by the Appellant during the course of arguments which already holds that non­consideration of certain facts and grounds can be considered in ROM application? [e] Any other question of law which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the the facts and circumstances of the case?”

Brief facts of the case arising in this appeal are as under : 3.1)  The appellant was a Non­Executive Chairman of one M/s. Sheshanka Sea Foods (P) Ltd.(here­in­after referred to as “the company”). According to the appellant, he used to visit   the   company   and   used   to   preside   over   the   Board meetings very rarely and one Shri V.V. Kamath, Executive Director of the company was the overall in­charge of all the affairs of the company along with whole time Director Shri Srinivasa R. Naik. 3.2)  The company imported 666.750 mt of HDPE granules under   the   separate   bills   of   entry   filed   in   the   month   of March   1990   under   the   DEEC   scheme   at   Kandla   port claiming   the   benefit   of   exemption   notification   without payment   of   duty   on   the   ground   to   be   utilised   for manufacturing and exporting such goods. According to the appellant, he had no knowledge of the order being placed for supply of the goods as the same was never brought before the Board meeting at all or to his knowledge by any of the directors. 3.3)   Custom Investigation  wing however, found that in breach   of   conditions   of   DEEC   scheme,   the   goods   were diverted to the local market and in fact the goods never reached the factory of The company situated at Karnataka. The show cause notice dated 31st  July 1998 was issued alleging that the appellant along with other directors of the company had jointly diverted the goods in the local market which were meant for re­export.  The competent authority therefore, prima­facie, found the following breaches of the notification: “Therefore, from the above facts and narration it appears that   M/s   SSFPL   has   violated   the   following   conditions   of Notfn. No.140/87 dtd.27.3.97 (parawise) : (i) Para (1)(d) by not bringing the goods imported directly into the factory. (ii) Para (1)(e) by not exporting the products produced out of the imported material. (iii)   Para   (1)(f)   by   not   using   the   imported   goods   for   the specific purpose for which the same was imported i.e. for manufacturing packing materials. (iv) Para (1)(g) by disposing off the imported goods which was not allowed under this notification.” 3.4) On the basis of above breached stated   in the show cause notice, the company and its directors including the present appellant were called upon to show cause as to why:­ “(1)   the   imported   goods   i.e.   HDPE   granules   /   Moulding powder   weighing   666.75   Mts   and   valued   at Rs.71,86,128/should   not   be   confiscated   under   section 111(d) & 111(o) of Customs Act, 1962. (2)   customs   duty   amounting   to   Rs.89,61,999.00   (BCD Rs.20,01,750.35;   Addl.   Rs.32,33,757.75   and   CVD Rs.37,28,490.90) payable on the goods imported should not be demanded under the proviso   to   section   28(1)   of   the   Customs   Act,   1962   and interest payable @ 20% per annum under section 28 AB of Customs Act, 1962. (3)   penalty   under   section   112(a)   and   (b)   and   114(iii)   of Customs Act, 1962 should not be imposed on them. S/Shri R.N.Shetty and V.V.Kamnath are also hereby called upon to show cause as to why penalty under section 112(a) (iii) of Customs Act, 1962 should not be imposed upon them for   suppression   of   facts,   wilful   wrong   statement   and fabricating the statutory documents.” 3.5)   The   adjudicating   authority   passed   the   Order   in Original dated 28th November, 2000 after completion of the hearing   of   the   show   cause   proceedings.   The   appellant

Learned advocate Mr. Raghavendra Hanjer   with learned advocate   Mr.   Bhash   H.   Mankad   for   the   appellant submitted that in the statement dated 20th  June, 1997 it was categorically deposed that the appellant was only Non­ Executive Chairman having no authority to conduct any business/take decision in the Board meeting and that he was not aware of the records maintained by the company and that at no point of time proposal to import granules was brought before the Board meeting or to his personal knowledge by other directors. It was also pointed out form the said statement of the appellant that Shri V.V. Kamat and Shri Srinivasa Naik were in charge of the affairs of the company   and   they   did   not   handover   the   record   of   the company   and   criminal   complaint   also   has   been   lodged against   them   before   the   jurisdictional   Court.   It   was therefore, submitted that in view of such statement of the appellant   as   well   as   the   statements   of   other   persons recorded by the Customs authority under section 108 of the   Customs   Act,   the   appellant   could   not   have   been saddled   with   the   penalty   of   Rs.   20   Lakhs   being   the chairman of the company.

Learned advocate for the appellant further submitted that the appellant filed a detailed replies on 10th October, 1998 and  on 20th October, 1999 pointing out various facts with regard   to   the   alleged   offence   to   demonstrate   that   the appellant   had   no   knowledge   about   the   transaction   of import   but   the   same   were   not   considered   by   the adjudicating authority of by the CESTAT.

Learned advocate for the appellant also pointed out that the   request   of   the   appellant   for   cross   examination   was rejected   by   the   Commissioner   in   the   second   round   of hearing. It was pointed out that the appellant being a Non­ Executive   Chairman,   no   penalty   ought   to   have   been imposed on him in absence of any specific allegation and evidence against the appellant. It was submitted that since the witnesses were not allowed to be cross examined, the statements involving the appellant had to be ignored and could   not   have   been   relied   upon   by   the   adjudicating authority.   Learned   advocate   for   the   appellant   further submitted   that   the   CESTAT   has   passed   the   impugned order   on  incorrect   appreciation  of  the  facts  which  were neither part of the appeal nor urged by the respondent department   and   the   impugned   order   is   passed   without appreciating the facts and evidence to the effect that the appellant was a Non­ Executive Chairman and was never part   of   the   transaction   and   ground   on   which   penalty imposed is upheld by the CESTAT that the appellant was a promoter   cum   whole   time   chairman   of   the   company   is contrary to the facts and evidence on record. It was further pointed out that late Shri Ramakanth Naik who was father of Shri Srinivasa Naik was the founder and the Managing Director   of   the   company.   Learned   advocate   for   the appellant further submitted that in the synopsis of written submissions   submitted   by   the   appellant   before   the CESTAT, the appellant had contended that not only the statements of Shri V.V. Kamath, Shri Srinivasa Naik and Shri Y.D. Gavadi were recorded but statements of other persons   of   the   company   i.e.   Shri   Sumati   U.   Naik,   Shri Sitaram Hegde, Shri V. Ranganath, Shri Kamal Mehta and Shri R.N. Naik were also recorded and none of them have implicated   the   appellant   for   the   alleged   offence.   It   was pointed   out   that   the   CESTAT   did   not   consider   such submissions  as there is no finding or discussion about such vital facts in the impugned order. It was therefore, submitted   that   the   impugned   order   is   a   non   speaking order. Learned advocate for the appellant also pointed out that   in   the   statement   date   14th  June,   1991   of   Shri Srinivasa R.Naik who was the whole time director of the company, he   clearly stated that Shri Vijay Kamath was overall in­charge of the factory and there was no mention of the appellant having any knowledge of the alleged import of the goods and its alleged diversion without bringing the same to   the factory. Learned advocate for the appellant pointed out that there are contradictory statements of Shri Srinivasa  R. Naik  inasmuch  as in  statement  dated  14th July, 1997, it was stated by him that import matter was looked after by Shri V.V. Kamath under direct supervision of the appellant and therefore, the statement given after six years from the first statement could not have been relied upon by the authority as such statement was given only with an intention to take revenge against the appellant for filing a criminal case.

It was submitted that the CESTAT failed to consider that no tangible and corroborative evidence was collected by the investigating authority to reject the request of the appellant for cross examination of the witnesses.

Learned advocate for the appellant submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, no penalty could have been imposed under section 112(a) of the Customs Act as the ingredients required to invoke the said provisions are not   present   inasmuch   as   the   CESTAT   confirmed   the penalty   only   on   the   ground   that   the   appellant   was   a promoter and whole time director of the company which is not true and correct. It was submitted that the CESTAT was duty bound to correct the mistake in its order where an issue has been argued and/or statement made the on issue which was not recorded and/or considered in the order. It was further submitted that import was without approval   of   the   appellant   and   he   was   not   involved   in evasion of the duty.

Learned   advocate   for   the   appellant   in   support   of   his submissions relied upon the follwing decisions : i)   HIM Logistics Pvt. Ltd v. Principal Commissioner of Customs reported in 2016(336) ELT 15 (Del). ii)  Swadeshi Polytex Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Meerut reported in 2000 (122) ELT 641 (SC). iii)  Basudev Gard v. Commissioner of Customs reported in 2013 (294) ELT 353 (Del). iv)   Lakshman Exports Limited v. Collector of Central Excise reported in 2002(143) ELT 21 (SC). v)   Mulchand M. Zaveri v. Union of India  reported in 2017 (52) STR 92 (Guj). vi)    Commissioner   of   Central   Excise   v.   Kurele   pan Products Pvt. Ltd reported in 2017 (52) STR 218 (All). vii) Sushil   Kumar   Kanodia   v.   Commissioner   of Customs, Chennai  reported in 2007 (218) ELT 453 (Tri­ Chennai). viii)    Prasanta   Sarkar   v.   Commissioner   of   Customs (Prev.)   Mumbai  reported   in   2007   (209)   ELT   220   (Tri­ Mumbai). ix)   Jagannath Premnath v. Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai reported in 2006 (198) ELT 104 (Tri­Delhi). x) Superintendent   of   Customs   v.   Bhanabhai Khalapabhai Patel and another reported in AIR 1992 SC 1583. xi) Pradeep   Kumar   v.   Commissioner   of   Customs­ LAWS(CE) 1999 12 119. xii) Mohteshan   Mohd.   Ismail   v.   Spl.   Director, Enforcement Directorate and another reported in (2007) 8 SCC 254. xiii)   Haricharan Kurmi; Jogia Hajam v. State of Bihar ­LAWS(SC) 1964 2 6. xiv)  Surinder   Kumar   Khanna   v.   Intelligence   Officer Directorate   of   Revenue   Intelligence  SLP   (Criminal) No.9816/2017. 10. On the other hand, learned Senior Standing Counsel Mr. Mitesh Amin assisted by learned Standing Counsel Ms. Maithili Mehta submitted that the adjudicating authority as well as the CESTAT after considering the materials on record have arrived at findings of fact that the appellant was   a   whole   time   chairman   of   the   company   and   was authorised signatory looking after all the operations of the company and its bank accounts and the policy matters were approved by him. Mr. Amin would submit that the import of HDPE granules involved transaction of import of huge   amount   without   payment   of   duty   resulting   into breach of exemption notification and DEEC scheme. 11.Mr. Amin referred to the statement of Shri Vijay Venkatrao Kamath that he was acting entirely under the instructions of the appellant. Mr. Amin relied upon the order passed by the   coordinate   Bench   of   this   Court   in   Tax   Appeal   No. 653/2017 in case of Shri Vijay Venkatrao Kamat whereby the appeal filed by Shri Kamat for imposition of penalty of Rs. 10 lakhs by the adjudicating authority was dismissed. It was pointed out that in the said order, this Court has referred   to   the   statement   dated   3rd  July,   1997   of   Shri Kamat   wherein   he   had   admitted   that   application   for advance license for import of goods was submitted to the licensing authority with the knowledge of the appellant and he reported directly to the appellant being the chairman of the company. Learned advocate Mr. Amin also relied upon the decision of this Court (Coram :   Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rajesh Shukla) in case of  Amad Noormamad Bakali v. (The) State of Gujarat and others reported in 2011 (12) GLH 31 to submit that the statement under section 108 of the   Customs   Act   recorded   by   the   Customs   Officer   is admissible in evidence as it would  be hit by the provisions of sections 30 and 34 of the Evidence Act. It was therefore, submitted that statements of Mr. Kamat and Mr. Srinivasa Naik   recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act by the   Customs   authority     cannot   be   treated   as   the statements   of   the   co   accused   persons   but   the   such statements are admissible in the evidence and therefore, the penalty levied on the basis of such statements cannot be interfered with.

Having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record, it would be fruitful to refer to the findings arrived at by the adjudicating authority which were later on confirmed by the   CESTAT   by   the   impugned   order.   The   adjudicating authority has arrived at the following findings :

The CESTAT after considering the materials on the record as well as written statements and synopsis filed by the appellant held as under :

While   dismissing   the   appeal   filed   by   Mr.   Kamat arising out of common order passed by the CESTAT, this Court in Tax Appeal No. 653/2017 has held as under :

It is also required to be mentioned that it has been further observed as under : “it   is   not   every   threat,   inducement   or   promise   even emanating   from   the   person   in   authority   that   is   hit   by Section­24 of the Evidence Act. In order to attract the bar, it has to be such an inducement, threat or promise, which should lead the accused to suppose that "by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him.”

Further, it has also been observed as under: “The collection of evidence under Section 108 and other relevant provisions relating to search and seizure are only for the purpose of taking further steps for confiscation of contraband   and   imposition   of   penalty.   The   self   same evidence is admissible in. evidence on the complaint laid by the Customs Officer for prosecution under Section 135 or other relevant statutes.”

Therefore, in light of this clear discussion with regard to   the   admissibility   of   the   statements   recorded   under Section 108 of the Customs Act and also contention raised with   regard   to   the   coercion   or   threat   have   also   been considered and have not been accepted. It is required to be mentioned as observed that it is the duty of the accused prima­facie to establish by evidence that such statement was recorded under such compulsion or coercion or threat then burden would shift on the prosecution to discharge that it was recorded voluntarily. In the facts of the present case, it could be seen that the accused had moved earlier Criminal Misc. Application Nos.1340, 1347 & 1348 of 1985 and as per the order dated 19.09.1985 passed therein, it has   been   clearly   recorded   that   the   appellant   had undertaken to accept summons under Section 108 of the Customs   Act   and   had   agreed   to   remain   present   for recording   such   statement.   Therefore,   such   applications were made under Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, wherein the orders have been passed recording some statements on behalf of the accused and, thereafter, when such statements are recorded, the submission with regard to coercion or threat cannot be readily accepted. Further, as rightly submitted by the learned Counsel, Ms.Yagnik, no evidence  has been brought  on  record  on this  aspect  to primarily establish that it was not made voluntarily. Even the   statements   under   Section   313   of   the   Criminal Procedure Code does not refer to this aspect, in Which, it was open for the accused persons to say or state before the Court. Therefore, such contention which has been raised at belated stage by way of defence cannot be readily accepted.

In the aforesaid judgment of the Honble Apex Court reported in (1997) 3 SCC 721, similar contention raised by the learned Counsel relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court   reported   in  AIR   1970   SC   940  also   have   been considered. While considering this aspect, it is required to be considered that in a judgment reported in (2002) 1 SCC 155  while   considering   admissibility   of   the   confessional statement recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act vis­a­vis   other   procedure,   the   Hon'ble   Apex   Court   has quoted earlier judgment of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1968   SC   832   in   case   of   Abdulla   v.   State   of Maharashtra and made following observations : “These   statements   are   not   confessions   recorded   by   a Magistrate   under   Section   164   of   the   Code   of   Criminal Procedure but are statements made in answer to a notice under Section 171A of the Sea Customs Act. As they are not   made   subject   to   the   safeguards   under   which confessions   are   recorded   by   Magistrates   they   must   be specially scrutinised to finding out if they were made under threat or promise from someone in authority. If after such scrutiny they are considered to be voluntary, they may be received   against   the   maker   and   in   the   same   way   as confessions are received, also against a co­accused jointly tried with him.”

It has also been discussed that since such statement given before the Competent Officer under the statute like Customs Act, is not a statement of the accused, a person, who gives such statement, does not give the character of the   accused.   In   a   judgment   of   the   Hon'ble   Apex   Court reported   in    AIR   1970   SC   940,  this   aspect   has   been considered   and   same   contention   has   been   squarely answered in a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Rajesh Bajaj v.State NCT of Delhi and Ors. reported in  (1999) 3 SCC 259,  wherein it has been observed as under:­

Therefore,   as   such   statements   recorded   before   the authority under the special statute like Customs Act are not   a   statements   of   the   accused   and,   therefore,   the submissions   made   by   the   learned   Counsel   that   the statements of the co­accused would not be admissible also is misconceived.

Further,   as   discussed   hereinabove   referring   to   the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (1997) 3 SCC 721 wherein the purpose and object is also reflected and the purpose as indicated is that while making such inquiry   for   the   purpose   of   collecting   evidence   and   in furtherance thereof when the seizure has been made of the contrabands goods, the entire evidence would be a relevant for considering the guilt of the accused persons. Therefore in the facts of the case, on the basis of such statements of the accused recorded revealing the details with regard to the transaction which have taken place leading to further recovery   of   the   contraband   articles   and   or   money,   for which,   panchnamas   are   made.   Therefore,   observations have been made by the Apex Court in a judgment reported in  (1997) 3 SCC 721  that such statements will lead to further evidence is required to be considered if on the basis of   such   revelation   made   in   the   statements   leading   to further   evidence   like   recovery   or   discovery   of   the contraband   articles,   for   which,   panchnama   have   made would also be a relevant evidence. Again it is corroborated by   the   testimony   of   the   Customs   Officers   as   stated hereinabove. This aspect has to be considered in light of the provisions of Section 6 of the Evidence Act read with Section 10 and 11 of the Evidence Act.

Provisions of Section 6 of the Evidence Act refers to the relevancy of the facts forming part of some transaction, which reads as under :

This   aspect   has   to   be   considered   in   light   of   the evidence regarding the recovery of the contraband articles and the money from the co­accused on the basis of the revelation made in the statements recorded under Section 108 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Customs Act by other co­accused.

Further   Section   10   of   the   Evidence   Act   clearly suggests that it is not merely a statement made by one co­ accused, which would have bearing but if on the basis of such statements, further evidence is collected suggesting the involvement in the offence, it will have to be considered.

Therefore,   the   submissions   made   by   the   learned Counsel with regard to the conviction having based Only on the confessional statements under Section 108 of the Customs   Act   only   and   that   there   is   no   corroborative evidence and the fact that such statements could be only corroborative piece of evidence are misconceived.

Another facet of arguments that the statements made by the co­accused cannot be made admissible in evidence to establish the guilt of other co­accused even though the statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act is made admissible is also misconceived. As discussed above, the statement recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act is   not   a   statement   under   Section   164   of   the   Criminal Procedure Code as it is not a statement of the accused and still on the basis of such statement or admission made, further evidence is collected, which would be evidence for all the accused and if such independent evidence is there, it   cannot   be   said   that   other   co­accused   are   implicated merely on the basis of the statements of other co accused recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act. In fact, it is on the basis of such revelation, further evidence has been collected like in the present case on the basis of the­ statement of the co­accused when search has been made and   the   contraband   articles   (watches   and   money)   have been recovered from the other co­accused would in fact be a evidence against them. Further, there is no explanation with   regard   to   this   aspect   in   further   statements   under Section   313   of   the   Criminal   Procedure   Code.   Therefore, cumulative   effect   of   the   entire   evidence   has   to   be considered and particularly when there is no explanation coming forth from the accused or the concerned accused with   regard   to   the   incriminating   evidence   against   him. Therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned judgment and order recording conviction, which has been confirmed, is perverse or resulted into miscarriage of justice. It is also well   settled   that   the   provisions   of   Section   313   of   the Criminal   Procedure   Code   is   specific   for   the   purpose   of pointing   out   circumstances   with   regard   to   the   relevant evidence or incriminating evidence against him, which can be   considered   and   opportunity   is   offered   to   give explanation   or   rebuttal   even   by   preponderance   of   the probability.

Therefore, having regard to the aforesaid discussions, it cannot be said that the impugned judgment and order recording   conviction,   which   has   been   confirmed   by   the lower Appellate Court is perverse or it is based only on the statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act or even it is based on the statements of the co­accused recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act as sought to be canvassed. Moreover, it is well settled that the scope of exercise of discretion is very limited as observed in a catena of judicial pronouncement including that judgment of the hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2008) 11 SCC 76 in case   of  Raj   Kumar   v.   State   of   Himachal   Pradesh, wherein referring to earlier judgment reported in (1999) 2 SCC 452 in case of State of Kerala v. Puttumana Math Jathavedan Namboodiri it has been observed as under : “the revisional jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate Court nor can it be treated even   as   a   second   appellate   jurisdiction.   Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re­appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice   of   the   High   Court   which   would   otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 17.The Supreme Court in case of K.I. Pavunny v. Assistant Collector   (HQ)   Central   Excise   Collectorate,   Cochin reported in 1997 Law Suit (SC) 174,  has held as under: “[17] It   would   thus   be   clear   that   the   object   of   the   Act empowering Customs Officers to record the evidence under  Section   108  is   to   collect   information   of   the contravention   of   the   provisions   of   the   Act   or concealment of the contraband or avoidance of the duty of excise so as to enable them to collect the evidence   of   the   proof   of   contravention   of   the provisions of the Act so as to take proceedings for further action of confiscation of the contraband or imposition of the penalty under the Act etc. By virtue of authority of law, the officer exercising the powers under the Act is an authority within the meaning of Section 24 of Evidence Act. [1] Though the authority/officer on suspecting a person of having committed the crime under the Act can record his   statement,   such   a   person   per   force   is   not   a person accused under the Act. [2] he becomes accused of the offence under the Act only when a complain is laid by the competent customs officer   in   the   court   of   competent   jurisdiction   or magistrate   to   take   cognizance   of   the   offence   and summons   are   issued.   thereafter,   he   becomes   a person accused of the offence. [3] A statement recorded or given by the person suspected of having committed an offence during the inquiry under  Section 108  of the Act or during confiscation proceedings is not a person accused of the offence within the meaning of Section 24 of the Evidence Act. [4] Though the Customs Officer is an authority within the meaning of Section 24 of the Evidence Act, by reason of statutory compulsion of recording the statement or the accused giving voluntary statement pursuant to his appearing either after issuance of summons or after   the   appellant's   surrender,   such   statement cannot  be  characterised   to  have  been  obtained  by threat, inducement or promise. [5] The collection of evidence under Section 108 and other relevant provisions relating to search and seizure are only   for   the   purpose   of   taking   further   steps   for confiscation of contraband and imposition of penalty. [6] The self­same evidence is admissible in evidence on the complaint laid by the Customs Officer for prosecution under Section 135 or other relevant statutes. [18] It is true, as pointed out by Shri Thakur, that Public Witness 2 admitted in cross­examination that they treated the appellant as an accused and decided to prosecute   the   appellant.   but   the   above   evidence requires to be tested in the light of the above legal position. The assumption of Public Witness 2 that the appellant   was   an   accused   as   on   6/12/1980,   is erroneous, since as on that date on formal complaint had   been   laid   against   the   appellant.   Therefore,   it cannot   be   considered   that   on   6/12/1980,   the appellant was an accused of the offence under Section 24 of the Evidence Act. [19] Next   question   for   consideration   is:   whether   such statement can form the sole basis for conviction? It is seen   that,   admittedly,   the   appellant   made   his statement in his own hand­writing giving wealth of details running into five typed pages. Some of the details   which   found   place   in   the   statement   were specially within his knowledge, viz., concealment of the 200 biscuits in his earlier rented house till he constructed   the   present   house   and   shifted   his residence and thereafter he brought to his house and concealed   the   same   in   his   compound;   and   other details   elaboration   of   which   is   not   material.   The question then is whether it was influenced by threat of implicating his wife in the crime which is the sole basis for the claim that it was obtained by threat by Public   Witness   2   and   Public   Witness   5. In   that behalf, the High Court has held that it could not be considered to be induced by threat that his wife will be   implicated   in   the   crime   and   accordingly disbelieved his plea. It is seen that admittedly after the appellant gave his statement, he was produced before the magistrate though no complaint was filed and was released on bail. He did not complain to the magistrate that Ex. P­4 statement was given under inducement,   threat   or   duress.   It   was   raised   only subsequently   making   accusations   against   Public Witness   5,   the   Inspector   of   Customs.   Therefore, obviously   it   was   only   an   afterthought.   The   High Court, therefore, rightly has not given any weight age to the same. It is true that the Magistrate has given various reasons for disbelieving the evidence of Public Witness 3, the panch witness who had also, at one point of time, indulged in smuggling. It is unlikely that Public Witness 3 would bring 200 gold biscuits of   foreign   marking   and   conceal   them   in   the compound   of   the   appellant   without   appellant's knowledge for safe custody. It is not his case that he had   facilitated   PW­3   in   concealing   them   in   his compound.   The   place   of   concealment   of   the contraband is also significant at this juncture. It is just near and visible from the window of his bed­ room   through   which   he   or   family   members   could always watch anyone frequenting the place where the contraband was concealed. This fact becomes more relevant when we consider that after concealment of the contraband in the compound one would ensure that others having access to the compound may not indulge in digging and carrying away the same. As soon  as   the  appellant  and/or  the  members  of  his family   had   sight   of   such   visitor   or   movement   by others, they would immediately catch hold of such person or would charge them. Obviously, therefore, it would be the appellant who had concealed 200 gold biscuits   of   foreign   marking   in   his   compound   at   a place   always   visible   from   his   bedroom   window. Therefore, the High Court was right in its conclusion, though   for   different   reasons,   that   Ex.P­4   is   a voluntary statement and was not influenced by threat duress or inducement etc. Therefore, it is a voluntary statement given by the appellant and is a true one.” 18.In   view   of   the   above   dictum   of   law   with   regard   to   the 625 (SC), wherein the Apex Court has held as under:

In view of above, no substantial question of law arises from   the   impugned   order   passed   by   the   CESTAT.   Tax Appeal is therefore, accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. (J. B. PARDIWALA, J) (BHARGAV D. KARIA, J) RAGHUNATH R NAIR