Commissioner Of Income Tax-Ii vs. Indore Premier Co-Operative Bank Ltd.

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ITA/80/2013HC Madhya Pradesh13 October 2014Bench: HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE P.K. JAISWAL7 pages
For Petitioner: Ku. Veena Mandlik
AI SummaryDismissed

What did the High Court hold?

The Tribunal held that the issue was squarely covered by the Apex Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax, Coimbatore vs. M/s Textool Co. Ltd. The Apex Court had held that the assessee had no control over the fund created by LIC for the benefit of its employees, and that all contributions made by the assessee ultimately came back to the fund. Therefore, the conditions stipulated in Section 36(1)(v) of the Act were satisfied. The Tribunal found no substantial question of law arising in the appeal. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed. The ratio decidendi is that if an employer makes contributions to a gratuity fund managed by LIC for the benefit of employees, and the employer has no control over the fund, and the contributions ultimately revert to the employee benefit fund, then the deduction is allowable even if the payment is made directly to LIC, as the purpose of the provision is to ensure the employer relinquishes control over the funds for the employees' benefit.

What were the facts?

The assessee, a bank, paid Rs. 74,51,731 as contribution towards a 'Group Gratuity cum Life Assurance Fund' (Policy No. 59080) to LIC for the benefit of its employees during Assessment Year 2009-10. This policy was taken in 1976, and premiums were regularly paid and debited to the profit and loss account. The Assessing Officer disallowed this contribution, stating the fund was not approved by the trust. The CIT(Appeal) upheld this disallowance. The assessee appealed to the ITAT. The ITAT noted that on identical circumstances and issues, it had previously decided in favour of the assessee for an earlier assessment year.

What were the issues?

1. Whether the Tribunal erred in deleting the disallowance of Rs. 74,51,731 made by the Assessing Officer under Section 40A(7) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, concerning contributions to a Group Gratuity cum Life Assurance Fund? (Question of law) Assessee's Contention: The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant argued that the Tribunal erred in deleting the disallowance, drawing attention to Section 40A(7)(a) and Part C of Schedule IV of the IT Act. Revenue's Contention: The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the issue was considered by the Apex Court in CIT vs. M/s Textool Co. Ltd. (Civil Appeal No. 447/2003), which held that the conditions laid down in Section 36(1)(v) of the Act must be fulfilled for claiming deduction, and that a strict construction of fiscal statutes is necessary. The revenue argued that since the contribution was not made to an approved gratuity fund, the High Court was not justified in affirming the view taken by the lower authorities.

Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?

Section 37(1),Section 40A(7),Section 36(1)(v)

AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below

1 I.T.A. No.82/2013 , I.T.A. No.81/2013 and I.T. A. No.80/2013 13.10.2014 Shri R.L. Jain, learned Senior Counsel with Ku. Veena Mandlik, learned counsel for the appellant. Shri Sumit Nema, learned counsel for the respondent. They are heard. 1. This   order   will   also   govern   the   disposal   of   I.T.A. No.81/2013 and I.T.A. No.80/2013 as the common questions are involved and all the matters were heard together and are being decided by this common order.  For the purpose of this order, the facts are taken from I.T.A. No.82/2013. 2. The   facts,   in   brief,     are   that   the   assessee   ­   Bank   paid contribution   of   Rs.74,51,731/­   during   the   Assessment   Year 2009­10   towards   “Group   Gratuity   cum   Life   Assurance Fund”(Policy No.59080).  The said policy was taken by the Bank for  the  benefit  of   employees     in  the   Year,  1976   and Bank  is regularly   paying   premium   to   the   LIC   under   this   policy.     The payment so paid as premium was debited to the profit and loss account. The Assessing   Officer   disallowed the contribution for the reason that the trust has not approved the fund to the assessee ­ bank. 3. On appeal, the learned CIT(Appeal) affirmed the stand  of the learned Assessing Officer and dismissed the appeal by order dated  24/01/2013. 4. As per Section 37(1) of the IT Act, an expenditure incurred 2 for staff welfare is deductible, provided it is established that the payments were made for sound commercial purposes and with the object of facilitating the carrying on of the business. 5. It is not in dispute that the payments of the impugned amount were made to Life Insurance Corporation as premium towards the master policy which covers the employees of the assessee. 6. The   learned   Tribunal   has   observed   that   on   identical circumstances, the Tribunal after having detailed discussion on the   issue   including   the   conditions   prescribed   under   Section 40A(7) and Section 37(1) decided   the issue in favour of the assessee vide order dated 27th  February, 2013.   Following the aforesaid decision of the Tribunal in the case of  the assessee for earlier assessment year, the appeal has been allowed by order dated 1/08/2013. 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant drew our attention to Section 40A(7)(a) of the IT Act and Part C of Schedule IV and submitted   that   the   learned   Tribunal   erred   in   deleting   the disallowance  of   Rs.74,51,731/­  made   by   the  Assessing  Officer under Section 40A(7) of the I.T. Act, 1961. 8. On   the   other   hand,   learned   counsel   for   the   respondent submits that the issue involved in this case has been considered by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.447/2003(Commissioner of Income Tax, Coimbatore vs. M/s Textool Co. Ltd) by order dated 9th September, 2009.  Order dated 09/09/2009 reads as under:­ 3 “This appeal, by special leave is directed against the judgment, dated 4th February, 2002, rendered by the High Court of Judicature at Madras, in Tax Case No. 267 of 1989. By the impugned judgment, the High court has answered the question of law, referred to it by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras Bench (for short, "the Tribunal") under Section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, (for short, "the Act") at the instance of the Revenue. The question of law, so referred, was as follows : "...Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal is right in allowing the deduction of Rs.55,84,754/- being the payment made by the assessee company directly to Life Insurance Corporation towards Group Gratuity Fund under Section 36 (1)(v) of the Incocme Tax Act, 1961?" Material facts relevant for the purpose of the present appeal may be stated thus : For the assessment year, 1983-84, for which the relevant previous year ended on 30th April, 1982, the assessee claimed a deduction of Rs. 92,06,978/- as contribution/provision towards the approved gratuity fund. As per the breakup of the said amount, an amount of Rs.5,84,754/- was paid as annual premium to the Life Insurance Corporation("LIC" for short); a sum of Rs. 50,00,000/- was paid to the LIC as initial contribution in the group Life Assurance Scheme framed by the LIC for the benefit of the employees of the assessee and the remaining amount of Rs. 36,22,224/- was shown as provision for initial contribution. It is common ground that assessee company's gratuity fund, viz., the Textool Company Ltd. Employees Group Gratuity Fund was approved by the Commissioner of Income Tax, coimbatore, w.e.f. 25th February, 1983. While completing assessment, the Assessing Officer allowed a deduction of Rs. 36,22,224/- under Section 40A(7) of the Act. However, deduction for the balance amount was 4 disallowed on the ground that payment towards the gratuity fund was made by the assessee directly to the LIC and not to an approved gratuity fund and, therefore, it was not allowable under Section 36(1)(v) of the Act. Being aggrieved, the assessee preferred appeal to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The Commissioner observed that the initial payment of Rs.50,00,000/- and the annual premium of Rs. 5,57,943/- was made by the assessee directly to the LIC instead of as a contribution towards the approved gratuity fund; the LIC had accepted the said payment on behalf of the Group Life Assurance Scheme for the exclusive benefit of the employees of the assessee under the policy issued by it. Upon perusal of the original Master policy issued by the LIC, the Commissioner recorded his satisfaction that the initial contribution as well as annual premium had been credited by the LIC to the Group Life Assurance Scheme on behalf of the Textool Company Ltd. Employees Group Gratuity Fund only, meaning thereby that the insurance policy had been taken in the name of the approved gratuity fund only; this fund was shown as the payee in the policy; vide its letter dated 20th November, 1985, addressed to the I.A.C., the assessee had confirmed that in the subsequent assessment years, they had contributed funds to the Employees Group Gratuity Fund and the trustees in turn had made payment to the LIC in respect of the Textool Co. Ltd.; Employees Group Gratuity Assurance Scheme under the said policy and it was only the initial payment and first annual premium had been made directly to the LIC against the said policy. The Commissioner was thus, convinced that by making payment of the amounts in question directly to the LIC, the assessee had not violated any of the conditions stipulated in Section 36 (1) (v) of the Act. Accordingly, the Commissioner came to the conclusion that since, on the facts of the case, the objective of the fund was achieved, a narrow interpretation of the provision would be straining the language of Section 36(1)(v) of the Act so as to deny the deduction claimed by the assessee. Consequently, the Commissioner allowed the said amount of Rs. 58,84,754/- as deduction for the relevant assessment year. Being dissatisfied with the view taken by the Commissioner, the Revenue took the matter in further appeal 5 to the Tribunal. Relying on its earlier decision in the case of Janambikai Mills Ltd, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal. As stated above, by the impugned order, the afore extracted question, referred at the instance of the revenue, has been answered by the High Court in favour of the assessee. While answering the question, the High Court has observed as follows : "In our opinion, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal have correctly held that merely because the payments were made directly to the LIC, the company could not be denied the benefit under Section 36(1)(v) and the amount had to be credited in favour of the assessee. Both the Commissioner (appeals) as well as the Tribunal have correctly read the law and have correctly relied upon the aforementioned Supreme Court judgment. In our opinion, since the finding of fact is that all the payments made were only towards the Group Gratuity Fund, there would be no question of finding otherwise." Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Revenue has submitted before us that the provisions of Section 36(1) (v) of the Act have to be construed strictly and for claiming deduction, conditions laid down in Section 36(1)(v) of the Act must be fulfilled. It is urged that since during the relevant previous year the contribution by the assessee towards the gratuity fund was not in an approved gratuity fund the High Court was not justified in affirming the view taken by the Commissioner as also by the Tribunal while answering the reference in favour of the assessee. However, on a query by us as to whether the contribution made by the assessee in the approved gratuity fund credited by the LIC for the employees of the assessee and ultimately the entire amount deposited with the LIC came back to the fund created by the assessee for the benefit of its employees and approved by the Commissioner w.e.f. 25th February, 1983, or not, learned counsel is not in a position to make a categorical statement in that behalf. Having considered the matter in the light of the background facts, we are of the opinion that there is no merit 6 in the appeal. True that a fiscal statute is to be construed strictly and nothing should be added or subtracted to the language employed in the Section, yet a strict construction of a provision does not rule out the application of the principles of reasonable construction to give effect to the purpose and intention of any particular provision of the Act. (See : Shri Sajjan Mills Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, M.P. & Anr. (1985) 156 ITR 585). From a bare reading of Sectin 36(1)(v) of the Act, it is manifest that the real intention behind the provision is that the employer should not have any control over the funds of the irrevocable trust created exclusively for the benefit of the employees. In the instant case, it is evident from the findings recorded by the Commissioner and affirmed by the Tribunal that the assessee had absolutely no control over the fund created by the LIC for the benefit of the employees of the assessee and further all the contribution made by the assessee in the said fund ultimately came back to the Textool Employees Gratuity Fund, approved by the Commissioner with effect from the following previous year. Thus, the conditions stipulated in Section 36(1)(v) of the Act were satisfied. Having regard to the facts found by the Commissioner and affirmed by the Tribunal, no fault can be found with the opinion expressed by the High court, warranting our interference. Resultantly, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.” 9. The Apex Court has held that the assessee had no control over the fund created by the LIC for the benefit of the employees of the assessee and further alleged that all the contribution made by the assessee  in the said fund  ultimately came back to the assessee. Thus, the conditions stipulated in Section 37(1) (v) of the Act were satisfied. 10. In view of the law laid down by the apex Court in the matter of Commissioner of Income Tax, Coimbatore(supra), we 7 are   of   the   view   that   the   question   involved   in   this   appeal   is squarely covered by the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court.  No substantial question of law is arising in this appeal. 11. Accordingly, the I.T.A. No.82/2013 and other two connected ITAs bearing I.T.A. No.81/2013 and I.T. A. No.80/2013 are accordingly, dismissed. (P.K. Jaiswal )

(D.K. Paliwal) Judge

Judge

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