DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CENTRAL CIRCLE 2(2), CHENNAI, CHENNAI vs. SADASIVAM SAMBANDAN LALITKUMAR, CHENNAI

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ITA 2112/CHNY/2026Status: DisposedITAT Chennai12 October 2026AY 2020-2115 pages

In favour of the assessee: the Revenue's appeal was dismissed. From the AI summary of this appeal.

AI SummaryDismissed

What did the Tribunal hold?

The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Ld. CIT(A) and dismissed the Revenue's appeal. The Tribunal agreed that the initiation of penalty proceedings under Section 270A was invalid. The Ld. CIT(A) correctly observed that the AO failed to initiate penalty proceedings during the course of assessment proceedings, and the notice under Section 274 read with Section 270A was issued after the assessment order was passed on March 15, 2022. This was considered an incurable jurisdictional defect, making the penalty notice issued on March 20, 2022, invalid. The Tribunal relied on the binding judicial precedents, including the decision of the Chennai Bench of the ITAT in *Srinivasan Chandrasekara Chandliya v. ACIT*, which held that penalty proceedings must be initiated during the course of assessment proceedings and not thereafter. The Tribunal found the Ld. CIT(A)'s view on the legal issue to be plausible and did not interfere with it. Consequently, the penalty levied by the AO amounting to Rs. 1,44,33,962/- was deleted. The Tribunal did not examine the other legal ground raised by the Revenue as the appeal was dismissed on the primary legal issue.

What were the facts?

The assessee, Sadhasivam Sambandan Lalitkumar, is in appeal against the order of the Learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeal) (Ld. CIT(A)) for Assessment Year 2020-21. A search and seizure action on Shri C. Joseph Vijay led to a survey under Section 133A at the assessee's premises. During the survey, the assessee admitted unaccounted cash receipts of Rs. 1,22,00,000/- and undisclosed income of Rs. 56,57,320/- from function hall activities. While the function hall income was offered in the return, the cash receipts were not. The Assessing Officer (AO) completed the assessment by adding Rs. 1,22,00,000/-, noting that penalty proceedings under Section 270A would be initiated separately. The AO subsequently issued multiple show cause notices for penalty, eventually levying a penalty of Rs. 1,44,33,962/- under Section 270A for under-reporting and mis-reporting of income.

What were the issues?

1. Whether the penalty proceedings under Section 270A were validly initiated, considering the notice was issued after the assessment order was passed? - Assessee's Contention (as accepted by Ld. CIT(A)): The AO failed to initiate penalty proceedings during the assessment proceedings. The notice under Section 274 read with Section 270A was issued after the assessment order, rendering it invalid and striking at the jurisdiction of the AO to levy penalty. This lapse is not curable. Reliance was placed on judicial precedents like *Srinivasan Chandrasekara Chandliya v. ACIT* and *CIT v. Rajendra Kumar Somani*. - Revenue's Contention: The Ld. CIT(A) erred in holding the initiation of penalty proceedings as ambiguous. The penalty proceedings were validly initiated based on under-reporting of income detected during assessment proceedings. The provisions of Section 270A permit levy for under-reporting and mis-reporting, and the AO had sufficient material. 2. Whether the AO could levy penalty for under-reporting of income in consequence of mis-reporting, when initially the penalty proceedings were initiated for under-reporting of income? - Assessee's Contention (as accepted by Ld. CIT(A)): The AO's satisfaction for initiating proceedings under Section 270A was ambiguous. The AO initially initiated proceedings for under-reporting but later shifted the stand to 'under-reporting in consequence of mis-reporting' without clear justification, indicating a lack of clarity on the correct charge. Reliance was placed on judicial precedents.

Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?

Section 270A,Section 274,Section 133A,Section 132,Section 250

AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, ‘C’ BENCH: CHENNAI

Before: SHRI ABY T. VARKEY & MS. PADMAVATHY. S

Hearing: 06.08.2026Pronounced: 12.10.2026

आदेश / O R D E R PER ABY T. VARKEY, JM: This is an appeal preferred by the assessee against the order of the Learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeal) (hereinafter referred to as ‘Ld.CIT(A)’), Chennai-19, dated 22.01.2026 for the Assessment Year (hereinafter referred to as ‘AY’) 2020-21, passed u/s.250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’)

ITA 2112/CHNY/2026 SADASIVAM SAMBANDAN LALITKUMAR :: 2 :: 2. The grievances involved in the grounds raised by the Revenue is against the action of the Ld. CIT(A) deleting the penalty levied by the AO u/s 270 of the Act by holding that penalty was not validly initiated by the AO which rendered the penalty order as bad in law. Since Revenue has challenged the impugned action of Ld CIT(A) allowing the legal issue raised by the assessee, holding the initiation of penalty proceedings itself as invalid, which strikes at the root of the AO levying penalty, we will examine the same.

3.

The brief facts as culled out from the record are that, a search and seizure action u/s.132 of the Act was conducted in the case of Shri C. Joseph Vijay and others on 05.02.2020 and based on certain material relating to the assessee found during search, survey u/s 133A of the Act was carried out at assessee’s premises. During the course of survey proceedings, the assessee admitted unaccounted cash receipts of Rs.1,22,00,000/- from his real estate business and further undisclosed income of Rs.56,57,320/- from function hall and allied activities, based on seized materials and data found in the Tally server.

4.

In respect of function hall receipts, suppression of rental and exhibition income was noticed for earlier years, which the assessee admitted and offered additional income for A.Ys. 2016-17 to 2018-19. For F.Y. 2019-20, additional income was quantified at Rs.56,57,320/-. While

ITA 2112/CHNY/2026 SADASIVAM SAMBANDAN LALITKUMAR :: 3 :: the assessee included Rs.56,57,320/- in the return of income, he failed to include the undisclosed income of Rs.1,22,00,000/- admitted during survey. Consequently, the AO completed the assessment on 15.03.2022 by adding Rs.1,22,00,000/- and assessed the total income at Rs.2,17,21,110/-. The AO, in the last paragraph of the assessment order, is noted to have observed that, "Penalty u/s. 270A will be initiated separately for underreporting of income."

5.

The AO issued show cause notice to the assessee proposing levy of penalty for underreporting of income on 20.03.2022 and thereafter, on 26.07.2022 proposing penalty for underreporting of income and thereafter, reiterated the same by issuance of another notice on 26.08.2022 and thereafter, again issued show cause notice proposing levy of penalty for underreporting inconsequence of misreporting of income. During the course of penalty proceedings, the assessee’s explanation that the disclosure made during survey is not admissible in evidence and based on that no penalty was leviable was rejected. However, the AO held that the disclosure was pursuant to survey findings and that omission of the admitted income tantamount to mis-reporting, and accordingly levied penalty u/s 270A of the Act at 200% of the tax sought to be evaded, amounting to Rs.1,44,33,962/- and completed the penalty proceedings by passing order u/s 270A of the Act on 26.09.2022.

ITA 2112/CHNY/2026 SADASIVAM SAMBANDAN LALITKUMAR :: 4 ::

6.

Aggrieved the assessee preferred an appeal before the Ld. CIT(A), before him assessee is noted to have raised the legal issues; and Ld. CIT(A) is noted to have allowed one of the legal issue by holding as under:- 6.1.10 In the present case, it is evident from the assessment records and dates noted above that the AO failed to initiate the penalty proceedings during the course of assessment proceedings, and the notice issued u/s 274 r.w.s 270A of the Act was issued only after the assessment orders had already been passed. This lapse is not curable and strikes at the jurisdiction of the AO to levy penalty. Therefore, following the binding judicial precedents and consistent view of the higher appellate forums, the penalty order passed u/s 270A of the Act for assessment year under consideration are legally unsustainable. 6.1.11 In view of the above factual matrix and the settled legal position, it is evident that the penalty proceedings in the present case suffer from an incurable jurisdictional defect. Once the assessment proceedings came to an end on 15.03.2022, the AO ceased to have the power to initiate penalty u/s 270A of the Act, and the notice issued u/s 274 r.w.s 270A of the Act on 20.03.2022 is rendered invalid in the eyes of law. Accordingly, this ground raised by the appellant is treated as allowed. 7. The next legal issue, the Ld. CIT(A) decided is noted as under:- Issue: Whether the AO can levy a penalty by issuing notice to levy penalty for underreporting of income and finally levying the penalty for under reporting in consequence of mis reporting thereof ?

8.

And thereafter, the Ld. CIT(A) is noted to have decided the same by relying on several judicial precedents of Hon’ble High Courts/Tribunal and held as under:- 6.2.14 In the present case, on examination of the assessment order, it has been found that the AO has not specifically mentioned as to which limb of section 270A of the Act is attracted and how the ingredients of Section 270A(9) of the Act is specified. In view of this, the satisfaction arrived by the AO in initiating proceedings u/s 270A of the Act is only ambiguous. Further as evident in the records, the AO at the first instance has initiated penalty proceedings u/s 270A of the Act for under reporting of income vide notice dated 20.03.2022. However, the AO suddenly shifted the stand and issued show cause notice u/s 270A of the Act for “under-reporting in consequence of mis-reporting thereof” for the first time on 15.09.2022. This sudden shift in stand by the AO affirms the fact that

ITA 2112/CHNY/2026 SADASIVAM SAMBANDAN LALITKUMAR :: 5 :: the AO was not clear as to the right levy of charge in the case of the appellant. Therefore, the levy of penalty u/s 270A of the Act for under-reporting of income in consequence of mis-reporting of income thereof is not legally tenable as per the various judicial decision(s) as supra. 6.2.15 In view of the above discussion and judicial precedents relied upon, the undersigned is of the considered view that there exists no prima facie case when the AO failed to bring on record of any findings that the appellant has under- reported income in consequence of mis-reporting of income thereof, Accordingly, all the grounds raised by the Appellant upon the levy of penalty u/s 270A of the Act are hereby treated as allowed and the AO is hereby directed to delete the penalty levied u/s 270A of the Act amounting Rs. 1,44,33,962/- for the AY 2020- 21. 9. The aforesaid action of the Ld. CIT(A) is assailed before us by the Revenue by preferring the following grounds of appeal:- 1. The learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) erred in law and on facts in deleting the penalty of Rs.1.44,33,962/- levied by the Assessing Officer under section 270A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. 2. The learned CIT(A) erred in holding that the initiation of penalty proceedings under section 270A was ambiguous, without appreciating that the penalty proceedings were validly initiated based on under-reporting of income detected during assessment proceedings. 3. The learned CIT(A) failed to appreciate that the provisions of section 270A permit levy of penalty for under-reporting of income and, where applicable, for mis-reporting thereof, based on facts brought on record during assessment proceedings. 4. The learned CIT (A) failed to appreciate that the Assessing Officer had sufficient material on record to establish that the assessee had under-reported income and that such under-reporting was in consequence of mis-reporting of income within the meaning of section 2704(9) of the Act. 5. The order of the learned CIT(A) is erroneous and contrary to the facts and provisions of law, and therefore the order of the Assessing Officer deserves to be restored. 6. For these grounds and any other ground including amendment of grounds that may be raised during the course of the appeal proceedings, the order of learned CIT(Appeals) may be set aside and that of the Assessing Officer be restored. 10. First we will examine ground No.2 and 3 supra, wherein the action of the Ld. CIT(A) allowing the legal issues raised by the assessee is assailed before us.

11.

We have heard the rival contentions, perused the material available on record and gone through the orders of the authorities below as well as

ITA 2112/CHNY/2026 SADASIVAM SAMBANDAN LALITKUMAR :: 6 :: the judicial precedents cited before us. The controversy before us lies in a narrow compass. The issue to be answered is whether the action of the Ld. CIT(A) holding that the initiation of penalty proceedings u/s.270A of the Act suffered from fundamental infirmity, was a view plausible in law or not, and in particular whether the solitary sentence appearing at the foot of the assessment order(s) constitutes the satisfaction and the direction contemplated by law.

12.

In order to answer the above issue, Let us first have look at the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 270A of the Act opens with the words "The Assessing Officer………… may, during the course of any proceedings under this Act, direct that any person who has underreported his income shall be liable to pay a penalty in addition to tax, if any, on the underreported income”. It is thus observed that, the satisfaction of the AO, arrived at in the course of the proceedings before him, is the sine qua non for the assumption of jurisdiction to levy penalty. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. S.V. Angidi Chettiar [1962] 44 ITR 739 has held that the satisfaction of the officer is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power, and must exist before the proceedings before him are concluded. Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of D.M. Manasvi v. CIT [1972] 86 ITR 557 (SC) observed that, the issue of notice is a consequence of the satisfaction and that the two cannot be equated.

ITA 2112/CHNY/2026 SADASIVAM SAMBANDAN LALITKUMAR :: 7 :: The proposition which emanates from this judgment which, we may observe at once, presupposes the existence of the satisfaction and does not dispense with it.

13.

The Ld. CIT, DR contended that a valid satisfaction existed in the assessment order, which we now proceed to examine. The case of the Revenue rests on the AO’s observation viz., “Penalty u/s 270A will be initiated separately for underreporting of income." According to us, the expression "will be initiated" is in the simple future tense. Grammatically and legally, it speaks of an event yet to occur. It records a proposal, or at highest an intention, to do something at some point in the future. It does not record that anything has been done, or that anything is being done, or that anyone has been directed to do anything. This is not a question of construing the language of a quasi-judicial order pedantically; rather it is a question of examining whether the statutory requirement of a direction was met or not.

14.

We find this issue also to be no longer res integra. In CIT v. Rajinder Kumar Somani (supra), the Hon'ble Delhi High Court was faced with an assessment order which had a materially identical language that penalty proceedings will be initiated separately. Rejecting the revenue's plea that the sentence should not be construed narrowly, the Court held that such words are indicative not of an initiation of steps for levy of

ITA 2112/CHNY/2026 SADASIVAM SAMBANDAN LALITKUMAR :: 8 :: penalty but only of possible future initiation; that it is not enough for the officer to record that penalty proceedings are to be, or will be, initiated separately; and that there must be some other positive step, such as an actual direction to the office to issue a penalty notice. The Court further observed that where the officer has in fact initiated action during the assessment proceedings, the usual course is for the penalty notices to be issued and served simultaneously with the assessment order and the demand notice, and that the issue of the notices some 18 days after completion of the assessment was itself a circumstance not without significance. In the present case, also we find that the notice(s) u/s274 of the Act was issued first of all after five (5) days from the date of assessment order i.e. 15.03.2022 [and thereafter, notices were issued on 26.07.2022, 26.08.2022 proposing levy of penalty for underreporting of income and thereafter notice was issued on 15.09.2022 proposing levy of penalty for underreporting of income inconsequence of misreporting of income]. The relevant findings of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court, which has a direct bearing on the issue at hand, is as follows:-

“In the present case, unfortunately, it seems to us that the requirements of the statute have not been fulfilled. There is no direction for issue of penalty notice in the assessment order. All that the ITO has observed is that penalty proceedings are to be initiated separately. These are words indicative not of an initiation of steps for levy of penalty but only of possible future initiation. On behalf of the department, Sri Mukerjee submitted that the words used in the assessment order should not be construed narrowly and that the sentence at the end of the assessment order (extracted earlier) should be treated as sufficient for the purpose. We are unable to accept this submission. As explained

ITA 2112/CHNY/2026 SADASIVAM SAMBANDAN LALITKUMAR :: 9 :: above the language of section 275 envisages some positive step on the part of the ITO being taken before the completion of the assessment. In our opinion It not enough for the officer to record that penalty proceedings are to be or will be initiated separately. There should be some other step such as an actual direction to the office to issue a penalty notice (which thereafter needs only ministerial compliance), the actual issue of a penalty notice, a reference to the IAC or some other similar action. It is also not without significance that in this case, though the assessment was completed on November 28, 1963, the penalty notices were issued by the ITO only as late as December 16, 1963. As rightly pointed out by the Tribunal, in cases where the ITO has initiated action during the assessment proceedings, the usual course is for the penalty notices to be issued and served simultaneously with the assessment order and the demand notice. In the present case, even that was not done. The penalty notices were served upon the assessee only after the service of the assessment order and the demand notice. All these circumstances clearly justify the conclusion of the Tribunal that no action had been initiated in the course of the assessment proceedings for the levy of penalty. The conclusion of the Tribunal is one of fact based on the facts and circumstances of the case with which this court will not interfere in a reference.” 15. The Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT v. MWP Ltd.(supra) also considered the same question in the context of section 271(1B) and held that expression such as "penalty proceedings are being initiated separately" or "penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c) are initiated separately" do not comply with the meaning of the word "direction" as contemplated even by the amended provisions; and that a direction must be clear and unambiguous. Following the decision of Hon’ble Delhi High Court (supra), the Court observed that a direction by a statutory authority is in the nature of an order requiring positive compliance, so that where the matter is left to the option and discretion of the officer it cannot be described as a direction at all. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble High Court, are as under:-

ITA 2112/CHNY/2026 SADASIVAM SAMBANDAN LALITKUMAR :: 10 :: “12. A reading of the aforesaid order makes it clear that Assessing Authority was not satisfied that there is any concealment of the income. Further there is no direction for initiation of penalty proceedings could be gathered from the said order also. It is held in the aforesaid judgment that (a) phrases like penalty proceedings are being initiated separately (b) penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) are initiated separated don not comply with the meaning of the word direction as contemplated even in the amended provisions of law. The direction should be clear and without any ambiguity. The word 'direction' has been interpreted by the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rajinder Nath v. CIT [1979] 120 ITR 14/2 Taxman 204, where it has been held that in any event whatever else it may amount to, on its very terms the observation that the ITO is free to take action, to assess the excess in the hand of the co-owners cannot be described as a direction. A direction by a statutory authority is in the nature of an order requiring positive compliance. When it is left to the option and discretion of the ITO whether or not take action, it cannot be described as a direction. 13. In the absence of such a direction, the deeming provision is not attracted. Therefore the conditions prescribed under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act, is not attracted. Therefore the Tribunal was justified in setting aside the order passed by the Assessing Authority as well as the Appellate Authority, imposing penalty. No merits. Dismissed. The substantial question of law is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.” 16. We observe that the case of the assessee is on a better footing. In the above decision (supra), the present indicative "are initiated" was held insufficient, and therefore the future tense "will be initiated" employed in the present case does not meet the statutory requirement.

17.

Admittedly, the legislature has consciously used the word "may" in the substantive provision of Section 270A so far as the decision to impose penalty is concerned. The usage of the words ‘may’ negates the theory of the Revenue that, in search assessments, where additional income was offered to tax in the returns of income filed after search, would lead to automatic initiation and imposition of penalty. The term 'may' vests the

ITA 2112/CHNY/2026 SADASIVAM SAMBANDAN LALITKUMAR :: 11 :: AO with discretionary power to impose penalties, which discretion must be exercised fairly, and not arbitrarily, justly and not fancifully. In this context, we gainfully rely on decision rendered by the Special Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Vinil Venugopal [2025] 179 taxmann.com 618 (Mumbai – Trib) wherein though in the context of Black Money (BM) Act, it was clearly explained that the usage of the word 'may' in Section 43 of BM Act indicated that there is a discretion vested with the Assessing Officer to impose penalty or otherwise depending upon facts and circumstances of each case and that the same is not automatic. There is merit in Ld AR’s plea that the existence of jurisdictional fact cannot be laid in arguments, but it is required to be demonstrated that they exist on the record at the time the jurisdiction is assumed.

18.

Overall therefore, we find ourselves to be in concurrence with the following findings of the Ld. CIT(A), which are as under:-

6.1.1 In this ground, the appellant has assailed the validity of the penalty proceedings, initiated u/s 270A of the Act on the fundamental ground that the mandatory statutory requirement of initiation of penalty “in the course of assessment proceedings” has not been adhered to in the present case. It is the specific contention of the appellant that while the assessment order was admittedly passed on 15.03.2022, the notice proposing levy of penalty u/s 270A of the Act was issued only on 20.03.2022, i.e., after the assessment proceedings had already concluded. According to the appellant, once the assessment proceedings stood completed, the AO became functus officio in so far as initiation of penalty u/s 270A of the Act is concerned, and any action taken thereafter is without jurisdiction and contrary to law. 6.1.2 During the course of appellate proceedings, the AR made detailed submission upon this issue, the relevant extract of the same is reproduced here as under

ITA 2112/CHNY/2026 SADASIVAM SAMBANDAN LALITKUMAR :: 12 :: “Notice initiating penalty u/s.270A of the Act was issued on 20.03.2022, whereas assessment order was passed on 15.03.2022. Thus, the said show cause notice was not issued in the course of assessment proceedings is bad in law and consequently the impugned penalty order is invalid and liable to be quashed.” In this connection, the relevant part of provisions of Section 270A of the Act read as follows: “270A. (1) The Assessing Officer or the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner may, during the course of any proceedings under this Act, direct that any person who has under-reported his income shall be liable to pay a penalty in addition to tax, if any, on the under-reported income.” In this connection, the phrase “during the course of any proceedings under this Act” used in Section 270A of the Act is relevant. It indicates that the show-cause notice initiating penalty should be issued along with the passing of the assessment order since the initiation cannot take place after the assessment proceedings have come to an end. In this connection, reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Chennai ITAT in the case of Srinivasan Chandrasekara Chandilya v ACIT in ITA No.1487/Chennai/2024, the relevant portion of which decision is reproduced below for ready reference of this respected authority: 6.1.3 On a careful examination of the assessment records, it is seen that the assessment order for the AY 2020-21 was passed on 15.03.2022 by the AO, and notice u/s 274 r.w.s 270A of the Act was issued on 20.03.2022 to initiate penalty proceedings. The relevant extract of the notice(s) issued for the AY 2020-21 is appended here under. 6.1.4 The undersigned on examination finds that the contention of the appellant is found to be factually correct. There is nothing on record to indicate that any notice for initiation of penalty proceedings was issued either simultaneously with the assessment order or at any time during the pendency of the assessment proceedings. The records do not disclose issuance of any show-cause notice u/s 270A of the Act prior to or on the date of completion of assessment. 6.1.5 On the contrary, it is an admitted position that the notice u/s 270A of the Act were issued only on 20.03.2022, i.e., five days after the assessment order dated 15.03.2022 for the AY 2020-21 was passed. By that time, the assessment proceedings had already culminated and the assessment order had attained finality, thereby clearly breaking the statutory linkage between the assessment proceedings and the initiation of penalty. 6.1.6 At the outset, the language employed in section 270A of the Act, namely the phrase “in the course of any proceedings under this Act,” has been the subject matter of consistent judicial interpretation. The initiation of penalty proceedings is not an independent or post-assessment exercise; rather, it is a consequential action that is statutorily required to emanate from, and be embedded within, the assessment proceedings themselves. 6.1.7 The undersigned is of the view that the issuance of the penalty notice after the assessment order was passed is not a mere procedural lapse

ITA 2112/CHNY/2026 SADASIVAM SAMBANDAN LALITKUMAR :: 13 :: that can be cured subsequently. It strikes at the very root of the jurisdiction of the AO to initiate penalty proceedings u/s 270A of the Act. The statutory condition precedent for valid initiation namely, initiation in the course of assessment proceedings, having not been fulfilled, the AO lacked the legal authority to commence penalty proceedings after the assessment had concluded. Such an initiation, being contrary to the express mandate of the Act, is therefore void ab initio. 6.1.8 In this regard, it is appropriate to rely upon the decision of the Hon’ble Chennai Bench of the ITAT in the case of Srinivasan Chandrasekara Chandliya v. ACIT [ITA Nos. 1478 to 1487/Chny/2024], wherein the Hon’ble Tribunal held that penalty proceedings must be initiated during the course of the assessment proceedings, and not thereafter. The Hon’ble Tribunal emphasized that the timing of initiation is crucial, and that the AO must record his satisfaction within the assessment order itself or issue the penalty notice simultaneously on the same date. Further, reliance is also placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in CIT v. Rajendra Kumar Somani [(1980) 125 ITR 756 (Del)], where the Court had occasion to interpret the phrase "during the course of assessment proceedings", holding that penalty initiation must form part of the assessment process and cannot be initiated after its conclusion. 6.1.9 Further, the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT v. Manjunatha Cotton and Ginning Factory [(2013) 359 ITR 565 (Karn)] has held that recording of satisfaction for initiation of penalty must be evident from the assessment order itself, and the notice must not be issued as an afterthought. The timing and manner of initiation of penalty proceedings is not a mere procedural formality but goes to the root of the validity of penalty proceedings. 6.1.10 In the present case, it is evident from the assessment records and dates noted above that the AO failed to initiate the penalty proceedings during the course of assessment proceedings, and the notice issued u/s 274 r.w.s 270A of the Act was issued only after the assessment orders had already been passed. This lapse is not curable and strikes at the jurisdiction of the AO to levy penalty. Therefore, following the binding judicial precedents and consistent view of the higher appellate forums, the penalty order passed u/s 270A of the Act for assessment year under consideration are legally unsustainable. 6.1.11 In view of the above factual matrix and the settled legal position, it is evident that the penalty proceedings in the present case suffer from an incurable jurisdictional defect. Once the assessment proceedings came to an end on 15.03.2022, the AO ceased to have the power to initiate penalty u/s 270A of the Act, and the notice issued u/s 274 r.w.s 270A of the Act on 20.03.2022 is rendered invalid in the eyes of law. Accordingly, this ground raised by the appellant is treated as allowed.

ITA 2112/CHNY/2026 SADASIVAM SAMBANDAN LALITKUMAR :: 14 :: 19. The above findings are found to be ably supported by the decision of the coordinate bench of this Tribunal in Srinivasan Chandrasekara Chandilya v. ACIT (ITA Nos.1478 to 1487/Chny/2024), wherein, on a substantially identical recording by the AO, the penalty was deleted, by observing as under:-

6.

…The controversy raised qua lack of clarity as to whether assessee had concealed its income or had furnished inaccurate particulars thereof, is also not supported by facts as the Ld. AO in the assessment order dated 13.12.2019 clearly indicated that assesse had concealed true particulars of his income. It is however seen that in spite of above facts, the penalty imposed by the Revenue u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act, is non- maintainable in the eyes of law and hence deserves to be quashed. The Ld. DR has submitted vide his paper book dated 13.08.2024 which, inter-alia, contains original penalty notices u/s 271(1)(c) issued to the assesse. It is seen that the said notices were issued on 19.12.2019. As discussed herein above, the original assessment order was passed on 13.12.2019. Consequently, the penalty notice ought to have been issued on or before 13.12.2019. Any notice issued after 13.12.2019 becomes non est in the eyes of law. 7.0 It is seen that section 271(1)(c) of the Act clearly empowers an assessing officer to initiate penalty proceedings if "...in the course of any proceedings under this Act is satisfied that any person..." has concealed the particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars thereof. The law therefore mandates that there should be existence of "... any proceedings..." under the Act so as to give the Ld. AO the authority to initiate any penalty proceedings. With this understanding of the law, the Ld. AO was required to have issued penalty notice u/s 271(1) (c) of the Act on 13.12.2019 only. His issuance of notice u/s 271(1)(c) on 19.12.2019 Supra therefore makes the penalty order dated 01.02.2022 invalid as it is not based upon any lawfully issued notice. Pertinently no proceedings were pending against the assessee on 19.12.2019 when the notice u/s 271(1)(c) was issued. In above view of the matter, we hold that the penalty order u/s 271(1)(c) dated 01.02.2022 is invalid and bad in law. The same is therefore quashed and set aside.”

20.

For the reasons discussed above, we are of the view that the action of the Ld. CIT(A) holding the initiation of penalty proceedings as invalid was a plausible view in law and thus does not warrant our interference.

ITA 2112/CHNY/2026 SADASIVAM SAMBANDAN LALITKUMAR :: 15 :: We thus dismiss the grounds of the Revenue against the impugned action of Ld CIT(A) qua legal issue supra. Since we have upheld the action of Ld CIT(A) on legal issue discussed supra, we are not inclined to examine the other legal ground, which is left open. Hence the Revenue appeal is dismissed.

21.

In the result, the appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed.

Order pronounced on the 12th day of October, 2026, in Chennai.

Sd/- Sd/- (प�ावती .एस) (एबी टी. वक�) (PADMAVATHY. S) (ABY T. VARKEY) लेखा सद�य/ACCOUNTANT MEMBER �या�यक सद�य/JUDICIAL MEMBER चे�नई/Chennai, �दनांक/Dated: 12th October, 2026. YS आदेश क� ��त�ल�प अ�े�षत/Copy to: 1. अपीलाथ�/Appellant 2. ��थ�/Respondent 3. आयकरआयु�/CIT, Chennai / Madurai / Salem / Coimbatore. 4. िवभागीय�ितिनिध/DR 5. गाड�फाईल/GF YASHVI Digitally signed by YASHVIR SINGH R SINGH Date: 2026.10.16 10:04:26 +05'30'

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