LATE SHRI DEEPAK PURI THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE NITA PURI,NEW DELHI vs. DCIT/ACIT CENTRAL CIRCLE-20, NEW DELHI, NEW DELHI
What did the Tribunal hold?
The Tribunal held that the delay of 775 days in filing the appeal before the Ld. CIT(A) should be condoned. The Tribunal noted that the assessee passed away on 02.10.2021, and the limitation period expired on 29.10.2021. Therefore, the cause for the delay arose before the expiry of the limitation period. The Tribunal referred to Supreme Court decisions emphasizing that the cause for delay must be beyond the control of the appellant and that the expression 'sufficient cause' should be interpreted liberally to advance substantial justice. The Tribunal directed the Ld. CIT(A) to dispose of the case on merits, following the ITAT's order in the case of Neeta Puri. The issue of additions made on merit was not decided by the Tribunal, as the Ld. CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal in limine.
What were the facts?
The appeal is against the order dated 16.03.2026 passed by the Ld. CIT(A)-27, New Delhi, under Section 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer (AO) had made additions of Rs. 50,29,856/- on account of alleged excess value of jewelry and Rs. 6,35,250/- on account of cash seized. The assessee filed an appeal before the Ld. CIT(A) with a delay of 775 days, which was not condoned, leading to the dismissal of the appeal in limine. The assessee's legal representative challenged the Ld. CIT(A)'s decision to not condone the delay and also the additions made on merit. The assessee's counsel submitted that the assessee passed away on 02.10.2021, shortly after the AO's order, and the legal heir was brought on record on 28.03.2022, causing the delay.
What were the issues?
1. Whether the Ld. CIT(A) erred in not condoning the delay of 775 days in filing the appeal, turning on the interpretation of 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as applicable to tax proceedings. Assessee's contentions: The delay was caused due to the death of the assessee on 02.10.2021, a few days after the AO's order dated 29.09.2021. The legal heir faced difficulties in managing affairs and was brought on record on 28.03.2022, justifying the delay. The assessee relied on the coordinate bench order in the case of Mrs. Neeta Puri. Revenue's contentions: The assessee provided a bald statement without proof, and there was no justification for condoning a delay of 775 days. The revenue supported the order of the authorities below.
Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?
AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, DELHI BENCH “E” NEW DELHI
Before: SHRI VIMAL KUMAR & SHRI SANJAY AWASTHI
IT(SS)A No.5913/DEL/2026 LATE SHRI DEEPAK PURI IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL DELHI BENCH “E” NEW DELHI BEFORE SHRI VIMAL KUMAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SHRI SANJAY AWASTHI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER IT(SS)A No.5913/DEL/2026 Assessment Year: 2020-21 LATE SHRI DEEPAK PURI Vs DCIT/ACIT, Central Circle- Through Legal Representative, Nita Puri, A- . 20, Room No108, 1st Floor, 187, New Friends Colony, Sriniwaspuri, South Income Tax Building, E-2, Delhi, New Delhi 110065. ARA Centre, Jhandewalan PAN No. AVLPS1533N Extension, New Delhi 110055. Appellant Respondent Assessee by Shri Vikrant Suri, Adv, Ms. Suman Sapra, CA & Shri Jeevan Giri, Adv. Revenue by Shri Robin Rawal, CIT DR Date of hearing: 24.08.2026 Pronouncement on 24.08.2026 O R D E R PER SANJAY AWASTHI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER: 1. The present appeal arises from order dated 16.03.2026, passed u/s 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereafter as “the Act”), by Ld. CIT(A)- 27, New Delhi.
1.1 In this case, the Ld. AO passed an order dated 29.09.2021 through which addition of Rs.50,29,856/- was made on account of alleged excess value of jewelry found and another addition of Rs.6,35,250/- was made on account of cash seized from the premises of the assessee.
IT(SS)A No.5913/DEL/2026 LATE SHRI DEEPAK PURI 1.2 The assessee filed the first appeal with a delay of 775 days which was not condoned and the appeal was dismissed inlimine. The Ld. CIT(A) has given a detailed finding as to why the delay could not be condoned.
1.3 The aggrieved assessee has now approached the ITAT with grounds challenging the action of Ld. CIT(A) in not considering the reasons given for the delay and dismissing the appeal inlimine. The assessee has also challenged the additions made on merit.
Before us the Ld. AR took us through the impugned order where the detailed reasons for the delay before the Ld. CIT(A) had been put forth in the shape of an affidavit. The Ld. AR mentioned in brief that the assessee passed away on 02.10.2021, i.e. a few days after the Ld. AO’s order dated 29.09.2021. Thereafter, the legal heir could be brought on record, with the approval of the Income Tax Department, on 28.03.2022. The Ld. AR stated that due to the death of the assessee it was difficult to manage the affairs and therefore there was the delay which was justified and deserved to be condoned. The Ld. AR also placed on record the coordinate bench order in the case of Mrs. Neeta Puri, the legal heir L/H in the present case, and requested that the findings therein may also be considered.
2.1 The Ld. DR supported the order of authorities below and stated that the assessee merely submitted a bald statement, without any proof,
IT(SS)A No.5913/DEL/2026 LATE SHRI DEEPAK PURI before the authorities below and thus, there was no reason which could justify condoning a delay of 775 days.
We have considered the rival submissions and have gone through the records before us. Regarding the issue of condonation of delay, the Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of decisions has held that the law of limitation being substantive, the power of discretion to condone the delay is to be exercised judiciously and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. The parties are expected to approach the Court in adherence to this general principle. Thus, filing an appeal is the rule and condoning the delay is the exception, wherein the Courts have to exercise their discretionary power judiciously and by recording reasons. Once there is a delay, the person who is filing the condonation petition is expected to furnish the reason which must be acceptable to this Bench. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji 1987 taxmann.com 1072/28 ELT 185, has observed that it is for the assessee to explain each and every day of delay in filing of appeal, even when he does not stand to gain due to the delay. At this juncture, it is necessary to delve into the genesis of limitation and how a judicial forum needs to deal with matters pertaining to condonation of delay. Almost all the tax laws, whether they relate to direct taxes or indirect taxes, contain provisions for condonation of delay in filing appeals, if the appellant (whether it is the taxpayer or the revenue) proves to the satisfaction of the appellate authority that he had sufficient cause for 3
IT(SS)A No.5913/DEL/2026 LATE SHRI DEEPAK PURI not filing the appeal within time. The genesis for such provisions can be traced to section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which reads as follows:
"Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. - Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation: The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section." The two essential ingredients for condoning delays are: (i) the existence of 'sufficient cause, and (ii) the satisfaction of the competent authority that such sufficient cause was proved as existing. Thus, the first issue about the existence of sufficient cause covers the factual matrix in respect of which the onus to prove is squarely on the litigant, while the second issue about 'satisfaction' covers the discretionary area in which the competent authority, this Bench, is expected to act. It is by now well settled that the expression 'sufficient cause' has to be understood to mean a cause beyond the control of the appellant or one which the appellant, even with the exercise of due care and attention, could not avoid. The expression is required to be interpreted liberally so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant. Further, it is a general principle of law that whenever a Court is vested with a discretionary power, such a discretion must be exercised not in an arbitrary, vague or fanciful
IT(SS)A No.5913/DEL/2026 LATE SHRI DEEPAK PURI manner but on judicial principles. The fundamental principle, which has been universally recognized as the true rule of guidance for the exercise of discretion to condone delays is to see whether the party claiming indulgence has been reasonably diligent in prosecuting his appeal. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Sayed Mohd. Baquir E1 Edross AIR 1981 SC 1921, the Supreme Court laid down the following principles that should govern the exercise of powers of condonation under section 5:
(i) The party seeking relief has to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal, etc., within the prescribed time. (ii) The explanation has to cover the entire period of delay. (iii) A litigant should not be permitted to take away a right which has accrued to his adversary by lapse of time. (iv) The proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court under section 5. After sufficient cause is shown, the Court is to inquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. (v) The discretion conferred on the Court is a judicial discretion and must be exercised to advance substantial justice. (vi) No liberal view should be taken merely because the defaulting party is a Government. (vii) Even if there was a strong case for acceptance of the appeal on merits that could not be a ground for condonation of delay. (viii) When there is remiss on the part of the advocate, the question that comes up for consideration is whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose such as latches on the part of the litigant or an attempt to save limitation in an underhand way. It was also held in an earlier decision in the case of Ramlal Motilal v. Rewa Coalfields AIR 1962 SC 361, that 'every day's delay must be
IT(SS)A No.5913/DEL/2026 LATE SHRI DEEPAK PURI explained'. Another important requirement is that the 'cause' for the delay must have arisen before the expiry of the limitation period, and, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat AIR 1981 SC 733, "no event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation period can constitute sufficient cause. In this case the limitation expired on 29.10.2021 and the assessee passed away on 02.10.2021. Thus, clearly the cause for delay arose before the limitation expired.
3.1 Considering the discussion above, we direct that the delay be hereby condoned and the Ld. CIT(A) must dispose of the case on merits following the ITAT’s order in the case of Neeta Puri [ITA No.3853/Del/2023, order dated 12.08.2026].
In the result, the appeal is partly allowed for statistical purposes.
Order pronounced in the open court on 24.08.2026 Sd/- Sd/- (VIMAL KUMAR) (SANJAY AWASTHI) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER Dated: 15.09.2026 *Kavita Arora, Sr. P.S.
IT(SS)A No.5913/DEL/2026 LATE SHRI DEEPAK PURI
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